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1. INTRODUCTION	
	
The	 recent	 sequence	 of	 crises	 (global	 financial	 crisis	 2007‐2009,	 Great	 Recession	
2008‐2009,	European	sovereign	debt	crisis	2009‐today)	sparked	off	historic	and	often	
indispensable	reforms	in	the	spheres	of	banking	regulation	and	financial	market	policy	
as	well	as	 in	 the	sphere	of	 fiscal	policy.	The	bursting	of	 the	real	estate	price	bubble	 in	
2007	 led	 to	 an	 overall	 credit	 and	 banking	 crisis,	 which	 brought	 a	 rather	 exceptional	
period	of	expansion	of	banks’	balance	sheets	to	a	provisional	end.	The	financial	crisis	not	
only	 adversely	 affected	 investment	 decisions	 by	 financial	 intermediaries,	 but	 also	
infringed	 on	 real	 sector	 firms	 and	 households.	 This	 development	 culminated	 in	 an	
economic	downturn	in	many	countries	worldwide,	which	came	to	be	known	as	the	Great	
Recession.		
As	a	political	response	to	the	banking	and	real	economic	crises,	numerous	countries	
tried	to	stabilize	their	impaired	financial	sectors	as	well	as	their	real	economy	by	setting	
up	 funds	 to	 recapitalize	banks	and	by	 running	 large	 fiscal	 stimulus	programs	 to	boost	
aggregate	demand.	 In	consequence	of	 the	discretionary	public	spending	programs,	but	
also	to	a	large	extent	due	to	the	unfavorable	economic	development	and	the	functioning	
of	 automatic	 stabilizers	 with	 declining	 revenues	 and	 increasing	 expenditures,	 public	
debt	 levels	 in	 relation	 to	 gross	 domestic	 product	 (GDP)	 skyrocketed	 in	 numerous	
countries	 in	 the	years	after	2007,	 reaching	unforeseen	highs	 (see	e.g.	Eyraud	and	Wu,	
2015).	By	2009,	some	euro	area	countries	even	encountered	severe	liquidity	problems	
due	to	persistently	high	public	deficits	and	elevated	public	debt	levels.		
This	 dissertation	 addresses	 several	 important	 aspects	 of	 the	 above	 mentioned	
crises,	their	consequences	and	relevant	policy	reactions.	In	a	first	part	(Chapter	2),	it	is	
concerned	with	the	effects	of	the	global	financial	crisis	as	well	as	the	(re‐)regulation	of	
banking	markets	on	the	internationalization	strategies	of	(German)	banks.		
In	a	second	part	(Chapters	3	and	4),	the	thesis	is	concerned	with	the	credibility	of	
fiscal	 rules,	 which	 have	 been	 revised,	 strengthened	 and	 newly	 implemented	 in	 many	
European	countries1	as	a	response	to	the	high	public	deficits	and	ever	rising	public	debt	
levels.	Specifically,	it	looks	at	expectation	building	of	German	subnational	policy	makers	
with	 respect	 to	 the	 future	 compliance	 with	 the	 so‐called	 constitutional	 German	 ‘debt	
brake’	that	was	implemented	in	2009	but	will	only	take	effect	for	German	Länder	in	the	
																																																								
1	See	Eyraud	and	Wu	(2015)	for	a	thorough	stock	taking	of	recent	fiscal	governance	reforms	in	Europe.	
	2	
	
year	2020.	In	this	context,	it	also	addresses	potential	problems	for	the	adherence	to	such	
rules	 like	 the	 lack	of	subnational	 revenue	autonomy	 in	 federal	 countries	 like	Germany	
and	 investigates	 the	 determinants	 of	 politicians’	 preferences	 for	 either	more	 revenue	
autonomy	or	more	fiscal	equalization	across	jurisdictions.		
In	a	third	part	(Chapters	5	and	6),	 the	thesis	digs	into	the	highly	topical	 issue	of	
sovereign	debt	restructurings.	After	the	Greek	debt	restructuring	of	2012	and	in	the	face	
of	Greece’s	continuing	liquidity	and	even	debt	sustainability	problems,	the	repeated	ad	
hoc	reactions	of	 the	European	Union	and	 the	Eurogroup	seem	to	be	stretched	 to	 their	
limits.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 thesis	 examines	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 serial	 sovereign	 debt	
restructurings	in	the	absence	of	binding	international	restructuring	rules	and	presents	a	
proposal	for	a	statutory	sovereign	debt	restructuring	mechanism	for	the	euro	area.		
Finally,	Chapter	7	concludes	by	giving	both	an	overview	of	the	main	findings	of	the	
different	papers	as	well	as	a	brief	outlook.	Before	immersing	into	the	above	mentioned	
Chapters,	 though,	 the	 following	 three	 sections	 provide	 short	 outlines	 of	 Chapters	 2	
through	6.	
1.1 The	 Financial	 Crisis,	 Banking	 Market	 Regulation	 and	
International	Banking	
The	 global	 financial	 crisis	 has	 terminated	 a	 rather	 unprecedented	 period	 of	
expansion	 of	 banks’	 international	 financial	 assets	 and	 liabilities.	 This	 first	 thematic	
priority	of	the	dissertation	is	treated	in	Chapter	2,	which	engages	in	finding	the	drivers	
of	the	adjustments	of	internationally	active	German	banks.	In	response	to	the	financial	
crisis,	 banks	 have	 decreased	 their	 international	 activities	 as,	 also	 due	 to	 regulatory	
restrictions,	 they	 had	 to	 deleverage	 and	 shrink	 their	 balance	 sheets.	 One	 important	
question	 is	whether	 this	withdrawal	 of	 German	banks	 from	 foreign	markets	will	 be	 a	
temporary	 phenomenon	 or	whether	 it	marked	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 sustained	 period	 of	
financial	 disintegration,	 as	was	 observed	 after	 the	Great	Depression	during	 the	 1930s	
(Rajan	and	Zingales,	2003).	
Chapter	2	particularly	studies	bank	internationalization	before	and	during	the	crisis	
from	 a	 bank‐level	 perspective.	 The	 data	 used	 give	 detailed	 information	 on	 the	
international	 activities	 of	 German	 banks.	 These	 banks	 engage	 in	 internationalization	
either	directly	via	 their	bank	holding	companies	out	of	Germany	or	 indirectly	 through	
their	respective	branches	and	subsidiaries	abroad.	Stylized	facts	show	that	the	decline	in	
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international	 banking	during	 the	 crisis	 is	most	 pronounced	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 volume	 of	
international	activities	(the	intensive	margin),	but	there	has	also	been	a	notable	decline	
in	the	number	of	foreign	subsidiaries	(the	extensive	margin).	However,	this	decline	had	
already	started	well	before	the	crisis	and	has	hardly	accelerated	since	then.	
The	results	 from	running	so	called	gravity	equations,	 largely	 following	Okawa	and	
van	 Wincoop	 (2012)	 as	 well	 as	 Brüggemann	 et	 al.	 (2012),	 suggest	 the	 following	
interpretation	of	these	trends	and	their	persistence:	
First,	 banks	 with	 market‐based	 funding	 models	 have	 higher	 international	 assets.	
Hence,	persistently	tighter	conditions	on	funding	markets	would	have	an	impact	on	the	
internationalization	strategies	that	banks	will	pursue	in	the	future,	at	least	if	they	do	not	
find	appropriate	substitutes	for	their	present	refinancing	activities.	How	persistent	this	
adjustment	is	going	to	be	is	quite	difficult	to	predict.	To	the	extent	that	the	re‐regulation	
of	the	banking	industry	with	stricter	capital	requirements	that	is	currently	taking	place	
changes	 market	 structures	 in	 banking	 and	 banks’	 funding	 markets	 permanently,	 the	
adjustment	is	likely	to	be	persistent.	
Second,	 policy	 interventions	 seem	 to	matter.	 Some	German	banks	which	 received	
state	 support	 during	 the	 crisis	 period	 have	 significantly	 lowered	 their	 international	
assets,	 as	 this	 was	 also	 a	 condition	 for	 the	 eligibility	 of	 state	 aid	 measures.	 Foreign	
macroprudential	policies	have	had	a	negative	impact,	too.	To	the	extent	that	reductions	
in	 international	 assets	 are	 associated	with	 the	 permanent	 closure	 of	 foreign	 affiliates	
they	are	indeed	likely	to	be	persistent.	
Third,	 the	documented	withdrawal	 from	 foreign	markets	may	 also	 reflect	 a	 slight	
increase	 in	 home	 bias	 on	 the	 part	 of	 banks	 (see	 also	 Giannetti	 and	 Laeven	 2011,	
Hildebrand	 et	 al.	 2012,	 Rose	 and	 Wieladek	 2011).	 Financial	 frictions,	 as	 proxied	 by	
gravity‐type	 variables	 like	 geographical	 distance,	 common	 language,	 common	 legal	
origin,	 etc.	 do	 indeed	 matter	 for	 international	 banking.	 However,	 their	 impact	 has	
remained	 quite	 stable	 throughout	 the	 crisis.	 The	 variables	 for	 which	 stronger	 effects	
during	the	crisis	period	could	be	 identified	are	adjacency	and	the	presence	of	bilateral	
trade	agreements.	This	suggests	that	 trade‐related	 finance	has	become	relatively	more	
important	over	the	crisis.	
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1.2 Compliance	 Expectations	 for	 the	 German	 Debt	 Brake	 and	
Revenue	Autonomy	Preferences	in	German	Länder	
The	second	part	of	the	thesis	(Chapters	3	and	4)	is	concerned	with	fiscal	institutions	
in	 Germany.	 The	 European	 sovereign	 debt	 crisis	 with	 soaring	 debt‐to‐GDP‐levels	 has	
triggered	 the	 implementation	 of	 statutory	 budget	 rules.	 Germany,	 in	 particular,	
reformed	 its	 fiscal	 governance	 framework	 by	 implementing,	 among	 other	 European	
rules,	 the	 national	 constitutional	 debt	 brake	 (Schuldenbremse)2,	which	 constrains	 the	
federal	government	to	run	a	maximal	structural	deficit	of	0.35	percent	of	GDP	as	of	2016	
and	the	subnational	governments	(the	16	German	Länder)	to	run	a	structurally	balanced	
budget	as	of	2020.		
	
Even	though	the	German	debt	brake	has	already	become	part	of	the	constitution	in	
2009,	it	will	only	take	effect	in	2016	at	the	federal	level	and	in	2020	at	the	Länder	level.	
Thus,	 the	 standard	 ex	 post	 strategy	 to	 evaluate	 the	 potency	 of	 numerical	 fiscal	 rules	
based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 aggregate	 fiscal	 performance,	 as	 is	 done	 in	 the	 literature	 for	
different	regional	contexts	(see	Heinemann	et	al.	(2015)	for	an	overview	of	the	literature	
and	 a	 meta‐regression‐analysis),	 is	 no	 possibility	 here.	 Furthermore,	 this	 literature	
cannot	reveal	how	fiscal	rules	 impact	on	the	expectations	and	beliefs	of	 fiscal	decision	
makers	 regarding	 future	 compliance	 and,	 hence,	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 fiscal	 rule.	
Chapter	 3,	 thus,	 presents	 a	 dynamic	 theoretical	 model	 of	 lagged	 implementation	
(Buchanan,	 1994)	 of	 a	 deficit	 rule	 as	 well	 as	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 drivers	 of	
compliance	expectations	of	Länder	politicians.		
The	theoretical	model	features	a	deficit	rule	which	is	implemented	in	period	0	but	
only	 takes	 effect	 in	 the	 distant	 future	 (period	 2).	 A	 fiscal	 shock	 in	 period	 1	 makes	
compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule	uncertain	when	the	rule	is	not	credible.	The	government	
can	take	decisions	in	period	1,	too,	trading	off	the	benefits	and	costs	of	complying	with	
the	fiscal	rule.	The	model	suggests	that	compliance	is	more	likely,	(i)	the	lower	the	initial	
deficit	in	period	0,	(ii)	the	lower	bailout	expectations	of	Länder	politicians	(vis‐à‐vis	the	
federal	 government),	 (iii)	the	 tighter	 the	 fiscal	 rule,	 and	 (iv)	 the	 higher	 the	 deficit	
reduction	in	period	0.		
Furthermore,	one	key	prediction	of	 the	model	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 insiders’	 (defined	as	
members	 of	 incumbent	 government	 parties	 and/or	 within‐state	 members	 of	
																																																								
2	See	Article	109	Section	3	of	the	German	Constitution	(Grundgesetz).	
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parliament)	 compliance	 expectations	 are	 more	 optimistic	 than	 those	 of	 outsiders	
(opposition	members	 and/or	 out‐of‐state	 parliamentarians).	 The	model	 provides	 two	
thinkable	explanations	for	this	phenomenon:	asymmetric	information	between	insiders	
and	 outsiders	 on	 the	 occurring	 fiscal	 shocks	 or	 sheer	 overconfidence	 on	 the	 part	 of	
insiders.	
The	empirical	analysis,	which	uses	a	unique	self‐conducted	survey	of	members	of	all	
16	German	state	parliaments,	is	guided	by	these	theoretical	findings	and	shows	that	the	
debt	 brake’s	 credibility	 is	 far	 from	 perfect.	 The	 heterogeneity	 of	 compliance	
expectations	corresponds	to	the	theoretical	predictions.	Furthermore,	the	asymmetry	in	
compliance	 expectations	 between	 insiders	 and	 outsiders	 can,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
empirical	 findings	of	probit	regressions,	be	attributed	to	overconfidence	on	the	part	of	
insiders	 rather	 than	 noisy	 information	 on	 the	 part	 of	 outsiders.	 This	 systematic	
overconfidence	 bias	 might	 be	 problematic	 in	 practice	 since	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 too	 little	
consolidation	effort.	
	
The	drastic	changes	to	the	fiscal	governance	framework	as	well	as	the	expiration	of	
laws	 specifying	 the	 institutional	 details	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 Germany’s	 horizontal	 and	
vertical	fiscal	equalization	scheme	necessitate	reforms	with	respect	to	the	revenue	side	
of	the	Länder.	Until	the	fiscal	equalization	scheme	expires	in	2019,	Länder	have	little	tax	
autonomy	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 fiscal	 equalization	 is	 quite	 large.	 Thus,	 for	 now,	 Länder	
largely	 have	 to	 rely	 on	 consolidation	 on	 the	 expenditure	 side	 to	 be	 able	 to	 fulfill	 the	
requirements	of	the	German	debt	brake	as	of	2020.	Since	the	sunset	clause	in	the	fiscal	
equalization	laws	tends	to	weaken	the	status	quo	bias,	Chapter	4	is	concerned	with	the	
drivers	of	decision	makers’	preferences	for	fiscal	equalization	and	tax	autonomy	at	the	
Länder	level.		
Again,	using	a	self‐conducted	survey	of	all	members	of	the	16	state	parliaments,	the	
paper	 tries	 to	 establish	 to	 what	 extent	 Länder	 self‐interest,	 party	 ideology,	 and	
individual	 characteristics	 influence	 parliamentarians’	 reform	 preferences.	 This	 also	
helps	 to	 understand	 the	 sources	 of	 political	 controversies	 regarding	 reforms	 of	 fiscal	
federalism.	Furthermore,	the	paper	is	concerned	with	the	degree	of	polarization	among	
Länder	and	simulates	potential	majorities	 in	 favor	of	or	against	reforms	of	the	current	
system	of	fiscal	federalism.	
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The	empirical	results	of	ordered	probit	regressions	suggest	that	party	ideology	and	
special	interests	of	the	Länder	are	jointly	linked	to	federal	reform	preferences.	General	
political	views	on	the	role	of	the	government	translate	into	federal	views,	i.e.	politicians	
who	are	 in	 favor	of	 lower	 taxes	and	a	 smaller	government	are	also	 in	 favor	of	a	more	
competitive	type	of	fiscal	federalism.	With	regard	to	jurisdictional	special	interests,	the	
paper	 finds	 evidence	 that	 poorer	 Länder	 as	 well	 as	 Länder	 with	 high	 legacy	 debt	
burdens	 and/or	 high	 fiscal	 consolidation	 needs	 are	 less	 inclined	 to	 accept	 more	 tax	
competition	 and	 a	 lower	 intensity	 of	 fiscal	 equalization.	 Finally,	 by	 simulating	
politicians’	 voting	 behavior	 with	 respect	 to	 fiscal	 equalization	 and	 tax	 autonomy	 the	
paper	 identifies	 a	majority	 for	 less	 intense	 fiscal	 equalization	while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 (fragile)	 blocking	 minority	 against	 more	 tax	 autonomy.	 Thus,	 in	
terms	 of	 policy	 implications,	 the	 paper	 concludes	 that	 a	 promising	 reform	 of	 fiscal	
federalism	could	 include	more	revenue	autonomy,	 if,	at	 the	same	time,	 the	problem	of	
high	legacy	debt	and	fiscal	consolidation	needs	were	to	be	addressed.	
 
1.3 Serial	 Sovereign	Debt	Restructurings	 and	 a	 Viable	 Insolvency	
Procedure	for	Sovereigns	in	the	Euro	Area	
When	 sovereign	 countries	 end	 up	 with	 short‐term	 liquidity	 problems	 or	 even	
unsustainably	high	debt	burdens	in	the	long	term	–	either	due	to	a	lack	of	or	in	spite	of	
fiscal	rules	–	they	often	face	debt	renegotiations	with	their	private	and	public	creditors	
(as	 it	 is	 the	case	 in	Greece).	Since	there	are	still	no	enforceable	common	rules,	neither	
within	 the	 IMF	 framework	 nor	 within	 the	 European	 Union,	 each	 and	 every	 debt	
restructuring	seems	to	be	a	new	endeavor	with	unknown	ramifications.	Thus,	the	third	
part	 of	 the	 dissertation	 examines	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 serial	 sovereign	 debt	
restructurings	(Chapter	5)	and	looks	at	potential	drivers	of	the	probability	of	a	country	
having	to	restructure	again	shortly	after	a	debt	restructuring	has	taken	place.	Following	
this	empirical	analysis,	Chapter	6	presents	a	proposal	 for	a	viable	statutory	insolvency	
procedure	for	sovereign	countries	in	the	euro	area,	which	builds	on	insights	of	economic	
and	 especially	 public	 finance	 research	 as	 well	 as	 earlier	 proposals	 of	 restructuring	
regimes	for	sovereign	states.				
	
Traditionally,	literature	on	sovereign	defaults	has	been	concerned	with	the	costs	of	
restructurings	 because	 these	 costs	 are	 often	 viewed	 to	 be	 the	 main	 reason	 why	
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countries	repay	their	debt	(see	Das	et	al.	(2012),	Panizza	et	al.	(2009),	Sturzenegger	and	
Zettelmeyer	(2006),	and	Tomz	and	Wright	(2013)	for	thorough	reviews	of	the	literature	
as	well	 as	 stylized	 facts).	When	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 data	 for	 the	 past	 decades,	
however,	one	can	make	out	entire	series	of	sovereign	debt	restructurings	for	numerous	
countries.	 Since	 there	 is	 still	 no	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 this	 phenomenon,	 Chapter	 5	
attempts	to	explain	potential	determinants	of	such	(near‐term)	follow‐up	restructurings.	
Some	authors	(Das	et	al.,	2012;	Moody’s,	2012)	as	well	as	the	IMF	(2013)	speculate,	that	
sovereign	debt	restructurings	“have	often	been	too	little	and	too	late”	(IMF,	2013,	p.1),	
which	 hindered	many	 countries	 to	 re‐establish	 debt	 sustainability	 and	 regain	market	
access	in	a	timely	manner	after	a	default.		
Chapter	5	puts	 such	propositions	 to	 the	 test	descriptively	and	econometrically	by	
conducting	so‐called	survival	time	analyses	in	the	spirit	of	Cox	(1972).	The	data	on	debt	
restructurings	and	their	different	features	come	from	Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013).	The	
empirical	 analysis	 verifies	 that	 higher	 haircuts	 (in	 terms	 of	 net	 present	 value)	 are	
associated	with	a	lower	probability	of	serial	restructurings.	Most	interestingly,	however,	
cuts	in	face	value	have	a	stronger	negative	impact	on	this	probability	than	equally	sized	
reductions	 in	 net	 present	 value	 by	means	 of	maturity	 extensions	 and/or	 interest	 rate	
reductions.	This	finding	is,	at	first,	quite	puzzling	but	could	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	
timing	seems	to	be	important:	a	cut	in	face	value	provides	immediate	and	outright	debt	
relief	(in	terms	of	debt	sustainability),	whereas	interest	rate	cuts	and	especially	maturity	
extensions	 merely	 buy	 an	 insolvent	 and	 illiquid	 country	 some	 time	 until	 it	 becomes	
illiquid	again.								
	
Chapter	6	argues	that	a	mechanism	to	restructure	the	debt	of	an	insolvent	country	
is	still	missing	in	the	emerging	institutional	architecture	of	the	euro	area	because	private	
creditors	 do	 not	 internalize	 solvency	 risks	 properly,	 but	 rather	 seem	 to	 speculate	 on	
public	 bailouts.	 A	 credible	 insolvency	 procedure	 would	 make	 debt	 renegotiations	 a	
realistic	scenario,	thereby	strengthening	market	discipline.	However,	the	introduction	of	
an	 insolvency	procedure	for	sovereigns	bristles	with	difficulties:	 in	the	next	 few	years,	
its	 introduction	 would	 risk	 pushing	 Europe	 back	 into	 acute	 crisis	 because	 numerous	
euro	area	countries	still	exhibit	high	public	debt	 levels	and	 large	deficits.	On	the	other	
hand,	 an	 indefinite	 postponement	 of	 such	 a	 reform	would	 impair	 the	 credibility	 of	 a	
future	regime	change.	Therefore,	the	chapter	reviews	arguments	and	existing	blueprints	
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for	 sovereign	 insolvency	 procedures	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 (see	 e.g.	 Gros	 and	Mayer,	 2010;	
Gianviti	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 European	 Economic	 Advisory	 Group,	 2011;	 Committee	 on	
International	 Economic	 Policy	 and	 Reform,	 2013)	 and	 develops	 a	 Viable	 Insolvency	
Procedure	for	Sovereigns	(VIPS).	The	VIPS‐proposal	avoids	sudden	measures	that	could	
destabilize	 the	 present	 fragile	 situation.	 Instead,	 it	 prudently	 designs	 an	 irreversible	
bridge	 towards	 the	 new	 regime	 characterized	 by	 lagged	 implementation	 (Buchanan,	
1994).	 The	 proposal,	 thus,	 comprises	 two	 pillars:	 a	 specification	 of	 an	 insolvency	
mechanism	for	the	long	run	and	a	credible	transition	path	towards	the	new	system.	
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2. HOW	THE	CRISIS	AFFECTED	INTERNATIONAL	BANKING3	
2.1 Motivation	
The	global	financial	crisis	has	brought	a	rather	unprecedented	period	of	expansion	
of	banks’	international	financial	assets	and	liabilities	to	an	end.	In	response	to	the	crisis,	
banks	 have	 lowered	 their	 international	 assets	 and	 liabilities	 in	 the	 process	 of	
deleveraging	 and	 shrinking	 their	 balance	 sheets.	 While	 total	 international	 assets	 of	
German	 banks	 grew,	 on	 average,	 by	 8	 percent	 per	 year	 between	 2002	 and	 2007,	
international	 assets	 dropped	 by	 almost	 20	 percent	 in	 2008	 alone.	 These	 adjustments	
have	mainly	taken	place	due	to	changing	risk	perceptions	and	changing	regulations.	The	
key	question	 is	whether	 this	withdrawal	of	banks	 from	 foreign	markets	will	be	 short‐
lived	or	whether	it	marks	the	beginning	of	a	sustained	period	of	financial	disintegration,	
as	was	observed	after	the	Great	Depression	(Rajan	and	Zingales	2003).		
In	this	paper,	we	study	bank	internationalization	before	and	during	the	crisis	from	a	
bank‐level	perspective.	Our	data	give	detailed	information	on	the	internationalization	of	
German	banks.	The	“External	Position	Reports”	provided	by	the	Deutsche	Bundesbank	
contain	 information	 on	 the	 international	 assets	 of	 German	 banks	 and	 their	 foreign	
affiliates	 (branches	 and	 subsidiaries),	 month‐by‐month	 and	 country‐by‐country.	 Our	
sample	starts	in	December	2002,	when	minimum	reporting	thresholds	were	abolished,	
and	 ends	 in	 December	 2011.	We	 investigate	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 stocks	 of	 banks’	
assets	at	the	end	of	each	year.	
Data	similar	to	ours	have	been	used	in	previous	work	to	analyze	the	importance	of	
bank	productivity	for	the	international	activities	of	banks	(Buch	et	al.	2012,	2011b),	the	
determinants	of	short‐term	adjustments	of	internationally	active	banks	during	the	crisis	
(Düwel	 et	 al.	 2011),	 the	 portfolio	 investment	 decisions	 of	 German	 banks	 in	 emerging	
markets	 (Wildmann	 2011),	 the	 impact	 of	 international	 activities	 of	 German	 banks	 on	
performance	at	home	(Buch	et	al.	2013),	or	the	impact	of	crisis‐related	policy	measures	
on	 international	 banking	 (Buch	 et	 al.	 2011a).	Düwel	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 find	 that	 rising	 risk	
aversion,	 measured	 through	 the	 capital‐asset	 ratio	 of	 a	 German	 parent	 bank,	 has	 a	
negative	impact	on	cross‐border	lending	activities	of	the	corporate	banking	group,	even	
																																																								
3	This	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	 joint	 work	 with	 Claudia	 M.	 Buch	 and	 Katja	 Neugebauer,	 which	 has	 been	
published	 as	 “Changing	 forces	 of	 gravity:	 how	 the	 crisis	 affected	 international	 banking”,	 Deutsche	
Bundesbank	Discussion	Paper	No.	48/2013,	Frankfurt	a.M.	See	Buch,	Neugebauer,	and	Schröder	(2013).	
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more	so	during	the	crisis.	Düwel	(2013)	analyzes	the	adjustment	of	international	banks	
through	the	internal	capital	market.	
In	 contrast	 to	 this	 research,	 we	 explicitly	 distinguish	 between	 three	 modes	 of	
international	banking	activities:	direct	activities	by	the	German	bank	holding	companies	
in	 different	 destination	 countries	 and	 indirect	 activities	 via	 branches	 and	 subsidiaries	
located	abroad	(in	what	we	call	host	countries)	to	different	destination	countries.	Hence,	
we	distinguish	the	direct	mode	from	the	branch	mode	and	the	subsidiary	mode	(Figure	
2.1).	 Assets	 held	 through	 either	 of	 these	 modes	 are	 labeled	 “international	 assets”	 of	
banks.	 Thus,	 we	 can	 exploit	 a	 richer	 geographical	 structure	 of	 the	 data	 compared	 to	
previous	work:	 Instead	of	analyzing	 the	activities	of	domestic	banks	 in	certain	 foreign	
destination	 countries	 only,	 we	 also	 analyze	 international	 activities	 of	 German	 banks’	
foreign	affiliates.	 In	 fact,	a	 little	more	than	half	of	our	observations	are	related	to	such	
‘export‐platform’	 FDI,	 i.e.	 to	 activities	 of	 German	 banks’	 foreign	 affiliates	 outside	 the	
market	in	which	these	affiliates	reside.		
We	 find	 that	 the	decline	 in	 international	banking	 in	 response	 to	 the	crisis	 is	most	
pronounced	in	terms	of	the	volume	of	international	activities	and	thus	for	the	intensive	
margin.	 We	 also	 describe	 the	 adjustment	 along	 the	 extensive	 margin,	 and	 we	 find	 a	
decline	in	the	number	of	foreign	subsidiaries.	However,	this	decline	started	well	before	
the	crisis	and	has	hardly	accelerated	since	then.	In	terms	of	the	composition	of	foreign	
activities,	we	observe	a	shift	away	from	assets	held	through	subsidiaries	towards	assets	
held	through	branches.		
Overall,	 our	 findings	 suggest	 three	 explanations	 for	 the	 decline	 in	 international	
banking.	
First,	banks	have	responded	to	changing	funding	conditions.	During	the	crisis	banks	
had	to	economize	on	their	use	of	capital.	This	could	explain	why	banks	have	reduced	the	
share	 of	 international	 assets	 held	 through	 the	 subsidiary	 mode,	 which	 is	 the	 most	
expensive	way	of	entering	foreign	markets.	Also,	wholesale	and	short‐term	funding	have	
become	more	 costly	 during	 the	 crisis,	 thus	 affecting	 in	 particular	 those	 banks	with	 a	
market‐based	funding	model.	However,	the	sensitivity	of	banks’	international	activities	
to	bank‐specific	variables	measuring	the	funding	structure	has	not	changed	much	during	
the	crisis.	
Second,	 government	 support	 during	 the	 crisis	 has	 been	 conditional	 on	 the	
requirement	 that	 banks	 close	 some	 of	 their	 foreign	 affiliates	 (EU	 2009,	 Zimmer	 and	
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Blaschczok	 2012).	 In	 our	 empirical	 results	 we	 show	 that	 banks	 which	 have	 received	
state	 support	 during	 the	 crisis	 from	 the	 German	 federal	 government	 or	 from	 state	
governments	have	indeed	reduced	their	international	assets.	
Third,	the	withdrawal	from	foreign	countries	could	reflect	an	increasing	home	bias	
in	 banks’	 activities,	 as	 has	 been	 documented	 in	 other	work	 analyzing	 the	 response	 of	
banks	 to	 the	 crisis	 (Giannetti	 and	 Laeven	 2011,	 Hildebrand	 et	 al.	 2012,	 Rose	 and	
Wieladek	2011).	Note	that	the	reasons	are	difficult	to	disentangle:	If	withdrawal	is	due	
to	increased	risks	and/or	lower	(relative)	returns,	it	may	in	fact	be	a	rational	response	
to	market	conditions	rather	 than	an	 increased	bias	 in	 investment	decisions.	Generally,	
we	find	a	significant	effect	of	financial	frictions	on	the	international	activities	of	German	
banks:	 Adjacency,	 common	 language,	 common	 legal	 origins,	 and	 regional	 trade	
agreements	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 international	 assets;	 distance	 has	 a	 negative	
impact.	 In	the	 international	 trade	 literature,	 the	distance	coefficient	 is	 interpreted	as	a	
proxy	 for	 transportation	 costs.	 In	 international	 banking	 physical	 transportation	 costs	
are	 of	 limited	 importance.	 Here,	 the	 geographic	 distance	 between	 two	 countries	 is	 a	
proxy	 for	 informational	 frictions	or	monitoring	costs	 (Brüggemann	et	al.	2012,	Okawa	
and	van	Wincoop	2012).	Perhaps	contrary	to	conventional	wisdom,	the	effects	of	most	
of	 these	 financial	 frictions	 have	 remained	 rather	 unchanged	 during	 the	 crisis.	 If	
anything,	the	effects	of	adjacency	and	of	regional	trade	agreements	being	in	place	have	
become	more	important.		
Our	 research	 complements	 previous	 work	 analyzing	 the	 transmission	 of	 shocks	
across	borders	and	the	impact	of	the	crisis	on	banks’	investments	at	home.	A	first	set	of	
papers	looks	at	the	impact	of	government	interventions.	Rose	and	Wieladek	(2011)	use	
information	on	local	lending	by	foreign	banks	residing	in	the	UK	to	analyze	how	support	
measures,	such	as	capital	injections	targeted	at	these	banks,	have	affected	lending	in	the	
UK.	After	nationalization	foreign	banks	reduced	the	share	of	their	loans	going	to	the	UK,	
which	can	be	interpreted	as	evidence	for	financial	protectionism.	Giannetti	and	Laeven	
(2011)	analyze	the	geographic	structure	of	syndicated	loan	issuances	and	find	a	“flight	
home”	 effect	 in	 response	 to	 the	 crisis.	 The	 strength	 of	 this	 effect	 is	 not	 affected	 by	
government	intervention,	measured	by	a	dummy	variable	that	equals	one	if	a	bank	was	
nationalized	 or	 received	 state	 support	 in	 the	 form	 of	 asset	 or	 capital	 guarantees.	 Our	
findings	show	that	state	support	(capital	 injections,	credit	 lines,	and	guarantees)	had	a	
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negative	impact	on	the	international	activities	of	banks	since	these	aids	were	given	only	
subject	to	certain	conditions.	
De	 Haas	 and	 Van	 Horen	 (2011)	 use	 individual	 loan	 data	 from	 syndicated	 loan	
issuances	for	the	world’s	largest	banks.	During	the	crisis,	 foreign	banks	have	remained	
more	 committed	 to	 countries	 hosting	 an	 affiliated	 subsidiary,	 that	 are	 geographically	
close,	 and	 that	 have	 built	 up	 relationships	with	 local	 banks.	 Our	 findings	 confirm	 the	
importance	 of	 geography	 for	 international	 bank	 assets,	 indicating	 a	 negative	 and	
strongly	significant	effect	of	distance	on	international	lending.	Furthermore,	we	also	find	
a	positive	effect	of	affiliate	lending	within	host	countries.		
Finally,	our	results	are	in	line	with	previous	studies	for	German	banks	documenting	
an	impact	of	the	crisis	on	lending	at	home	and	an	increasing	home	bias	in	banks’	security	
portfolios.	Puri	et	al.	(2011)	study	the	impact	of	the	crisis	on	lending	at	home.	They	find	
that	 savings	 banks	 which	 are	 linked	 to	 Landesbanken	 affected	 by	 the	 crisis	 reject	
substantially	more	 loan	applications	 than	non‐affected	banks.	Hildebrand	et	al.	 (2012)	
use	the	Bundesbank's	Securities	Holdings	Statistics	to	analyze	the	securities	portfolios	of	
banks.	During	the	crisis	banks	have	increased	the	share	of	domestic	sovereign	bonds	in	
their	portfolios.	
Our	research	is	motivated	by	recent	theoretical	work	justifying	a	gravity	equation	in	
banking,	 which	 suggests	 taking	 into	 account	 variables	 proxying	 for	 information	
asymmetries	 in	 gravity	 equations	 for	 international	 asset	 holdings	 as	 a	 measure	 of	
financial	frictions.	Work	by	Brüggemann	et	al.	(2012)	and	Niepmann	(2013)	provides	a	
direct	 motivation	 for	 international	 bank	 loans,	 while	 most	 other	 models	 focus	 on	
international	equity	investments.	We	also	borrow	from	the	empirical	analysis	presented	
by	Okawa	and	van	Wincoop	(2012)	in	the	sense	that	we	use	a	broad	measure	of	financial	
frictions	and	that	we	test	how	their	importance	has	changed	over	time,	across	countries,	
and	–	as	a	new	element	–	across	banks.		
In	section	2.2,	we	summarize	recent	theoretical	work	motivating	the	use	of	gravity	
equations	in	international	banking	and	finance.	In	section	2.3,	we	describe	our	data	and	
our	empirical	methodology.	In	section	2.4,	we	present	the	regression	results.	Section	2.5	
concludes.		
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2.2 Theoretical	Background	
Empirical	gravity	models	have	a	long‐standing	tradition	in	the	international	banking	
literature.	The	distance	between	countries,	the	size	of	markets,	regulatory	barriers	and	
variables	capturing	information	frictions	explain	international	asset	holdings	quite	well	
(Aviat	and	Coeurdacier	2007,	Berger	et	al.	2004,	Buch	2003,	Buch	and	Lipponer	2007,	
Claessens	and	van	Horen	2012,	Focarelli	and	Pozzolo	2005).4	However,	there	has	been,	
until	 recently,	 very	 little	 theoretical	 motivation	 for	 why	 international	 banking	 should	
depend	 on	 gravity‐type	 variables.	 Recent	 theoretical	 work	 takes	 up	 the	 issue	 of	
motivating	the	use	of	gravity	models	in	international	banking	and	finance.	These	models	
differ	with	regard	to	the	specific	financial	friction	they	assume	and	the	type	of	asset	they	
focus	on.	Yet,	the	empirical	specifications	following	from	this	research	are	similar.	
2.2.1 Gravity	Equations	for	International	Bank	Assets	
Brüggemann	et	al.	(2012)	provide	a	theoretical	motivation	for	an	empirical	gravity	
equation	of	banks’	 international	assets.	They	develop	a	search	model	in	which	a	firm	g	
located	in	country	i	seeks	a	bank	loan	with	specific	characteristics	in	terms	of	maturity,	
volume,	interest	rates,	or	other	contractual	features.	Search	is	done	across	a	number	of	
possible	 countries	 N,	 including	 the	 home	 country.	 The	 firm	 chooses	 a	 bank	 k	 in	 a	
particular	 country	 j	 if	 this	 bank	offers	 the	most	 attractive	 loan	 conditions.	The	 lowest	
cost	 at	 which	 the	 bank	 can	 supply	 a	 loan	 is	 given	 by	 igjkc .	 This	 cost	 depends	 on	
observable	factors	such	as	geographic	distance,	which	generates	monitoring	costs	( ij ).	
Banks	also	differ	along	other	dimensions,	hence	total	costs	are	composed	of	the	average	
interest	 rate	 in	 a	 particular	 country	 jr ,	 average	 bank	 characteristics	 ja ,	 and	 a	 term	
capturing	 any	 unobservable	 cost	 or	 bank‐firm‐specific	 traits	 ( igjk ):	
igjkjijjigjk arc   .	Any	variation	in	costs	across	countries	can	be	summarized	as	
ijc :	 igjkijigjk cc  .		
A	firm	then	compares	offers	of	banks	located	in	different	countries.	The	probability	
that	 a	 firm	 chooses	 a	 specific	 bank	 depends	 on	 the	 average	 cost	 structures,	 on	 the	
characteristics	 of	 the	 country	 pair,	 and	 on	 an	 unobservable	 cost	 component.	
Brüggemann	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 use	 their	 model	 to	 study	 aggregate	 credit	 relationships	
																																																								
4	For	an	extensive	survey	of	literature	on	home	bias	in	international	asset	portfolios,	see	Coeurdacier	and	
Rey	(2011).	
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between	banks	and	firms	located	in	countries	i	and	j	as	a	function	of	the	average	interest	
rate	in	the	host	country,	bilateral	observable	monitoring	costs	(geographic	distance),	the	
number	 of	 banks	 active	 in	 the	 foreign	 market,	 and	 the	 size	 of	 the	 foreign	 banking	
market.	They	also	include	time‐varying	measures	of	multilateral	resistance,	i.e.	country‐
year	 fixed	effects	 for	 the	host	 and	 the	destination	 country.	The	multilateral	 resistance	
term	refers	 to	 the	average	 financial	barrier	of	any	country	vis‐à‐vis	all	other	countries	
(Anderson	and	van	Wincoop	2003,	Baldwin	and	Taglioni	2007)	(see	section	2.2.3).5	
2.2.2 Gravity	Equations	for	International	Financial	Assets	
While	 the	 above	 models	 focus	 on	 international	 banking,	 it	 is	 generally	
straightforward	to	derive	a	gravity	equation	for	international	financial	asset	holdings	as	
well.	Martin	and	Rey	(2004)	model	a	portfolio	choice	for	international	holdings	of	equity	
in	an	environment	with	risk‐averse	agents,	an	endogenous	number	of	assets,	and	costs	
of	 international	 transactions.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 theoretical	 gravity	 equation	 in	 which	
bilateral	asset	holdings	depend	on	 the	distance	between	 two	countries	and	 the	size	of	
their	 markets.	 Aviat	 and	 Coeurdacier	 (2007)	 use	 a	 similar	 theoretical	 modeling	
approach.	They	focus	on	the	relationship	between	bilateral	trade	and	financial	linkages,	
arguing	 that	 there	can	be	 two‐way	causality.	Empirically,	 they	 find	 that	accounting	 for	
asset	trade	reduces	the	impact	of	distance	on	trade	in	goods.		
Okawa	and	van	Wincoop	(2012)	have	taken	up	the	role	of	gravity	 in	 international	
finance.	Their	portfolio	model	consists	of	risky	assets,	which	could	capture	equity	assets	
or	fixed	income	securities	such	as	corporate	bonds.	In	addition,	there	is	a	risk‐free	bond.	
Each	 risky	 security	 has	 a	 payoff	 which	 depends	 on	 country‐specific	 as	 well	 as	 global	
factors.	The	demand	for	an	asset	depends	on	the	expected	asset	return	(relative	to	the	
risk‐free	asset)	and	the	variance	of	country‐specific	returns.		
The	main	 non‐standard	 element	 is	 the	 assumption	 of	 an	 information	 asymmetry:	
domestic	 agents	 have	 better	 information	 about	 the	 idiosyncratic	 risk	 of	 the	 domestic	
securities	as	compared	to	 foreign	 investors.	As	 in	Brüggemann	et	al.	 (2012),	 there	 is	a	
																																																								
5	While	 Brüggeman	 et	 al	 (2012)	 focus	 on	 the	 role	 of	 information	 cost	 as	 a	 motivation	 for	 the	 gravity	
equation	 in	 banking,	Niepmann	 (2013)	 focuses	 on	 relative	 efficiency.	 In	 her	model,	 banks	 intermediate	
savings	between	the	home	and	the	 foreign	economy.	There	are	 two	sources	of	heterogeneity:	Countries	
differ	 in	 their	 factor	 endowments,	 and	 banks	 differ	 in	 their	 efficiency	 of	 intermediation.	 Efficiency	 is	
reflected	 in	 a	 fee	 banks	 collect	 for	 their	 services.	 Financial	 intermediation	 is	 subject	 to	 a	moral	 hazard	
problem	because	firms	can	choose	between	good	and	bad	projects,	this	choice	being	unobservable	by	the	
banks.	In	her	model,	bilateral	bank	assets	between	two	countries	depend	on	relative	capital	endowments	
and	levels	of	bank	efficiency.		
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bilateral	 cost	 term	 ij ,	 but	 the	 interpretation	 is	 different.	 In	 Okawa	 and	 van	Wincoop	
(2012),	this	term	affects	the	variance	of	a	particular	asset,	i.e.	 2iij 	where	 iiij   	when	
ji  .	 Okawa	 and	 van	 Wincoop	 (2012)	 estimate	 their	 model	 using	 bilateral	 data	 on	
equity	 holdings.	 They	 include	 variables	 capturing	 information	 frictions	 such	 as	
geographic	distance,	bilateral	trade	links,	common	language,	adjacency,	a	common	legal	
system,	regulatory	similarity,	or	currency	unions.6			
2.2.3 Implications	for	Empirical	Work	
The	models	 reviewed	 above	 differ	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 assets	 considered,	 the	 type	 of	
informational	 friction,	 and	 the	 optimization	 approach.	 However,	 there	 are	 two	
important	parallels.		
The	 first	 parallel	 is	 that	 bilateral	 asset	 holdings	 depend	 not	 only	 on	 bilateral	
information	 frictions	 ij 	but	also	on	 the	relative	 friction	 jiij DD ,	where	 iD 	and	 jD 	are	
the	 average	 financial	 frictions	 in	 the	 host	 and	 the	 destination	 country.	 These	 relative	
frictions	 can	be	 captured	by	a	 full	 set	of	 country‐year	 fixed	effects.	The	 importance	of	
dummy	 variables	 capturing	 multilateral	 resistance	 was	 first	 brought	 up	 in	 the	
international	 trade	 literature.	 In	 gravity	 regressions	 country‐year	 dummies	 capture	
omitted	 variables,	 which	 are	 correlated	 with	 trade	 costs	 and	 with	 the	 error	 term	
(Baldwin	 and	 Taglioni	 2007).	 Anderson	 and	 van	 Wincoop	 (2003)	 show	 that	 time‐
varying	 country	 fixed	 effects	 account	 for	 multilateral	 resistance.	 In	 their	 model	
multilateral	resistance	captures	country‐specific	price	indices:	for	a	given	bilateral	trade	
barrier,	higher	trade	barriers	between	j	and	all	its	other	trade	partners	will	reduce	the	
relative	price	of	country	i’s	exports	to	j	and	thereby	cause	a	rise	of	i’s	exports	to	j.	High	
multilateral	 resistance	 of	 one	 country	 thus	 increases	 bilateral	 trade	 of	 all	 other	
countries.	 Including	 multilateral	 resistance	 terms	 addresses	 the	 concern	 that	 early	
empirical	applications	of	the	gravity	equation	found	implausibly	high	border	effects.	In	
our	 context,	 multilateral	 resistance	 terms	 capture	 portfolio	 effects	 and	 the	 effects	 of	
financial	frictions	in	one	host	market	relative	to	all	other	countries.	
																																																								
6	Bergin	 and	 Pyun	 (2012)	 extend	 a	 model	 by	 Devereux	 and	 Sutherland	 (2011),	 which	 allows	 for	 an	
endogenous	 choice	 of	 international	 assets	 in	 an	 open	 economy	macro	model,	 to	 an	N‐country	 setting.	
Their	theoretical	setup	is	different	from	the	papers	discussed	so	far	because	they	do	not	assume	frictions	
in	 asset	 trade	 between	 countries.	 Instead,	 their	 multilateral	 resistance	 terms	 capture	 third‐country	
correlation	effects.	The	authors	show	that	including	these	terms	addresses	the	“correlation	puzzle”,	i.e.	the	
inability	of	previous	literature	to	show	an	impact	of	return	correlations	on	asset	holdings	as	predicted	by	
standard	theory.	
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The	 second	 parallel	 across	 the	 theoretical	 papers	 is	 the	 similarity	 of	 control	
variables	which	should	be	included	in	an	empirical	gravity	equation.	Brüggemann	et	al.	
(2012)	 or	 Niepmann	 (2013)	 regress	 log	 bank	 assets	 between	 countries	 i	 and	 j	 on	
distance,	proxies	for	the	size	and	development	of	foreign	banking	systems	as	well	as	on	a	
full	 set	 of	 host	 country	 and	 receiving	 country	 fixed	 effects.	 Okawa	 and	 van	Wincoop	
(2012)	use	a	 larger	set	of	measures	 for	 informational	 frictions	as	well	as	 time‐varying	
destination‐	 and	 host	 country	 fixed	 effects.	 They	 also	 replace	 the	 host	 country‐year	
dummies	by	explanatory	variables	at	the	country	level,	while	including	separate	country	
and	 year	 fixed	 effects.	 We	 proceed	 similarly	 in	 order	 to	 check	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	
results.		
Our	specific	empirical	model	thus	 looks	as	 follows.	We	estimate	a	baseline	gravity	
equation	which	relates	 the	 log	of	bank	k’s	 international	assets	A	 in	host	 country	 i	 and	
destination	 country	 j	 to	 fixed	 effects	 as	 well	 as	 to	 bank‐	 and	 country‐pair	 specific	
explanatory	variables:	
  tijtjtiktktkM
m
m
tijmtkij dddXzA ,,,,,
1
,, 'ln   

	 	 	 (1)	
where	 mtijz , 	is	a	vector	of	observable	bilateral	financial	frictions	between	countries	i	and	j	
including	bilateral	distance,	adjacency,	common	language,	a	common	legal	system,	and	
regional	 trade	 agreements	 being	 in	 place.	 m 	are	 coefficient	 estimates	 on	 these	
observables,	 tkX , 	are	explanatory	variables	at	the	bank	level,	 tk , are	the	coefficients	to	
these	observables,	 	and	 tij , 	is	an	error	 term.	 kd 	are	 fixed	effects	 for	each	parent	bank,	
tid , 	and	 tjd , 	are	time‐varying	destination	and	source	country	dummies.	Standard	errors	
are	clustered	at	the	level	of	each	host‐destination	country	pair.7	
As	 an	 alternative	 to	 our	model	with	 country‐year	 fixed	 effects,	 Fitzgerald	 (2012)	
suggests	 modeling	 multilateral	 resistance	 terms	 by	 including	 price	 terms	 for	 all	
countries.	This	approach	has	 the	advantage	 that	additional	variables	which	vary	along	
the	 country‐time	dimension	can	be	 included.	Claessens	and	van	Horen	 (2012)	apply	a	
similar	 empirical	 model	 to	 banking	 data.	 They	 include	 a	 measure	 of	 competitor	
remoteness	by	explaining	the	location	decision	of	banks	with	a	variable	measuring	the	
weighted	 distance	 of	 all	 competing	 banks	 in	 a	 specific	 host	 country.	 They	 find	 that	
																																																								
7	We	have	 experimented	with	different	 clustering	options	 such	as	destination	 country,	 host	 country,	 or	
bank‐host	country	clusters,	but	the	results	are	hardly	affected.	
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competitor	 remoteness	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 locational	 decision	 of	 banks.	We	 do	 not	
follow	the	same	route	here	for	two	reasons.	First,	we	do	not	have	a	full	set	of	bilateral	
trade	 data	 for	 all	 countries	 in	 the	 sample.	 Second,	 our	main	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 effects	 of	
measures	of	bilateral	financial	frictions	and	their	changing	importance	over	time.	Hence,	
the	 specific	 results	 for	 time‐varying	 destination	 country	 variables	 such	 as	 GDP	 are	 of	
lesser	interest	for	us.		
In	 terms	 of	 the	 geographic	 dimension,	 the	 structure	 of	 our	 dataset	 differs	 from	
previous	work	in	the	following	sense:	firms	and	households	in	any	destination	country	
can	choose	between	loans	granted	by	German	banks,	their	respective	foreign	branches	
and	subsidiaries,	or	loans	by	banks	from	countries	other	than	Germany.	In	each	market,	
German	 banks	 and	 their	 foreign	 affiliates	 are	 thus	 assumed	 to	 compete	 against	many	
other	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 banks.	 Unobserved	 third‐country	 characteristics,	 such	 as	
changes	in	the	competitive	environment,	are	also	captured	through	the	full	set	of	time‐
varying	host‐	and	destination	country	fixed	effects.	
2.3 Data	
This	section	gives	an	overview	of	the	data	that	we	use.	Data	definitions	and	sources	
can	 be	 found	 in	 Table	 A.2.1	 in	 the	 appendix	 to	 Chapter	 2.	 Descriptive	 statistics	 are	
presented	in	Table	A.2.2.		
2.3.1 External	Position	Reports	
Our	main	data	source	are	the	External	Position	Reports	of	the	Deutsche	Bundesbank	
(Fiorentino	et	al.	2010).	The	data	can	be	used	for	research	purposes	on	the	premises	of	
the	 Bundesbank	 only.	 The	 dataset	 provides	 a	 full	 sample	 survey	 of	 German	 banks’	
international	 activities.	 The	 Bundesbank	 receives	 mandatory	 reports	 on	 external	
positions	by	all	banks	located	in	Germany	and	by	their	foreign	affiliates,	including	assets	
and	 liabilities	vis‐à‐vis	 foreign	counterparties.	These	data	serve,	 inter	alia,	as	 inputs	 to	
the	 bilateral	 banking	 statistics	 provided	 by	 the	 Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements.	
Reporting	occurs	monthly,	and	reporting	thresholds	have	been	abandoned	in	2002.	We	
use	the	data	at	an	annual	frequency	(2002‐2011)	because	we	are	interested	in	the	long‐
run	structure	of	 international	asset	holdings	and	also	because	most	of	our	explanatory	
variables	are	available	only	at	an	annual	frequency.	
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Modes	of	foreign	activities	
Our	 empirical	 model	 differs	 from	 previous	 work	 applying	 the	 gravity	 model	 to	
banking	or	financial	markets	in	two	regards.	First,	we	use	bank‐level	data,	which	allow	
us	to	analyze	the	importance	of	individual	bank‐related	factors	such	as	their	size,	their	
funding	structure,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	some	banks	have	received	state	support	during	
the	 crisis.	 Second,	 we	 restrict	 our	 analysis	 to	 banks	 which	 are	 headquartered	 in	
Germany.	However,	we	have	information	not	only	on	the	 international	activities	of	 the	
banks	 located	 in	 Germany,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 cross	 border	 activities	 of	 their	 foreign	
affiliates	 located	 in	host	 countries	other	 than	Germany.	Hence,	we	can	 still	 exploit	 the	
bilateral	 nature	 of	 international	 banking	 relations,	which	would	 not	 be	 the	 case	 if	we	
estimated	 a	 model	 of	 the	 consolidated	 foreign	 exposure	 of	 each	 bank	 group.	 We	
distinguish	three	different	modes	of	foreign	activities	(Figure	2.1):	
‐ Mode	 1	 captures	 the	 assets	 held	 in	 a	 given	 foreign	 country	 by	 domestic	 banks	
located	in	Germany.	We	label	this	the	“direct	mode”.		
‐ Mode	2	captures	assets	held	in	a	given	destination	country	by	branches	located	in	
a	particular	foreign	host	country.	We	label	this	the	indirect	“branch	mode”.	
‐ Mode	 3	 captures	 assets	 held	 in	 a	 given	 destination	 country	 by	 subsidiaries	
located	in	a	particular	foreign	host	country.	We	label	this	the	indirect	“subsidiary	
mode”.	Subsidiaries	are	legally	independent,	hold	their	own	equity,	are	subject	to	
host	country	control,	and	frequently	run	large‐scale	retail	operations.	Therefore,	
they	 incur	 the	highest	 costs	 in	 terms	of	 capital	 requirements,	 regulatory	 (start‐
up)	burden,	and	fixed	investments	(Cerutti	et	al.	2007,	Fiechter	et	al.	2011).		
	
Figure	2.1	shows	the	structure	of	the	dataset:	Suppose	that	there	is	a	bank	holding	
company	Banco	Teutonia8	(BHC)	 in	Germany.	Banco	Teutonia	 can	now	engage	 in	direct	
or	 indirect	 international	 asset	 holdings.	 Direct	 asset	 holdings,	 or	 the	 “direct	 mode”,	
imply	 that	 Banco	 Teutonia	 lends	 money	 to	 a	 firm,	 a	 household,	 a	 bank,	 or	 the	
government	 in	 country	 A	 or	 in	 country	 B.	 Let	 us	 call	 country	 A	 the	 host	 country	 and	
country	 B	 the	 destination	 country.	 Banco	 Teutonia	 now	 also	 has	 branches	 and	
subsidiaries	 in	host	 country	A.	 If	assets	are	held	 through	a	branch	or	a	 subsidiary,	we	
call	 these	 indirect	 international	asset	holdings.	These	branches	and	subsidiaries	 in	 the	
host	 country	 can	 either	 lend	 to	 firms,	 households,	 banks,	 or	 the	 government	 in	 host	
																																																								
8	This	name	is	purely	fictitious.	Any	resemblance	to	real	banks,	living	or	dead,	is	purely	coincidental.	
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country	 A,	 or	 they	 can	 lend	 to	 firms,	 households,	 banks,	 or	 the	 government	 in	
destination	country	B.		
Overall,	 there	 are	 about	 1,800	banks	 active	 in	Germany.	Many	of	 these	banks	 are	
small	regional	cooperative	or	savings	banks	without	any	active	international	business.9	
Activities	of	many	of	these	banks	remain	confined	even	within	small	regional	domestic	
market	segments.	International	banking	is	dominated	by	the	largest	banks	in	Germany,	
in	particular	when	it	comes	to	direct	investment	abroad	through	foreign	affiliates	(Buch	
et	al.	2012).		
For	this	reason,	we	include	all	banks	with	foreign	affiliates	in	our	dataset,	which	is	
an	unbalanced	panel	with	information	on	(the	largest)	100	bank	holding	companies	plus	
almost	all	remaining	bank	holding	companies	(54),	which	are	not	among	the	largest	100	
banks,	but	which	have	foreign	branches	or	subsidiaries.	Overall,	the	number	of	banks	in	
our	sample	has	declined	from	154	to	123	over	the	sample	period	(2002‐2011).	Because	
we	do	not	observe	all	of	these	bank	holding	companies	at	each	point	in	time,	we	restrict	
our	panel	to	those	92	bank	holding	companies	(34	commercial	banks,	45	savings	banks,	
and	13	cooperative	banks)	 that	appear	 throughout	 the	entire	dataset.	This	means	that	
we	are	left	with	a	“balanced”	panel,	when	it	comes	to	bank	holding	companies	and	years.	
Of	 course,	 these	 bank	 holding	 companies	 are	 not	 present	 in	 all	 markets	 through	 all	
modes.	Thus,	the	dataset	is	not	entirely	balanced	along	the	foreign	dimension.	The	banks	
reside	 in	 up	 to	 68	host	 countries	 and	 are	 active	 in	 79	destination	 countries.	Our	 data	
cover	70‐78	percent	of	all	direct	international	activity	by	the	bank	holding	companies,	as	
well	 as	 88‐100	 percent	 of	 all	 foreign	 subsidiaries,	 and	 84‐92	 percent	 of	 all	 foreign	
branches	of	German	banks	(Figure	2.2).	
	
	 	
																																																								
9	Our	dataset	includes	all	large	cooperative	and	savings	banks	as	well	as	their	head	institutions	(including	
Landesbanken).	These,	of	course,	are	active	abroad	to	a	considerable	extent.	
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Figure	2.1:	Modes	of	International	Asset	Holdings	
This	figure	illustrates	the	different	modes	through	which	German	Bank	Holding	Companies	(BHC)	are	active	
abroad.	The	BHC	 can	 either	 directly	 lend	 to	 households	 and	 firms	 in	 different	 countries	 (oval	 shapes)	 or	
indirectly	via	its	subsidiaries	and	branches	that	are	located	abroad.	The	direct	mode	is	labelled	by	the	solid	
lines	and	the	indirect	modes	are	labelled	by	the	dashed	lines.	
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Figure	2.2:	Number	of	Bank	Holding	Companies,	Branches,	and	Subsidiaries	
The	 graphs	 report	 the	 absolute	 number	 of	 bank	 holding	 companies	 active	 in	 non‐German	 destination	
countries	 via	 subsidiaries	 and	 branches	 as	well	 as	 the	 absolute	 number	 of	 subsidiaries	 and	 branches	 via	
which	 these	 bank	 holding	 companies	 are	 active	 abroad.	 Source:	Own	 calculations	 based	 on	 the	 External	
Positions	Report	of	the	Deutsche	Bundesbank.	
(a) Bank	Holding	Companies	with	Foreign	Subsidiaries	
	
(b) Number	of	Foreign	Subsidiaries	
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(c) Bank	Holdings	Companies	Active	via	Branches	
	
(d) Number	of	Foreign	Branches	
	
	
	
2.3.1.1 Extensive	Margin	
We	 are	 interested	not	 only	 in	 the	volume	 of	 international	 activities	 (the	 intensive	
margin)	but	also	in	the	number	of	banks	that	are	active	abroad	(the	extensive	margin).	If	
banks	 withdraw	 from	 foreign	 markets,	 i.e.	 if	 they	 adjust	 along	 the	 extensive	 margin,	
adjustment	 is	 likely	 to	be	more	persistent	 than	 in	 a	 situation	 in	which	 they	 lower	 the	
volume	 of	 international	 assets	 only.	 Our	 analysis	 of	 the	 extensive	 margin	 is	 purely	
descriptive.	 Analyzing	 the	 extensive	 margin	 in	 a	 regression‐based	 model	 is	 difficult	
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given	the	nature	of	our	dataset.	 In	order	to	provide	results	comparable	to	those	of	the	
intensive	margin,	we	would	 need	 a	 dataset	which	 spans	 options	 for	 all	 banks	 and	 all	
foreign	affiliates	to	invest	into	all	foreign	markets.		
Figure	 2.2	 shows	 the	 total	 number	 of	 bank	 holding	 companies	 active	 abroad	 via	
subsidiaries	 and	 branches.	 In	 the	 year	 2011,	 there	 have	 been	 fewer	 bank	 holding	
companies	 with	 subsidiaries	 (35)	 than	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 sample	 period	 (47	 in	
2002).	In	terms	of	the	number	of	subsidiaries,	there	has	been	quite	a	remarkable	decline	
from	200	to	87	over	the	reporting	period.	The	total	number	of	banks	active	through	the	
branch	 mode	 has	 been	 more	 stable	 (around	 54).	 The	 total	 number	 of	 branches	 has	
increased	from	205	in	the	year	2002	to	226	in	the	year	2008.	In	immediate	response	to	
the	crisis,	16	branches	have	been	closed.		
The	bank	holding	companies	in	our	dataset	had	on	average	1.9	subsidiaries	in	2002	
and	 0.9	 subsidiaries	 in	 2011,	 where	 the	 average	 number	 of	 subsidiaries	 declined	
steadily	in	between.		When	only	looking	at	the	average	of	those	BHCs	that	actually	have	
at	least	one	subsidiary,	they	had	5.3	subsidiaries	on	average	in	2002	and	2.5	subsidiaries	
in	 2011.	 As	 concerns	 branches,	 the	 bank	 holding	 companies	 in	 our	 dataset	 had	 on	
average	 1.9	 in	 2002,	 2.2	 branches	 in	 2008,	 and	 2	 branches	 in	 2011.	 The	 number	 of	
branches	 rose	 up	 to	 2008	 and	 declined	 again	 thereafter.	 When	 only	 looking	 at	 the	
average	of	those	BHCs	that	actually	have	at	least	one	branch,	they	had	4.6	branches	on	
average	in	2002,	5.3	branches	in	2008	and	4.7	branches	in	2011.	
	
2.3.1.2 Intensive	Margin	
Our	 data	 cover	 a	 time	 period	 which	 is	 characterized	 by	 two	 distinct	 trends	 in	
international	banking.	Prior	to	the	crisis,	banks	have	increased	their	exposure	vis‐à‐vis	
foreign	markets	to	a	significant	extent.	This	expansion	of	international	activities	reflects,	
both,	 enhanced	 financial	 market	 integration	 and	 the	 buildup	 of	 excessive	 credit	 on	
banks’	 balance	 sheets.	 After	 the	 start	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 in	August	 2007	 and,	 at	 an	
accelerated	 path,	 after	 the	 fall	 of	 Lehman	 Brothers	 in	 September	 2008,	 banks	 have	
withdrawn	from	foreign	markets	(Figures	2.3	(a)	and	(b)).10	
	
																																																								
10	The	 share	 of	 international	 assets	 in	 Figure	 2.3	 (a)	 is	 calculated	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 total	 international	
assets	of	the	bank	holding	company	and	all	subsidiaries	and	branches	relative	to	the	balance	sheet	total	of	
the	bank	holding	company.	 	Since	subsidiary	assets	are	not	part	of	 the	bank	holding	company’s	balance	
sheet,	shares	can	exceed	100%.		
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Figure	2.3:	Foreign	Activity	of	German	Banks	by	Mode	
Graph	 (a)	 reports	 aggregated	 total	 international	 assets	 of	 the	 entire	 banking	 groups	 in	 	 percent	 of	 the	
balance	sheet	total	of	the	German	bank	holding	companies	for	all	banks	as	well	as	for	the	different	groups	of	
banks	(commercial,	savings,	cooperative).	
Graph	(b)	reports	the	absolute	amount	of	total	 international	assets	of	bank	holding	companies	(residing	 in	
Germany,	 i.e.	 direct	 international	 activity)	 as	 well	 as	 their	 branches	 and	 subsidiaries	 (not	 residing	 in	
Germany)	in	millions	of	€.		
Graph	 (c)	 reports	 the	 relative	 shares	 in	 total	 international	 assets	 attributable	 to	 the	 different	modes	 of	
foreign	activity	(i.e.	direct	 international	activity	by	the	bank	holding	company,	via	 foreign	branches,	or	via	
foreign	subsidiaries).	
(a) International	Assets	in	percent	of	Total	Assets	by	Banking	Group	
	
(b) International	Assets	in	Million	€	
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(c) International	Assets	by	Mode	in	percent	of	Total	International	Assets	
	
	
Banks	have	not	only	shifted	their	activities	across	regions,	but	there	has	also	been	a	
shift	 in	 the	 composition	 of	 international	 activities	 across	 modes.	 While	 international	
assets	 held	 through	 the	 direct	 mode	 had	 increased	 from	 below	 50	 percent	 of	 total	
international	assets	in	2002	to	more	than	60	percent	in	2009,	they	stood	at	50	percent	
in	2011	(Figure	2.3	(c)).	The	overall	importance	of	subsidiaries	has	declined	from	17‐20	
percent	at	the	beginning	of	the	sample	until	2006	to	only	10‐12	percent	between	2007	
and	2011.	Branch	activity	fluctuated	between	27	and	40	percent	over	the	sample	period,	
where	it	decreased	during	the	crisis,	but	has	been	increasing	again	since	2010.		
	
2.3.1.3 Summing	up	
Our	data	show	five	stylized	facts:		
‐ First,	more	German	banks	are	active	abroad	via	branches	than	via	subsidiaries.	
‐ Second,	the	number	of	subsidiaries	has	declined,	but	this	decline	has	accelerated	
only	marginally	over	the	course	of	the	crisis.		
‐ Third,	the	number	of	foreign	branches	had	increased	before	the	crisis,	and	it	has	
returned	to	the	pre‐crisis	level	subsequently.		
‐ Fourth,	 the	 amount	 of	 international	 assets	 of	 large	 German	 banks	 increased	
steadily	up	until	2008	and	dropped	rapidly	thereafter.		
‐ Fifth,	commercial	banks	started	to	lower	their	international	assets	already	prior	
to	 the	 crisis;	 cooperative	 and	 savings	 banks	 increased	 their	 foreign	 exposures	
until	2007	and	only	started	withdrawing	from	abroad	in	2008.	
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2.3.2 Proxies	for	Financial	Frictions	
One	 aim	 of	 our	 paper	 is	 to	 assess	 whether	 financial	 frictions	 have	 become	more	
important	during	the	financial	crisis.	Financial	frictions	are	not	directly	observable,	and	
we	 thus	 refer	 to	 proxies	 that	 have	 been	 used	 in	 the	 literature.	 These	 include	 the	 log	
distance	 between	 the	host	 and	destination	 country,	dummies	 for	adjacency,	 a	common	
legal	origin,	 a	 common	language,	 a	 common	membership	in	a	regional	trade	agreement,	
and	a	dummy	for	countries	that	share	the	Euro	as	their	common	currency.	 In	all	models	
we	include	dummies	for	countries	hosting	financial	centers	(Great	Britain11,	Hong	Kong,	
Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Singapore,	Switzerland)	and	a	dummy	for	the	financial	crisis	(i.e.	a	
variable	that	takes	on	the	value	of	one	after	the	period	following	the	collapse	of	Lehman	
Brothers	in	September	2008).12	
It	could	be	argued	that	there	is	little	variation	in,	say,	the	language	dummy	because	
we	 consider	 German	 banks	 only.	 Therefore,	 the	 common	 language	 dummy	 might	
capture	 asset	 holdings	 in	 Austria	 and	 Switzerland	 only.	 Note	 that	 our	 data	 include	
information	 not	 only	 on	 asset	 holdings	 of	 German	parents,	 but	 also	 of	 assets	 held	 via	
subsidiaries	or	branches	in	different	host	and	destination	countries.	This	adds	additional	
variation	 to	 these	 dummy	 variables.	More	 than	 50	 percent	 of	 our	 observations	 cover	
these	 indirect	 relations.	 Hence,	 there	 is	 sufficient	 variation	 in	 the	 data	 to	 identify	 the	
effects	of	these	dummies.	
In	 column	 (5)	 of	Table	2.1,	we	also	 include	one	 specification	with	 information	on	
bilateral	trade.	Note	that	these	data	are	not	available	for	all	country‐pairs	in	the	sample.	
Therefore,	 the	 total	 number	 of	 observations	 declines	 from	 about	 59,000	 to	 49,000.	
Trade	has	the	expected	positive	sign,	being	significant	at	the	10	percent‐level.	Because	
the	remaining	results	are	not	affected	much,	we	leave	out	this	variable	in	all	subsequent	
regressions	in	order	to	work	with	the	full	sample.	
The	 above	 proxies	 for	 financial	 frictions	 and	 other	 transaction	 costs	 are	 country‐
pair‐specific.	To	check	the	robustness	of	our	results,	we	also	include	variables	that	vary	
across	 countries.	 Indicators	 of	 financial	 and	 business	 freedom	 from	 the	 Heritage	
Foundation	 measure	 the	 degree	 of	 economic	 and	 financial	 development,	 including	
																																																								
11		Great	Britain	is	treated	as	a	financial	center	because	the	data	do	not	allow	discriminating	between	the	
United	Kingdom	and	the	Channel	Islands	Jersey,	Guernsey	and	Isle	of	Man,	which	are	all	considered	to	be	
financial	centers.	Also,	this	dummy	captures	the	role	of	the	City	of	London	as	a	financial	center.		
12		Alternatively,	we	use	a	financial	crisis	dummy	that	equals	one	for	the	period	following	August	2007.	
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potential	unilateral	informational	frictions.	Furthermore,	we	include	host	countries’	GDP	
per	capita	(from	the	World	Bank)	to	control	for	the	level	of	economic	development.		
2.3.3 Bank‐Level	Controls	
The	 intensity	 and	 the	mode	 through	 which	 banks	 are	 active	 abroad	 are	 affected	
strongly	 by	 bank‐specific	 traits.	 We	 control	 for	 characteristics	 of	 the	 German	 bank	
holding	 company	 by	 including	 log	 size	 (total	 assets),	 the	 degree	 of	 capitalization	(the	
ratio	of	capital	to	total,	non‐risk‐weighted	assets),	the	dependence	on	wholesale	funding	
(liabilities	vis‐à‐vis	banks	/	total	liabilities),	and	the	share	of	short‐term	funding	(short‐
term	 liabilities	 /	 total	 liabilities).	 The	 source	 for	 this	 information	 are	 the	 “Monthly	
Balance	Sheet	Statistics“	provided	by	the	Deutsche	Bundesbank.	Bank‐level	controls	are	
lagged	by	one	year	to	account	for	simultaneity	issues.	
We	 also	 include	 a	 dummy	 variable	 which	 equals	 one	 for	 those	 banks	 that	 have	
received	state	support	 from	the	German	government.	Several	German	banks,	 including	
IKB	 and	 Landesbanken	 like	WestLB,	 BayernLB,	 and	 SachsenLB,	 have	 received	 capital	
injections,	 credit	 lines,	 and	 guarantees	 by	 the	German	 government	 (federal	 and	 state‐
level)	between	August	2007	and	August	2008.	In	October	2008,	the	German	government	
announced	 a	 blank	 guarantee	 for	 bank	 deposits	 and	 it	 set	 up	 a	 €	 400	 billion	 bank	
guarantee	 fund	 and	 a	 €	 70	 billion	 recapitalization	 facility.	 The	 government	 created	 a	
special	 institution	 to	 administer	 these	 funds,	 the	 so‐called	 SoFFin	 (Sonderfonds	
Finanzmarktstabilisierung,	 Special	 Fund	 Financial	 Market	 Stabilization).	 As	 of	 August	
2010,	a	total	of	€	152.6	billion	in	guarantees	by	the	SoFFin	has	been	taken	up	by	eight	
German	banks	in	addition	to	€	29.3	billion	in	equity	stakes	in	four	German	banks	(Aareal	
Bank,	Commerzbank,	Hypo	Real	Estate,	WestLB).		Additionally,	capital	support	has	been	
provided	by	the	federal	states	to	their	Landesbanken	(BayernLB,	HSH	Nordbank).	This	
information	 has	 been	 made	 publicly	 available	 on	 the	 SoFFin’s	 website	 (see	 also	
Table	A.2.1).	
To	capture	the	effects	of	these	state	support	measures,	we	use	a	combined	indicator	
which	 assumes	 the	 value	 of	 one	 from	 the	 time	when	 the	German	parent	 has	 received	
some	 kind	 of	 support	 measure.	 A	 reason	 for	 using	 a	 combined	 indicator	 rather	 than	
treating	 capital	 injections	 and	guarantees	 separately	 is	 that	most	banks	have	 received	
different	 rescue	 measures.	 While	 the	 timing	 of	 these	 measures	 has	 differed	 to	 some	
extent,	there	is	insufficient	variation	in	the	data	to	clearly	identify	the	effects	of	capital	
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injections	 or	 guarantees.	 Overall,	 10	 out	 of	 our	 over	 92	 parent	 banks	 have	 received	
government	 support	 in	 one	 form	or	 another.	 The	 expected	 effect	 of	 the	 state	 support	
measures	 is	 negative	 because	 state	 support	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 requirements	 to	 close	
foreign	affiliates.	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 bank‐level	 variables,	 the	 expected	 sign	 for	 bank	 size	 is	
straightforward,	 International	 asset	 holdings	 involve	 fixed	 and	 variable	 costs.	 Larger	
and	 thus	 presumably	 more	 productive	 banks	 should	 be	 able	 to	 shoulder	 these	 costs	
more	 easily.	 The	 expected	 effects	 on	 the	 funding	 variables	 are	 not	 clear	 cut	 a	 priori.	
Ceteris	paribus,	weakly	capitalized	banks,	banks	with	a	high	share	of	wholesale	funding,	
and	banks	with	a	high	share	of	short‐term	funding	are	more	risky.	This	could	induce	the	
banks	 to	 be	 less	 active	 internationally;	 hence	 the	 expected	 sign	would	 be	 positive	 for	
capitalization	 and	 negative	 for	 the	 two	 funding	 variables.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
internationalization	may	be	seen	as	a	channel	 for	risk	diversification	and	for	access	 to	
market‐based	 funding.	 If	 this	 aspect	 dominates	 the	 decisions	 of	 banks	 to	 expand	
internationally,	we	would	expect	 to	 see	a	negative	effect	of	 capitalization	and	positive	
effects	of	wholesale	and	short‐term	funding.	
Bank‐level	 controls	 are	 potentially	 endogenous.	 Because	 we	 lack	 convincing	
instruments	 for	 the	 bank‐level	 variables,	 we	 present	 results	 including	 and	 excluding	
bank‐level	variables	to	check	the	sensitivity	of	our	results.	Our	main	interest	lies	in	the	
country‐level	 proxies	 for	 financial	 frictions.	We	 will	 show	 below	 that	 our	 results	 are	
fairly	robust	to	including	or	excluding	the	bank‐level	variables.	Therefore,	endogeneity	
of	 bank‐level	 controls	 does	 not	 affect	 our	 results	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 financial	
frictions	to	any	important	degree.	
2.3.4 Country‐Level	Controls	
In	our	baseline	specification,	we	use	country‐year	fixed	effects	 in	order	to	capture	
multilateral	 resistance	 (see	 section	 2.2.3).	 Hence,	 we	 cannot	 include	 country‐level	
variables	such	as	GDP	or	trade,	which	vary	across	countries	and	years	at	the	same	time.		
Nevertheless,	 we	 test	 whether	 regulatory	 policies	 have	 affected	 the	 international	
activities	 of	 banks.	 The	 IMF	 (2011)	 shows	 that	 macroprudential	 policies	 affect	 the	
cyclicality	 of	 bank	 lending.	 One	 channel	 through	which	 these	 policies	 affect	 domestic	
lending	could	be	their	impact	on	the	international	activities	of	banks.	Hence,	we	include	
dummy	variables	capturing	regulatory	 indicators,	which	have	kindly	been	provided	as	
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summary	 statistics	 by	 the	 IMF	 from	 a	 survey	 among	 central	 banks.	 These	 regulatory	
measures	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	 groups:	 asset	 measures,	 asset/liability	 measures,	
and	 capital	measures.	 These	 indicators	 are	 converted	 into	 indicator	 variables	 ranging	
from	0‐5	for	the	asset	measures	and	from	0‐3	for	the	asset/liability	measures	or	for	the	
capital	 measures.	 The	 dummies	 for	 the	 individual	 measures	 are	 switched	 on	 for	 the	
countries	and	years	 in	which	 the	 respective	measures	have	been	 in	place.	Sample	size	
shrinks	somewhat	to	57	host	and	77	destination	countries	if	we	add	these	variables	at	
the	country	level.	Hence,	we	use	these	variables	as	robustness	tests	only	(Table	2.6).	
2.4 Estimation	Results	
This	section	analyzes	the	determinants	of	banks’	 international	assets	and	possible	
changes	 in	 these	determinants	 over	 time.	We	begin	with	 a	 set	 of	 baseline	 regressions	
(Table	2.1).	Furthermore,	we	perform	the	 following	robustness	 tests:	We	test	whether	
the	determinants	of	banks’	international	assets	have	changed	significantly	over	time	by	
introducing	 interaction	 terms	 between	 all	 explanatory	 variables	 and	 crisis	 dummies	
(Table	 2.2)	 as	 well	 as	 by	 estimating	 our	model	 for	 pre‐	 and	 post‐crisis	 sample	 splits	
(Table	2.3).	We	distinguish	the	determinants	of	the	intensive	margin	by	mode	of	foreign	
activity	 (direct,	 subsidiary,	 branch)	 (Table	 2.4),	 for	 the	 three	 pillars	 of	 the	 German	
banking	 system	 (Table	 2.5),	 and	 we	 examine	 the	 effects	 of	 specific	 host	 country	
characteristics	and	banking	regulation	(Table	2.6).	
2.4.1 What	Determines	the	Volume	of	Banks’	International	Assets?	
In	Table	2.1,	we	analyze	the	volume	of	international	assets	of	banks.	Our	full	sample	
has	almost	60,000	bank‐country‐year	observations.	All	regressions	 include	a	 full	set	of	
country‐year	effects;	the	exception	is	column	(4),	which	includes	separate	host	country,	
destination	country,	and	year	fixed	effects	to	check	for	the	sensitivity	of	all	other	results	
with	respect	to	the	level	of	fixed	effects.	Results	are	extremely	robust.	Additionally,	we	
include	fixed	effects	for	each	bank	holding	company	in	all	regressions	presented	in	this	
paper.	We	vary	the	empirical	model	with	regard	to	the	set	of	regressors	included.	Most	
of	 the	 variation	 in	 the	 data	 is	 driven	 by	 the	 overall	 cross‐section	 of	 bank	 holding	
company‐affiliate‐destination	 combinations:	while	 the	overall	R²	 is	0.50,	 the	within	R²	
takes	a	value	of	only	0.07.			
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In	 terms	 of	 bank‐level	 explanatory	 variables,	 two	 results	 are	 in	 line	 with	
expectations	and	with	previous	literature:	larger	banks	and	banks	with	a	higher	share	of	
wholesale	 funding	 hold	 higher	 international	 assets.	 Quantitatively,	 a	 rise	 of	 one	
percentage	 point	 in	 the	 share	 of	 wholesale	 funding	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 one	 percent	
increase	 in	 total	 international	 assets	 in	 a	 particular	 destination	 country.	 Hence,	 the	
strains	that	 the	crisis	has	 induced	for	the	wholesale	 funding	market	are	causes	 for	 the	
decline	 in	 banks’	 international	 assets	 during	 the	 crisis.	 Capitalization	 and	 short‐term	
funding	do	not	impact	international	assets	though.	It	is	thus	difficult	to	draw	a	straight	
line	 from	 the	 riskiness	 of	 banks’	 funding	 models	 to	 their	 internationalization.	 State	
support	has	the	expected	negative	effect	on	international	assets:	banks	which	received	
state	support	during	the	crisis	hold	approximately	exp(‐0.13)‐1=	‐12.19	percent13	lower	
international	assets	than	those	that	did	not	have	to	be	supported.		
With	regard	 to	 the	proxies	 for	 financial	 frictions,	we	obtain	 the	expected	result:	A	
one	percent	increase	in	distance	lowers	international	assets	by	a	little	more	than	half	a	
percent;	 sharing	 a	 common	 border	 or	 a	 common	 language	 increases	 foreign	 asset	
holdings	 by	 95	 or	 59	 percent,	 respectively;	 so	 does	 membership	 in	 a	 regional	 trade	
agreement	 (73	 percent).	 A	 dummy	 for	 international	 assets	 held	 in	 the	 Euro	 Area	 is	
insignificant	in	all	specifications	which	include	country‐year	fixed	effects.		
Acknowledging	the	special	nature	of	our	dataset,	we	also	include	a	set	of	dummies	
capturing	 the	 mode	 through	 which	 banks	 hold	 their	 international	 assets	 (host	 is	 the	
same	 as	 destination,	 host	 or	 destination	 are	 financial	 centers).	 All	 these	 dummies	 are	
positive	and	significant.	This	can	be	interpreted	as	evidence	that	lower	information	costs	
or	 lower	 regulatory	 barriers	 increase	 the	 volume	 of	 international	 bank	 activity.	 The	
results	for	financial	frictions	do	not	change	qualitatively	or	in	terms	of	significance	when	
the	 bank‐level	 variables	 are	 excluded.	 This	 is	 important	 because	 it	 shows	 that	 the	
potential	endogeneity	of	bank‐level	variables	does	not	affect	our	main	results.	
How	important	are	the	different	explanatory	variables?	To	answer	this	question	we	
have	 calculated	 standardized	 beta‐coefficients	 (unreported)	 in	 order	 to	 assess	 the	
magnitude	of	the	different	variables	with	respect	to	the	overall	model.14	In	the	baseline	
																																																								
13	This	formula	to	calculate	the	change	in	international	assets	will	be	applied	to	all	coefficients	on	dummy	
variables	throughout	the	rest	of	the	paper.	
14	Beta	coefficients	are	given	by	the	coefficient	estimate	of	a	particular	variable,	multiplied	by	the	standard	
deviation	of	 this	variable,	and	divided	by	 the	standard	deviation	of	 the	dependent	variable.	Hence,	beta	
coefficients	give	the	contribution	of	each	explanatory	variable	to	the	variance	of	the	banks’	international	
assets.	
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model	in	Table	2.1,	column	(1),	the	most	important	variables	are	distance,	size,	and	the	
dummies	for	financial	centers	and	local	lending	in	the	host	country.	
	
Table	2.1:	Baseline	Fixed	Effects	Regressions	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
	 Baseline	 Excluding	country‐specific	regressors
Excluding	bank‐
specific	regressors
Separate	country‐	
and	years	
dummies	
Including	bilateral	
trade	
Log	size	(t‐1)	 0.662***	 0.661***	 	 0.663***	 0.496***	
	 [0.094]	 [0.094]	 	 [0.091]	 [0.106]	
Capitalization	(t‐1)	 0.003	 0.003	 	 0.009	 ‐0.019	
	 [0.013]	 [0.013]	 	 [0.012]	 [0.014]	
Wholesale	funding	(t‐1)	 0.010***	 0.010***	 	 0.007***	 0.011***	
	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 	 [0.0029]	 [0.002]	
Short‐term	funding	(t‐1)	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.001	 	 0.000	 ‐0.003	
	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	
State	support	(0/1)	 ‐0.130***	 ‐0.130***	 	 ‐0.370***	 ‐0.122**	
	 [0.050]	 [0.050]	 	 [0.056]	 [0.053]	
Subsidiary	activity	(0/1)	 ‐8.252***	 ‐8.610***	 	 ‐6.831***	 ‐9.611***	
	 [2.810]	 [2.827]	 	 [0.590]	 [3.238]	
Branch	activity	(0/1)	 ‐7.448***	 ‐7.836***	 	 ‐6.052***	 ‐8.982***	
	 [2.804]	 [2.823]	 	 [0.559]	 [3.235]	
Log	distance	 ‐0.554***	 	 ‐0.549***	 ‐0.619***	 ‐0.695***	
	 [0.156]	 	 [0.160]	 [0.142]	 [0.169]	
Adjacency	(0/1)	 0.666***	 	 0.685***	 0.644***	 0.326	
	 [0.241]	 	 [0.241]	 [0.239]	 [0.247]	
Common	legal	origin	(0/1)	 0.200	 	 0.191	 0.197	 0.170	
	 [0.127]	 	 [0.127]	 [0.124]	 [0.142]	
Common	language	(0/1)	 0.461**	 	 0.459**	 0.440**	 0.252	
	 [0.216]	 	 [0.216]	 [0.216]	 [0.209]	
Regional	trade	agreement		 0.546**	 	 0.525**	 0.267	 0.223	
(0/1)	 [0.240]	 	 [0.239]	 [0.178]	 [0.245]	
Common	currency	(Euro)		 0.255	 	 0.267	 0.313**	 0.073	
(0/1)	 [0.207]	 	 [0.209]	 [0.148]	 [0.196]	
Log	bilateral	trade	 	 	 	 	 0.137*	
	 	 	 	 	 [0.070]	
Host	is	destination	(0/1)	 2.877***	 4.480***	 2.898***	 2.750***	 2.062***	
	 [0.470]	 [0.422]	 [0.474]	 [0.476]	 [0.541]	
Host	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 5.120*	 5.083*	 0.912	 4.182***	 6.767**	
	 [2.823]	 [2.845]	 [0.575]	 [0.600]	 [3.250]	
Destination	is	financial	center		 1.939***	 2.105***	 1.895***	 1.397***	 2.275***	
(0/1)	 [0.365]	 [0.491]	 [0.363]	 [0.385]	 [0.453]	
Country‐year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 Yes	
Country	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 No	
Year	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 No	
Number	of	observations	 59,701	 59,701	 59,701	 59,701	 49,716	
Number	of	panel	units	 11,159	 11,159	 11,159	 11,159	 9,318	
R²	within	 0.071	 0.070	 0.065	 0.018	 0.065	
R²	between	 0.514	 0.486	 0.509	 0.509	 0.522	
R²	overall	 0.500	 0.474	 0.498	 0.491	 0.494	
Notes:	This	 table	presents	 results	 from	 regressions	with	bank	holding	 company	 fixed	 effects	using	 the	 full	 sample,	 i.e.	
pooling	 across	 the	 three	 different	modes	 of	 international	 banking.	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 log	 of	 banks’	 total	
international	assets	held	in	different	destination	countries	by	the	domestic	headquarters,	their	foreign	branches,	or	their	
foreign	subsidiaries	located	in	different	host	countries.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	All	bank‐level	covariates	are	
lagged	by	one	year.	***Significant	at	1%	level.	**Significant	at	5%	level.	*	Significant	at	10%	level.	
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2.4.2 Have	 the	 Determinants	 of	 Banks’	 International	 Assets	 Changed	
During	the	Crisis?	
Given	the	reversal	of	banks’	international	assets	during	the	crisis	as	documented	in	
Figures	2.2	and	2.3,	the	natural	question	to	ask	is	whether	this	has	been	due	to	a	change	
in	the	determinants	of	banks’	foreign	activities	or	due	to	a	changing	sensitivity	of	banks	
with	regard	to	these	determinants.	This	question	can	be	answered	by	either	splitting	the	
sample	to	estimate	the	model	for	the	pre‐crisis	and	for	the	crisis	period	or	by	including	
interaction	 terms	 between	 all	 variables	 and	 a	 crisis	 dummy.	 Both	 methods	 require	
defining	a	crisis	and	a	pre‐crisis	period.	We	perform	two	splits,	using	the	periods	2002‐
2007	or	2002‐2008	as	the	pre‐crisis	periods,	and	the	subsequent	years	(2008‐2011	or	
2009‐2011)	as	the	crisis	years.	The	main	results	are	not	affected	by	this	choice.	
Table	 2.2	 reports	 the	 results	 including	 interaction	 terms	 between	 crisis	 dummies	
and	all	explanatory	variables.	It	shows	that	the	impact	of	bank‐level	controls	and	most	of	
the	proxies	for	financial	frictions	has	not	changed	over	the	course	of	the	crisis	with	two	
exceptions.	 For	 the	 case	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 dummy	 being	 one	 after	 the	 Lehman	
collapse	 (i.e.	 starting	 in	 2008),	 adjacency	 has	 become	 more	 important	 and	 common	
language	has	become	less	important.	
Table	2.3	presents	the	results	splitting	the	sample	into	pre‐crisis	and	crisis	period.	
In	terms	of	the	bank‐level	variables,	it	shows	that	the	positive	effect	of	size	significantly	
increased	 during	 the	 crisis	 and	 that	 capitalization	 changed	 from	 being	 negatively	
significant	 before	 the	 crisis	 to	 being	 a	 positive	 and	 significant	 determinant	 of	
international	 assets	 during	 the	 crisis.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 financial	 frictions,	 the	 effect	 of	
distance,	common	legal	origin,	and	common	language	did	not	change	over	time.	Like	in	
the	model	with	interaction	terms,	the	data	do	not	support	the	conventional	wisdom	that	
banks	have	become	more	sensitive	to	financial	frictions	or	to	cultural	factors	during	the	
crisis.		
The	sample	splits	detect	three	changes	in	the	country‐level	determinants	of	banks’	
international	assets,	though:	the	importance	of	adjacency,	of	bilateral	trade	agreements,	
and	of	the	Euro	Area	dummy	has	become	stronger	over	time.	One	interpretation	is	that	
banks	 have	 re‐focused	 their	 international	 assets	 on	 trade‐related	 activities	 during	 the	
crisis.	The	positive	effect	of	 the	Euro	Area	dummy	 for	 the	crisis‐period	could	 reflect	a	
general	home	bias	effect	or	increasing	sensitivity	to	exchange	rate	risk.	
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Table	2.2:	Regressions	with	Crisis	Dummies	and	Crisis	Interaction	Terms	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Baseline	with	
crisis	dummy	
(August	2007)	
Baseline	with	crisis	dummy	
(August	2007)	and	crisis	
interaction	terms	
Baseline	with	crisis	
dummy	(September	
2008)	
Baseline	with	crisis	dummy	
(September	2008)	and	crisis	
interaction	terms	
	 	 Baseline	 Interaction	term	 	 Baseline	
Interaction	
term	
Log	size	(t‐1)	 0.662***	 0.653***	 0.018	 0.662***	 0.663***	 0.011	
	 [0.094]	 [0.098]	 [0.021]	 [0.094]	 [0.098]	 [0.022]	
Capitalization	(t‐1)	 0.003	 0.004	 ‐0.014	 0.003	 0.009	 ‐0.018	
	 [0.013]	 [0.015]	 [0.012]	 [0.013]	 [0.014]	 [0.013]	
Wholesale	funding	(t‐1)		 0.010***	 0.010***	 ‐0.000	 0.010***	 0.011***	 ‐0.001	
	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
Short‐term	funding	(t‐1)	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.000	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.003	 0.001	
	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
State	support	(0/1)	 ‐0.130***	 ‐0.172***	 	 ‐0.130***	 ‐0.152***	 	
	 [0.050]	 [0.050]	 	 [0.050]	 [0.054]	 	
Subsidiary	activity	(0/1)	 ‐8.252***	 ‐6.340***	 ‐2.157	 ‐8.252***	 ‐7.211***	 ‐1.221	
	 [2.810]	 [0.621]	 [2.633]	 [2.810]	 [0.572]	 [2.599]	
Branch	activity	(0/1)	 ‐7.448***	 ‐5.874***	 ‐1.514	 ‐7.448***	 ‐6.627***	 ‐0.719	
	 [2.804]	 [0.584]	 [2.630]	 [2.804]	 [0.533]	 [2.595]	
Log	distance	 ‐0.554***	 ‐0.510***	 ‐0.083	 ‐0.554***	 ‐0.519***	 ‐0.076	
	 [0.156]	 [0.159]	 [0.059]	 [0.156]	 [0.160]	 [0.059]	
Adjacency	(0/1)	 0.666***	 0.590**	 0.140	 0.666***	 0.565**	 0.229**	
	 [0.241]	 [0.239]	 [0.106]	 [0.241]	 [0.241]	 [0.111]	
Common	legal	origin	(0/1)	 0.200	 0.123	 0.124	 0.200	 0.143	 0.101	
	 [0.127]	 [0.135]	 [0.084]	 [0.127]	 [0.133]	 [0.078]	
Common	language	(0/1)	 0.461**	 0.584***	 ‐0.203*	 0.461**	 0.577***	 ‐0.225**	
	 [0.216]	 [0.225]	 [0.114]	 [0.216]	 [0.223]	 [0.110]	
Regional	trade	agreement		 0.546**	 0.457*	 0.128	 0.546**	 0.475*	 0.126	
(0/1)	 [0.240]	 [0.246]	 [0.158]	 [0.240]	 [0.249]	 [0.145]	
Common	currency	(Euro)		 0.255	 0.229	 0.082	 0.255	 0.281	 0.010	
(0/1)	 [0.207]	 [0.212]	 [0.129]	 [0.207]	 [0.209]	 [0.133]	
Host	is	destination	(0/1)	 2.877***	 3.038***	 ‐0.302*	 2.877***	 3.008***	 ‐0.294	
	 [0.470]	 [0.473]	 [0.180]	 [0.470]	 [0.477]	 [0.185]	
Host	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 5.120*	 3.877***	 1.270	 5.120*	 4.500***	 0.642	
	 [2.823]	 [0.632]	 [2.641]	 [2.823]	 [0.584]	 [2.602]	
Destination	is	financial	center		 1.939***	 1.437***	 0.515**	 1.939***	 1.662***	 0.297	
(0/1)	 [0.365]	 [0.376]	 [0.232]	 [0.365]	 [0.364]	 [0.224]	
Crisis	dummy	(0/1)	 ‐1.750	 0.462	 	 ‐1.034	 0.405	 	
	 [2.615]	 [0.685]	 	 [2.578]	 [0.685]	 	
Country‐year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	 No	
Year	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	 No	
No.	of	observations	 59,701	 59,701	 59,701	 59,701	
Number	of	panel	units	 11,159	 11,159	 11,159	 11,159	
R²	within	 0.071	 0.074	 0.071	 0.073	
R²	between	 0.514	 0.516	 0.514	 0.515	
R²	overall	 0.500	 0.501	 0.500	 0.501	
Notes:	This	 table	presents	 results	 from	 regressions	with	bank	holding	 company	 fixed	 effects	using	 the	 full	 sample,	 i.e.	
pooling	 across	 the	 three	 different	modes	 of	 international	 banking.	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 log	 of	 banks’	 total	
international	assets	held	in	different	destination	countries	by	the	domestic	headquarters,	their	foreign	branches,	or	their	
foreign	 subsidiaries	 located	 in	 different	 host	 countries.	 The	 second	 columns	 of	 regressions	 (2)	 and	 (4)	 display	 the	
coefficients	for	the	interaction	terms	of	the	variables	with	the	crisis	dummy.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	All	bank‐
level	covariates	are	lagged	by	one	year.	***Significant	at	1%	level.	**Significant	at	5%	level.	*	Significant	at	10%	level.	
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Table	2.3:	Sample	Splits	Pre‐Crisis	versus	Crisis	Sample	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 Before	2007	 After	2007	 Before	2008	 After	2008	
Log	size	(t‐1)	 0.163	 0.851***	 0.547***	 0.838***	
	 [0.151]	 [0.100]	 [0.131]	 [0.107]	
Capitalization	(t‐1)	 ‐0.027*	 0.046***	 ‐0.033**	 0.052***	
	 [0.016]	 [0.017]	 [0.016]	 [0.017]	
Wholesale	funding	(t‐1)	 0.001	 0.007***	 0.005**	 0.005***	
	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
Short‐term	funding	(t‐1)	 0.003	 ‐0.003**	 0.003	 0.001	
	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	
State	support	(0/1)	 0.000	 ‐0.137***	 0.095	 ‐0.268***	
	 [0.000]	 [0.044]	 [0.155]	 [0.092]	
Subsidiary	activity	(0/1)	 1.024	 ‐8.083***	 0.000	 ‐7.507**	
	 [2.362]	 [2.939]	 [0.000]	 [3.144]	
Branch	activity	(0/1)	 1.331	 ‐6.853**	 0.429**	 ‐6.276**	
	 [2.343]	 [2.932]	 [0.172]	 [3.136]	
Log	distance	 ‐0.528***	 ‐0.549***	 ‐0.521***	 ‐0.555***	
	 [0.171]	 [0.161]	 [0.169]	 [0.160]	
Adjacency	(0/1)	 0.439*	 0.778***	 0.432*	 0.913***	
	 [0.239]	 [0.253]	 [0.238]	 [0.256]	
Common	legal	origin	(0/1)	 0.135	 0.221*	 0.158	 0.211	
	 [0.152]	 [0.134]	 [0.147]	 [0.136]	
Common	language	(0/1)	 0.589**	 0.375*	 0.571**	 0.327	
	 [0.248]	 [0.215]	 [0.243]	 [0.222]	
Regional	trade	agreement	(0/1)	 0.434*	 0.869***	 0.428*	 0.826**	
	 [0.249]	 [0.329]	 [0.242]	 [0.329]	
Common	currency	(Euro)	(0/1)	 0.269	 0.407*	 0.306	 0.460**	
	 [0.229]	 [0.216]	 [0.217]	 [0.232]	
Host	is	destination	(0/1)	 3.066***	 2.602***	 3.082***	 2.596***	
	 [0.536]	 [0.483]	 [0.527]	 [0.485]	
Host	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 ‐2.266**	 4.718	 ‐2.794***	 4.238	
	 [0.931]	 [2.950]	 [0.828]	 [3.153]	
Destination	is	financial	center		 1.994***	 1.965***	 1.296***	 1.936***	
(0/1)	 [0.507]	 [0.380]	 [0.449]	 [0.381]	
Country‐year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	 No	
Year	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	 No	
No.	of	observations	 26,933	 32,768	 33,693	 26,008	
Number	of	panel	units	 8,607	 9,571	 9,012	 9,034	
R²	within	 0.056	 0.066	 0.062	 0.063	
R²	between	 0.544	 0.516	 0.550	 0.499	
R²	overall	 0.515	 0.505	 0.518	 0.498	
Notes:	This	 table	presents	 results	 from	 regressions	with	bank	holding	 company	 fixed	 effects	using	 the	 full	 sample,	 i.e.	
pooling	 across	 the	 three	 different	modes	 of	 international	 banking.	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 log	 of	 banks’	 total	
international	assets	held	in	different	destination	countries	through	the	domestic	headquarters,	its	foreign	branches,	or	its	
foreign	 subsidiaries	 located	 in	 different	 host	 countries.	The	 samples	 are	 split	 as	 indicated	 in	 the	 top	 of	 the	 columns.	
Standard	 errors	 are	 in	 parentheses.	 All	 bank‐level	 covariates	 are	 lagged	 by	 one	 year.	 ***Significant	 at	 1%	 level.	
**Significant	at	5%	level.	*Significant	at	10%	level.	
 
Generally,	 a	 comparison	 between	 the	 two	methods	 reveals	 that	 simply	 including	
interaction	 terms	 for	 the	 crisis	 period	 fails	 to	 detect	 changes	 in	 the	 determinants	 of	
cross‐border	banking	that	have	evolved	over	the	years.	Most	 importantly,	 the	growing	
importance	 of	 regional	 trade	 agreements	 is	 not	 detected	 by	 the	 interaction	 terms.	
However,	 both	 methods	 detect	 a	 growing	 importance	 of	 adjacency,	 pointing	 into	 the	
direction	of	an	increasing	concentration	on	familiar	markets	during	the	crisis.	
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2.4.3 What	is	the	Impact	of	the	Mode	of	Foreign	Banking?	
So	 far,	 we	 have	 pooled	 the	 data	 across	 the	 different	 modes	 and	 we	 have	 not	
distinguished	 differences	 in	 foreign	 business	models.	 Given	 that	 foreign	 branches	 and	
subsidiaries	 differ	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 costs	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 business	 model,	 the	
natural	question	to	ask	is	whether	our	main	results	hold	when	splitting	the	sample	into	
different	modes.	Table	2.4	 thus	 shows	 the	baseline	model	 from	Table	2.1	 for	 all	 three	
modes	of	activities	separately.		
Many	results	are	qualitatively	similar	across	the	different	modes,	which	justifies	our	
pooling	 assumption.	 For	 the	 bank‐level	 variables	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 bank	 holding	
company,	results	are	similar	with	some	exceptions:	capitalization	has	a	negative	impact	
on	branch	activity	but	no	impact	on	all	other	modes.	Size	plays	a	role	only	for	the	direct	
mode,	and	short‐term	funding	impacts	only	the	two	indirect	modes	negatively.		
Financial	frictions	are	somewhat	less	important	for	subsidiaries	than	for	the	branch	
or	 the	 direct	 mode.	 One	 might	 think	 that	 retail‐focused	 subsidiary	 activity	 is	 more	
information	sensitive	than	wholesale	oriented	direct	and	branch	activity.	However,	the	
lower	 information	 sensitivity	 might	 result	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 subsidiaries,	 which	 are	
engaged	in	local	and	geographically	close	retail	markets	and	also	rely	on	local	deposits	
and	deposit	 guarantees	 (see	 also	Cerutti	 et	 al.	 2007,	 Fiechter	et	 al.	 2011),	 have	better	
knowledge	of	 the	 greater	 region	 than	 only	wholesale	 oriented	branches	 or	 even	bank	
holding	 companies	 that	 are	 situated	 in	Germany.	 Information	and	monitoring	 costs	 as	
proxied	by	bilateral	 gravity‐type	variables	might	 thus	be	 lower	 than	 for	branches	 and	
bank	holding	 companies	 that	do	not	have	 this	advantage	of	 a	better	knowledge	of	 the	
local	retail	market,	which	in	turn	is	very	important	for	wholesale	activity,	too.	The	effect	
of	 common	 legal	 origin	 is	negative	 for	 the	direct	mode	and	positive	 for	 the	branch	or	
subsidiary	mode.		
	 	
	36	
	
Table	2.4:	Regressions	by	Mode	of	Foreign	Activity	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
	 Direct	Mode	 Subsidiary	Mode	 Branch	Mode	
Log	size	(t‐1)	 0.875***	 ‐0.277	 ‐0.101	
	 [0.107]	 [0.207]	 [0.205]	
Capitalization	(t‐1)	 0.012	 0.039*	 ‐0.125***	
	 [0.018]	 [0.020]	 [0.032]	
Wholesale	funding	(t‐1)	 0.007***	 0.011**	 0.019***	
	 [0.002]	 [0.004]	 [0.003]	
Short‐term	funding	(t‐1)	 0.003*	 ‐0.018***	 ‐0.019***	
	 [0.002]	 [0.005]	 [0.004]	
State	support	(0/1)	 ‐0.075	 ‐0.440***	 0.033	
	 [0.074]	 [0.095]	 [0.100]	
Log	distance	 ‐1.195***	 ‐0.345**	 ‐0.486***	
	 [0.135]	 [0.172]	 [0.136]	
Adjacency	(0/1)	 0.132	 0.145	 ‐0.025	
	 [0.379]	 [0.251]	 [0.269]	
Common	legal	origin	(0/1)	 ‐1.366***	 0.410***	 0.666***	
	 [0.031]	 [0.155]	 [0.150]	
Common	language	(0/1)	 0.679***	 0.261	 0.608***	
	 [0.022]	 [0.223]	 [0.234]	
Regional	trade	agreement	(0/1)	 0.682***	 0.422	 0.464*	
	 [0.022]	 [0.287]	 [0.237]	
Common	currency	(Euro)	(0/1)	 ‐1.132***	 ‐0.018	 ‐0.673***	
	 [0.050]	 [0.260]	 [0.252]	
Host	is	destination	(0/1)	 	 3.342***	 3.088***	
	 	 [0.606]	 [0.434]	
Host	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 	 2.942***	 5.105*	
	 	 [0.752]	 [3.014]	
Destination	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 1.892***	 ‐1.603***	 3.004***	
	 [0.012]	 [0.559]	 [1.134]	
Country‐year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	
Year	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	
Number	of	observations	 28,691	 14,219	 16,791	
Number	of	panel	units	 4,218	 3,359	 3,582	
R²	within	 0.104	 0.102	 0.092	
R²	between	 0.760	 0.488	 0.470	
R²	overall	 0.689	 0.466	 0.448	
Notes:	This	table	presents	results	from	regressions	with	bank	holding	company	fixed	effects	using	sample	splits	according	
to	 the	 three	different	modes	of	 international	banking	(direct,	branch,	subsidiary).	The	dependent	variable	 is	 the	 log	of	
banks’	 total	 international	 assets	 held	 in	 different	 destination	 countries	 by	 the	 domestic	 headquarters,	 their	 foreign	
branches,	or	their	foreign	subsidiaries	located	in	different	host	countries,	respectively.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	
All	bank‐level	covariates	are	lagged	by	one	year.	***Significant	at	1%	level.	**Significant	at	5%	level.	*	Significant	at	10%	
level.	
 
2.4.4 What	is	the	Impact	of	Banks’	Business	Models?	
While	 Table	 2.4	 accounts	 for	 differences	 across	 the	 foreign	 business	 models	 of	
banks,	 Table	2.5	 takes	 into	 consideration	 that	 the	 domestic	 business	models	 differ	 as	
well.	The	German	banking	system	is	characterized	by	a	three‐tier	structure	consisting	of	
commercial,	 savings,	 and	 cooperative	 banks.	 These	 banks	 have	 different	 business	
models:	the	private	banks	are	traditionally	more	active	in	the	wholesale	business	and	on	
international	 markets,	 while	 the	 savings	 and	 cooperative	 banks	 focus	 more	 on	 retail	
activities	in	local	markets.		
To	 check	 how	 pooling	 across	 the	 different	 domestic	 business	 models	 affects	 our	
results,	we	split	the	sample	into	observations	for	banks	in	each	of	these	groups	(Table	
2.5).	Given	 these	different	business	models	 and	differences	 in	 the	probability	of	 going	
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abroad,	 the	determinants	of	 international	activities	of	banks	 in	 these	 three	groups	are	
surprisingly	 similar.	 One	 exception	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 short‐term	 funding	 which	 is	
associated	 with	 lower	 international	 assets	 for	 commercial	 banks,	 but	 with	 higher	
international	assets	for	savings	banks.		
	
Table	2.5:	Regressions	by	Bank‐Group	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
	 Commercial	Banks	 Savings	Banks	 Cooperative	Banks	
Log	size	(t‐1)	 0.713***	 0.090	 1.447***	
	 [0.114]	 [0.212]	 [0.415]	
Capitalization	(t‐1)	 ‐0.005	 ‐0.067*	 ‐0.067	
	 [0.014]	 [0.035]	 [0.127]	
Wholesale	funding	(t‐1)	 0.011***	 0.003	 0.016***	
	 [0.003]	 [0.003]	 [0.004]	
Short‐term	funding	(t‐1)	 ‐0.007***	 0.013***	 0.011*	
	 [0.002]	 [0.003]	 [0.006]	
State	support	(0/1)	 0.221***	 ‐0.233***	 0.000	
	 [0.077]	 [0.082]	 [0.000]	
Subsidiary	activity	(0/1)	 ‐8.143***	 ‐5.515***	 1.269	
	 [2.846]	 [1.012]	 [5.018]	
Branch	activity	(0/1)	 ‐7.402***	 ‐5.106***	 2.961	
	 [2.840]	 [0.970]	 [4.838]	
Log	distance	 ‐0.472***	 ‐0.678***	 ‐1.101***	
	 [0.137]	 [0.193]	 [0.305]	
Adjacency	(0/1)	 0.464*	 0.709***	 0.537	
	 [0.244]	 [0.265]	 [0.436]	
Common	legal	origin	(0/1)	 0.249*	 0.161	 ‐0.219	
	 [0.135]	 [0.176]	 [0.301]	
Common	language	(0/1)	 0.537***	 0.356	 0.585	
	 [0.206]	 [0.290]	 [0.451]	
Regional	trade	agreement	(0/1)	 0.700***	 0.341	 ‐0.806	
	 [0.214]	 [0.336]	 [0.798]	
Common	currency	(Euro)	(0/1)	 0.107	 0.129	 1.002**	
	 [0.233]	 [0.243]	 [0.427]	
Host	is	destination	(0/1)	 3.454***	 1.928***	 ‐0.261	
	 [0.399]	 [0.741]	 [1.512]	
Host	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 4.540	 3.326***	 ‐4.741	
	 [2.860]	 [1.039]	 [4.974]	
Destination	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 2.440***	 1.606***	 0.028	
	 [0.608]	 [0.480]	 [0.823]	
Country‐year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	
Year	fixed	effects	 No	 No	 No	
Number	of	observations	 27,908	 24,900	 6,893	
Number	of	panel	units	 5,800	 4,319	 1,066	
R²	within	 0.088	 0.106	 0.229	
R²	between	 0.436	 0.626	 0.740	
R²	overall	 0.440	 0.585	 0.682	
Notes:	This	table	presents	results	from	regressions	with	bank	holding	company	fixed	effects	using	sample	splits	according	
to	the	type	of	the	bank	(commercial,	savings	(including	Landesbanken),	cooperative).	The	dependent	variable	is	the	log	of	
banks’	 total	 international	 assets	 held	 in	 different	 destination	 countries	 by	 the	 domestic	 headquarters,	 their	 foreign	
branches,	or	their	foreign	subsidiaries	 located	in	different	host	countries.	Standard	errors	are	 in	parentheses.	All	bank‐
level	covariates	are	lagged	by	one	year.	***Significant	at	1%	level.	**Significant	at	5%	level.	*	Significant	at	10%	level.	
 
The	most	 interesting	difference	across	the	different	banking	groups	 is	 that	 for	 the	
state	 support	 variable	 though:	 commercial	 banks	 which	 have	 received	 state	 support	
have	increased	rather	than	decreased	their	international	assets.	The	negative	effect	for	
the	 pooled	 regressions	 is	 driven	 by	 the	 savings	 banks.	 This	 result	 is	 interesting	 as	 it	
suggests	 an	 alternative	 interpretation	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 state	 support:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	
state	support	was	associated	with	the	requirement	to	divest	international	activities.	On	
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the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 state	 support	 has	 also	 allowed	 banks	 to	 stabilize	 their	
activities	and	to	expand	their	 international	activities	relative	to	 total	assets	(which	we	
include	 as	 a	 control	 variable).	 Analyzing	whether	 these	 international	 expansions	 have	
increased	or	decreased	bank	risk	would	be	an	interesting	extension	of	our	study.	
Finally,	 most	 results	 for	 the	 financial	 frictions	 are	 similar	 across	 the	 different	
specifications	 as	 well.	 The	 main	 exceptions	 are	 that	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 adjacency	
found	for	the	full	sample	is	driven	to	a	large	extent	by	the	savings	banks,	reflecting	the	
regional	nature	of	their	business	model.	But	adjacency	is	positive	for	all	 three	banking	
groups	and	significant	at	the	ten	percent	level	for	commercial	banks,	too.	Common	legal	
origin,	 common	 language,	 and	 regional	 trade	 agreements	 play	 a	 role	 only	 for	 the	
commercial	banks.	
2.4.5 What	Are	the	Effects	of	Host	Country	Characteristics	and	Regulations?	
Table	 2.6	 presents	 the	 results	 for	 augmenting	 the	 baseline	 specification	 by	
additional	(lagged)	host	country	characteristics.	Host	country	and	year	fixed	effects	are	
now	 included	 separately	 because	 host‐year	 dummies	 would	 be	 collinear	 with	 the	
additional	variables.	We	also	estimate	this	specification	 for	samples	before	and	during	
the	crisis.	
The	 country‐level	 variables	 proxying	 for	 financial	 and	 business	 freedom	 enter	
significantly	with	the	expected	positive	signs.	The	remaining	results	are	hardly	affected.	
Bank‐level	covariates	and	proxies	for	financial	frictions	are	quite	robust	compared	to	the	
baseline	 specification	 in	 Table	 2.1,	 column	 (1).	 The	 joint	 significance	 of	 all	 seven	
variables	proxying	 for	 financial	 frictions	hardly	changes.	The	null	hypothesis	 for	 those	
variables	 being	 jointly	 zero	 can	 be	 rejected	 with	 a	 χ²(6)‐value	 of	 189.02	 at	 the	 one	
percent	significance	level,	which	is	almost	the	exact	same	value	as	in	the	baseline	model.	
All	three	macroprudential	regulations	are	jointly	significantly	different	from	zero	at	
the	 one	 percent	 level.	 Asset	 measures	 are	 strongly	 significant	 whereas	 asset/liability	
measures	and	capital	measures	are	not	significant.	More	restrictive	asset	side	measures	
in	 the	 form	of	 limits	 on	 exposure	 concentration	 and	 caps	on	 foreign	 currency	 lending	
lower	 international	 bank	 assets.	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 expectations	 because	 these	
measures	impact	a	bank’s	international	assets	directly,	as	opposed	to	capital	and	liability	
measures.	
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Table	2.6:	Regressions	with	Host	Country	Characteristics	and	Banking	
Regulation	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	
Baseline	
Baseline	with	
regulatory	
measures	
Before	2007	 After	2007	 Before	2008	 After	2008	
Log	size	(t‐1)	 0.609***	 0.603***	 0.305*	 0.136	 0.731***	 0.062	
	 [0.106]	 [0.106]	 [0.158]	 [0.146]	 [0.130]	 [0.165]	
Capitalization	(t‐1)	 ‐0.018	 ‐0.015	 ‐0.008	 ‐0.075***	 ‐0.016	 ‐0.070***	
	 [0.014]	 [0.014]	 [0.016]	 [0.021]	 [0.017]	 [0.021]	
Wholesale	funding	(t‐1)	 0.008***	 0.008***	 0.001	 0.012***	 0.005**	 0.014***	
	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.003]	 [0.003]	 [0.002]	 [0.004]	
Short‐term	funding	(t‐1)	 0.001	 0.001	 0.004	 ‐0.006***	 0.004	 ‐0.005**	
	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.003]	 [0.002]	 [0.003]	 [0.002]	
State	support	(0/1)	 ‐0.253***	 ‐0.233***	 0.000	 ‐0.138***	 ‐0.126	 ‐0.107	
	 [0.054]	 [0.055]	 [0.000]	 [0.045]	 [0.227]	 [0.088]	
Subsidiary	activity	(0/1)	 ‐6.142***	 ‐6.172***	 ‐8.176***	 ‐9.190***	 ‐6.137***	 ‐10.144***	
	 [0.892]	 [0.931]	 [1.272]	 [1.044]	 [1.109]	 [1.327]	
Branch	activity	(0/1)	 ‐5.175***	 ‐5.206***	 ‐7.659***	 ‐7.576***	 ‐5.475***	 ‐8.478***	
	 [0.873]	 [0.904]	 [1.257]	 [1.022]	 [1.088]	 [1.310]	
Log	distance	 ‐0.587***	 ‐0.587***	 ‐0.606***	 ‐0.593***	 ‐0.603***	 ‐0.615***	
	 [0.202]	 [0.202]	 [0.212]	 [0.218]	 [0.208]	 [0.223]	
Adjacency	(0/1)	 0.370	 0.371	 0.273	 0.401	 0.230	 0.535**	
	 [0.246]	 [0.246]	 [0.242]	 [0.262]	 [0.240]	 [0.269]	
Common	legal	origin	(0/1)	 0.301*	 0.303*	 0.286	 0.321*	 0.266	 0.330*	
	 [0.168]	 [0.168]	 [0.191]	 [0.177]	 [0.183]	 [0.186]	
Common	language	(0/1)	 0.527**	 0.528**	 0.569**	 0.516**	 0.610**	 0.413	
	 [0.252]	 [0.252]	 [0.270]	 [0.256]	 [0.264]	 [0.270]	
Regional	trade	agreement		 0.482*	 0.486**	 0.326	 0.863**	 0.306	 0.862**	
(0/1)	 [0.247]	 [0.248]	 [0.255]	 [0.375]	 [0.244]	 [0.385]	
Common	currency	(Euro)		 0.241	 0.233	 0.293	 0.282	 0.339	 0.293	
(0/1)	 [0.201]	 [0.202]	 [0.238]	 [0.212]	 [0.224]	 [0.239]	
Financial	freedom	(t‐1)	 0.014***	 0.014***	 0.003	 0.006	 0.008**	 0.015*	
	 [0.003]	 [0.003]	 [0.004]	 [0.008]	 [0.004]	 [0.008]	
Business	freedom	(t‐1)	 0.010***	 0.009***	 0.002	 ‐0.019*	 0.008**	 0.004	
	 [0.003]	 [0.003]	 [0.003]	 [0.012]	 [0.003]	 [0.014]	
GDP	per	capita	(t‐1)	 0.079***	 0.083***	 ‐0.031	 0.035	 0.063	 ‐0.072	
	 [0.030]	 [0.029]	 [0.043]	 [0.041]	 [0.040]	 [0.049]	
Host	is	destination	(0/1)	 3.133***	 3.131***	 3.142***	 3.068***	 3.234***	 2.972***	
	 [0.497]	 [0.496]	 [0.560]	 [0.528]	 [0.541]	 [0.536]	
Host	is	financial	center		 2.074**	 2.134**	 4.986***	 4.916***	 2.218*	 6.444***	
(0/1)	 [0.984]	 [0.988]	 [1.396]	 [1.244]	 [1.223]	 [1.491]	
Destination	is	financial		 1.872***	 1.899***	 ‐0.079	 1.934***	 ‐0.092	 1.995***	
center	(0/1)	 [0.353]	 [0.346]	 [0.470]	 [0.386]	 [0.461]	 [0.400]	
Asset	measures	(0‐5)	 	 ‐0.147**	 ‐0.033	 ‐0.134**	 0.088	 ‐0.066	
	 	 [0.063]	 [0.227]	 [0.054]	 [0.178]	 [0.048]	
Asset/liability	measures		 	 0.049	 0.118	 0.158	 ‐0.027	 ‐0.007	
(0‐3)	 	 [0.111]	 [0.293]	 [0.109]	 [0.192]	 [0.149]	
Capital	measures	(0‐3)	 	 ‐0.110	 0.038	 0.200	 ‐0.433	 ‐0.018	
	 	 [0.181]	 [0.079]	 [0.184]	 [0.630]	 [0.206]	
Country‐year	fixed	effects	 Destination	 Destination	 Destination	 Destination	 Destination	 Destination	
Country	fixed	effects	 Host	 Host	 Host	 Host	 Host	 Host	
Year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Number	of	observations	 45,691	 45,691	 23,203	 22,488	 29,030	 16,661	
Number	of	panel	units	 8,694	 8,694	 7,371	 7,312	 7,712	 6,796	
R²	within	 0.056	 0.056	 0.047	 0.040	 0.051	 0.039	
R²	between	 0.544	 0.544	 0.555	 0.550	 0.561	 0.535	
R²	overall	 0.522	 0.522	 0.526	 0.535	 0.530	 0.532	
Notes:	This	 table	presents	 results	 from	 regressions	with	bank	holding	 company	 fixed	 effects	using	 the	 full	 sample,	 i.e.	
pooling	 across	 the	 three	 different	modes	 of	 international	 banking.	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 log	 of	 banks’	 total	
international	assets	held	in	different	destination	countries	through	the	domestic	headquarters,	its	foreign	branches,	or	its	
foreign	subsidiaries	located	in	different	host	countries.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	All	bank‐level	as	well	as	the	
host	country	level	covariates	are	lagged	by	one	year.	***Significant	at	1%	level.	**Significant	at	5%	level.	*Significant	at	
10%	level.	 	
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2.5 Conclusion	
The	 past	 decades	 have	 witnessed	 a	 substantial	 increase	 in	 international	 banking	
which	the	recent	financial	crisis	has	brought	to	an	abrupt	end.	International	banking	has	
declined	significantly,	and	it	is	not	clear	whether	it	will	revert	to	its	pre‐crisis	level	in	the	
near	 future.	 This	 paper	 has	 examined	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 decline	 and	 its	 determinants.	
Using	a	novel	bank‐level	dataset	for	German	bank	holding	companies	and	their	branches	
and	 subsidiaries,	 we	 have	 examined	 their	 international	 activity	 for	 the	 period	 2002‐
2011.		
Stylized	facts	show	that	German	banks	have	withdrawn	from	foreign	markets,	both	
along	 the	 extensive	 and	 the	 intensive	 margin.	 This	 withdrawal	 has	 been	 relatively	
stronger	for	activities	of	foreign	subsidiaries	compared	to	direct	cross‐border	assets	or	
assets	held	through	branches.		
Our	 results	 suggest	 the	 following	 interpretation	 of	 these	 trends	 and	 their	
persistence.	
First,	banks	with	market‐based	funding	models	and,	in	particular,	with	a	high	share	
of	 wholesale	 funding	 have	 higher	 international	 assets.	 Hence,	 persistently	 tighter	
conditions	 on	 funding	 markets	 would	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 internationalization	
strategies	that	banks	will	pursue	in	the	future.	How	persistent	this	adjustment	is	going	
to	be	is	hard	to	predict.	To	the	extent	that	the	re‐regulation	of	the	banking	industry	that	
is	 currently	 taking	 place	 changes	 market	 structures	 in	 banking	 and	 banks’	 funding	
markets,	the	adjustment	is	likely	to	be	sustained.		
Second,	 policy	 interventions	matter.	 Some	 banks	 receiving	 German	 state	 support	
during	 the	crisis	have	 lowered	 their	 international	 assets,	 and	 foreign	macroprudential	
policies	 had	 a	 negative	 impact	 as	 well.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 reductions	 in	 international	
assets	are	associated	with	the	closure	of	foreign	affiliates,	they	are	likely	to	be	persistent.	
Third,	financial	frictions	matter	for	international	banking.	As	in	previous	studies,	we	
find	 that	 geographical	 and	 cultural	 proximity	 has	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 banks’	
international	 assets.	Perhaps	 contrary	 to	 conventional	wisdom,	 the	 impact	of	 financial	
frictions	has	remained	relatively	stable	 throughout	the	crisis	as	well.	The	variables	 for	
which	we	find	a	stronger	effect	during	the	crisis	period	are	adjacency	and	the	presence	
of	 bilateral	 trade	 agreements.	 This	 suggests	 that	 trade‐related	 finance	 has	 become	
relatively	more	important	over	time.	
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2.6 Appendix	to	Chapter	2	
Table	A.2.1:	List	of	Variables	and	Definitions	
Variable	 Definition	 Source	
Dependent	variable	 	 	
Log	total	international	assets		
(intensive	margin)	
Natural		logarithm	of	gross	total	assets	(in	million	€)	held	in	any	
destination	country	by	any	bank	located	in	any	host	country	
External	Position	Reports,	
Deutsche	Bundesbank	
Bank‐level	covariates	 	 	
Log	size		
	
Natural	logarithm	of	banks’	gross	total	assets	 Monthly	Balance	Sheet	
Statistics,	Deutsche	
Bundesbank	
Capitalization	 Ratio	of	total	equity	capital	to	gross	total	assets	 Monthly	Balance	Sheet	
Statistics,	Deutsche	
Bundesbank	
Wholesale	funding		 Liabilities	vis‐à‐vis	banks	(including	central	bank)	/	total	liabilities	 Monthly	Balance	Sheet	
Statistics,	Deutsche	
Bundesbank	
Short‐term	funding		 Total	short‐term	liabilities	(with	maturity	of	up	to	one	year)	/	total	
liabilities	
Monthly	Balance	Sheet	
Statistics,	Deutsche	
Bundesbank	
State	support	 Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	for	bank	holding	companies	that	received	
state	support	during	the	crisis,	0	otherwise	
SoFFin	(German	
Restructuring	Fund)	
http://www.fmsa.de/de/f
msa/soffin/instrumente/
SoFFin‐
Massnahmen/SoFFin‐
Massnahmen.html	
Subsidiary	 Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	for	subsidiary	activity,	0	otherwise	 External	Position	Reports,	
Deutsche	Bundesbank	
Branch	 Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	for	branch	activity,	0	otherwise	 External	Position	Reports,	
Deutsche	Bundesbank	
Bilateral	financial	frictions	 	 	
Log	distance	 Natural	logarithm	of	the	population	weighted	distance	(in	km)	between	
host	and	destination	country	
Centre	d’Etudes	
Prospectives	et	
d’Informations	
Internationales,	CEPII	
Adjacency	 Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	if	two	countries	share	a	common	border,	0	
otherwise	
CEPII	
Common	legal	origin	
	
Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	if	two	countries	have	the	same	legal	origin,	
0	otherwise	
CEPII	
Common	language	
	
Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	if	two	countries	share	a	common	language	
that	is	spoken	by	at	least	9	percent	of	the	population	in	both	countries,	
0	otherwise	
CEPII	
Regional	trade	agreement	 Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	if	two	countries	are	both	members	of	a	
regional	trade	agreement,	0	otherwise	
CEPII	
Common	currency	(Euro)	
	
Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	if	two	countries	share	the	Euro	as	same	
currency,	0	otherwise	
	
Bilateral	trade	 Total	yearly	bilateral	trade	flows	in	thousands	of	euros,	total	trade	in	
goods	(grand	total)	
OECD,	STAN	Bilateral	
Trade	Database	
Unilateral	financial	frictions	 	 	
Business	freedom	 Index	from	0	(repressive)	–	100	(completely	free	business	
environment)		
“measure	of	the	ability	to	start,	operate,	and	close	a	business	that	
represents	the	overall	burden	of	regulation	as	well	as	the	efficiency	of	
government	in	the	regulatory	process.”	
Index	of	Economic	
Freedom,	The	Heritage	
Foundation	
Financial	freedom	 Index	from	0	(repressive)	–	100	(negligible	government	interference)		
“measure	of	banking	efficiency	as	well	as	a	measure	of	independence	
from	government	control	and	interference	in	the	financial	sector.”	
Index	of	Economic	
Freedom,	The	Heritage	
Foundation	
GDP	per	capita	
	
In	thousands	of	euros		 World	Governance	
Indicators,	World	Bank	
Asset	measures	 Index	of	macroprudential	regulations	running	from	0	to	5	capturing	
whether	caps	on	loan‐to‐value	ratios,	caps	on	debt/loan‐to‐income	
ratios,	limits	on	exposure	concentration,	caps	on	foreign	currency	
lending,	and	ceilings	on	credit	or	credit	growth	have	been	in	place	for	a	
given	year.	The	index	is	the	sum	of	individual	dummy	variables	for	the	
specific	asset	measures	being	in	place	(=1)	or	not	(=0).	
International	Monetary	
Fund	(IMF),	Survey	of	
Central	Banks	
Asset/liability	measures		 Index	of	macroprudential	regulations	running	from	0	to	3	capturing	
whether	limits	on	net	open	currency	positions,	limits	on	maturity	
mismatch,	and	reserve	requirements	have	been	in	place	for	a	given	
year.	The	index	is	the	sum	of	individual	dummy	variables	for	the	
specific	asset/liability	measures	being	in	place	(=1)	or	not	(=0).	
IMF	
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Capital	measures		 Index	of	macroprudential	regulations	running	from	0	to	3	capturing	
whether	countercyclical	capital	requirement,	dynamic	provisioning,	
and	restrictions	on	profit	distribution	have	been	in	place	for	a	given	
year.	The	index	is	the	sum	of	individual	dummy	variables	for	the	
specific	capital	measures	being	in	place	(=1)	or	not	(=0).	
IMF	
Other	country	level	
covariates	
	 	
Host	is	destination	 Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	if	host	country	is	destination	country,	0	
otherwise	
	
Host	(destination)	is	financial	
center	
Dummy	variable	equal	to	1	if	host	(destination)	country	is	a	financial	
center,	0	otherwise	
Deutsche	Bundesbank	
Financial	crisis	dummies	 	 	
August	2007	 Equal	to	1	after	(and	including	2007),	0	before	 	
September	2008	 Equal	to	1	after	(and	including	2008),	0	before	 	
	
	
Table	A.2.2:	Summary	Statistics	for	Variables	
An	 asterisk	 (*)	 indicates	 that	 minima	 and	 maxima	 for	 these	 variables	 cannot	 be	 disclosed	 due	 to	
confidentiality	reasons.	
Variable	 Observations	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	
Dependent	Variable	 	 	 	 	 	
Log	total	international	assets	 59,701 1.39 3.96	 * *
Bank	level	covariates	 	
Log	size		 59,701 11.27 1.58	 * *
Capitalization	 59,701 4.29 2.05	 * *
Wholesale	funding	 59,701 42.12 20.37	 * *
Short‐term	funding		 59,701 63.17 22.49	 * *
State	support	(0/1)	 59,701 0.12 0.33	 0 1
Savings	bank	(0/1)	 59,701 0.42 0.49	 0 1
Cooperative	bank	(0/1)	 59,701 0.12 0.32	 0 1
Subsidiary	activity(0/1)	 59,701 0.24 0.43	 0 1
Branch	activity	(0/1)	 59,701 0.28 0.45	 0 1
Bilateral	financial	frictions	 	
Log	distance	 59,701 7.71 1.30	 2.13 9.88
Adjacency	(0/1)	 59,701 0.14 0.34	 0 1
Common	legal	origin	(0/1)	 59,701 0.21 0.41	 0 1
Common	language	(0/1)	 59,701 0.12 0.33	 0 1
Regional	trade	agreement	(0/1)	 59,701 0.60 0.49	 0 1
Common	currency	(Euro)	(0/1)	 59,701 0.22 0.41	 0 1
Log	bilateral	trade	 49,716 8.97 2.25	 ‐0.61 21.07
Unilateral	financial	frictions	(host	country)	 	 	 	 	
Financial	freedom		 45,691 63.13 14.65	 10 90
Business	freedom	 45,691 84.04 10.21	 40 100
GDP	per	capita		 45,691 24.67 6.98	 9 92
Asset	measures		 45,691 0.17 0.48	 0 5
Asset/liability	measures		 45,691 0.06 0.27	 0 3
Capital	Measures		 45,691 0.02 0.15	 0 3
Other	country	level	covariates	 	
Host	is	destination	(0/1)	 59,701 0.04 0.19	 0 1
Host	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 59,701 0.29 0.45	 0 1
Destination	is	financial	center	(0/1)	 59,701 0.17 0.38	 0 1
Financial	crisis	dummies	 	
August	2007	(0/1)	 59,701 0.55 0.50	 0 1
September	2008	(0/1)	 59,701 0.44 0.50	 0 1
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3. FISCAL	RULES	AND	COMPLIANCE	EXPECTATIONS15	
3.1 Introduction	
Constitutional	 fiscal	 rules	 such	as	a	balanced	budget	 requirement	have	been	used	
for	decades	 in	 federal	countries	such	as	Switzerland	and	 the	US	states	 to	 limit	deficits	
and	 debts	 of	 sub‐national	 jurisdictions	 (for	 a	 survey	 of	 current	 fiscal	 rules	 see	 IMF,	
2012).	 On	 the	 national	 level,	 the	 euro	 area	 debt	 crisis	 has	 triggered	 a	 wave	 of	 new	
statutory	 and	 constitutional	 budget	 constraints	 in	 order	 to	 boost	 public	 borrower	
reputation.	 The	 Fiscal	 Compact,	 accepted	 by	 all	 EU	 countries	 except	 the	 UK	 and	 the	
Czech	Republic	 in	2012,	has	been	another	milestone	 for	 the	spread	of	numerical	 fiscal	
constraints.	The	signatory	countries	commit	to	the	introduction	of	national	debt	brakes	
with	well‐defined	numerical	contents	(i.e.	governments	are	required	to	limit	structural	
deficits	 to	 a	maximum	 of	 0.5	 percent	 of	 GDP,	 and	 to	 lower	 debt	 levels	 systematically	
when	exceeding	60	percent	of	GDP,	European	Council,	2011).		
A	 growing	 literature	 examines	 the	 impact	 of	 numerical	 fiscal	 rules	 based	 on	
aggregate	fiscal	performance	in	different	regional	contexts.	The	standard	approach	is	the	
estimation	 of	 cross‐section	 or	 panel	 models	 for	 the	 selected	 jurisdictions	 and	 their	
deficit	 or	 debt	 performance	 (for	 the	US	 see	Eichengreen	 and	Bayoumi,	 1994,	 Poterba,	
1996;	for	Europe	see	Debrun,	2000,	Lagona	and	Padovano,	2007,	Debrun	et	al.,	2008;	for	
OECD	 countries	 see	 Dahan	 and	 Strawczynski,	 2010;	 and	 for	 Swiss	 cantons	 and	
municipalities	 see	 Feld	 and	 Kirchgässner,	 2008;	 Krogstrup	 and	 Wälti,	 2008).	 A	
shortcoming	of	these	highly	aggregated	approaches	is	that	they	do	not	reveal	how	fiscal	
rules	impact	on	the	beliefs	of	fiscal	decision	makers	regarding	the	credibility	of	the	fiscal	
rule	and	hence	their	expectations	for	compliance.	The	present	paper	aims	to	fill	this	gap	
by	examining	theoretically	and	empirically	the	intermediate	step	between	fiscal	rules	on	
the	one	hand	and	decision	makers’	expectations	on	future	fiscal	outcomes	on	the	other	
hand.	
A	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 an	 effective	 and	 credible	 rule	 is	 that	 it	 anchors	
expectations	consistent	with	the	rule’s	constraints.	This	logic	has	long	been	the	key	for	
assessing	 monetary	 rules.	 In	 the	 monetary	 context,	 incentives	 to	 generate	 surprise	
																																																								
15	This	chapter	is	based	on	joint	work	with	Friedrich	Heinemann,	Eckhard	Janeba,	and	Frank	Streif,	which	
has	been	published	as	“Fiscal	Rules	and	Compliance	Expectations	–	Evidence	for	the	German	Debt	Brake”,	
ZEW	Discussion	Paper	No.	14‐034,	Mannheim.	See	Heinemann,	Janeba,	Schröder,	and	Streif	(2014b).	
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inflation	may	undermine	the	credibility	of	an	inflation	rule	(Kydland	and	Prescott,	1977;	
Barro	 and	 Gordon,	 1983).	 Hence,	 a	 monetary	 rule’s	 effectiveness	 can	 be	 assessed	 by	
analyzing	its	impact	on	inflationary	expectations.	For	fiscal	policy,	an	analogy	applies	for	
a	 deficit	 rule	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 compliance	 expectations.	 Due	 to	 the	 political	 costs	 of	
fiscal	consolidation,	politicians	may	face	incentives	not	to	comply	with	the	deficit	rule	in	
the	 future.	Whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 new	 rule	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 binding	 constraint	
should	 be	detectable	 from	compliance	 expectations.	This	 should	hold	 in	particular	 for	
the	 expectations	 of	 those	 political	 actors	 who	 take	 the	 relevant	 budgetary	 decisions.	
Therefore,	the	impact	of	fiscal	rules	on	politicians’	expectations	offers	a	natural	way	to	
assess	the	credibility	and	effectiveness	of	a	new	rule‐based	fiscal	regime.	
Although	 the	 underlying	 idea	 is	 of	 obvious	 and	 fundamental	 importance,	 our	
contribution	 is	 the	 first	 to	 study	 through	 a	 survey	 of	 politicians	 to	what	 extent	 policy	
makers	expect	compliance	with	a	new	fiscal	rule.	Thus,	it	serves	to	fill	a	striking	gap	in	
the	 literature	on	 fiscal	rules’	effectiveness.	The	approach	has	a	 further	strength:	While	
studies	on	the	link	between	rules	and	observable	fiscal	performance	are	only	applicable	
on	 an	 ex	 post‐basis	 (i.e.	 after	 many	 years	 of	 experience	 with	 an	 existing	 rule)	 our	
method	 can	 be	 employed	 ex	 ante	 (i.e.	 once	 a	 rule	 has	 come	 into	 existence	 but	
performance	 data	 are	 not	 yet	 available).	 Furthermore,	 it	 opens	 the	 black	 box	 of	
aggregation	and,	 instead,	 looks	 into	 the	 impact	of	 a	 fiscal	 rule	on	 the	 (heterogeneous)	
expectations	of	those	individual	politicians	who	actually	take	the	budgetary	decisions.	
The	 institutional	 context	 of	 our	 analysis	 is	 the	 German	 debt	 brake.	 We	 explore	
expectation	 formation	 for	 the	members	 of	 all	 German	 state	 parliaments	 regarding	 an	
existing	 fiscal	 rule	 that	 becomes	 binding	 only	 several	 years	 from	 now.	 The	 case	 of	
Germany’s	debt	brake	is	of	interest	for	the	understanding	of	fiscal	rules	more	generally	
and	 beyond	 Germany:	 First,	 the	 German	 government	 has	 been	 a	 major	 advocate	 for	
establishing	the	Fiscal	Compact	in	Europe.	In	fact,	in	many	dimensions	the	provisions	of	
the	 Fiscal	 Compact	 are	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 Germany’s	 debt	 brake.	 Therefore,	 a	 better	
understanding	of	the	German	debt	brake	will	also	be	helpful	for	assessing	the	Compact’s	
consequences	for	other	EU	countries.	Second,	the	German	debt	brake	is	characterized	by	
lagged	implementation	since	its	binding	constraints	are	phased	in	over	a	longer	period	
(for	 the	 central	 level	 until	 the	 year	 2016	 and	 for	 the	 state	 level	 in	 2020).	 Lagged	
implementation	is	a	frequent	strategy	to	realize	far	reaching	institutional	reforms	since	
it	helps	to	overcome	reform	resistance	(see	Buchanan,	1994,	 for	a	general	discussion).	
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At	the	same	time,	the	transition	process	raises	substantial	credibility	questions	and	the	
German	 debt	 brake	 example	 offers	 the	 opportunity	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 general	
conditions	under	which	lagged	implementation	can	nevertheless	be	credible.	
Our	 analysis	 of	 expectation	 formation	 comprises	 a	 theoretical	 and	 an	 empirical	
contribution.	First	we	develop	a	theoretical	model	with	three	periods	(labelled	0,	1,	2)	
describing	 the	 dynamic	 fiscal	 decision	 situation	 in	 an	 environment	 characterized	 by	
phasing	 in	 a	 zero	 deficit	 rule.	 Decisions	 on	 deficits	 are	 dynamic	 by	 nature	 and	 imply	
trade‐offs	 between	 instant	 and	 future	 political	 costs	 from	 fiscal	 consolidation.	 The	
model’s	key	feature	is	the	existence	of	a	fiscal	rule	which	takes	effect	only	in	the	future	
(period	2).	A	fiscal	shock	in	the	near	future	(period	1)	makes	compliance	with	the	fiscal	
rule	uncertain	when	the	fiscal	rule	is	not	credible.	In	period	1,	the	government	trades	off	
the	benefits	and	costs	of	adhering	 to	 the	 fiscal	rule.	We	show	that	compliance	 is	more	
likely	i)	the	lower	the	initial	deficit	in	period	0,	ii)	the	lower	the	bailout	expectations,	iii)	
the	 tighter	 the	 fiscal	 rule,	 and	 iv)	 the	 higher	 the	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 0.	
Furthermore,	the	model	predicts	that	insiders	(defined	to	be	members	of	parties	of	the	
incumbent	 government	 or	 within‐state	 parliamentarians)	 have	 more	 optimistic	
compliance	expectations	 than	outsiders	 (opposition	members,	out‐of‐state	politicians).	
Here,	 the	model	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 two	 possible	 explanations:	 asymmetric	
information	 between	 insiders	 and	 outsiders	 on	 the	 occurring	 fiscal	 shocks	 and	
overconfidence	 on	 the	 side	 of	 insiders.	 The	 model	 thus	 captures	 key	 features	 of	 the	
German	debt	 rule	 as	well	 as	 similar	 institutional	 innovations	 elsewhere	 (e.g.	 the	 joint	
implementation	of	European	and	national	fiscal	rules)	and	guides	the	empirical	analysis.	
In	 a	 second	 step,	 we	 test	 these	 model	 predictions	 on	 the	 drivers	 of	 compliance	
expectations	based	on	a	unique	survey	of	members	of	all	16	German	state	parliaments,	
who	 have	been	 contacted	with	 a	 questionnaire	 relating	 to	 the	 new	debt	 brake.	 In	 the	
survey	 we	 elicited	 responses	 for	 the	 politicians’	 expectations	 on	 the	 own	 state	
complying	with	the	new	rule	by	the	year	2020,	on	other	states’	compliance,	and	on	the	
likelihood	 of	 sanctions	 or	 bailout	 if	 a	 state	 violates	 the	 new	 rule	 in	 2020.	 Since	 the	
survey	 was	 not	 anonymous,	 individual	 characteristics	 (such	 as	 education,	 party	
membership,	 etc.)	 and	 state	 characteristics	 (such	 as	 current	 fiscal	 position	 and	 future	
need	 for	 fiscal	 consolidation)	 can	be	used	 to	 systematically	 study	 the	determinants	 of	
compliance	expectations.	We	obtained	answers	from	639	politicians	who	provided	their	
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compliance	 expectations	 for	 16	 states,	 which	 leaves	 us	 with	 more	 than	 10,000	
observations.	
The	 survey	 shows	 that	 the	 debt	 brake’s	 credibility	 is	 far	 from	 perfect.	 The	
heterogeneity	 of	 compliance	 expectations	 in	 the	 survey	 closely	 corresponds	 to	 our	
theoretical	 predictions.	 States’	 initial	 fiscal	 conditions,	 specific	 state	 fiscal	 rules	 and	
bailout	 perceptions	 matter.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 a	 robust	 asymmetry	 in	 compliance	
expectations	 between	 insiders	 and	 outsiders	 (both	 for	 in‐state	 versus	 out‐of‐state	
politicians	 and	 the	 government	 versus	 opposition	 dimension).	 Insiders	 tend	 to	 be	
significantly	 more	 optimistic	 than	 outsiders	 regarding	 the	 likelihood	 of	 their	 state’s	
compliance.	Based	on	the	guidance	of	our	theoretical	model	we	diagnose	overconfidence	
of	 insiders	 (and	 not	 noisy	 information)	 as	 driving	 this	 asymmetry.	 These	 detailed	
insights	improve	our	understanding	on	how	the	credibility	of	a	new	national	fiscal	rule	
can	be	strengthened	in	general.	Our	results	point	to	the	importance	of	no‐bailout	rules,	
sustainable	initial	fiscal	conditions	and	complementary	sub‐national	rules.	
Our	 paper	 is	 related	 to	 various	 other	 literatures.	 A	 few	 recent	 papers	 analyze	
theoretically	the	role	of	fiscal	rules	in	a	political	economy	framework,	such	as	Azzimonti,	
Battaglini	 and	 Coate	 (2008).	 Janeba	 (2012)	 considers	 the	 role	 of	 delay	 in	 making	 a	
German	type	debt	brake	binding	when	the	fiscal	rule	itself	is	credible.	The	incentives	of	
bailouts	in	a	federal	context	are	considered	by	Goodspeed	(2002).	Kirchgässner	(2002)	
and	Voigt	and	Blume	(2011)	examine	empirically	the	effects	of	fiscal	constraints	on	fiscal	
outcomes.	Expectation	effects	of	fiscal	rules	with	respect	to	bond	market	investors	play	a	
role	for	studies	which	look	into	the	impact	of	fiscal	rules	on	risk	premia	of	government	
bonds	 (Heinemann,	 Osterloh	 and	 Kalb,	 2014;	 Iara	 and	 Wolff,	 2014).	 Surveys	 of	
politicians	have	been	used	in	recent	research	by	two	of	the	present	authors.	Heinemann	
and	Janeba	(2011)	use	a	survey	of	members	of	Germany’s	national	parliament	to	study	
ideological	bias	in	tax	policy.	Janeba	and	Osterloh	(2013)	use	a	survey	of	mayors	in	the	
German	 state	 of	 Baden‐Württemberg	 to	 empirically	 motivate	 the	 spatial	 structure	 of	
local	 tax	 competition	 in	 a	 theoretical	 tax	 competition	model.	Heinemann	and	Osterloh	
(2013)	 survey	 members	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 regarding	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	
minimum	tax	 for	companies	 in	 the	EU	 in	order	 to	disentangle	 ideological	and	national	
preferences	of	politicians.	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 Section	 3.2	 sets	 up	 the	 theoretical	
model	 and	 derives	 comparative	 statics	 for	 the	 likelihood	 of	 compliance	with	 the	 debt	
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brake.	 Section	3.3	describes	 the	original	 survey	and	provides	background	 information	
on	 Germany’s	 political	 and	 fiscal	 system	 and	 the	 debt	 brake.	 Our	 main	 findings	 are	
presented	and	discussed	in	section	3.4.	Finally,	section	3.5	concludes.	
3.2 A	Model	of	Compliance	with	a	Fiscal	Rule		
We	model	 the	 dynamic	 fiscal	 decision	 of	 an	 incumbent	 government	 to	 reduce	 its	
deficit	in	order	to	meet	the	target	of	a	fiscal	rule	becoming	effective	only	in	the	distant	
future.	 Political	 costs	 of	 deficit	 reduction	 are	modeled	 in	 a	 reduced	 form	 in	 order	 to	
focus	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	 fiscal	 rule.	 Lack	 of	 government	
commitment	and	deficit	shocks	make	compliance	non‐trivial	and	uncertain.	Specifically,	
we	 assume	 that	 the	 economy	 lasts	 for	 three	 periods,	ݐ ൌ 0,1,2,	 where	 period	 0	 is	 the	
present,	period	1	is	a	future	point	in	time	when	a	fiscal	shock	occurs,	and	period	2	is	the	
time	when	the	fiscal	rule	becomes	binding	(i.e.,	2020	in	the	context	of	the	German	debt	
brake).		
The	main	variable	of	interest	is	the	government	deficit	݀௧.	The	initial	deficit	is	given	
by	݀଴ ൐ 0	and	 is	 exogenous	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 incumbent	 government	 in	
period	0.	The	fiscal	rule	(i.e.,	the	debt	brake)	requires	the	government	to	run	(at	least)	a	
balanced	budget	in	period	2.	If	this	target	is	met,	that	is,	݀ଶ ൑ 0,	the	government	obtains	
payoff	ݑ௖	(subscript	c	 for	compliance).	Otherwise	the	government	 is	noncompliant	and	
obtains	payoff	ܾ ∙ ݑ௡௖,	where	ܾ ൑ 1	is	an	endogenous	variable	that	 is	discussed	in	more	
detail	 below	 (subscript	 nc	 for	 non‐compliance).	 We	 assume	ݑ௖ െ ݑ௡௖ ൐ 0		 so	 that	 the	
gross	gain	from	compliance	is	positive.	The	government	can	reach	the	target	of	the	fiscal	
rule	 in	 two	 steps	 by	 reducing	 the	 deficit	 in	 periods	 0	 and	 1	 by	 the	 amounts	ݎ଴	and	ݎଵ,	
respectively.	 A	 negative	 value	 of	ݎ௧,	 for	 		ݐ ൌ 0,1,	 represents	 the	 opposite	 of	 fiscal	
consolidation,	 called	 fiscal	 profligacy.	 We	 model	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 a	 reduced	 form	
without	 specifying	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 fiscal	 adjustment	 (i.e.,	 tax	 increases	 and/or	
expenditure	cuts).		
Deficit	 reduction	 is	 costly	 for	 the	 government	 in	 the	 period	 when	 it	 takes	 place	
because	 approval	 ratings	 of	 the	 government	 or	 reelection	 chances	 are	 harmed.	 An	
increase	in	the	fiscal	deficit	works	in	the	opposite	direction.	We	focus	on	the	concurrent	
cost	 even	 though	 the	 cost	 of	 permanent	 deficit	 reduction	 may	 spill	 over	 to	 future	
periods.	We	 thus	 implicitly	 assume	 that	 voters	 and	 politicians	 care	mostly	 about	 the	
change	 of	 the	deficit,	 rather	 than	 its	 level.	The	cost	 function	 for	permanently	 reducing	
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the	deficit	by	r	is	c(r)	in	the	period	when	the	adjustment	is	made,	and	has	the	properties	
ܿሺݎሻ ⋛ 0	for	ݎ ⋛ 0,	 and	 c’>0,	 c’’	 >	 0	 .	 Strict	 convexity	 implies	 that	 spreading	 a	 given	
deficit	reduction	over	time	is	efficient,	all	else	being	equal.		
The	 deficit	 in	 period	 1	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 initial	 deficit	 d0	 and	 the	 reduction	 r0	
undertaken	in	period	0.	The	deficit	d1	is	stochastic	due	to	a	shock	influencing	the	deficit	
in	 period	 1.	 The	 shock	 is	 labeled	 s	 and	 is	 drawn	 from	 the	 uniform	 distribution	 with	
support	ൣݏ, ݏ൧.	 The	 probability	 density	 function	 is	 thus	൫ݏ െ ݏ൯ିଵ ൌ: ܵିଵ.	 When	 putting	
these	elements	together	the	actual	deficit	in	period	1	is		 	 	
݀ଵ ൌ ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏ.																															 	 			 	 (1)	
In	period	1	the	government	changes	the	deficit	by	choosing	r1	so	that		
	 	 	 ݀ଶ ൌ ݀ଵ െ ݎଵ.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
By	assumption	no	shock	is	assumed	to	take	place	in	period	2.	The	government	payoff	is	
given	by		
ܷ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜሾݒ െ ܿሺݎଵሻሿ,	 	 	 	 	 (3)	
where	ݒ ൌ ݑ௖	when	the	government	is	compliant	in	period	2,	that	is	d2	≤	0,	and	ݒ ൌ ܾݑ௡௖	
when	not.		Let	ߜ ൑ 1		be	the	discount	factor.16	
3.2.1 Credible	Fiscal	Rule	
We	start	with	a	benchmark	situation	in	which	the	fiscal	rule	݀ଶ ൑ 0	is	credible	and	
the	 government	 must	 comply	 with	 it	 regardless	 of	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 shock	 in	
period	1.	In	this	situation	the	government	exactly	meets	the	fiscal	target	because	further	
deficit	reduction	is	costly.	Therefore	deficit	reduction	in	period	1	is	ݎଵ ൌ ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏ.	The	
expected	utility	from	compliance	is	then	
			 	 		ܧሾܷሿ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂݑ௖ െ ଵௌ ׬ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏሻ
௦
௦ ݀ݏቃ,		 	 (4)	
where	we	made	use	of	the	assumption	that	shocks	are	uniformly	distributed.	The	costs	
of	compliance	come	 from	the	cost	of	deficit	 reduction	 in	period	0	plus	 the	discounted,	
probability	weighted	 cost	 in	 period	 1,	which	 depend	 on	 the	 initial	 deficit	d0,	 period	 0	
deficit	reduction	r0,	and	the	magnitude	of	the	realized	shock	s.	
The	government	influences	the	expected	utility	by	choosing	r0,	which	in	turn	affects	
the	 amount	 and	 costs	 of	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 1.	 The	 optimal	 initial	 deficit	
																																																								
16	We	could	discount	utility	in	period	2	by	ߜଶ	instead	of	ߜ.		Doing	so	would	simply	rescale	the	utility	level	v,	
without	affecting	results.	We	omit	the	complication	in	order	to	save	on	notation.	
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reduction	 is	 found	 by	maximizing	 (4)	 with	 respect	 to	 r0.	 The	 optimum	ݎ଴෥ 	is	 implicitly	
given	by	the	condition		 	
	 	 	 ఋሾ௖ሺௗబି௥బ෦ା௦ሻି௖൫ௗబି௥బ෦ା௦൯ሿௌ ൌ ܿᇱሺݎ଴෥ሻ.	 	 	 				 (5)	
Strict	convexity	of	the	cost	function	ensures	that	the	second	order	condition	holds.	
The	right	hand	side	of	(5)	represents	the	marginal	cost	of	increasing	deficit	reduction	in	
period	0.	 The	 left	 hand	 side	 captures	 the	marginal	 benefit	 of	 doing	 so.	An	 increase	 in	
period	0	deficit	reduction	decreases	the	range	of	feasible	deficits	in	period	1,	which	on	
net	 saves	 cost	ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴෥ ൅ ݏሻ െ ܿ൫݀଴ െ ݎ଴෥ െ ݏ൯.	 	 Inserting	 the	 optimal	 value	ݎ଴෥ 	into	 (4)	
gives	the	maximal	utility	from	compliance	with	a	credible	deficit	rule.	
3.2.2 Lack	of	Commitment	
In	contrast	to	the	previous	section,	we	now	assume	that	the	compliance	decision	is	
not	forced	by	a	credible	rule.	The	cost	of	compliance	in	period	1	becomes	high	if	the	level	
of	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 0	 is	 low	 and/or	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 fiscal	 shock	 in	
period	1	 is	bad.	 In	such	a	situation,	a	government	may	find	it	attractive	not	to	comply.	
We	analyze	the	conditions	under	which	it	is	in	the	government’s	interest	(not)	to	comply	
with	the	fiscal	target.	For	the	time	being	we	focus	on	the	political	decision	maker	and	her	
interest	 in	 compliance.	 Later	 we	 consider	 how	 other	 individuals	 (such	 as	 opposition	
politicians	or	observers	from	outside	of	state)	assess	the	likelihood	of	compliance.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 government	may	 still	 choose	 to	 comply.	 Then	 the	 payoff	 is	
exactly	as	described	in	the	previous	section.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	government	does	
not	comply	with	 the	 fiscal	rule	we	assume	that	 the	degree	of	non‐compliance	matters.	
This	seems	economically	reasonable	and	makes	the	analysis	more	tractable.	Specifically,	
the	 gross	 benefit	 to	 non‐compliance	 is	ܾሺݎଵሻݑ௡௖,	where	ܾሺݎଵሻ ൑ 1.	 The	 function	ܾሺݎଵሻ	is	
increasing	 and	 strictly	 concave	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 1:	
ܾᇱሺݎଵሻ ൐ 0 ൐ ܾ′′ሺݎଵሻ.	Above	we	made	the	assumption	that	the	additional	gross	benefit	of	
compliance	ݑ௖ െ ݑ௡௖	is	always	positive.	This	implies	that	even	for	large	values	of	ݎଵ,	and	
thus	ܾሺݎଵሻ → 1,	a	small	level	of	non‐compliance	carries	a	non‐negligible	loss	in	payoff.	In	
other	words,	missing	the	target	even	slightly,	carries	a	significant	penalty.17	
																																																								
17	The	function	ܾሺݎଵሻ	could	depend	on	the	realization	of	the	shock	s	and/or	the	amount	of	deficit	reduction	in	period	0,	ݎ଴.	In	practice	voters	may	have	an	imperfect	memory	about	the	amount	of	fiscal	consolidation	in	 the	more	 distant	 past,	 and	 an	 incomplete	 understanding	 of	 the	 origins	 of	 fiscal	 deficits	 (high	 initial	
deficit	vs.	size	of	 fiscal	shock).	We	therefore	choose	the	analytically	much	simpler	approach	and	assume	
that	the	function	ܾ	depends	only	on	deficit	reduction	in	period	1.		
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The	 stochastic	 nature	 of	 the	 government	 deficit	 in	 period	 1	 makes	 it	 uncertain	
whether	 compliance	 occurs.	 An	 important	 variable	 in	 our	 subsequent	 analysis	 is	 the	
probability	 of	 compliance	 p.	 We	 are	 interested	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 p	 and	
exogenous	 parameters	 of	 the	model,	 such	 as	 the	 initial	 deficit	d0,	 the	 gross	 gain	 from	
compliance	u,		possible	bailout	expectations,	as	well	as	additional	fiscal	rules	restricting	
the	maximum	deficit	level	in	period	1	(prior	to	the	existing	fiscal	rule	in	period	2).	The	
lack	of	commitment	requires	that	we	solve	the	model	by	backward	induction.		
	
Period	1.		
The	simple	payoff	structure	ሺݑ௖, ܾሺݎଵሻ ൉ ݑ௡௖ሻ	combined	with	costly	deficit	reduction	
makes	the	analysis	straightforward.	When	the	government	complies	with	the	fiscal	rule	
it	chooses	ݎଵ ൌ ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏ,	which	implies	d2	=	0.	There	is	no	benefit	of	overachieving	the	
fiscal	target	because	deficit	reduction	is	costly.	The	payoff	to	compliance	from	a	period	1	
perspective	is	then		
௖ܷ ൌ ݑ௖ െ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏሻ.		 	 	 	 	 (6)	
If	the	government	does	not	comply	with	the	fiscal	rule	its	payoff	is	ܾሺݎଵሻݑ௡௖ െ ܿሺݎଵሻ.	
The	optimal	level	of	fiscal	consolidation	(or	fiscal	profligacy)	in	this	regime	is	found	by	
maximizing	 the	 payoff	 with	 respect	 to	ݎଵ.	 The	 first	 order	 condition	 reads	ܾᇱሺݎଵሻݑ௡௖ െ
ܿᇱሺݎଵሻ ൌ 0,	and	the	second	order	condition	is	fulfilled	by	assumption	on	the	properties	of	
functions	ܾሺݎଵሻ	and	ܿሺݎሻ.	Denote	the	optimal	choice	by	ݎଵ௡௖∗ 	and	the	(period	1)	net	benefit	
from	optimal	non‐compliance	by		
ܷ௡௖∗ ൌ ܾሺݎଵ௡௖∗ ሻݑ௡௖ െ ܿሺݎଵ௡௖∗ ሻ.	 	 	 	 	 (7)	
A	 comparison	 of	 (6)	 and	 (7)	 reveals	 that	 compliance	 is	 preferable	 to	 non‐
compliance	if	and	only	if	 	 	 	
ܿሺ݀ଵሻ ൑ ∆u ∶ൌ ݑ௖ െ ܷ௡௖∗ ,	 	 	 	 	 (8)	
that	 is,	 the	cost	of	reducing	the	deficit	to	zero	under	compliance	is	not	higher	than	the	
gross	 gain	 from	 compliance	 measured	 by	∆ݑ.	 The	 cost	 of	 deficit	 reduction	ܿሺrሻ	is	 a	
monotone	 function	 of	 r	 and	ܷ௡௖∗ 	is	 independent	 of	݀଴, ݎ଴ 	and	ݏ.	We	 can	 therefore	
invert	(8)	when	it	holds	with	equality,	and	define	a	critical	 level	of	 the	period	1	deficit	
for	 compliance	 to	 occur,	 namely,	݀ଵ∗ ൌ ܿିଵሺ∆ݑሻ.	 For	 d1	 less	 than	 or	 equal	 to	݀ଵ∗,	 the	
government	will	choose	to	be	compliant,	otherwise	not.		
Using	(1),	the	threshold	level	defines	implicitly	a	maximum	level	of	the	deficit	shock	
s,	called	s*,	that	is	consistent	with	d2	=	0.	The	critical	level	is	given	by		
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	 	 	 ݏ∗ ൌ ݀ଵ∗ ൅ ݎ଴ െ ݀଴ ൌ ܿିଵሺ∆ݑሻ ൅ ݎ଴ െ ݀଴.	 	 	 (9)	
Instead	 of	 stating	 government	 compliance	 in	 terms	 of	 period	 1	 deficit	 (݀ଵ∗),	
condition	(9)	allows	us	to	restate	the	same	decision	in	terms	of	the	realized	value	of	the	
shock	s:	For	s	≤	s*	the	government	is	compliant,	otherwise	not.	Note	that	the	threshold	
level	s*	 is	a	positive	 function	of	 the	additional	gain	 from	compliance	and	of	 the	deficit	
reduction	 in	 period	 0,	 but	 depends	 negatively	 on	 the	 initial	 deficit	 d0.	We	 thus	 write	
ݏ∗ ൌ ݏሺݎ଴, ∆ݑ, ݀଴ሻ.	 Recall	 that	 r0	 is	 exogenous	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 period	 1,	 but	
endogenous	ex	ante	(unlike	the	other	variables).	
Given	a	uniform	probability	density	function	for	s	we	now	use	(9)	to	introduce	the	
probability	of	compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule	(when	ݏ∗ ∈ ሾݏ, ݏሿ)			
	 	 	 ݌ ൌ ௦∗ି௦௦ି௦ ൌ
௖షభሺ∆௨ሻା௥బିௗబି௦
ௌ 		 	 	 	 	 (10)	
where	ܵ ൌ ݏ െ ݏ.	The	 probability	 p	 is	 the	 key	 object	 for	 our	 further	 analysis	 and	 lies	
between	0	and	1	under	suitable	assumptions	on	 the	size	of	d0	and	S.18	We	make	those	
assumptions,	as	this	leads	to	an	empirically	relevant	setup.	The	probability	depends	on	
(ݎ଴, ∆ݑ, ݀଴ሻ.	Note	in	particular	that		
	 	 డ௣డ௥బ 	ൌ 	െ	
డ௣
డௗబ 	ൌ 	
ଵ
௤ௌ ൐ 0,
డ௣
డሺ∆௨ሻ 	ൌ 	
௖షభᇲሺ∆୳ሻ
ௌ ൐ 0,
డ௣
డௗబ 	ൌ െ	
ଵ
ௌ ൏ 0.		 (11)	
The	 probability	 of	 compliance	 p	 increases	 (decreases)	 with	 the	 level	 of	 period	 0	
deficit	reduction	(initial	deficit).		
The	 above	 setup	 is	 fairly	 simplistic	 overall.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 captures	 a	
reasonable	and	 intuitive	aspect	of	 the	 compliance	with	 fiscal	 rules.	Compliance	with	a	
fiscal	rule	in	the	distant	future	requires	that	fiscal	conditions	in	the	near	future	turn	out	
to	be	somewhat	favorable	and	the	current	fiscal	conditions	are	not	too	bad.	
	
Period	0.	
We	now	turn	 to	 the	analysis	of	period	0,	 in	which	 the	government	chooses	r0	and	
therefore	 affects	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	 via	 (10).	 From	 the	 incumbent	
government’s	view	in	period	0	the	utility	is	uncertain	due	to	the	shock	s.	The	expected	
payoff	is			
																																																								
18	First,	the	probability	is	strictly	positive	when	ݏ∗ ൐ ݏ,	which	for	given	ݎ଴	requires	݀଴	and	ݏ	to	be	relatively	
small.	The	probability	of	compliance	is	less	than	one	when	ݏ∗ ൏ ݏ,	which	holds	for	relatively	high	values	of	
the	initial	deficit	݀଴	and	maximum	shock	ݏ.		
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ܧሾܷሿ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜܵ ቎නሺݑ௖ െ
௦∗
௦
ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏሻሻ݀ݏ ൅ නܷ௡௖∗
௦
௦∗
݀ݏ቏	
	ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂܷ௡௖∗ ൅ ݌∆ݑ െ ଵௌ ׬ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏሻ
௦∗
௦ ݀ݏቃ	 	 	 (12)	
The	 first	 line	 shows	 in	 square	 brackets	 the	 utility	 (periods	 1	 and	 2)	 under	
compliance	 and	 non‐compliance,	 respectively,	 depending	 on	 the	 realization	 of	 the	
shock	s.	 For	 low	 levels	 of	 s,	 s	 ≤	 s*,	 the	 government	 complies	 in	 period	 1	 by	 deficit	
reduction	leading	to	d2	=	0	(the	first	integral).	If	s	is	higher	than	s*,	the	government	does	
not	 comply	 (the	 second	 integral).	 Rewriting	 terms,	 the	 second	 line	 in	 (12)	 shows	 in	
brackets	the	same	expression	as	before,	now	as	the	sum	of	the	guaranteed	utility	under	
non‐compliance	and	the	expected	gross	gain	from	compliance,	minus	the	cost	of	deficit	
reduction	in	period	1	when	s	is	sufficiently	small	ሺs ൏ ݏ∗ሻ.	
First	 period	deficit	 reduction	 r0	 affects	 (12)	 via	 the	 cost	 of	 effort	 in	period	0	 (the	
first	 term	 in	 (12)),	 the	probability	of	 realizing	 the	gross	gain	of	 compliance	p,	 and	 the	
cost	of	effort	in	period	2	under	compliance.	Recall	that	the	threshold	level	s*	is	a	function	
of	r0.	The	derivative	of	expected	payoff	with	respect	to	r0	is			
߲ܧሾܷሿ
߲ݎ଴ ൌ 	െܿ
ᇱሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቎∆ݑ ݀݌݀ݎ଴ െ
1
ܵන
݀ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏሻ
݀ݎ଴
௦∗
ୱ
݀ݏ െ 1ܵ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏ
∗ሻ ݀ݏ
∗
݀ݎ଴቏	
	 			 	 ൌ െܿᇱሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂ∆௨ି௖൫ௗబି௥బା௦൯ௌ ቃ.	 	 	 	 (13)	
Derivative	 (13)	 has	 the	 following	 interpretation:	 An	 increase	 in	 r0	 increases	 the	
marginal	cost	of	deficit	reduction	in	the	current	period.	The	marginal	benefit	of	doing	so	
is	the	discounted	increase	in	the	expected	gross	gain	of	compliance	(due	to	the	increase	
in	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance)	 adjusted	 for	 the	 cost	 of	 reducing	 the	 deficit	 by	
݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݏ.	 Recall	 that	ሺܵሻିଵ	represents	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	
when	 r0	 is	 raised	 marginally.	 The	 optimal	 level	 of	 first	 period	 deficit	 reduction	̂ݎ଴	is	
found	by	setting	(13)	equal	to	zero19		
	 	 	 	 ఋሾ୼୳ି௖൫ௗబି௥̂బା௦൯ሿௌ ൌ ܿᇱሺ̂ݎ଴ሻ.		 	 	 	 (14)	
 
																																																								
19	It	 is	 worth	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 second	 order	 derivative	 of	 (12),	 	െܿᇱᇱሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ఋ௖
ᇲ൫ௗబି௥బା௦൯
ௌ ,	 is	 not	automatically	 negative.	 We	 use	 techniques	 from	 the	 theory	 of	 monotone	 comparative	 statics	 to	 sign	
comparative	statics	effects.	
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3.2.3 Results	
We	now	study	the	determinants	of	the	probability	of	compliance	p,	which	depends	
on	exogenous	model	parameters	both	directly,	as	shown	in	(10),	but	also	indirectly	via	
the	 optimal	 level	 of	 initial	 deficit	 reduction	 r0,	 as	 implicitly	 defined	 in	 (14).	 	We	 use	
insights	 from	 the	 theory	 of	monotone	 comparative	 statics	 to	 sign	 the	 effects;	 see	 van	
Zandt	(2002).	
	
1.	Initial	deficit:	We	first	wish	to	analyze	the	effect	of	a	change	in	the	initial	deficit	on	
period	0	deficit	reduction.	Based	on	Remark	5	and	Theorem	4	in	van	Zandt	(2002),	the	
expected	 payoff	 function	 (12)	 has	 the	 property	 of	 strictly	 decreasing	 differences	 in	
ሺݎ଴, ݀଴ሻ		
డమாሾ௎ሺ௥బ,ௗబሻሿ
డ௥బడௗబ ൌ െ
ఋ௖ᇲ൫ௗబି௥బା௦൯ሿ
ௌ ൏ 0.	 	 	 (15)	
Theorem	1	 in	van	Zandt	 then	 implies	 that	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 initial	 deficit	 lowers	
deficit	reduction	in	period	0,	that	is		
	 	 	 	 డ௥̂బడௗబ ൏ 0.	 	 	 	 	 	 (16)	
The	probability	of	compliance	p	(see	(10))	is	also	lowered	by	the	direct	effect	so	that	the	
total	effect	becomes		
	 	 	 	 డ௣డௗబ ൌ
ଵ
ௌ ቀ
డ௥̂బ
డௗబ െ 1ቁ ൏ 0.	 	 	 	 (17)	
States	with	a	larger	initial	deficit	are	less	likely	to	comply	with	the	fiscal	rule	in	period	2	
(Hypothesis	1:	H1).	
2.	Bailout	expectations:	Up	to	now	we	did	not	explicitly	address	the	role	of	a	possible	
bailout	in	case	of	non‐compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule.	Rather	we	assigned	a	utility	level	
for	 the	 case	 of	 non‐compliance,	 assuming	 it	 to	 be	 lower	 than	 in	 case	 of	 compliance.	
Suppose	 now	 that	 a	 bailout	 is	 possible	 but	 less	 than	 certain.	 We	 maintain	 the	
assumption	that	non‐compliance	is	worse	than	compliance	in	expected	terms:	ݑ௡௖ ൏ ݑ௖,	
and	 consider	 that	 the	 exogenous	 probability	 of	 a	 bailout	 goes	 up.	 This	 affects	 the	
government	 effort	 in	 reaching	 the	 deficit	 target.	 Formally,	 we	 capture	 the	 bailout	
probability	by	interpreting	the	utility	from	non‐compliance	unc	as	expected	utility,	which	
comprises	the	utility	when	no	bailout	occurs	and	when	it	does	occur.	An	increase	in	the	
bailout	 probability	 leads	 to	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 unc,	 a	 higher	 net	 utility	ܷ௡௖∗ 	(the	 indirect	
effect	 on	 optimal	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 1,	ݎଵ௡௖∗ ,	can	 be	 ignored	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
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envelope	theorem),	and	thus	lower	net	utility	gain	∆ݑ.	Looking	again	at	the	cross	partial	
derivative	of	(12)		
డమாሾ௎ሺ௥బ,∆௨ሻሿ
డ௥బడሺ௱௨ሻ ൌ
ఋ
ௌ ൐ 0,	 	 	 	 	 (18)	
the	 expected	 payoff	 function	 has	 the	 property	 of	 strictly	 increasing	 differences	 in	
(ݎ଴, ߂ݑሻ.	An	increase	in	Δݑ,	which	is	equivalent	to	a	lower	bailout	probability,	leads	to	a	
an	increase	in	period	0	deficit	reduction	 	 	 	
డ௥̂బ
డሺ௱௨ሻ ൐ 0.	 	 	 	 	 	 (19)	
Moreover,	 a	 lower	 bailout	 utility	 increases	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	 because	 an	
increase	in	߂ݑ	raises	p	both	directly	and	indirectly:		
	 	 	 	 డ௣డሺ௱௨ሻ ൌ
ଵ
ௌ ቀܿିଵ
ᇲሺ߂ݑሻ ൅ డ௥̂బడሺ௱௨ሻቁ ൐ 0.	 	 	 (20)	
We	conclude	that	higher	bailout	expectations	(=	smaller	߂ݑ)	make	compliance	with	the	
balanced	budget	requirement	less	likely	(Hypothesis	2:	H2).	
	
3.	State	fiscal	rule	in	period	1:	The	fiscal	rule	under	consideration	becomes	effective	
in	period	2.	Some	states	in	Germany	have	introduced	fiscal	rules	at	the	state	level	with	
constraints	 becoming	 effective	 prior	 to	 the	 national	 debt	 brake’s	 crucial	 year	 2020.	
These	state	rules	are	supposed	to	strengthen	the	effort	and	likelihood	of	compliance.	In	
the	present	framework	we	capture	this	idea	by	allowing	for	an	additional	fiscal	rule	to	
be	 already	 effective	 in	 period	 1.	We	 assume	 that	 the	 additional	 fiscal	 rule	 is	 credible,	
perhaps	because	there	is	no	one	to	bail	out	the	government	within	its	state.	Yet	we	allow	
for	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 may	 be	 of	 different	 strictness.	 We	 express	 the	
strictness	 in	 terms	 of	 the	maximum	 feasible	 deficit	 that	 can	 occur	 in	 period	1,	݀଴ ൅ ݏ.	
The	upper	limit	of	the	deficit	in	period	1	must	obey		 	
	 	 	 	 ݀ଵ ൑ ݀̅ଵ ൌ ߙሺ݀଴ ൅ ݏሻ.	 	 	 	 (21)	
The	parameter	α	from	[0,1]	represents	the	strength	of	the	fiscal	rule.	The	fiscal	rule	
has	no	bite	whatsoever	when	α	=	1	because	no	deficit	reduction	is	necessary	in	period	0	
to	 be	 compliant	 with	 the	 new	 rule	 in	 period	 1.	 By	 contrast,	 α	 =	 0	 means	 that	 the	
government	 is	 not	 allowed	 to	 run	 a	 government	 deficit	 in	 period	 1	 regardless	 of	 the	
value	 of	 the	 shock	 s	 (assuming	 that	 the	 additional	 fiscal	 rule	 is	 credible).	 In	 that	 case	
deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 0	 must	 be	݀଴ ൅ ݏ,	 thus	 inducing	݀ଵ ൑ 0.	Lower	 values	 of	 α	
thus	 correspond	 to	 a	 tighter	 fiscal	 rule	 in	 period	 1.	 Using	 (2)	we	 can	 reformulate	 the	
requirement	in	(21)	in	terms	of	initial	deficit	reduction:		
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		 	 	 	 ݎ଴ ൒ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ݀଴ ൅ ݏሻ ൌ: ݎ଴ഥ .	 	 	 	 (22)	
Note	that	 	ݎ଴ഥ 		 is	decreasing	 in	α.	 	A	tighter	 fiscal	rule	 in	period	1	requires	a	higher	
deficit	 reduction	effort	 in	period	0,	 if	 the	additional	 fiscal	 rule	 is	binding.	Whether	 the	
additional	fiscal	rule	has	bite	depends	on	the	magnitudes	of	ݎ଴ഥ 	and	̂ݎ଴,	where	the	latter	is	
taken	 from	 (14)	 and	 represents	 the	 optimal	 choice	 of	 initial	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 the	 additional	 fiscal	 rule	 in	 period	 1.	 When	ݎ଴ഥ ൐	̂ݎ଴,	 the	 new	 fiscal	 rule	 is	
binding,	otherwise	 it	 is	not.	This	 result	has	 further	 ramifications	 for	 the	probability	of	
compliance	with	the	original	fiscal	rule	in	period	2.	When	binding,	compliance	with	the	
fiscal	rule	is	more	likely	because	probability	p	depends	positively	on	r0.		
We	conclude	that	the	likelihood	of	compliance	(weakly)	increases	in	the	strength	of	
a	credible	fiscal	rule	at	state	level	which	restricts	the	period	1	deficit	(Hypothesis	3:	H3).	
	
4.	 	Individual	Beliefs:	Consider	now	the	beliefs	 in	government	compliance	after	the	
decision	on	period	0	deficit	reduction	has	been	taken,	but	before	the	shock	s	realizes.	We	
thus	 focus	 on	 the	 expectations	 at	 an	 interim	 stage	 for	 a	 given	 level	 of	 r0.	We	wish	 to	
compare	 the	 beliefs	 in	 compliance	 of	 two	 types	 of	 politicians:	 the	 incumbent	
government	 or	 in‐state	 legislators	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 (the	 “insiders”),	 and	 opposition	
politicians	or	out‐of‐state	politicians	on	the	other	hand	(the	“outsiders”).	
The	 psychological	 literature	 (see	 Moore	 and	 Healy,	 2008)	 suggests	 that	 a	 large	
number	of	 individuals	(more	than	half)	believe	to	perform	better	than	the	average	(or	
more	 precisely,	 the	 median),	 which	 is	 impossible.	 This	 is	 termed	 overconfidence.	
Ortoleva	and	Snowberg	(2015)	recently	presented	a	 theoretical	and	empirical	analysis	
confirming	 that	 overconfidence	 is	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 ideological	 extremeness	 and	
partisan	 identification.	 In	 the	 present	 context,	 overconfidence	 could	 mean	 that	 the	
insiders	 believe	 that	 the	 range	 of	 fiscal	 shocks	 is	more	 favorable	 than	what	 outsiders	
believe,	perhaps	due	 to	 their	 self‐perceived	competency	 in	managing	 the	economy.	To	
capture	this,	we	define	the	upper	and	lower	bound	of	the	fiscal	shock	as		
ݏ ൌ ݏ௠௔௫ െ ߛ			and					ݏ ൌ ݏ௠௜௡ െ ߛ,		 	 	 (23)	
where	smax	and	smin	are	the	base	values	of	the	maximal	and	minimal	fiscal	shock.	A	higher	
value	of	γ	means	that	the	distribution	of	the	fiscal	shock	shifts	lower,	leading	to	a	smaller	
expected	 value	 of	 the	 shock	ܧሾݏሿ ൌ ሺݏ௠௔௫ െ ݏ௠௜௡ െ 2ߛሻ/2,	 but	 unchanged	 variance	
ܸܽݎሾݏሿ ൌ ሺݏ௠௔௫ െ ݏ௠௜௡ሻଶ/12.	 Note	 that	ܵ ൌ ݏ െ ݏ ൌ ݏ௠௔௫ െ ݏ௠௜௡	is	 independent	 of	ߛ.	 If	
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incumbent	 governments	 or	 in‐state	 politicians	 are	 overconfident,	 they	 believe	 in	 a	
higher	value	of	γ	than	outsiders.	
We	 can	 immediately	 derive	 the	 implications	 for	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	 by	
inserting	definition	(23)	into	(10),	then	differentiate	to	find	for	given	r0	that		
	 	 	 	 ௗ௣ௗఊ ൌ
ଵ
ௌ ൐ 0.	 	 	 	 	 	 (24)	
Hence	 at	 an	 interim	 stage	 in	 period	 1	 insiders	 believe	 in	 a	 higher	 probability	 of	
compliance	 than	 outsiders.	 This	 effect	 is	 reinforced	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 ex‐ante	
perspective	 in	 period	 0	 when	 r0	 is	 endogenously	 chosen.	 The	 effect	 of	 γ	 on	 period	 0	
deficit	reduction	can	be	signed	by	looking	at	the	cross‐partial	derivative	to	(12)	
డమாሾ௎ሺ௥బ,ఊሻሿ
డ௥బడఊ ൌ
ఋ௖ᇱሺௗబି௥బା௦೘೔೙ିఊሻ
ௌ ൐ 0.	 	 	 (25)	
Hence	 a	 higher	 value	 of	 γ	 makes	 it	 more	 attractive	 to	 reduce	 the	 deficit	 in	 period	 0,	
which	 in	 turn	 increases	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	 even	 further.	 Overconfident	
insiders	believe	more	strongly	in	compliance	than	outsiders.	
Alternatively,	we	may	 assume	 that	 insiders	 have	more	 precise	 information	 about	
the	range	of	fiscal	shocks	than	outsiders.	Specifically,	we	assume	that	the	fiscal	shock	is	
bounded	by	the	values	
	 	 	 	 ݏ ൌ ݏ௠௔௫ ൅ ߪ				and				ݏ ൌ ݏ௠௜௡ െ ߪ,		 	 (26)	
In	 this	 case	 variations	 in	 σ	 leave	 the	 expected	 value	 of	 the	 fiscal	 shock	ܧሾݏሿ ൌ
ሺݏ௠௔௫ െ ݏ௠௜௡ሻ/2	unaffected,	while	 the	 variance	 increases	 in	 the	 parameter	 σ.	We	 also	
note	 that	ܵ ൌ ݏ െ ݏ ൌ ݏ௠௔௫ െ ݏ௠௜௡ ∓ 2ߪ	is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 shift	 parameter	 σ.	 We	
assume	 now	 that	 outsiders	 have	 a	 noisier	 signal	 about	 the	 range	 of	 fiscal	 shock	
realization,	and	thus	a	larger	value	of	σ.		
Inserting	(26)	into	p	and	differentiating	with	respect	to	the	parameter	σ	gives	
	 	 	 	 	 ௗ௣ௗఙ ൌ
ଵିଶ௣
௦ି௦ .	 	 	 	 	 (27)	
Condition	 (27)	 allows	 us	 to	 rank	 the	 beliefs	 of	 insiders	 and	 outsiders:	 If	 insiders	
believe	in	compliance	with	more	than	50	percent	probability,	݌௜௡௦ ൐ 0.5,	then	outsiders	
attach	a	lower	probability	ሺ݌௢௨௧ ൏ ݌௜௡௦ሻ.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	insiders	find	compliance	
less	 likely	 than	 non‐compliance	ሺ݌௜௡௦ ൏ 0.5ሻ,	 outsiders	 are	 more	 optimistic	 than	
insiders,	 that	 is	݌௢௨௧ ൐ ݌௜௡௦.	 In	 other	 words,	 insiders	 have	 more	 extreme	 views	 than	
outsiders	when	the	latter	have	noisier	information	than	the	former.		
Combining	 the	 insights	 from	 the	 two	 alternative	 setups	 we	 formulate	 our	 fourth	
hypothesis:	 Insiders	 (the	 incumbent	 government	 or	 in‐state	 politicians)	 are	 more	
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optimistic	 about	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	 than	 outsiders	 (political	 opposition	 or	
out‐of‐state	 politicians)	 when	 insiders	 either	 are	 overconfident	 or	 if	 under	 the	 noisy	
information	 hypothesis	 insiders	 consider	 compliance	 with	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 more	 likely	
than	non‐compliance.	Insiders	are	less	optimistic	about	compliance	than	outsiders	only	
under	 the	 noisy	 information	 hypothesis	 and	when	 insiders	 believe	 compliance	 is	 less	
likely	 than	non‐compliance.	 (Hypothesis	4:	H4).	 It	 is	 the	 latter	case	which	allows	us	to	
distinguish	the	two	alternative	hypotheses	empirically.	Looking	at	states	with	generally	
low	 expectations	 regarding	 compliance,	 the	 finding	 that	 insiders	 are	 more	 optimistic	
than	outsiders	favors	the	overconfidence	explanation.	
Thus,	 our	 model	 arrives	 at	 hypotheses	 on	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 compliance	
expectations	 across	 individual	 politicians.	 These	 hypotheses	 are	 derived	 for	 a	 setting	
where	 jurisdictions	 are	 confronted	 with	 an	 identical	 fiscal	 rule,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 case	 for	
German	states	and	the	national	debt	brake.	Our	survey	among	members	of	German	state	
parliaments	offers	the	basis	for	testing	their	relevance.	
3.3 Institutional	and	Survey	Details	
3.3.1 Germany’s	Federal	System	and	the	Constitutional	Debt	Brake	
Before	 we	 introduce	 the	 survey	 we	 provide	 a	 brief	 introduction	 to	 Germany’s	
electoral,	political	and	fiscal	system	(for	a	more	detailed	description	of	the	German	party	
and	electoral	system	the	reader	is	referred	to	Roberts,	1988,	and	Poguntke,	1994).		
Democracy.	Germany	is	a	parliamentary	democracy	with	a	bicameral	legislation	at	
the	 federal	 level:	 the	 lower	 house,	 called	Bundestag,	 is	 elected	 by	 all	 citizens	 and	 the	
upper	house,	called	“Bundesrat”,	represents	the	16	states	of	Germany	and	its	members	
are	delegates	of	state	governments.	The	debt	brake	was	approved	in	2009	by	more	than	
the	required	two	thirds	majority	in	both	chambers	in	order	to	change	the	constitution.	
At	 the	state	 level,	 there	exists	only	one	chamber	 like	the	 lower	chamber	at	 the	 federal	
level.	We	surveyed	members	of	these	state	parliaments,	called	MSP	henceforth.	
Parties.	 The	 number	 of	 political	 parties	 has	 some	 regional	 variation.	We	 describe	
the	 main	 parties:	 The	 Christian	 Democratic	 Union	 and	 Christian	 Social	 Union	
(CDU/CSU20)	 are	 center‐right	 parties	 forming	 an	 alliance	 at	 the	 federal	 level.	 They	
pursue	a	relatively	market	oriented	policy	but	are	socially	conservative	 in	some	states	
																																																								
20	Instead	of	the	Christian	Democratic	Union	(CDU),	Bavaria	has	a	party	called	the	Christian	Social	Union	
(CSU).	At	the	federal	level,	these	two	parties	always	form	an	alliance.	
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(like	Bavaria)	and	on	some	policy	issues	(such	as	the	traditional	role	of	the	family).	The	
Social	Democratic	 Party	 (SPD)	 is	 the	 other	major	 party	 and	 represents	 the	 center‐left	
(less	market	 oriented	 than	 the	 Christian	 Democrats,	 socially	 progressive,	 trade‐union	
friendly,	 and	 in	 favor	 of	 more	 intense	 redistribution	 than	 CDU/CSU).	 The	 Free	
Democratic	 Party	 (FDP)	 is	 the	 most	 market	 oriented	 party	 which	 favors	 small	
government	 and	 low	 taxes.	 On	 civil	 liberty	 issues	 it	 is	 more	 progressive	 than	 the	
Christian	Democrats.	 The	Left	 Party	unites	 rather	pragmatic	 former	 communists	 from	
East	Germany	and	disappointed	left	wing	Social	Democrats	with	a	strong	anti‐capitalist	
ideology	 from	West	Germany.	The	Green	Party	 is	 also	on	 the	 center‐left.	 It	 pushes	 for	
environmental	and	social	reforms	with	diverse	views	on	economic	 issues.	The	party	 is	
especially	popular	with	well‐educated	individuals	from	the	middle	class.		
Fiscal	Federalism.	The	German	state	 features	 three	government	 layers	with	partly	
overlapping	areas	of	policy	responsibility:	(1)	the	federal	level,	(2)	the	states,	and	(3)	the	
municipal	level.	Tax	autonomy	at	the	state	level	is	relatively	low.	Revenues	are	equalized	
to	 a	 significant	 degree	 across	 states	 and	 in	 addition	 through	 vertical	 tax	 sharing.		
Differences	 in	 state	 revenues	 per	 capita	 are	 reduced	 via	 a	 fiscal	 equalization	 system,	
whose	legal	foundation	is	set	in	Article	106	of	the	German	constitution	(“Grundgesetz”),	
according	 to	 which	 material	 living	 conditions	 should	 be	 comparable	 across	 German	
states.	Through	the	large	degree	of	revenue	sharing	the	German	federal	system	is	closer	
to	being	an	example	of	cooperative	fiscal	federalism	rather	than	competitive	federalism	
(Braun,	 2007;	 for	 details	 on	 equalization	 and	 tax	 sharing	 see	 also	 Heinemann	 et	 al.,	
2015).		
Fiscal	 Rules.	 The	 fiscal	 rule	 is	 the	 German	 debt	 brake	 (“Schuldenbremse”),	 which	
became	part	 of	 the	German	 constitution	 (“Grundgesetz”)	 in	2009.	 It	was	motivated	by	
the	 continuing	buildup	of	public	debt	across	all	 levels	of	 government	 since	 the	1970s.	
The	 new	 constitutional	 rule	 requires	 the	 federal	 government	 to	 run	 a	 (cyclically	
adjusted)	 budget	 deficit	 of	 no	 more	 than	 0.35	 percent	 of	 GDP	 starting	 in	 2016	 (see	
Federal	 Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 2009	 for	 a	 detailed	 description).	 For	 German	 states	
(“Länder”)	 the	 new	 rule	 is	 more	 stringent	 and	 requires	 them	 to	 run	 a	 zero	 deficit	
(cyclically	adjusted).	The	zero	deficit	 constraint	 for	 the	states	does	not	become	 legally	
effective	 until	 the	 budgetary	 year	 2020.	 The	 rule	 for	 the	 federal	 government	 is	
accompanied	with	 a	 specific	 plan	detailing	how	 the	 structural	 deficit	 shall	 be	 reduced	
between	2011	and	2015	so	that	the	target	is	reached	in	2016.	For	the	states,	no	specific	
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path	 exists	 in	 general.	 However,	 five	 states	 (Berlin,	 Bremen,	 Saarland,	 Saxony‐Anhalt	
und	 Schleswig‐Holstein)	 receive	 “consolidation	 aids”	 in	 total	 of	 €800	million	 annually	
until	2019.	In	return	they	are	required	to	reduce	their	2010	budget	deficit	in	equal	steps	
until	 2020.	 As	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	 new	 national	 constitutional	 rule,	 several	 states	 have	
adjusted	 their	 state	 constitutions	 or	 state	 budgetary	 laws	with	 rules	 echoing	 or	 even	
sharpening	the	national	rule	(for	a	survey	see	Ciaglia	and	Heinemann,	2013).		
Enforcement.	The	Stability	Council	(“Stabilitätsrat”)	has	the	task	to	supervise	fiscal	
performance	 and	 compliance	 both	 at	 the	 federal	 and	 the	 state	 level.	 It	 represents	 the	
federal	ministers	 for	 finance	and	economics	 as	well	 as	 all	 state	 finance	ministers.	The	
Council	has	relatively	little	power	to	enforce	fiscal	rules	and	improve	fiscal	performance	
because	it	 is	not	allowed	to	impose	monetary	sanctions	directly.	 In	the	case	of	the	five	
states	receiving	consolidation	aids	the	Council	is	entitled	to	withhold	aids	in	case	of	non‐
compliance.	Non‐monetary	sanctions	for	all	states	originate	from	the	possible	publicity	
of	the	Stability	Council’s	statements	or	from	political	costs	materializing	if	a	state	budget	
is	ruled	as	unconstitutional	by	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court.	
Economic	 Performance.	 The	 lack	 of	 comprehensive	 monetary	 sanctions	 and	 the	
long	 transitory	 period	 raise	 serious	 questions	 about	 the	 new	 rule’s	 credibility.	 In	
addition,	 the	 highly	 diverse	 fiscal	 situations	 of	 states	 feed	 diverging	 expectations.	
Table	3.1	 provides	 information	 on	 key	 indicators	 and	 shows	 the	 large	 difference	 in	
economic	activity.	GDP	per	capita	in	Hamburg,	for	example,	is	more	than	twice	as	large	
as	 in	most	 eastern	 states.	 Debt	 to	 state	 GDP	 is	 particularly	 high	 for	 the	 city	 states	 of	
Berlin	and	Bremen	(both	above	60	percent).	Often	high	debt	levels	go	hand	in	hand	with	
large	 projected	 fiscal	 adjustments,	 as	 identified	 by	 the	 German	 Council	 of	 Economic	
Advisors’	 calculation	of	consolidation	need	(an	 index	ranging	 from	‐0.6	 to	+3.5,	where	
Berlin	and	Bremen	are	near	the	maximum).	In	the	light	of	these	fiscal	performances	it	is	
somewhat	 surprising	 that	 credit	 ratings	 are	 fairly	 positive	 in	 all	 states	 (all	 in	 the	 A	
range).	One	explanation	consistent	with	these	observations	is	that	bailout	expectations	
exist.	Because	these	rankings	apparently	do	not	reflect	the	strength	of	the	debt	rule	at	
the	 state	 level	 in	 great	 detail,	 the	 last	 column	 of	 Table	 3.1	 provides	 an	 index	 for	 the	
stringency	 of	 German	 individual	 states’	 fiscal	 rules	 as	 developed	 by	 Ciaglia	 and	
Heinemann	(2013).	This	 index	takes	account	of	 the	rule’s	contents	and	precision,	 legal	
basis	and	enforcement.	
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Hence,	both	the	legal	setting	and	the	fiscal	divergence	leave	ample	space	for	highly	
heterogeneous	 expectations	 on	 state	 compliance,	which	we	 study	 through	 our	 survey	
among	members	of	state	parliaments.	
 
Table	3.1:	Economic	and	Fiscal	Indicators	
	 Population	
2011	
(in	millions)	
GDP	per	capita	
2011	(in	
thousands	of	€)	
Total	debt	to	
GDP	ratio	2011	
(in	%)	
Need	for	
Consolidation	
2011‐2020		
(in	%	of	GDP)	
Bond	
Rating	
2012a	
Index	of	
stringency	of	
state	debt	rule	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Federal	Government	 81.84	 44.02	 49.79e	 ‐	 AAAd,e	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Baden‐Württemberg	 10.79	 34.89	 17.16	 0.10	 AAAd		 0.62	
Bavaria	 12.60	 35.44	 6.79	 ‐0.60	 AAAd		 0.48	
Berlin	 3.50	 28.95	 61.64	 3.50	 Aa1c	 0.65	
Brandenburg	 2.50	 22.08	 35.77	 2.10	 Aa1c	 0.51	
Bremen	 0.66	 42.39	 73.63	 3.40	 ‐	 0.64	
Hamburg	 1.80	 52.49	 26.86	 0.30	 ‐	 0.47	
Hesse	 6.09	 37.51	 17.28	 1.30	 AAd	 0.50	
Mecklenburg‐West	
Pomerania	 1.63	 21.40	 29.11	 1.70	 ‐	 0.46	
Lower	Saxony	 7.91	 28.35	 25.42	 1.30	 ‐	 0.55	
North	Rhine‐Westphalia	 17.84	 31.88	 33.22	 1.60	 AA‐d	 0.45	
Rhineland‐Palatinate	 4.00	 28.31	 32.49	 1.80	 AAAb	 0.69	
Saarland	 1.01	 30.10	 41.83	 2.80	 ‐	 0.70	
Saxony	 4.14	 22.98	 9.99	 0.60	 AAAd	 0.76	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 2.31	 22.43	 39.84	 2.50	 AA+d	 0.77	
Schleswig‐Holstein	 2.84	 25.95	 38.57	 1.30	 AAAb	 0.77	
Thuringia	 2.22	 21.66	 35.04	 2.30	 AAAb	 0.66	
Notes:	 a	 from	 http://www.welt.de/finanzen/article107267058/Bundeslaender‐profitieren‐von‐Deutschland‐Bonds.html	
last	access	on	23	July	2013;	b	Fitch;	c	Moody’s;	d	S&P,	e	referring	to	federal	level	alone,	not	to	aggregate	for	Germany.	Need	
for	consolidation	 is	 taken	 from	Sachverständigenrat	 (2011)	and	 is	based	on	 the	average	budget	deficits	 from	2007	 to	
2010.	It	indicates	the	extent	of	consolidation	necessary	to	comply	with	the	debt	brake	by	2020.	For	that	purpose,	it	takes	
account	for	pension	obligations	and	the	reduction	of	transfers	from	the	federal	level	(Special	Purpose	Grants)	which	will	
both	come	into	effect	until	2020.	The	Index	of	stringency	of	the	debt	rule	 is	normalized	between	0	and	1,	where	higher	
values	indicate	a	more	stringent	debt	rule	(Ciaglia	and	Heinemann,	2013).	
 
3.3.2 The	Survey	Among	Members	of	State	Parliaments	
Our	 survey	 was	 sent	 to	 all	 1861	 members	 of	 the	 16	 German	 state	 parliaments	
during	 a	 period	 of	 14	 months	 in	 2011	 and	 2012.	 We	 conducted	 the	 survey	 in	 three	
waves	 in	 order	 to	make	 sure	 that	 it	 did	not	 collide	with	 election	 times	 (surveys	were	
conducted	approximately	at	mid‐term	of	an	electoral	cycle).	We	approached	members	of	
parliament	by	written	letters	and	subsequent	follow‐up	emails.	If	still	unsuccessful,	we	
contacted	 them	 by	 phone.	 Taking	 all	 three	 waves	 together	 639	 politicians	 finally	
participated	 in	 the	 survey,	which	 resulted	 in	 a	 response	 rate	 of	 34	percent.	 Response	
rates	 differ	 along	 state	 and	 party	 affiliation.	 Table	 3.2	 provides	 an	 overview.	 Possible	
concerns	about	the	effect	of	different	response	rates	are	dealt	with	 in	the	econometric	
analysis	below.	
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The	survey	was	non‐anonymous,	but	politicians	were	guaranteed	confidentiality	for	
individual	 responses.	 Thus,	we	 are	 able	 to	match	 the	 survey	 responses	with	 personal	
characteristics	 such	 as	 education,	 committee	 membership,	 etc.	 from	 public	 sources	
(personal	 or	 parliamentary	 websites)	 and	 with	 state	 characteristics	 such	 as	 GDP	 per	
capita,	 debt,	 need	 for	 fiscal	 consolidation,	 etc.	 (see	Table	A.3.1	 in	 the	 appendix	 to	 this	
chapter	for	all	variables).	
 
Table	3.2:	Response	Rates	and	Survey	Waves	
	 Number	of	
MSPs	
Number	of	
responses	
Response	rate	 Survey	
wavea	
Last	state	
election	
before	
survey	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Overall	 1861	 639	 34.34%	 	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	
Baden‐Württemberg	 138	 77	 55.80%	 3	 3/2011	
Bavaria	 187	 75	 40.11%	 1	 9/2008	
Berlin	 149	 30	 20.13%	 3	 9/2011	
Brandenburg	 88	 19	 21.59%	 1	 9/2009	
Bremen	 83	 18	 21.69%	 3	 5/2011	
Hamburg	 124	 39	 31.45%	 2	 2/2011	
Hesse	 114	 50	 43.86%	 2	 1/2009	
Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	 71	 17	 23.94%	 3	 9/2011	
Lower	Saxony	 152	 54	 35.53%	 1	 1/2008	
North	Rhine‐Westphalia	 181	 51	 28.18%	 2	 5/2010	
Rhineland‐Palatinate	 101	 50	 49.50%	 3	 3/2011	
Saarland	 51	 20	 39.22%	 1	 8/2009	
Saxony	 133	 45	 33.83%	 2	 8/2009	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 106	 47	 44.79%	 2	 3/2011	
Schleswig‐Holstein	 95	 29	 30.53%	 1	 9/2009	
Thuringia	 88	 36	 40.91%	 1	 8/2009	
Notes:	a	The	first	survey	wave	(1)	took	place	in	March	and	April	2011,	the	second	wave	(2)	took	place	in	December	2011	
and	January	2012,	and	the	third	wave	(3)	took	place	in	April	and	May	2012		
	
The	 questionnaire	 consisted	 of	 eight	 questions	 covering	 preferences	 for	 revenue	
autonomy	and	fiscal	equalization,	spending	preferences	as	well	as	questions	related	to	
the	debt	brake	 (for	 a	 full	 description	 see	Heinemann	et	 al.,	 2014a).	 For	our	 study,	we	
focus	on	the	following	two	questions:		
	
Question	on	compliance	expectations:	Which	of	the	16	German	states	will	comply	
with	the	constitutional	debt	brake	as	of	2020	with	high	probability?		
Each	of	the	16	states	could	be	ticked	individually	or	options	“all”	or	“none”	could	be	
chosen.		
	
In	order	to	illuminate	the	expected	impact	of	the	debt	brake	we	also	asked	for	the	
consequences	of	non‐compliance:	
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Question	on	consequences	of	non‐compliance:	What	will	happen	if	German	states	
do	not	comply	with	the	constitutional	debt	brake	as	of	2020?	(multiple	answers	possible)	
‐ Constitutional	 courts	 (on	 state	 and	 federal	 levels)	 will	 enforce	 budget	
consolidation	
‐ The	constitution	will	be	changed	so	as	to	relax	the	debt	brake	
‐ Transfer	 payments	 to	 non‐complying	 states	 are	 given,	which	 help	 to	 lower	 the	
deficit	
‐ There	will	be	sanctions	against	non‐complying	states,	e.g.,	lower	transfers	within	
the	federal	fiscal	equalization	scheme	
‐ There	 will	 be	 ordinary	 legal	 or	 constitutional	 interventions	 in	 non‐complying	
states’	budget	autonomy	
‐ Merger	of	states	
‐ Nothing	will	happen	
‐ Other:___________	
	
Figure	 3.1	 indicates	 that	 the	 debt	 rule	 credibility	 is	 imperfect	 and	 compliance	
expectations	differ	 remarkably	 for	different	 states.	While	Bavaria	 is	 seen	as	an	almost	
certain	case	of	compliance	(85	percent	believe	it	is	highly	probable)	the	prospects	of	the	
city	 states	of	Bremen	 (3	percent)	 and	Berlin	 (4	percent)	 are	highly	pessimistic.	These	
expectations	 obviously	 correlate	 closely	 with	 current	 consolidation	 needs	 and	 debt	
levels	 (see	Table	3.1).	Note	 again,	 that	 expectations	 for	 a	particular	 state	 i	 come	 from	
legislators	in	state	i	and	legislators	from	all	other	fifteen	states	j≠i.	In	addition,	a	strong	
asymmetry	 emerges	 for	 insider/outsider	 expectations	 on	 financially	 weak	 states	 (see	
Figure	3.2	with	the	example	for	Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania):	While	MSPs	from	other	
states	 are	 highly	 skeptical,	 a	 large	 majority	 of	 politicians	 from	 economically	 weaker	
states	 expect	 their	 state	 to	 respect	 the	 debt	 brake’s	 zero	deficit	 cap	by	 the	 year	2020	
(see	 Table	 A.3.2	 in	 the	 appendix	 to	 this	 chapter	 for	 full	 information	 on	 cross‐state	
expectations	which	confirms	this	asymmetry	in	general).	
Figure	 3.3	 summarizes	 the	 results	 for	 the	 non‐compliance	 question:	 A	 significant	
number	of	politicians	expects	a	 strong	role	of	 constitutional	 courts	 (both	 from	 federal	
and	 state	 level)	 to	 enforce	 consolidation	 or	 sanction.	 However,	 a	 large	 fraction	 of	
politicians	expect	the	government	budget	constraint	to	be	soft	due	to	bailout‐transfers	
or	a	 relaxation	of	 the	strict	debt	brake.	Overall,	 these	descriptive	 findings	point	 to	 the	
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possible	 relevance	 of	 our	model’s	 prediction	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 initial	 fiscal	 situation,	
bailout	 expectations	 or	 the	 expected	 asymmetry	 between	 insiders	 and	 outsiders.	 We	
substantiate	the	model’s	explanatory	power	in	the	subsequent	regression	analyses.	
 
Figure	3.1:	Compliance	Across	States	
This	graph	 reports	 the	percentage	of	all	 respondent	MSPs	across	 states	who	 indicated	 that	 the	 respective	
state	will	comply	with	the	debt	brake	with	high	probability.		
	
BB=Brandenburg,	 BE=Berlin,	 BW=Baden‐Württemberg,	 BY=Bavaria,	 HB=Bremen,	 HE=Hesse,	 HH=Hamburg,	
MV=Mecklenburg‐West	 Pomerania,	 NI=Lower	 Saxony,	 NW=	 North	 Rhine‐Westphalia,	 RP=Rhineland‐Palatinate,	
SH=Schleswig‐Holstein,	SL=Saarland,	SN=Saxony,	ST=Saxony‐Anhalt,	TH=Thuringia	
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Figure	3.2:	Compliance	Expectations	for	Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	
This	graph	reports	the	percentage	of	all	respondent	MSPs	 from	the	respective	state	who	 indicated	that	the	
Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	will	comply	with	the	debt	brake	with	high	probability.		
	
BB=Brandenburg,	 BE=Berlin,	 BW=Baden‐Württemberg,	 BY=Bavaria,	 HB=Bremen,	 HE=Hesse,	 HH=Hamburg,	
MV=Mecklenburg‐West	 Pomerania,	 NI=Lower	 Saxony,	 NW=	 North	 Rhine‐Westphalia,	 RP=Rhineland‐Palatinate,	
SH=Schleswig‐Holstein,	SL=Saarland,	SN=Saxony,	ST=Saxony‐Anhalt,	TH=Thuringia	
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Figure	3.3:	Consequences	of	Non‐Compliance	
This	graph	reports	the	percentage	of	all	respondent	MSPs	who	indicated	that	the	respective	consequence	will	
occur	if	German	states	will	not	comply	with	the	debt	brake.	Multiple	answers	were	possible.	
	
3.4 Regression	Analyses	
Our	database	is	sufficiently	rich	to	test	whether	the	predictions	from	our	theoretical	
model	 on	 expectation	 heterogeneity	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 observable	 response	
pattern.	 Our	 model	 predicts	 that	 compliance	 expectations	 of	 politicians	 should	 be	
related	to	the	initial	deficit,	or	more	general,	the	initial	economic	and	fiscal	conditions	of	
the	 state	 in	 question	 (H1),	 the	 individual	 politician’s	 bailout	 expectations	 (H2),	 the	
existence	and	characteristics	of	 state	 rules	which	complement	 the	national	debt	brake	
(H3),	 and	 the	 individual	 politician’s	 insider/outsider	 status	 (due	 to	 either	 asymmetric	
information	 or	 overconfidence	 on	 the	 side	 of	 insiders,	 H4).	 We	 cover	 these	 four	
dimensions	as	follows	(for	precise	variable	information	on	the	state	being	assessed	see	
Table	A.3.1	in	the	appendix	to	this	chapter):	
‐ The	 state	 characteristics	merged	 to	 the	 politician’s	 responses	 include	 GDP	 per	
capita	 and	 the	 need	 for	 consolidation	 (see	 Table	 3.1).	 The	 latter	 gives	 a	
comprehensive	picture	of	 the	 current	 fiscal	 and	 economic	 conditions	 (H1).	The	
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need	 for	 consolidation	 is	 taken	 from	 the	German	Council	of	Economic	Advisors	
(Sachverständigenrat,	 2011)	 and	 reflects	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 states	 need	 to	
consolidate	their	budgets	until	2020	when	the	debt	brake	comes	into	effect.	
‐ For	 bailout	 expectations	 (H2)	 we	 exploit	 the	 survey	 question	 on	 the	 expected	
consequences	of	 non‐compliance	 (Figure	3.3).	 From	 this	 question	we	 construct	
an	index	which	captures	the	individual	perception	of	the	strength	of	the	budget	
constraint.	A	larger	indicator	value	represents	the	perception	of	a	stricter	budget	
constraint	and	lower	bailout	expectations.21		
‐ For	the	existence	and	stringency	of	a	state	rule	(H3)	we	use	data	from	Ciaglia	and	
Heinemann	 (2013),	 who	 develop	 an	 index	 for	 the	 stringency	 of	 German	
individual	 states’	 fiscal	 rules,	 which	 takes	 account	 of	 the	 rule’s	 contents	 and	
precision,	legal	basis	and	enforcement.	
‐ The	 insider‐outsider‐differentiation	 (H4)	 has	 two	 dimensions:	 First,	 we	 can	
distinguish	 between	 incumbents	 as	 insiders	 and	 all	 others,	 whereby	
“incumbents”	 are	 defined	 as	 members	 of	 one	 of	 the	 governing	 parties	 in	 the	
respective	 state.	 Second,	we	 can	 compare	 the	 expectations	 for	 a	 specific	 state’s	
compliance	 between	 in‐state	 and	 out‐of‐state	 legislators.	 We	 include	 both	
dimensions	in	our	testing.	
We	 enrich	 this	 theory‐guided	 choice	 of	 variables	 through	 the	 inclusion	 of	 further	
individual	and	state	controls.	A	growing	empirical	literature	points	to	the	importance	of	
these	 variables	 for	 economic,	 monetary	 and	 fiscal	 performance	 (Besley	 et	 al.,	 2011,	
Göhlmann	 and	 Vaubel,	 2007,	 Moessinger,	 2014).	 We	 take	 account	 of	 the	 politician’s	
gender,	age,	education	(tertiary	degree,	type	of	degree,	such	as	in	business/economics),	
role	in	parliament	(membership	in	budget	committee)	and	experience	(number	of	years	
in	parliament).	Inter	alia,	these	variables	proxy	differences	in	the	individual	information	
level.		
Furthermore,	we	add	party	dummies	to	allow	for	 the	 impact	of	 ideology.	 Ideology	
might	influence	expectations	since	perceptions	of	economic	constraints	can	be	biased	by	
strong	 ideological	 positions	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Heinemann	 and	 Janeba,	 2011,	 for	 the	
																																																								
21	Indicator	construction	is	as	follows:	We	add	one	point	if	a	politician	expects	one	of	the	“tough”	reactions	
to	 a	 state	 non‐complying	 (i.e.	 “enforcement	 through	 constitutional	 courts”,	 “sanctions”,	 “intervention	 in	
budget	autonomy”	or	“merger	of	states”)	and	subtract	one	point	for	each	of	these	reactions	which	is	not	
expected.	 Analogously,	 we	 subtract	 one	 point	 for	 each	 of	 the	 expected	 “soft”	 reactions	 to	 a	 state‐non	
complying	 (i.e.	 “change	 of	 constitution”,	 “transfers”	 or	 “nothing”)	 and	 add	 one	 point	 for	 each	 of	 these	
reaction	which	is	not	expected.	
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perception	of	globalization	constraint	on	tax	policy).		Among	state	controls	we	include	a	
dummy	for	those	states	receiving	consolidation	aid	and	the	extent	of	fiscal	equalization	
transfers	received.	These	variables	cover	transfer	dependency.	Finally,	we	add	a	dummy	
for	 the	 political	 orientation	 of	 the	 incumbent	 government	 which	 allows	 for	 the	
possibility	 that	 the	 incumbent’s	 political	 orientation	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 compliance	
expectations	for	the	respective	state.	
3.4.1 Baseline	Results	
We	estimate	a	probit	model	with	the	compliance	expectation	as	dependent	variable	
(dummy	equals	1:	Politician	expects	a	state	to	comply	with	the	debt	brake	as	of	2020;	0:	
expects	 a	 state	 not	 to	 comply).	 Since	 we	 have	 expectations	 of	 639	 politicians	 on	 16	
states,	we	can	exploit	a	total	of	10,224	observations.	We	cluster	standard	errors	for	state	
pairs.	Column	(1)	in	Table	3.3	summarizes	our	starting	point	with	the	full	set	of	control	
variables.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 compliance	 expectations	 are	 related	 both	 to	 the	
individual	 and	 own	 state	 characteristics	 of	 respondents.	 We	 include	 fixed	 effects	 for	
MSPs’	 states	of	origin	 to	account	 for	 the	possibility	 that	politicians	of	particular	 states	
may	be	more	or	less	optimistic	in	general	(as	it	is	suggested	by	the	descriptive	analysis,	
see	Table	A.3.2	in	the	appendix	to	this	chapter).	
All	 proxies	 related	 to	 our	 four	 hypotheses	 are	 highly	 significant.	 Signs	 are	 in	 line	
with	the	theoretical	expectations	for	the	H1‐,	H2‐	and	H3‐related	indicators:	Compliance	
expectations	 for	 states	 with	 unfavorable	 starting	 positions	 (lower	 GDP	 per	 capita	 or	
larger	need	for	consolidation)	are	less	optimistic.	The	belief	in	bailout‐transfers	or	other	
relaxations	 of	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 (lower	 index	 for	 strength	 of	 budget	 constraint)	 lowers	
compliance	expectations.	A	stricter	state‐individual	fiscal	rule	is	correlated	with	a	more	
favorable	view	for	this	particular	state.	Judged	on	the	basis	of	average	marginal	effects,	
the	 size	 of	 the	 effects	 is	 substantial:	 A	 one	 percentage	 point	 increase	 of	 a	 state’s	
consolidation	 need	 (H1)	 lowers	 the	 probability	 that	 this	 state	 is	 expected	 to	 be	
compliant	by	about	10	percentage	points.	The	difference	between	a	very	soft	 (‐7)	and	
very	 hard	 (+7)	 perception	 of	 the	 budget	 constraint	 (H2)	 amounts	 to	 an	 impact	 of	 24	
percentage	points.	And	the	difference	between	the	weakest	(0.45)	and	strongest	(0.78)	
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observable	 state	 debt	 rule	 (H3)	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 probability	 increase	 of	 16	
percentage	points	that	a	state	is	predicted	to	comply.22		
H4‐related	 proxies	 are	 highly	 significant	 for	 both	 insider‐outsider‐dimensions:	
Insiders	 (members	 of	 parties	who	 form	 a	 state’s	 government/in‐state‐politicians)	 are	
more	optimistic	than	outsiders	(members	of	opposition	parties/out‐of‐state‐MSPs).	The	
size	 of	 the	 effect	 is	 much	 larger	 for	 the	 in‐state	 vs.	 out‐of‐state‐dimension	 (21	
percentage	 points)	 than	 for	 the	 government‐opposition‐distinction	 (4	 percentage	
points).	In	the	light	of	our	theory,	the	positive	sign	of	insider	status	points	to	the	role	of	
overconfidence	as	driving	 insider‐outsider‐asymmetry.	 If	outsiders	had	an	information	
disadvantage,	 they	 should	 sometimes	 over‐	 and	 sometimes	 underestimate	 the	 fiscal	
shock	 more	 than	 insiders	 do,	 but	 not	 necessarily	 be	 systematically	 more	 pessimistic	
than	 insiders.	 Therefore,	 the	 systematically	 larger	 optimism	 of	 insiders	 is	 consistent	
with	overconfidence	rather	than	with	noisy	information.		
Our	 theoretical	 analysis	 in	 section	 3.2.3	 suggests,	 however,	 that	 the	 existence	 of	
more	 optimistic	 insiders	 is	 not	 necessarily	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 noisy	 information	
explanation.	 We	 therefore	 deepen	 our	 econometric	 analysis	 with	 respect	 to	 H4	 by	
splitting	 the	 sample	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 compliance	 expectations	 of	 insiders	 (Table	 3.4).23	
Specifically,	 we	 approximate	 the	 theory‐based	 probability	 of	 compliance	 of	 insiders	
(݌௜௡௦)	 by	 the	 average	 compliance	 expectation	 of	 own‐state‐politicians,	 as	 recorded	 on	
the	diagonal	of	Table	A.3.2.	We	follow	our	theoretical	model	by	splitting	the	sample	into	
states	 with	݌௜௡௦ ൏ 0.5	and	 states	 with	݌௜௡௦ ൐ 0.5.	 Our	 implicit	 assumption	 is	 that	 a	
politician’s	subjective	belief	 in	the	own	state’s	compliance	 is	well	approximated	by	the	
relative	frequency	of	this	belief	across	all	politicians	from	the	same	state,	i.e.	the	average	
subjective	expectation	of	own‐state	compliance.	Doing	this,	we	end	up	with	one	smaller	
sample	of	five	“pessimistic”	states	(݌௜௡௦ ൏ 0.5,	see	column	(1)	of	Table	3.4)	and	a	larger	
sample	 of	 eleven	 “optimistic”	 states	 (݌௜௡௦ ൐ 0.5,	 see	 column	 (2)	 of	 Table	 3.4).	 We	
especially	make	use	of	the	subsample	for	“pessimistic”	states	to	distinguish	between	the	
two	competing	theories	which	can	cause	insiders	to	be	more	confident	than	outsiders.		
The	 estimated	 coefficient	 for	 the	 dummy	 for	 own‐state	 evaluation	 remains	
significantly	 positive	 in	 both	 subsamples,	 indicating	 that	 even	 those	 politicians	 from	
																																																								
22	(0.78‐0.45)*49	 =	 16	 where	 0.78	 is	 the	 largest	 observed	 value	 of	 the	 index	 and	 0.45	 is	 the	 smallest	
observed	value.	
23	We	have	 to	use	sample	splits	because	we	cannot	estimate	 interaction	effects	 reliably	due	 to	 the	non‐
linearity	of	the	probit	model	used.	
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pessimistic	states	are	more	confident	when	it	comes	to	the	evaluation	of	their	own	state.	
According	 to	 our	 theory,	 this	 finding	 is	 only	 consistent	with	 the	 explanation	based	on	
overconfidence,	not	noisy	 information.	The	 finding	 is	robust	 to	splitting	the	sample	on	
the	 basis	 of	 a	 stricter	 rule	 (i.e.	 	݌௜௡௦ ൏ 0.34	and	݌௜௡௦ ൐ 0.66).	 The	 own	 state	 dummy	
enters	 significantly	 with	 a	 positive	 sign,	 thereby	 confirming	 our	 H4	 hypothesis	 on	
overconfidence.24	Compared	 to	our	baseline	regressions,	most	of	 the	other	coefficients	
remain	robust	in	signs	and	significance	in	both	samples.		
All	other	control	variables	in	column	(1)	of	Table	3.3	are	important	to	understand	
the	heterogeneity	of	expectations	as	well.	The	observed	education	characteristics	do	not	
show	 up	 significantly.	Members	 of	 the	 budget	 committee	 view	 adherence	 to	 the	 debt	
brake	 as	 more	 difficult.	 Moreover,	 a	 longer	 parliamentary	 experience	 reduces	
compliance	expectation.	This	finding	is	not	driven	by	an	age	effect	which	points	into	the	
opposite	 direction,	 with	 older	 members	 being	more	 confident.	 Female	 legislators	 are	
more	pessimistic	than	their	male	colleagues.	Party	imprint	on	compliance	expectations	
is	moderate:	For	example,	there	are	no	significant	differences	between	parties	from	the	
opposite	 ends	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	 (i.e.	 between	 the	 market‐liberal	 FDP	 and	 the	
socialist	 Left	 Party).25	States	with	 a	 government	 consisting	 of	 center	 right	 parties	 (i.e.	
Christian	Democrats	and/or	FDP)	are	perceived	to	have	a	higher	chance	of	compliance.	
Consolidation	 aid	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 less	 favorable	 economic	 and	
fiscal	 conditions	 of	 the	 five	 related	 states	 since	 the	 related	 dummy	 is	 significantly	
negative.		
To	check	for	the	general	validity	of	our	results,	we	employ	various	model	variants:	
In	 column	 (2)	 of	 Table	 3.3	 we	 allow	 for	 individual	 fixed	 effects.26	This	 specification	
accounts	for	the	risk	that	unobserved	individual	characteristics	may	bias	the	results	for	
state	indicators.	No	substantial	differences	in	the	coefficients	to	the	state	characteristics	
emerge.	Further	model	variants	and	robustness	checks	are	described	in	the	next	section.	
	
	 	
																																																								
24	Results	are	not	shown	here	but	are	available	on	request.	
25	Weighted	 regressions,	 however,	 indicate	 that	 Left	 Party	 politicians	 are	more	 confident	 that	 the	 debt	
brake	will	be	respected	than	politicians	from	the	FDP,	see	below	section	3.4.2.	
26	Due	to	perfect	collinearity	of	individual	and	home	state	fixed	effects,	we	have	to	exclude	the	latter	in	this	
specification.	
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Table	3.3:	Likelihood	of	State’s	Compliance	–	Baseline	Results	
Probit	regressions	with	compliance	expectation	as	dependent	variable	(1:	compliance	expected,	0:	not	expected)	
		 (1)	 (2)	
Independent	Variables	 Baseline	1	
Average	
marginal	
effects	 Baseline	2	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Individual:	education	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.023	 0.006	 	 	
[0.035]	 [0.010]	 	 	
Economics/Business	degree	 0.038	 0.010	 	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Individual:	parliamentary	role	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.195***	 0.053***	 	 	
[0.044]	 [0.012]	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee	 ‐0.149***	 ‐0.041***	 	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.006***	 ‐0.002***	 	 	
[0.002]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	other	 	 	 	 	
Female	 ‐0.106***	 ‐0.029***	 	 	
[0.032]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Age	in	years	 0.002*	 0.001*	 	 	
[0.001]	 [0.000]	 	 	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation	 	 	 	 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2)	 0.062***	 0.017***	 	 	
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	 	 	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.139**	 ‐0.038**	 	 	
[0.070]	 [0.019]	 	 	
SPD	 ‐0.194***	 ‐0.053***	 	 	
	 [0.074]	 [0.020]	 	 	
Green	Party	 0.053	 0.015	 	 	
	 [0.087]	 [0.024]	 	 	
Left	Party	 0.119	 0.033	 	 	
[0.085]	 [0.023]	 	 	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.079	 ‐0.022	 	 	
[0.127]	 [0.035]	 	 	
State	characteristicsb	 	 	 	 	
Average	budget	deficit	over	last	three	years	(H1)	 ‐0.311***	 ‐0.085***	 ‐0.485***	 ‐0.088***	
	 [0.033]	 [0.009]	 [0.049]	 [0.008]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 2.626***	 0.717***	 3.776***	 0.687***	
	 [0.286]	 [0.077]	 [0.398]	 [0.071]	
GDP	per	capita	 0.027***	 0.007***	 0.032***	 0.006***	
	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]	 [0.001]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.763***	 ‐0.208***	 ‐1.162***	 ‐0.211***	
[0.092]	 [0.024]	 [0.127]	 [0.023]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.328***	 ‐0.090***	 ‐0.539***	 ‐0.098***	
	 [0.052]	 [0.014]	 [0.081]	 [0.014]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.587***	 0.160***	 0.843***	 0.153***	
[0.073]	 [0.019]	 [0.100]	 [0.017]	
Cross	state	dimension:	 	 	 	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.794***	 0.217***	 1.168***	 0.213***	
	 [0.106]	 [0.028]	 [0.162]	 [0.029]	
Home	state	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 	
Person	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Regression	diagnostics:	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 10,224	 10,224	
Pseudo‐R2	 0.243	 0.491	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000	 0.000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables	 0.000	 n.a.	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.000	 n.a.	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	characteristics	 0.000	 0.000	
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012.		
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Table	3.4:	Likelihood	of	State’s	Compliance	–	Check	H4		
(Sample	Splits	by	Table	A.2.)	
Probit	regressions	with	compliance	expectation	as	dependent	variable	(1:	compliance	expected,	0:	not	expected)	
		 (1)				݌௜௡௦ ൏ 0.5	 (2)				݌௜௡௦ ൐ 0.5	
Independent	Variables	
Baseline	1	for
BE,	HB,	NW,	
SL,	TH	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Baseline	1	for	
BB,	BW,	BY,	HE,	
HH,	MV,	NI,	RP,	
SH,	SN,	ST	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Individual:	education	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.134*	 0.024*	 ‐0.016	 ‐0.005	
[0.075]	 [0.014]	 [0.041]	 [0.012]	
Economics/Business	degree	 ‐0.198**	 ‐0.036**	 0.108**	 0.032**	
[0.083]	 [0.015]	 [0.046]	 [0.014]	
Individual:	parliamentary	role	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.214**	 0.039**	 0.211***	 0.062***	
[0.099]	 [0.018]	 [0.054]	 [0.016]	
Member	of	budget	committee	 ‐0.169**	 ‐0.031**	 ‐0.151***	 ‐0.044***	
[0.082]	 [0.015]	 [0.046]	 [0.014]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.012**	 ‐0.002**	 ‐0.005*	 ‐0.001*	
	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	other	 	 	 	 	
Female	 ‐0.262***	 ‐0.048***	 ‐0.064*	 ‐0.019*	
[0.073]	 [0.013]	 [0.037]	 [0.011]	
Age	in	years	 0.004	 0.001	 0.002	 0.001	
[0.004]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.000]	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation	 	 	 	 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2)	 0.075***	 0.014***	 0.062***	 0.018***	
[0.011]	 [0.002]	 [0.006]	 [0.002]	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	 	 	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.161	 ‐0.029	 ‐0.147*	 ‐0.043*	
[0.155]	 [0.028]	 [0.081]	 [0.024]	
SPD	 ‐0.365**	 ‐0.066**	 ‐0.161*	 ‐0.048*	
	 [0.176]	 [0.032]	 [0.087]	 [0.026]	
Green	Party	 0.073	 0.013	 0.044	 0.013	
	 [0.168]	 [0.031]	 [0.110]	 [0.032]	
Left	Party	 0.129	 0.023	 0.114	 0.034	
[0.176]	 [0.032]	 [0.100]	 [0.029]	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.104	 ‐0.019	 ‐0.082	 ‐0.024	
[0.226]	 [0.041]	 [0.157]	 [0.046]	
State	characteristicsb	 	 	 	 	
Average	budget	deficit	over	last	three	years	(H1)	 ‐0.049	 ‐0.009	 ‐0.617***	 ‐0.182***	
[0.197]	 [0.036]	 [0.043]	 [0.012]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 4.021**	 0.732**	 2.421***	 0.714***	
	 [1.670]	 [0.306]	 [0.281]	 [0.081]	
GDP	per	capita	 0.007	 0.001	 ‐0.003	 ‐0.001	
	 [0.025]	 [0.004]	 [0.004]	 [0.001]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐1.139***	 ‐0.207***	 ‐0.754***	 ‐0.222***	
[0.202]	 [0.036]	 [0.102]	 [0.029]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.039	 ‐0.007	 ‐0.869***	 ‐0.256***	
	 [0.122]	 [0.022]	 [0.061]	 [0.016]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.024	 0.004	 0.268***	 0.079***	
[0.292]	 [0.053]	 [0.057]	 [0.017]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	 	 	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.490***	 0.089***	 0.889***	 0.262***	
	 [0.128]	 [0.023]	 [0.106]	 [0.030]	
Home	state	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Regression	diagnostics:	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 3,195	 7,029	
Pseudo‐R2	 0.194	 0.231	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000	 0.000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables	 0.000	 0.000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.001	 0.003	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	controls	 0.000	 0.000	
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	 in	2011,	and	2011	data	 for	 survey	wave	3,	which	 took	place	 in	2012.	BB=Brandenburg,	BE=Berlin,	BW=Baden‐
Württemberg,	BY=Bavaria,	HB=Bremen,	HE=Hesse,	HH=Hamburg,	MV=Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania,	NI=Lower	Saxony,	
NW=	North	Rhine‐Westphalia,	RP=Rhineland‐Palatinate,	SH=Schleswig‐Holstein,	SL=Saarland,	SN=Saxony,	ST=Saxony‐
Anhalt,	TH=Thuringia.	
	
	 	
	72	
	
3.4.2 Robustness	of	Regression	Results	
First,	 the	 results	 presented	 above	 are	 robust	with	 respect	 to	 the	 use	 of	 different	
variables	capturing	state	fiscal	conditions	(Hypothesis	1).	No	matter	whether	we	include	
either	a	state’s	total	debt	stock	relative	to	its	GDP	or	the	need	for	consolidation	instead	
of	 the	 average	 budget	 deficit	 (over	 the	 last	 three	 years)	 relative	 to	 GDP,	 our	 above	
findings	are	confirmed	(see	Table	3.5):	 Just	 like	 the	average	deficit	 the	debt	stock	and	
the	 need	 for	 consolidation	 enter	 highly	 significantly	 and	with	 a	 negative	 sign.	 Higher	
debt	or	a	stronger	need	for	consolidation	also	decreases	the	compliance	expectations	of	
legislators.	 The	 impact	 of	 almost	 all	 other	 variables	 remains	 as	 in	 the	 baseline	
regressions.	Only	the	coefficients	to	the	fiscal	equalization	transfers	change	significance	
and	 signs	 across	 specifications.	We	 believe	 that	 this	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	
debt	 is	 highly	 correlated	 with	 financial	 equalization	 transfers27,	 whereas	 the	 average	
deficit	is	not.	
Second,	 a	 concern	 about	 the	 validity	 of	 our	 data	 could	 originate	 from	 sample	
selection.	For	our	survey,	Heinemann	et	al.	(2015)	have	conducted	a	unit	non‐response	
analysis.	They	make	use	of	data	on	the	personal	characteristics	for	all	1683	legislators,	
not	 only	 those	who	 responded.28	The	non‐response	 analysis	 identifies	 variables	 at	 the	
individual	 and	 state	 level	 that	 affect	 politicians’	 participation	 decision.	 According	 to	
these	 results,	 significant	 drivers	 of	 survey	 participation	 are:	 education	 (degree	 in	
economics	 or	 business),	 budget	 committee	 membership,	 membership	 in	 government	
coalition	parties	 and	gender.	Thus,	 our	 regressions	 comprise	 as	 controls	 those	 factors	
which	 are	 important	 drivers	 of	 non‐response.	 This	 greatly	 reduces	 the	 potential	 for	
selection	bias.	Yet,	we	cannot	fully	exclude	a	selection	bias	(Little	and	Vartivarian,	2005).	
As	 a	 further	 robustness	 check,	we	 therefore	 employ	 a	weighted	 regression	 (see	Table	
3.6).	 For	 the	 weighting,	 we	 use	 the	 inverse	 response	 probability	 based	 on	 party	 and	
state	 affiliation.	 The	 weighted	 regression	 slightly	 changes	 the	 findings	 for	 party	
dummies:	 The	 Social	 Democrats	 dummy	 loses	 significance	 whereas	 the	 difference	
between	the	Left	Party	and	the	Free	Democrats	now	becomes	significant.	Interestingly,	
in	 this	 regression	 variant	 left‐leaning	 politicians	 are	more	 optimistic	 than	 their	 right‐
leaning	 colleagues.	 The	 essential	 findings	 for	 our	 four	 key	 hypotheses	 are	 confirmed,	
																																																								
27	The	correlation	coefficient	amounts	to	0.76.	
28	We	 do	 not	 face	 severe	 item	 non‐response	 but	 predominantly	 unit	 non‐response.	 Item	 non‐response	
amounts	to	less	than	1%	of	respondents	and	is	therefore	negligible	for	the	survey	at	hand.			
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however.	Compared	to	the	non‐weighted	regression	there	are	only	minor	changes	in	the	
size	of	average	marginal	effects.	
	
Table	3.5:	Likelihood	of	State’s	Compliance	–	Robustness	Checks	1		
(alternative	variables	for	H1)	
Probit	regressions	with	compliance	expectation	as	dependent	variable	(1:	compliance	expected,	0:	not	expected)	
		 (1)	 (2)	
Independent	Variables	
Baseline	1	
(with	total	
debt)	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Baseline	1	
(with	budget	
deficit)	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Individidual:	education	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.022	 0.006	 0.021	 0.006	
[0.035]	 [0.009]	 [0.035]	 [0.009]	
Economics/Business	degree	 0.039	 0.010	 0.039	 0.011	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 [0.039]	 [0.011]	
Individual:	parliamentary	role	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.186***	 0.050***	 0.196***	 0.053***	
[0.044]	 [0.012]	 [0.044]	 [0.012]	
Member	of	budget	committee	 ‐0.152***	 ‐0.041***	 ‐0.150***	 ‐0.041***	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 [0.039]	 [0.011]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.006***	 ‐0.002***	 ‐0.006***	 ‐0.002***	
	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	other	 	 	 	 	
Female	 ‐0.106***	 ‐0.028***	 ‐0.106***	 ‐0.029***	
[0.033]	 [0.009]	 [0.032]	 [0.009]	
Age	in	years	 0.002*	 0.001*	 0.002*	 0.001*	
[0.001]	 [0.000]	 [0.001]	 [0.000]	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation	 	 	 	 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2)	 0.063***	 0.017***	 0.062***	 0.017***	
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	 	 	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.141**	 ‐0.038**	 ‐0.140**	 ‐0.038**	
[0.070]	 [0.019]	 [0.070]	 [0.019]	
SPD	 ‐0.196***	 ‐0.053***	 ‐0.195***	 ‐0.053***	
	 [0.075]	 [0.020]	 [0.075]	 [0.020]	
Green	Party	 0.050	 0.013	 0.052	 0.014	
	 [0.088]	 [0.024]	 [0.087]	 [0.024]	
Left	Party	 0.116	 0.031	 0.119	 0.032	
[0.085]	 [0.023]	 [0.084]	 [0.023]	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.086	 ‐0.023	 ‐0.078	 ‐0.021	
[0.128]	 [0.035]	 [0.127]	 [0.034]	
State	characteristicsb	 	 	 	 	
Total	debt	to	GDP	(H1)	 ‐0.050***	 ‐0.013***	 	 	
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Need	for	consolidation	(H1)	 	 	 ‐0.376***	 ‐0.102***	
	 	 	 [0.048]	 [0.013]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 1.057***	 0.284***	 1.926***	 0.523***	
	 [0.326]	 [0.088]	 [0.288]	 [0.078]	
GDP	per	capita	 0.022***	 0.006***	 0.008*	 0.002*	
	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.198*	 ‐0.053*	 ‐0.789***	 ‐0.214***	
[0.115]	 [0.031]	 [0.108]	 [0.029]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 0.112**	 0.030**	 ‐0.071	 ‐0.019	
	 [0.055]	 [0.015]	 [0.047]	 [0.013]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.179**	 0.048**	 0.589***	 0.160***	
[0.079]	 [0.021]	 [0.074]	 [0.020]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	 	 	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.782***	 0.210***	 0.764***	 0.208***	
	 [0.088]	 [0.023]	 [0.103]	 [0.028]	
Home	state	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Regression	diagnostics:	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 10,224	 10,224	
Pseudo‐R2	 0.253	 0.244	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000	 0.000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables	 0.000	 0.000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.000	 0.000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	characteristics	 0.000	 0.000	
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012.	
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Table	3.6:	Likelihood	of	State’s	Compliance	–	Robustness	Checks	2		
(weighting	by	inverse	response	probability	based	on	party	and	state	
affiliation)	
Probit	regressions	with	compliance	expectation	as	dependent	variable	(1:	compliance	expected,	0:	not	expected)	
		 (1)	 (2)	
Independent	Variables	
Baseline	1	
(Weighted	
regression)	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Baseline	2	
(Weighted	
regression)	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Individidual:	education	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.010	 0.003	 	 	
[0.040]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Economics/Business	degree	 0.077*	 0.021*	 	 	
[0.042]	 [0.012]	 	 	
Individual:	parliamentary	role	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.173***	 0.048***	 	 	
[0.046]	 [0.013]	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee	 ‐0.139***	 ‐0.039***	 	 	
[0.041]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.015***	 ‐0.004***	 	 	
	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	other	 	 	 	 	
Female	 ‐0.084**	 ‐0.023**	 	 	
[0.036]	 [0.010]	 	 	
Age	in	years	 0.007***	 0.002***	 	 	
[0.002]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation	 	 	 	 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2)	 0.057***	 0.016***	 	 	
[0.006]	 [0.002]	 	 	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	 	 	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.023	 ‐0.006	 	 	
[0.076]	 [0.021]	 	 	
SPD	 ‐0.135*	 ‐0.038*	 	 	
	 [0.082]	 [0.023]	 	 	
Green	Party	 0.040	 0.011	 	 	
	 [0.097]	 [0.027]	 	 	
Left	Party	 0.294***	 0.082***	 	 	
[0.097]	 [0.027]	 	 	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.504**	 ‐0.140**	 	 	
[0.204]	 [0.057]	 	 	
State	characteristicsb	 	 	 	 	
Average	budget	deficit	over	last	three	years	(H1)	 ‐0.299***	 ‐0.083***	 ‐0.476***	 ‐0.087***	
[0.033]	 [0.009]	 [0.050]	 [0.009]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 2.530***	 0.705***	 3.704***	 0.677***	
	 [0.287]	 [0.078]	 [0.403]	 [0.072]	
GDP	per	capita	 0.025***	 0.007***	 0.030***	 0.005***	
	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]	 [0.001]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.740***	 ‐0.206***	 ‐1.143***	 ‐0.209***	
[0.091]	 [0.025]	 [0.130]	 [0.024]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.307***	 ‐0.085***	 ‐0.504***	 ‐0.092***	
	 [0.049]	 [0.013]	 [0.082]	 [0.014]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.574***	 0.160***	 0.820***	 0.150***	
[0.073]	 [0.020]	 [0.102]	 [0.018]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	 	 	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.843***	 0.235***	 1.265***	 0.231***	
	 [0.122]	 [0.034]	 [0.193]	 [0.035]	
Home	state	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Regression	diagnostics:	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 10,224	 10,224	
Pseudo‐R2	 0.234	 0.493	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000	 0.000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables	 0.000	 n.a.	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.000	 n.a.	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	characteristics	 0.000	 0.000	
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	 in	 2011,	 and	 2011	 data	 for	 survey	 wave	 3,	 which	 took	 place	 in	 2012.	Weighting	 based	 on	 inverse	 response	
probabilities	based	on	party	and	state	affiliation.	
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3.5 Conclusion	
Fiscal	rules	are	designed	to	influence	fiscal	performance	of	states.	When	a	fiscal	rule	
is	 effective,	 it	 must	 impact	 on	 the	 expectations	 and	 beliefs	 of	 those	 politicians	 who	
decide	on	the	government	budget.	Our	study	of	the	new	debt	brake	in	Germany	reveals	
an	 imperfect	 credibility	 of	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 and	 points	 to	 highly	 heterogeneous	
expectations	with	respect	to	sub‐national	compliance.		
An	essential	result	relates	to	the	asymmetric	expectations	of	insiders	and	outsiders.	
This	 holds	 both	 for	 the	 government	 versus	 opposition	 and	 the	 in‐state	 versus	 out‐of‐
state	dimension.	This	result	might	be	considered	unproblematic,	if	the	governing	parties	
and	 politicians	 in	 the	 state	 under	 consideration	 were	 better	 informed	 and	 therefore	
more	trustworthy	in	their	judgments	than	outsiders.	Our	empirical	findings	based	on	a	
theoretical	model	point	into	a	different	direction,	however.	Insiders	(in‐state	politicians,	
members	from	governing	coalition	parties)	are	more	optimistic	than	outsiders	and	are	
likely	to	be	subject	to	an	overconfidence	bias,	which	could	lead	to	too	little	consolidation	
effort.	The	asymmetry	has	 the	potential	 to	undermine	a	 fiscal	 rule’s	effectiveness:	The	
prevalent	expectation	that	other	 jurisdictions	might	not	comply	could	also	weaken	the	
perceived	pressure	for	the	own	state.			
Our	analysis	allows	us	to	draw	a	few	tentative	conclusions	that	should	be	taken	into	
account	 in	 the	 design	of	 fiscal	 rules	 also	 in	 the	European	 context.	 First,	 a	weak	 initial	
fiscal	 situation	 is	a	burden	 for	rule	credibility.	The	phasing‐in	of	a	new	rule	should	be	
paralleled	 by	 attempts	 to	 remove	 or	 at	 least	 reduce	 the	 problem	 of	 unsustainable	
budgetary	 legacies	 such	 as	 high	 initial	 debt.	 Second,	 sub‐national	 rules	 might	 be	 a	
helpful	 complement	 to	 a	 national	 rule	 in	 a	 federal	 context	 like	Germany	where	 states	
have	 substantial	 spending	 and	 deficit	 autonomy.	 And	 third,	 clear	 and	 comprehensive	
sanctions	 and	 consequences	 in	 case	 of	 non‐compliance	 are	 important	 to	 anchor	
compliance	expectations.		
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3.6 Appendix	to	Chapter	3	
	
Table	A.3.1:	List	of	Variables	and	Definitions	
Variable	 Unit	 Explanations	
	 	 	
Individual:	education	
Tertiary	degree	 Dummy	 Degree	from	university	or	polytechnic	
Economics/Business	degree	 Dummy	 Tertiary	education	in	business	or	economics	
	 	 	
Individual:	parliamentary	role	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	
state	
Dummy	 Member	of	one	of	the	ruling	parties	
Member	of	budget	committee	 Dummy	 Deals	with	state	government	budget		
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 Discrete	 Calculated	as	2011/2012	minus	year	of	parliament	entry	
(interruptions	taken	into	account)	
	 	 	
Individual:	other	
Female	 Dummy	 Member	of	parliament	is	female	
Age	in	years	 Discrete	 Calculated	as	2011/2012	minus	year	of	birth	
	 	 	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	
budget	constraint	
Discrete	 Measure	ranging	from	‐7	to	+7,	with	higher	values	indicating	a	
higher	expectation	of	the	debt	brake	being	enforced	in	case	of	non‐
compliance,	see	footnote	3	
	 	 	
Individual:	party	affiliation	
CDU/CSU	 Dummy	 Member	of	Christian	Democratic	or	Christian	Social	Party		
FDP	 Dummy	 Member	of	Free	Democratic	Party	
Green	Party	 Dummy	 Member	of	Green	Party	
Left	Party	 Dummy	 Member	of	Left	Party	(not	included	into	regressions	since	it	serves	
as	base	category)	
SPD	 Dummy	 Member	of	Social	Democratic	Party	
Other	 Dummy	 Member	of	other	Party	
	 	 	
State	characteristics	
GDP	per	capita	 Continuous	 Gross	domestic	product	per	capita,	in	thousands	of	Euros,	source:		
German	Statistical	Office	
Need	for	consolidation	 Continuous	 In		percent	of	GDP,	consolidation	needed	to	comply	with	debt	brake	
by	the	year	2020,	source:	Sachverständigenrat	(2011)	
Total	debt	to	GDP	 Continuous	 Total	debt	divided	by	gross	domestic	product,	in		percent,	source:		
German	Statistical	Office	
Three	year	average	budget	deficit	
to	GDP		
Continuous	 Weighted	average	of	the	last	three	budget	deficits	divided	by	gross	
domestic	product,	in		percent,	source:		German	Statistical	Office	
Index	of	stringency	of	state	debt	
rule	
Continuous	
	
Normalized	between	0	and	1,	larger	values	indicating	stricter	rule,	
source:	Ciaglia	and	Heinemann	(2013)	
Dummy	for	consolidation	
assistance	
Dummy	 Takes	the	value	of	1	for	states	receiving	consolidation	assistance	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	
total	spending	
Continuous	 Total	net	intra‐state	transfer	payments	divided	by	total	spending,	in		
percent,	sources:		Federal	Ministry	of	Finance,	German	Statistical	
Office	
Government	coalition	consists	of	
right	parties	
Dummy	 Takes	the	value	of	1	for	a	purely	right‐leaning	government	
(coalition),	a	value	of	0.5	for	a	mixed	government	coalition	and	a	
value	of	0	for	a	purely	left‐leaning	government	(coalition)	
	 	 	
Cross	state	dimension	 	
Distance	 Continuous	 Distance	in	100	km	between	any	two	state	capital	cities	
Adjacency	 Dummy	 Takes	on	the	value	of	1	if	the	home	state	of	the	respondent	and	the	
state	to	be	evaluated	share	a	common	border	(and	if	the	state	to	be	
evaluated	is	the	home	state	of	the	respondent)	
Own	state	 Dummy	 Takes	on	the	value	of	1	if	the	state	to	be	evaluated	it	the	home	state	
of	the	respondent	
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Table	A.3.2:	Cross‐State	Compliance	Expectations	
	 	 Evaluated	states	 	 	
	 	 BB	 BE	 BW	 BY	 HB	 HE	 HH	 MV	 NI	 NW	 RP	 SH	 SL	 SN	 ST	 TH	 	 ∅	
Ev
al
ua
ti
ng
	st
at
es
	
BB	 53	 5	 68	 89	 0	 58	 53	 11	 37	 16	 32	 5	 11	 68	 16	 37	 	 35	
BE	 13	 33	 70	 73	 0	 67	 37	 30	 47	 10	 23	 13	 10	 57	 27	 50	 	 35	
BW	 5	 0	 75	 93	 1	 58	 22	 16	 17	 9	 19	 8	 4	 71	 5	 19	 	 26	
BY	 3	 3	 57	 89	 3	 53	 21	 4	 25	 5	 17	 7	 4	 61	 5	 32	 	 24	
HB	 11	 0	 67	 72	 11	 56	 28	 28	 50	 11	 28	 6	 6	 56	 28	 22	 	 30	
HE	 10	 2	 56	 76	 2	 78	 26	 18	 34	 10	 16	 8	 8	 58	 16	 32	 	 28	
HH	 21	 8	 72	 74	 0	 62	 67	 31	 44	 15	 36	 8	 3	 54	 21	 28	 	 34	
MV	 6	 0	 72	 78	 0	 53	 41	 83	 24	 0	 12	 0	 6	 78	 12	 29	 	 31	
NI	 4	 0	 74	 91	 2	 57	 24	 19	 56	 11	 26	 11	 6	 54	 20	 26	 	 30	
NW	 6	 4	 67	 82	 0	 53	 10	 24	 45	 16	 29	 10	 4	 61	 20	 31	 	 29	
RP	 14	 0	 76	 78	 4	 64	 28	 20	 36	 14	 52	 12	 4	 64	 22	 40	 	 33	
SH	 10	 7	 65	 86	 10	 55	 17	 24	 38	 10	 21	 66	 10	 52	 28	 31	 	 33	
SL	 20	 5	 95	 100	 5	 85	 45	 20	 55	 10	 35	 20	 30	 55	 25	 35	 	 40	
SN	 11	 0	 67	 80	 2	 42	 11	 29	 20	 0	 13	 4	 0	 89	 16	 42	 	 27	
ST	 24	 3	 76	 83	 7	 52	 28	 45	 35	 14	 28	 17	 17	 72	 59	 45	 	 38	
TH	 22	 11	 67	 97	 11	 69	 22	 31	 47	 19	 33	 28	 11	 89	 28	 47	 	 40	
∅MSP	
∅State	
12	 4	 69	 85	 3	 59	 27	 23	 36	 10	 26	 13	 7	 65	 19	 33	 	 31	
15	 5	 70	 84	 4	 60	 30	 27	 38	 11	 26	 14	 8	 65	 22	 34	 	 32	
#	of	times	
where	
outsiders	are	
more	
optimistic	
than	insiders	
0	 0	 3	 4	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	
	 	
Note:	Figures	are	in	percent	and	indicate	the	share	of	MSPs	who	expect	that	the	evaluated	state	will	be	compliant.	∅MSP	
indicates	the	average	over	all	MSPs.	∅State	indicates	the	unweighted	average	over	the	state	figures.	
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4. REVENUE	AUTONOMY	PREFERENCES	OF	SUBNATIONAL	POLITICIANS29	
4.1 Motivation	
Federal	 systems	 are	 subject	 to	 constant	 adjustments.	 The	 spectrum	of	 observable	
changes	 ranges	 from	 piecemeal	 adjustments	 of	 competencies	 up	 to	 comprehensive	
reforms	 such	 as	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	 regional	 authorities.30	Previous	 research	
(surveyed	 below)	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 structural	 and,	 increasingly,	 dynamic	 drivers	 of	
federal	 reform	 processes.	 While	 the	 empirical	 part	 of	 this	 literature	 exploits	 the	
experience	 from	country	case	studies	or	 comparative	aggregate	country	data,	 there	 is,	
however,	 a	 striking	 knowledge	 gap:	We	 hardly	 know	 how	 individual	 politicians	 form	
their	 federal	 reform	 preferences.	 Here,	 our	 contribution	 comes	 into	 play.	 For	 the	
example	 of	 German	 federalism,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 issue	 of	 subnational	 revenue	
autonomy,	 we	 explore	 reform	 preferences	 for	 members	 of	 parliaments	 of	 all	 sixteen	
German	 states	 (“Länder”	 henceforth).	 Beyond	 the	 German	 case,	 the	 insights	 are	 of	
general	 interest	 for	 federalism	 research	 in	 other	 national	 contexts	 by	 highlighting	
federal	reform	preference	formation	of	individual	politicians	at	the	subnational	level.	
Germany’s	 fiscal	 federalism	 is	 characterized	 by	 extensive	 joint	 decision	 making,	
intense	fiscal	equalization	across	subnational	jurisdictions,	and	a	large	extent	of	vertical	
tax	 sharing	 (Benz	 1999;	 Rodden	 2003;	 Stegarescu	 2005;	 Broschek	 2011).	 Fiscal	
sovereignty	 with	 respect	 to	 tax	 autonomy	 is	 particularly	 low	 at	 the	 Länder	 level.	
However,	the	system	has	gone	through	several	reforms	over	the	last	decade	increasing	
Länder	 independence.	 Greater	 Länder	 revenue	 autonomy	 or	 less	 intense	 fiscal	
equalization	have	been	important	issues	in	the	reform	debate,	but	a	consensus	for	a	far‐
reaching	change	has	so	far	been	out	of	reach	(Burkhart	2009).	A	new	reform	momentum	
originates	 from	 both	 the	 new	 constitutional	 debt	 brake,	 which	 requires	 structurally	
balanced	budgets	of	the	Länder	from	the	year	2020	onwards,	and	the	expiration	of	laws	
which	specify	 the	 institutional	details	and	the	precise	extent	of	vertical	and	horizontal	
equalization	 in	 Germany	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2019.	 This	 sunset	 clause	 tends	 to	weaken	 the	
status	quo	bias	since	 the	status	quo	(like	any	alternative	arrangement)	needs	 the	new	
																																																								
29	This	 chapter	 is	 joint	 work	with	 Friedrich	 Heinemann,	 Eckhard	 Janeba,	 and	Marc‐Daniel	 Moessinger,	
which	 has	 been	 published	 as	 “Who	 Likes	 to	 Fend	 for	 Oneself?	 Revenue	 Autonomy	 Preferences	 of	
Subnational	Politicians	in	Germany”,	Publius:	The	Journal	of	Federalism,	45	(4):	653‐685.	See	Heinemann,	
Janeba,	Moessinger,	and	Schröder	(2015).		
30	For	a	summary	on	recent	reforms	of	subnational	government	systems	in	the	EU	see	Nam	(2013).	
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backing	 by	 majorities	 in	 both	 parliamentary	 chambers,	 the	 Bundestag	 and	 the	
Bundesrat.	
Therefore,	 federalism	 reform	 is	 an	 ongoing	 issue	 in	 the	 political	 debate,	 which	
makes	 it	 worthwhile	 to	 study	 the	 views	 of	 important	 veto	 players	 in	 constitutional	
reforms.	 We	 employ	 a	 unique	 database	 to	 study	 individual	 reform	 preferences	 with	
respect	 to	both	 revenue	autonomy	at	 the	Länder	 level	 and	 the	 fiscal	 equalization.	The	
core	of	our	database	 is	a	 survey	among	 the	parliaments	of	all	 sixteen	German	Länder,	
which	was	in	the	field	in	2011–2012.	We	obtained	answers	from	639	politicians	(out	of	
1861	Länder	MPs)	across	all	Länder	and	parties.	German	Länder	have	a	decisive	say	in	
all	reforms	of	fiscal	federalism	through	the	German	upper	house,	the	Bundesrat.	In	the	
Bundesrat,	 each	 German	 Land	 is	 represented	 through	 its	 government,	 which	 casts	 a	
block	 vote.	 Länder	 governments	 in	 turn	 are	 elected	 by	 the	 respective	 Länder	
parliaments.	 Hence,	 federal	 reform	 preferences	 of	 Länder	 parliamentarians	 should	 be	
one	of	the	factors	shaping	the	use	of	the	Bundesrat	block	votes	and	veto	power	in	federal	
reforms.	
In	particular,	we	use	 the	survey	data	 to	address	 two	 interrelated	 issues:	First,	we	
want	to	understand	the	determinants	of	reform	preferences	such	as	Länder	self‐interest,	
party	 ideology,	 and	 individual	 characteristics	 (e.g.,	 education	 or	 parliamentary	
experience).	We	are	able	to	address	these	different	dimensions	by	combining	the	survey	
answers	 with	 both	 individual	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Länder	 MPs	 and	 general	 Länder	
characteristics.	 Second,	 we	 aim	 to	 identify	 the	 degree	 of	 polarization	 among	 German	
Länder	and	their	politicians	with	an	eye	toward	the	underlying	majorities	in	favor	of	or	
against	 fiscal	 federalism	 reforms.	 In	 particular,	we	 analyze	whether	more	 subnational	
revenue	autonomy	or	less	fiscal	equalization	would	garner	the	necessary	support	in	the	
Bundesrat,	thus	approximating	future	reform	decisions	as	closely	as	possible.	
Our	 results	 indicate	 that	 ideology	 and	 specific	 Länder	 interests	 are	 jointly	 linked	
with	federal	reform	preferences.	Those	politicians	who	prefer	lower	taxes	and	a	smaller	
size	 of	 government	 are	 also	 more	 inclined	 to	 accept	 a	 more	 competitive	 type	 of	
federalism	for	Germany	where	Länder	may	compete	for	(human)	capital	allocation,	e.g.,	
through	 autonomous	 tax	 setting.	 Länder	 characteristics	 are	 of	 importance	 as	 well:	
Politicians	from	poorer	Länder	and	from	Länder	with	particularly	high	public	debt	and	
consolidation	needs	(i.e.,	the	amount	of	fiscal	adjustment	necessary	to	comply	with	the	
constitutional	 debt	 brake	 until	 2020)	 are	 more	 hesitant	 to	 support	 tax	 autonomy	 or	
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lower	fiscal	equalization	intensity.	A	key	result	arises	from	our	simulated	majorities	for	
the	 Bundesrat:	 A	majority	 exists	 for	 lowering	 the	 degree	 of	 fiscal	 equalization,	 while	
there	is	a	(fragile)	blocking	minority	against	more	tax	autonomy.	Our	insights	point	to	a	
strategy	 which	 is	 promising	 to	 foster	 reform	 acceptance:	 a	 reform	 package	 which	
addresses	 budgetary	 legacies	 like	 high	 pre‐existing	 debt	 in	 combination	 with	 more	
revenue	autonomy.	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 After	 a	 short	 survey	 of	 relevant	
literature	(section	4.2),	we	give	a	summary	of	German	fiscal	federalism	and	describe	the	
more	 recent	 reform	 momentum	 (section	 4.3).	 Section	 4.4	 develops	 the	 hypotheses	
followed	 by	 descriptive	 and	 econometric	 evidence	 (section	 4.5).	 Section	 4.6	 simulates	
voting	 behavior	 of	 all	 Länder	 in	 the	 Bundesrat	 and	 the	 final	 section	 4.7	 draws	 some	
conclusions.	
4.2 Endogenous	Decentralization	in	the	Literature	
Decentralization	 has	 proven	 to	 be	 a	 relevant	 impact	 variable	 for	 many	 social,	
political,	 or	 economic	 outcomes,	which	 explains	 the	 ongoing	 interest	 in	 the	 drivers	 of	
decentralization.	In	this	context,	a	first	wave	of	contributions	has	focused	on	structural	
long‐term	 factors	 like	 wealth,	 ethnic	 fractionalization,	 colonial	 history,	 or	 democracy,	
which	determine	a	 country’s	 likely	degree	of	decentralization	 (surveyed,	 e.g.,	 by	Amat	
and	Falcó‐Gimeno	2013).	
A	 natural	 limitation	 of	 these	 static	 approaches	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 insight	 into	 shorter	
term	reforms	of	federal	systems	as	they	have	occurred	in	OECD	countries	over	the	last	
decades.	These	reform	activities	have	inspired	a	growing	line	of	research	on	endogenous	
decentralization	processes.	Related	contributions	point	to	the	role	of	changing	economic	
constraints,	democratization,	 supra‐national	 influence,	or	 fundamental	political	 regime	
change	clearing	the	way	for	decentralizing	reforms	(for	a	survey	see	Tafel	2010).	
In	 addition,	 political	 constraints	 and	 (changing)	 party	 preferences	 have	 attracted	
substantial	 attention	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 country‐wide	 political	 parties.	 For	
example,	 O’Neill	 (2003)	 points	 out	 that	 larger	 subnational	 autonomy	 could	 be	 an	
attractive	 option	 even	 for	 politicians	 at	 the	 central	 level	 if	 their	 party’s	 power	 at	 the	
central	government	level	is	uncertain	and	they	expect	to	win	a	substantial	proportion	of	
subnational	offices.	Conversely,	country‐wide	parties	with	good	federal	career	prospects	
for	 successful	 Länder	 politicians	 can	 explain	 these	 politicians’	 support	 for	 further	
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centralization,	which	seemed	to	be	the	case	in	Germany	(Feld	and	von	Hagen	2007).	For	
the	case	study	of	 the	United	Kingdom,	Hopkin	(2009)	describes	how	the	Labour	Party	
moved	 toward	 the	 support	 of	 devolution	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	 electoral	 competition	 from	
Scottish	and	Welsh	nationalist	parties.	In	her	case	study	on	Spain,	Verge	(2013)	points	
out	that	 federal	 ideology	and	power	 interact:	A	state‐wide	party’s	 federal	 ideology	is	a	
more	significant	constraint	if	this	party	is	in	opposition	and	not	in	government.	Related	
to	 the	 same	 federal	 context	 as	 our	 study,	 Turner	 and	Rowe	 (2013)	 find	 that	 partisan,	
ideological,	 and	 territorial	 factors	 help	 to	 understand	 the	 reform	 views	 of	 important	
actors	on	the	recent	reforms	of	German	federalism.	
Our	study	shares	the	objective	of	this	literature	insofar	as	it	aims	to	understand	the	
drivers	of	decentralizing	reforms	and	their	political	constraints.	However,	it	contributes	
several	 novelties	 to	 the	 literature.	 First,	 its	 focus	 is	 on	 one	 particular	 dimension	 of	
decentralization,	 which	 is	 subnational	 revenue	 autonomy	 and	 fiscal	 equalization.	 In	
contrast,	 the	 existing	 literature’s	 dependent	 variable	 of	 interest	 tends	 to	 be	
“decentralization”	 or	 “devolution”	 as	 a	 comprehensive	 qualitative	 or	 quantitative	
measure.31	
While	 this	 broad	 and	 comprehensive	 picture	 is	 important,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	
complemented	 through	 more	 targeted	 studies	 on	 single	 decentralization	 dimensions.	
We	provide	these	insights	for	revenue	decentralizing	reforms	where	specific	studies	are	
rare	and	of	a	qualitative	nature.	Garman,	Haggard	and	Willis	(2001)	note	that	regional	
politicians	 tend	 to	 prefer	 unconditional	 transfers	 from	 the	 center	 rather	 than	 taxing	
their	regional	voters	through	an	autonomous	tax.	
Second,	our	quantitative	basis	is	unique	since	we	exploit	a	direct	confidential	survey	
of	 more	 than	 600	 individual	 subnational	 policy	 makers.	 Thus,	 we	 observe	 direct	
measures	of	individual	politicians’	decentralization	preferences.	In	contrast,	the	existing	
literature	 on	 endogenous	 decentralization	 is	 either	 qualitative	 or	 derives	 preferences	
from	 textual	 analyses	 of	 party	 manifestos	 (Amat	 and	 Falcó‐Gimeno	 2013),	 a	 limited	
number	 of	 interviews	 (Turner	 and	 Rowe	 2013),	 or	 recorded	 votes	 (Bräuninger,	
Gschwend,	and	Shikano	2010;	Träger	and	Leuning	2014).32	
																																																								
31	A	 typical	 comprehensive	 decentralization	 indicator	 used	 in	 the	 literature	 (e.g.,	 by	 Amat	 and	 Falcó‐
Gimeno	2013)	is	the	“Regional	Authority	Index”	by	Hooghe,	Marks,	and	Schakel	(2010)	which	codifies	the	
extent	 to	 which	 regional	 authorities	 enjoy	 political	 power	 either	 through	 autonomous	 decisions	 over	
citizens	in	the	region	or	through	shared	power	for	the	country	as	a	whole.	
32	Studies	on	recorded	votes	in	the	Bundesrat,	the	upper	house	in	Germany,	have	the	particular	problem	
that	there	is	only	one	block	vote	per	Land,	i.e.,	no	individual	variance	is	observable.	
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The	 third	 contribution	 is	 methodological.	 We	 do	 not	 limit	 the	 analysis	 to	 the	
scrutiny	 of	 reform	 preferences,	 reform	 constraints,	 and	 the	 ex	 post	 explanation	 of	
observable	 reform	 activity.	 Based	 on	 our	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 individual	 preference	
heterogeneity,	 we	 also	 use	 the	 estimated	 model	 in	 a	 forward	 looking	 way	 to	 assess	
Länder‐dependent	reform	preferences	and	to	suggest	the	design	of	reform	packages	that	
would	garner	the	support	of	the	majority	of	Länder	in	the	Bundesrat.	
4.3 German	Länder	Autonomy	and	the	Reform	Debate	
Germany	 offers	 a	 type	 of	 federalism	 which	 is	 particularly	 promising	 to	 study	
preferences	for	subnational	revenue	autonomy.	In	Germany’s	federal	system,	legislative	
autonomy	of	 the	 sixteen	Länder	 is	highly	 limited.	 Instead,	 the	Länder	derive	 influence	
from	their	major	responsibility	in	administering	national	laws	and	their	extensive	veto	
power	 in	 the	 federal	 legislative	 process.	 With	 German	 “executive	 federalism”,	 the	
implementation	of	 federal	 laws	 is	 largely	 in	 the	responsibility	of	 the	Länder	(Burkhart	
2009).	Their	veto	power	originates	from	the	fact	that	a	substantial	share	of	federal	laws	
requires	 the	 consent	 of	 both	 chambers,	 the	 lower	 (Bundestag)	 and	 the	 upper	 house	
(Bundesrat).	
The	 financing	 of	 governmental	 levels	 is	 heavily	 interdependent.	 Joint	 financing	
makes	 up	 70	 percent	 of	 total	 tax	 income	 (see	 Table	 A.4.1	 in	 the	 appendix	 to	 this	
chapter).	 In	 contrast	 to	 other	 federal	 countries	 like	 the	 United	 States	 or	 Switzerland,	
German	Länder	cannot	levy	income	tax	surcharges	on	top	of	tax	rates	determined	by	the	
federal	 level.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Germany	 scores	 far	 below	 these	 federal	 countries	 in	
comparative	indicators	of	revenue	decentralization	that	take	account	of	the	subnational	
autonomy	in	setting	tax	rates	or	defining	tax	bases	(Stegarescu	2005).	At	the	same	time,	
however,	 the	 Länder	 have	 a	 fairly	 large	 amount	 of	 autonomy	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
expenditure	side	of	the	government	budget.	
A	 further	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 German	 federalism	 is	 that	 the	 German	
constitution	 (Grundgesetz)	 stipulates	 that	 living	 conditions	 in	 all	 regions	 should	 be	
equivalent	 (“Gleichwertigkeit	 der	 Lebensverhältnisse”),	 which	 is	 reflected	 in	 a	
complicated	 system	 of	 far‐reaching	 fiscal	 equalization.	 The	 equalization	 system	
comprises	several	elements	(for	details	see	Feld	and	von	Hagen	2007;	Federal	Ministry	
of	Finance	2012):	First,	in	the	allocation	of	tax	revenues,	poor	Länder	are	privileged	by	
additional	shares	of	VAT	revenues.	Second,	through	a	formula‐based	horizontal	system	
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the	richer	Länder	finance	unconditional	grants	to	those	Länder	with	a	financial	capacity	
below	average	(see	Figure	A.4.1	 in	 the	appendix	 to	 this	chapter).	Third,	 the	remaining	
differences	in	fiscal	capacity	are	further	equalized	by	(partially	conditional)	grants	from	
the	 federal	 government.	 The	 overall	 effect	 of	 these	 different	 steps	 is	 a	 far‐reaching	
equalization	of	the	initial	differences.	In	2013,	for	example,	financial	capacity	per	capita	
before	VAT	and	horizontal	redistribution	ranges	from	55	percent	of	the	average	across	
states	 in	Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	 to	157	percent	 in	Hamburg.	 Post‐equalization,	
financial	 capacity	 per	 capita	 ranges	 from	 a	 minimum	 of	 98	 percent	 (Berlin)	 to	 a	
maximum	of	106	percent	(Bavaria,	see	table	A.4.2	in	the	appendix	to	this	chapter).	
The	 system	 of	 the	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany	 is	 thus	 characterized	 by	 a	 high	
degree	of	political	and	fiscal	interdependence	between	the	federal	level	and	the	Länder,	
which	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 post‐war	 centralization	 process.	 The	 early	 decades	 of	 the	
Federal	Republic	after	1949	were	characterized	by	centralization	and	expansion	of	joint	
decision	making	culminating	in	the	1969	constitutional	reforms.	These	reforms	defined	
joint	 tasks	 and	 federal	 grants	 in	 the	 constitution	 and	 increased	 joint	 taxation	 (Benz	
1999;	Broschek	2011).	
After	unification	in	1990,	due	to	the	integration	of	the	poorer	new	Länder	into	the	
fiscal	 equalization	 system,	 a	 growing	 discontent	 with	 the	 condition	 of	 German	
federalism	 emerged	 (Burkhart	 2009).	 In	 addition,	 pressure	 from	 globalization	 and	
demographic	change	suggested	far‐reaching	institutional	reforms	in	Germany.	However,	
the	 specific	 institutional	 details	 of	 Germany’s	 federal	 system	were	 perceived	 to	 block	
reforms.	In	particular,	the	joint	decision‐making	of	Bundestag	and	Bundesrat	was	largely	
held	 responsible	 for	 a	 too	 slow	 pace	 of	 adjustment.	 Actually,	 the	 veto	 power	 of	 the	
Bundesrat	in	combination	with	the	often	opposing	party	majorities	in	the	two	chambers	
since	 the	 1980s	prevented	 the	 federal	 government	 from	 implementing	 reforms	of	 the	
labor	market	or	the	tax	and	welfare	system,	resulting	in	the	diagnosis	that	Germany	is	
stuck	in	a	“joint‐decision	trap”	(Scharpf	1988,	2005).		
To	at	least	partially	loosen	this	joint	decision	nexus,	two	comprehensive	reforms	of	
German	federalism	took	place	 in	2006	and	2009	(Turner	and	Rowe	2013).	Federalism	
Reform	 I	 (FR	 I)	was	 largely	 focused	on	a	disentanglement	of	 competencies	and	a	 roll‐
back	of	joint	decision	making.	One	important	objective	of	the	reform	was	to	substantially	
reduce	 the	number	 of	 federal	 laws	 that	 need	 approval	 from	 the	 Länder	 in	 the	 second	
chamber	 (Bundesrat).	 In	 exchange,	 the	 reform	 gave	 the	 Länder	 more	 discretionary	
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power	in	certain	policy	areas	such	as	environmental	legislation	and	the	pay	structure	for	
civil	 servants.	Federalism	Reform	 II	 (FR	 II)	 introduced	 the	 “debt	brake”,	 i.e.,	 (close	 to)	
balanced	 budget	 requirements	 in	 structural	 terms	 for	 the	 federal	 and	 Länder	
governments,	 starting	 in	 2016	 and	 2020,	 respectively.	 While	 this	 reform	 does	 not	
directly	affect	 the	degree	of	 tax	autonomy	between	the	Länder	and	the	extent	of	 fiscal	
equalization,	it	may	do	so	indirectly.	Without	the	option	to	run	repeated	budget	deficits,	
the	need	and	desire	to	have	access	to	an	independent	tax	policy	may	emerge	among	the	
Länder	themselves.	
While	 reforms	 of	 joint	 legislation	 and	 debt	 constraints	 have	 been	 substantial,	
political	 resistance	 to	 reforms	 increasing	 tax	 autonomy	 or	 limiting	 far‐reaching	
equalization	has	been	strong.	Prior	to	FR	I,	Länder	prime	ministers	explicitly	criticized	
reform	proposals	threatening	fiscal	equalization	and	pushing	for	regional	tax	autonomy	
together	with	territorial	reforms	(Burkhart	2009).	Nevertheless,	even	in	these	contested	
areas	small	 reforms	were	enacted	during	 the	 last	decade.	FR	 I	 comprised	a	 small	 step	
toward	higher	 tax	autonomy	by	granting	 the	Länder	 the	right	 to	decide	autonomously	
on	 the	 rate	 for	 the	 real	 estate	 transaction	 tax.	 Moreover,	 the	 last	 reform	 of	 fiscal	
equalization	 introduced	 a	 “premium	 model”	 from	 2005	 onwards	 to	 alleviate	 the	
disincentives	 of	 very	high	marginal	 equalization	payments	 from	additional	 Länder	 tax	
revenues.	The	new	premium	model	exempts	a	share	of	short‐run	increases	in	Länder	tax	
revenues	 from	 equalization	 (Fuest	 and	 Thöne	 2009).	 These	 examples	 indicate	 that	 at	
least	in	those	areas	incremental	reforms	are	feasible.	
After	 FR	 II,	 the	 reform	debate	on	German	 federalism	 continues.	The	 expiration	of	
the	current	Fiscal	Equalization	Law	(FEL)	by	the	year	2019	makes	a	renegotiation	of	the	
system	unavoidable.	Changing	constraints	should	have	an	impact	on	negotiations:	First,	
the	debt	brake	implies	new	financing	constraints	for	the	Länder,	which	could	change	the	
perspective	both	on	the	importance	of	tax	autonomy	and	the	equalization	needs.	Second,	
the	new	system	for	2020	is	unlikely	to	offer	privileges	comparable	to	those	provided	to	
the	 former	 Eastern	 German	 Länder,	 given	 that	 thirty	 years	 will	 have	 passed	 since	
unification	and	these	 three	decades	have	seen	 large	transfers	and	a	virtually	complete	
rebuilding	of	public	infrastructure	in	the	east.	
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Changes	 of	 the	 constitutional	 rules	 of	 governing	 German	 federalism	 require	 a	
qualified	 majority	 of	 two‐thirds	 both	 in	 the	 Bundestag	 and	 the	 Bundesrat.33	In	 the	
Bundesrat,	 votes	 are	 cast	 as	 a	 block	 vote	 by	 the	 delegates	 of	 the	 respective	 Länder	
governments.	 The	 latter	 are	 elected	 by	 the	 Länder	 parliaments	 and,	 for	 all	 legislative	
projects,	 depend	 on	 majority	 support	 in	 their	 Länder	 parliaments.	 Due	 to	 this	
dependence,	 preferences	 of	 the	 members	 of	 Länder	 parliaments	 have	 informational	
value	as	 to	which	reform	options	could	 find	the	acceptance	of	the	Bundesrat	as	one	of	
the	decisive	institutional	veto	players.	
4.4 Determinants	of	Preferences	
We	 assume	 that	 federal	 reform	 preferences	 of	 politicians	 are	 driven	 by	 three	
factors:	(i)	Länder	self‐interest,	(ii)	ideology	and	government	self‐interest,	as	well	as	(iii)	
individual	 characteristics	 related	 to	 information,	 education,	 and	 parliamentary	
role/experience.	The	distinction	between	Länder	 factors	 and	partisan	 aspects	 shaping	
the	 views	 of	 Länder	 politicians	 is	 also	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	 the	 literature	 studying	 voting	
behavior	 in	 the	 Bundesrat	 (Bräuninger,	 Gschwend,	 and	 Shikano	 2010;	 Träger	 and	
Leuning	 2014).	 Contrary	 to	 Bundesrat	 voting	 studies,	 our	 data	 base	 allows	 for	 the	
inclusion	of	the	individual	dimension	as	a	third	one.	
4.4.1 Länder	Self‐Interest	
The	predictions	related	to	Länder	self‐interest	are	straightforward	in	the	context	of	
fiscal	equalization	but	less	so	for	tax	autonomy.	Politicians	from	Länder	that	are	regular	
recipients	of	(contributors	to)	the	fiscal	equalization	system	should	tend	to	be	in	favor	of	
(against)	more	intense	equalization.	
With	 respect	 to	 tax	 autonomy	 the	 prediction	 is	more	 complex.	 Since	 Zodrow	 and	
Mieszkowski	 (1986)	 the	 public	 finance	 literature	 has	 paid	 close	 attention	 to	 the	
normative	side	of	tax	autonomy	and	tax	competition	(Fuest,	Huber,	and	Mintz	2005).	In	
our	context,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Länder	that	fall	above	and	below	median	levels	
of	 income	may	benefit	or	suffer	from	tax	competition	in	different	ways.	In	the	political	
debate,	 it	 is	 often	 argued	 that	 poor	 jurisdictions	 would	 lose	 from	 tax	 autonomy	 and	
																																																								
33	It	is	contested	to	which	extent	a	change	of	the	German	constitution	is	required	for	more	tax	autonomy.	
Feld,	Kube,	and	Schnellenbach	(2013,	52)	contend	that	changes	of	tax	laws	are	sufficient	to	enable	Länder	
to	set	surcharges	on	federally	defined	taxes.	For	these	tax	law	changes,	the	Bundesrat	would	still	be	a	veto	
player,	 albeit	 with	 simple	 majority	 sufficient	 for	 reform	 acceptance	 (instead	 of	 two‐thirds	 for	 a	
constitutional	change).	
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might	 even	 be	 confronted	 with	 a	 vicious	 cycle	 of	 rising	 taxes	 and	 outward	 flows	 of	
mobile	 tax	 bases	 (high‐income	 individuals,	 companies).	 This	 argument	 is	 reinforced	
when	 agglomeration	 externalities	 play	 a	 role	 (Baldwin	 and	 Krugman	 2004).	 Other	
authors,	however,	point	out	that	both	very	poor	and	very	rich	Länder	might	particularly	
welcome	 an	 autonomous	 tax	 setting	 since	 it	 offers	 both	 types	 leeway	 to	 adjust	 public	
good	 provision	 compared	 to	 Länder	with	 an	 average	 income	 level	 (Fuest	 2008).	 Rich	
(poor)	Länder	could	increase	(decrease)	the	supply	of	public	goods	and	increase	(lower)	
taxes.	According	 to	 this	 view,	we	 should	 expect	 that	 Länder	 at	 the	 tails	 of	 the	 income	
distribution	welcome	tax	autonomy,	whereas	Länder	close	to	the	median	position	may	
prefer	 the	 status	 quo.34	In	 addition,	 a	 high	 existing	 debt	 level	 should	 dampen	 the	
enthusiasm	 for	 tax	 competition	 because	 it	 would	 disadvantage	 the	 Länder	 in	 their	
attempt	to	offer	“value	for	money”	(i.e.,	public	goods	in	exchange	for	the	tax	burden)	and	
to	 offer	 an	 attractive	 location	 for	mobile	 factors.	 Finally,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 Länder	 could	
matter	 (Bucovetsky	 and	 Wilson	 1991):	 Smaller	 Länder	 might	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	
exploit	 autonomous	 tax	 setting	 through	 lowering	 tax	 rates	 and	 attracting	 capital	 from	
larger	 Länder.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 smaller	 Länder	 are	 confronted	 with	 a	 larger	 tax	
elasticity	of	a	mobile	tax	base	compared	to	larger	Länder.		
Our	brief	discussion	leads	us	to	make	the	following	hypotheses:	
‐ H1	(on	tax	autonomy):	Länder	“handicaps”	should	matter:	Parliamentarians	from	
Länder	with	high	debt	and/or	permanently	high	deficits	should	be	more	opposed	
to	tax	competition	than	those	from	low	debt	Länder.	
‐ H2	(on	tax	autonomy):	Politicians	from	small	Länder	(in	terms	of	population)	are	
relatively	 more	 supportive	 of	 tax	 autonomy	 than	 representatives	 from	 large	
Länder.	
‐ H3	 (on	 tax	 autonomy):	 For	 income,	we	 expect	 a	 nonlinear	 impact:	Members	 of	
parliament	 from	Länder	with	 incomes	 (far)	 above	 and	below	 the	mean	 income	
should	 favor	 tax	 autonomy,	 whereas	 Länder	 with	 an	 average	 position	 should	
have	less	interest	in	tax	autonomy.	
																																																								
34	There	is	the	subtle	problem	that	a	uniform	national	tax	rate	under	the	status	quo	may	not	be	equal	to	
the	 average	 tax	 rate	 in	 the	 non‐cooperative	 equilibrium	 with	 Länder	 tax	 autonomy.	 Our	 subsequent	
analysis	goes	through	if	members	of	Länder	parliaments	take	today’s	uniform	tax	rate	as	a	proxy	for	the	
expected	average	tax	rate	in	a	possible	future	non‐cooperative	situation.	
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‐ H4	 (on	 fiscal	 equalization):	Members	 of	 parliament	 from	Länder	which	 are	net	
contributors	 to	 the	 fiscal	 equalization	 system	 should	 be	 more	 opposed	 to	
extensive	equalization	than	those	from	net	receiving	Länder.	
4.4.2 Ideology	and	Government	Self‐Interest	
Party	programs	differ	with	respect	to	the	weights	they	assign	to	objectives	or	values	
such	 as	 “solidarity”,	 “incentives”,	 or	 “individual	 responsibility”.	 Furthermore,	 ideology	
impacts	on	the	perception	of	economic	constraints.	Heinemann	and	Janeba	(2011)	show	
how	 ideology	 influences	 the	 perception	 of	 firm	 mobility	 in	 the	 context	 of	 tax	 policy	
decisions.	Similar	to	welfare	state	reforms	or	tax	policy,	decisions	on	the	parameters	of	a	
federal	constitution	imply	decisions	on	trade‐offs	between	distributive	preferences	and	
efficiency.	We	expect	that	parties	from	the	left	will	assign	a	larger	weight	to	the	notion	of	
solidarity	between	different	Länder	relative	to	the	individual	responsibility.	In	contrast,	
market‐liberal	 parties	 should	 rather	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 Länder	 competition	 and	
incentives	with	a	critical	view	on	intense	equalization	and	the	lack	of	tax	autonomy.	This	
expectation	 is	 backed	 by	 the	 findings	 of	 Benoit	 and	 Laver	 (2006),	 who	 construct	 an	
indicator	 for	 the	 positioning	 of	 different	 parties	 with	 respect	 to	 different	 policy	
dimensions	by	conducting	expert	surveys.	Their	results	for	Germany	(Benoit	and	Laver	
2006,	261)	confirm	the	notion	that	center	right	parties	(Christian	Democratic	Party,	Free	
Democratic	 Party)	 are	 more	 market	 oriented	 and	 rather	 more	 in	 favor	 of	
decentralization	than	left	parties	(Social	Democratic	Party,	Green	Party,	Left	Party).	
Independent	 of	 party	 affiliation	 it	 could	make	 a	 difference	whether	 a	member	 of	
parliament	belongs	to	the	parties	of	 the	Länder	government	coalition	or	not.	From	the	
perspective	 of	 an	 opposition	 member,	 receipts	 to	 a	 poor	 Land	 from	 a	 generous	
equalization	system	may	be	less	appealing	since	the	political	advantage	of	this	resource	
inflow	goes	mainly	 to	 the	 incumbent	government.	Vice	versa,	opposition	politicians	 in	
rich	 Länder	 might	 view	 payments	 into	 the	 equalization	 system	 less	 critically	 since	 it	
constrains	the	incumbent	government.	
Our	expectation	is	as	follows:	
‐ H5	 (on	 fiscal	 equalization):	 Compared	 to	 politicians	 from	 Länder	 government	
coalition	parties,	 opposition	politicians	 in	 poor	 Länder	 (rich	 Länder)	 should	 be	
more	opposed	to	(supportive	of)	intense	equalization.	
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‐ H6:	 (on	 tax	autonomy	and	 fiscal	equalization):	Politicians	 from	the	political	 left	
should	 be	more	 supportive	 of	 equalization	 payments	 and	more	 opposed	 to	 tax	
autonomy	than	politicians	from	other/market‐liberal	parties.	
4.4.3 Individual	Characteristics	
Besides	Länder	interests	and	ideological	imprint,	individual	education,	information	
and	 parliamentary	 experience	 could	 be	 of	 relevance	 for	 views	 about	 the	 reform	 of	
federalism.	 There	 is	 a	 growing	 literature	 which	 looks	 at	 the	 impact	 of	 individual	
characteristics	of	policy	makers	on	beliefs,	preferences,	and	performance.	Referring	 to	
education,	 for	 instance	 Besley,	 Montalvo,	 and	 Reynal‐Querol	 (2011)	 show	 that	 the	
education	 of	 political	 leaders	 affects	 economic	 growth.	 The	more	 educated	 a	 political	
leader	 is,	 the	 higher	 the	 growth	 of	 GDP.	 Furthermore,	 the	 field	 of	 academic	 studies	
matters.	U.S.	congress	members	trained	in	economics	are	less	likely	to	support	minimum	
wage	 increases	 (O’Roark	 and	Wood	 2011),	 and	members	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	
with	an	economics	education	are	more	opposed	 to	 the	 introduction	of	 an	EU	 tax	 than	
their	parliamentary	colleagues	(Heinemann,	Mohl,	and	Osterloh,	2009).	Information	and	
former	professional	positions	seem	to	play	a	role,	too:	Göhlmann	and	Vaubel	(2007)	find	
that	inflation	preferences	of	central	bankers	are	driven	by	their	former	occupation	(the	
results	are	confirmed	by	Farvaque,	Hammadou,	and	Stanek	2011).	Evidence	in	a	similar	
vein	 is	 presented	 by	 Dreher	 et	 al.	 (2009),	 who	 show	 that	 a	 leader’s	 professional	
background	 (such	 as	 being	 a	 former	 entrepreneur)	 is	 a	 statistically	 significant	
determinant	 in	 explaining	 a	 country’s	 reform	 performance.	 With	 respect	 to	 fiscal	
performance,	 Jochimsen	 and	 Thomasius	 (2014)	 present	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 the	
financial	 expertise	 of	 Länder	 finance	 ministers	 in	 Germany	 matters	 for	 their	
jurisdiction’s	 budgetary	 performance.	 A	 link	 between	 experience	 and	 budgetary	
performance	is	found	by	Moessinger	(2014)	for	European	finance	ministers	and	by	Feld	
and	Schaltegger	(2010)	for	Swiss	finance	ministers.	
In	the	empirical	analysis,	we	are	able	to	control	for	individual	characteristics,	such	
as	age,	gender,	educational	attainments,	membership	in	the	budget	or	legal	committee,	
and	the	number	of	years	in	parliament.	Thus,	the	characteristics	included	refer	both	to	
education	and	the	individual	level	of	information	about	the	details	of	the	German	reform	
debate	 (proxied	 by	membership	 in	 specialized	 committees	 or	 length	 of	 parliamentary	
membership).	We	do	not	have	a	sign	prediction	for	these	individual	characteristics.	
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4.4.4 Survey	Details	
We	 conducted	 our	 survey	 among	 the	 members	 of	 all	 sixteen	 German	 Länder	
parliaments	in	three	different	rounds.	The	parliaments	of	Bavaria,	Brandenburg,	Lower	
Saxony,	Saarland,	Schleswig‐Holstein,	and	Thuringia	were	surveyed	in	March	and	April	
2011.	 The	 second	 round	 was	 conducted	 in	 Saxony,	 Saxony‐Anhalt,	 North	 Rhine‐
Westphalia,	Hesse,	and	Hamburg	in	December	2011	and	January	2012.	The	third	round	
in	 April	 and	 May	 2012	 included	 the	 parliamentarians	 of	 Baden‐	 Wuerttemberg,	
Rhineland‐Palatinate,	 Bremen,	 Berlin,	 and	 Mecklenburg‐West	 Pomerania.	 This	
sequential	 implementation	was	important	given	the	different	timing	of	elections	at	the	
Länder	 level.	 Specifically,	 surveys	 were	 conducted	 approximately	 at	 mid‐term	 of	 an	
electoral	 cycle,	 such	 that	members	 of	 parliament	 did	 not	 face	 electoral	 campaigns	 or	
pressure	from	post‐election	government	formation.	
The	first	step	in	each	survey	was	to	contact	each	parliament’s	presidential	office.	We	
informed	 the	presidency	on	 the	survey’s	academic	 intentions	and	asked	him	or	her	 to	
recommend	 participation	 to	 the	 Länder	 MPs.	 Subsequently,	 the	 politicians	 were	
approached	 individually	 by	 written	 letters.	 Letters	 were	 addressed	 to	 offices	 in	 their	
electoral	district	and	not	to	the	parliament’s	address.	This	decentralized	addressing	was	
chosen	 to	 lower	 the	 risk	 of	 any	 coordinated	 answering,	 e.g.,	 through	 staff	 in	 the	
parliamentary	 factions.	During	 the	 first	 round,	 non‐answering	members	of	 parliament	
received	a	follow‐up	email	with	the	questionnaire	attached.	 If	 they	did	not	answer,	we	
contacted	them	by	phone.	 In	the	second	and	third	rounds,	 the	email	 to	non‐answering	
politicians	 additionally	 included	 a	 link	 to	 an	 online	 platform	 which	 allowed	 them	 to	
answer	the	questionnaire	online.	Some	639	members	of	Länder	parliaments	in	Germany	
participated	 in	 the	 survey	which	 resulted	 in	 a	 response	 rate	 of	 34	 percent.	 Response	
rates	differ	between	various	Länder	(between	20	and	56	percent)	and	party	affiliations	
(between	24	and	42	percent,	see	Table	A.4.3	in	the	appendix	to	this	chapter	for	response	
rates	 across	 Länder	 and	 parties)	 and	 along	 individual	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Länder	
politicians.	
Politicians	 were	 guaranteed	 confidentiality	 on	 the	 individual	 response	 but	 were	
informed	 that	 aggregate	 results	 would	 be	 published.	 Confidentiality	 on	 individual	
responses	 improve	 the	 chances	 that	 parliamentarians	 reveal	 their	 individual	
preferences	 and	 pay	 less	 attention	 to	 issues	 of	 public	 opinion	 or	 party	 discipline	 as	
compared	 to	 statements	 in	 public.	 Data	were	 collected	 non‐anonymously	 so	 that	 it	 is	
	91	
	
possible	 to	 match	 answers	 with	 individual	 characteristics	 of	 politicians,	 which	 are	
publicly	 available	 on	 official	websites.	 The	 survey	 consists	 of	 questions	 related	 to	 the	
new	 German	 constitutional	 debt	 brake,	 expenditure	 preferences	 and	 preferences	 on	
fiscal	 equalization	 and	 tax	 autonomy	 (see	 Heinemann	 et	 al.	 2014a	 for	 a	 detailed	
description	and	Heinemann	et	al.	2014b	for	debt	brake‐related	results).	The	latter	two	
are	the	focus	of	this	analysis:	
	
Tax	 autonomy	 question:	 It	 is	 repeatedly	discussed	 to	grant	German	Länder	more	
tax	autonomy.	One	of	the	options	debated	 is,	 for	example,	the	right	to	 levy	surcharges	on	
income	or	corporate	 taxes.	Would	you	be	 in	 favor	of	Länder	being	allowed	 to	 levy	 these	
surcharges	and	determining	their	level	autonomously?	
Answers	 are	 given	 on	 a	 discrete	 9	 point	 scale	 from	 –4	 (“absolutely	 no”)	 to	 +4	
(“absolutely	yes”)	with	0	indicated	as	“undecided”.	Values	between	–4	and	0	or	0	and	+4	
can	thus	be	interpreted	as	nuances	of	“rather	no”	or	“rather	yes”,	respectively.	
	
Fiscal	equalization	question:	The	current	design	of	the	Länder	 fiscal	equalization	
system	 is	 also	 subject	 to	 an	 ongoing	 debate.	 How	 do	 you	 assess	 the	 current	 extent	 of	
redistribution	 among	 the	 German	 Länder	 (including	 all	 instruments	 of	 the	 federal	
equalization	 system)?35	The	 current	 equalization	 of	 the	 financial	 capacity	 across	 the	
Länder	through	the	fiscal	equalization	scheme	is	…	
Answers	are	given	on	a	discrete	9	point	scale	 from	–4	(“absolutely	too	low”)	 to	+4	
(“absolutely	too	far	reaching”)	with	0	indicated	as	“appropriate”.	Values	between	–4	and	
0	or	0	and	+4	can	thus	be	interpreted	as	nuances	of	“rather	too	low”	or	“rather	too	far	
reaching”,	respectively.	
The	descriptive	results	point	to	highly	diverse	tax	autonomy	preferences.	Figure	4.1	
shows	 that	 there	 is	 –	 with	 a	 thin	 margin	 –	 an	 absolute	 majority	 of	 respondents	 (51	
percent)	who	tend	to	support	higher	Länder	tax	autonomy	compared	to	the	status	quo,	
whereas	 10	 percent	 have	 a	 neutral	 position	 and	 39	 percent	 are	 opposed.	 However,	
nearly	 one‐fourth	 of	 respondents	 were	 in	 the	 most	 negative	 category	 (–4).	 Thus,	
opponents	have	a	more	determined	view	compared	to	the	supporters	of	tax	autonomy.	
																																																								
35	Through	the	reference	to	“all	 instruments	of	 the	 federal	equalization	system”	the	question	activates	a	
comprehensive	 assessment	 of	 the	 redistributive	 intensity.	 However,	 we	 cannot	 fully	 exclude	 the	
possibility	 that	 individual	 respondents,	 in	 their	 assessment,	 may	 focus	 on	 special	 provisions	 in	 the	
equalization	formula	which	give	an	advantage	or	disadvantage	to	their	Land.	
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Figure	4.1:	Tax	Autonomy	Preferences	–	Overall	Results	
This	graph	reports	the	percentage	of	all	respondent	MSPs	in	each	answer	category.		
	
	
Preferences	on	 fiscal	 equalization	 show	 systematic	differences	 compared	 to	 those	
for	tax	autonomy.	Figure	4.2	reveals	that	the	mode	is	the	neutral	position	with	a	share	of	
30	percent,	 implying	 that	most	members	of	Länder	parliaments	prefer	 the	 status	quo.	
The	 share	of	politicians	who	 reveal	preferences	 for	a	 lower	extent	of	 equalization	 (47	
percent),	however,	clearly	exceeds	the	share	of	those	who	are	in	favor	of	an	even	higher	
transfer	level	(23	percent).36		
	
	 	
																																																								
36	The	 far‐reaching	 equalization	 under	 the	 status	 quo	may	 help	 to	 explain	 this	 frequency	 distribution.	
However,	 even	 the	 highly	 equalizing	 status	 quo	 does	 not	 preclude	 a	 further	 increase	 in	 equalization	
intensity.	For	example,	the	current	horizontal	Länder	equalization	formula	only	partially	accounts	for	the	
financial	capacity	of	a	Land’s	municipalities	and	a	full	inclusion	is	one	of	the	debated	reform	options	which	
would	even	increase	the	size	of	transfers	from	the	richer	to	the	poorer	Länder.	
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Figure	4.2:	Fiscal	Equalization	Preferences	–	Overall	Results	
This	graph	reports	the	percentage	of	all	respondent	MSPs	in	each	answer	category.		
	
	
4.5 Econometric	Analysis	
Through	our	econometric	testing,	we	want	to	understand	the	relative	importance	of	
Länder	 characteristics,	 ideology,	 and	 individual	 drivers	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 federal	
preferences.	 In	 addition,	 we	 aim	 at	 identifying	 a	 model	 which,	 in	 the	 subsequent	
analytical	step,	serves	the	double	purpose	of	both	simulating	majorities	and	of	guiding	
us	in	the	development	of	viable	federal	reform	packages.	
At	the	outset,	we	have	to	take	account	of	several	possible	caveats	originating	from	
our	 survey	 data.	 First,	 unlike	 in	 incentivized	 experiments,	 survey	 respondents	 do	 not	
face	monetary	incentives	to	reveal	their	true	preferences.	While	this	criticism	is	valid	in	
principle,	our	survey	is	superior	to	recording	votes	because	the	confidential	treatment	of	
individual	responses	offers	the	possibility	to	study	preferences	of	politicians	that	are	not	
affected	by,	e.g.,	the	fear	of	party	sanctions.	
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Second,	we	have	to	pay	attention	to	the	different	response	rates	of	politicians	and	
their	possible	consequences	for	statistical	inference.37	Nonresponse	may	cause	a	biased	
sample	 (Rubin	 1976;	 Allison	 2002).	 However,	 concerns	 regarding	 nonresponse	 are	
limited	 if	 we	 are	 able	 to	 include	 those	 variables	 in	 our	 regressions	 which	 drive	
participation	(Allison	2002).	The	regression	then	adjusts	 for	all	observable	differences	
between	 non‐respondents	 and	 respondents.	 Our	 nonresponse	 analysis	 (Table	 4.1)	
guides	us	as	to	which	variables	drive	participation	and	thus	need	to	be	included	in	the	
subsequent	 regressions	 (see	 Table	 A.4.4	 for	 variable	 descriptions).38	In	 addition,	 we	
provide	robustness	checks	based	on	weighted	regressions,	which	is	one	way	of	reducing	
bias	from	unit	nonresponse	(Little	and	Vartivarian	2005).	
The	 results	 of	 our	 regression	 analyses	 are	 shown	 in	 Table	 4.2	 (tax	 autonomy	
preferences)	 and	 Table	 4.3	 (fiscal	 equalization	 preferences).	 All	 specifications	 display	
marginal	 effects	 for	 the	maximum	 response	 category	 (=	 +4)	 based	 on	 ordered	 probit	
estimations.	In	line	with	our	theoretical	considerations,	the	regressions	include	proxies	
for	 Länder	 self‐interest,	 political	 ideology	 and	 government	 self‐interest	 as	 well	 as	
individual	characteristics	(see	Table	A.4.5	for	descriptive	statistics	on	the	variables	used	
in	the	main	regressions).	
	
	 	
																																																								
37	Fortunately,	 we	 do	 not	 have	 a	 significant	 item	 nonresponse	 problem	 but	 predominantly	 face	 unit	
nonresponse.	The	latter	can	cause	serious	problems	in	the	measurement	of	actors’	positions	if	they	want	
to	hide	some	views	for	strategic	reasons	(König,	Finke,	and	Daimer	2005).	Item	nonresponse	is	negligible	
in	 our	 case	 (0.3	 percent	 for	 the	 tax	 autonomy	 and	 0.9	 percent	 for	 the	 fiscal	 equalization	 question),	
presumably	because	our	questions	do	not	touch	sensitive	issues.	
38	For	example,	we	find	that	politicians	who	studied	economics	or	business	and/or	are	a	member	of	the	
respective	parliament’s	budget	committee	of	the	Land	exhibit	a	significantly	higher	inclination	to	having	
answered	our	questionnaire.	This	is	in	line	with	the	insight	on	the	role	of	topic	interest	for	participation	
(Groves,	Presser,	and	Dipko	2004).	
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Table	4.1:	Non‐Response	Analysis,		
Probit	Estimation	with	Response	(=1,	0	otherwise)	as	Dependent	Variable	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Ideology	and	government	self‐interest:	 	 	 	 	
Party	affiliationa	 	 	 	 	
CDU/CSU	 	 0.242**	 0.250*	 0.283**	
	 [2.347]	 [1.705]	 [2.496]	
SPD	 	 0.004	 0.026	 0.102	
	 	 [0.036]	 [0.152]	 [0.810]	
Green	Party	 	 ‐0.033	 0.043	 0.065	
	 	 [‐0.254]	 [0.232]	 [0.506]	
Left	Party	 	 ‐0.148	 ‐0.259	 ‐0.118	
	 [‐1.044]	 [‐1.404]	 [‐0.739]	
Other	Parties	 	 0.121	 ‐0.094	 0.059	
	 [0.485]	 [‐0.291]	 [0.240]	
Power	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	government	coalition	of	Land	 ‐0.106	 	 ‐0.204**	 ‐0.169**	
	 [‐1.502]	 	 [‐2.185]	 [‐2.328]	
Individual	characteristics:	 	 	 	 	
Education	 	 	 	 	
College	entrance	qualification	 ‐0.162	 	 ‐0.158	 ‐0.138	
	 [‐1.153]	 	 [‐1.131]	 [‐0.975]	
Tertiary	degree	 0.140	 	 0.151	 0.150	
	 [1.074]	 	 [1.105]	 [1.140]	
Economics/Business	degree	 0.200**	 	 0.182*	 0.170*	
	 [2.236]	 	 [1.831]	 [1.834]	
Law	degree	 0.117	 	 0.089	 0.068	
	 [1.270]	 	 [0.963]	 [0.744]	
Information	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee	 0.353***	 	 0.333***	 0.360***	
	 [4.623]	 	 [4.384]	 [4.680]	
Member	of	legal	committee	 0.032	 	 0.029	 0.046	
	 [0.353]	 	 [0.335]	 [0.500]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 0.000	 	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.004	
	 [0.002]	 	 [‐0.341]	 [‐0.697]	
Other	individual	characteristics	 	 	 	 	
Female	 ‐0.308***	 	 ‐0.280***	 ‐0.274***	
	 [‐4.583]	 	 [‐4.256]	 [‐4.122]	
Age	in	years	 0.003	 	 0.005	 0.003	
	 [0.807]	 	 [1.321]	 [0.822]	
Regression	diagnostics:	 	 	 	 	
Länder	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Observations	 1,861	 1,861	 1,861	 1,861	
Pseudo	R2	 0.059	 0.043	 0.038	 0.065	
Notes:	This	table	displays	regression	coefficients;	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	standard	errors	
in	brackets	are	clustered	at	the	Länder	level;	a	base	category	is	the	liberal	democratic	party.	
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Table	4.2:	Ordered	Probit	Results	for	Tax	Autonomy	Question		
(‐4=not	in	favor;	+4=in	favor)	
	 Ideological	variations	 Legacy	variation	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Länder	self‐interest:	 	 	 	 	
Länder	characteristicsa:	income	and	size	 	 	 	 	
GDP	per	capita	 0.0115***	 0.0097***	 0.0124***	 0.0082***	
	 [0.0024]	 [0.0022]	 [0.0018]	 [0.0018]	
Absolute	deviation	of	Land	GDP	per	capita	 ‐0.0122**	 ‐0.0098**	 ‐0.0172***	 ‐0.0111**	
										from	federal	GDP	per	capita	 [0.0050]	 [0.0048]	 [0.0038]	 [0.0046]	
Population	 ‐0.0021	 ‐0.0020	 ‐0.0083**	 ‐0.0039	
	 [0.0043]	 [0.0043]	 [0.0035]	 [0.0042]	
Länder	characteristicsa:	legacies	 	 	 	 	
Total	debt	to	GDP	 ‐0.0022*	 ‐0.0021*	 	 	
	 [0.0012]	 [0.0011]	 	 	
3	year	average	of	deficit	to	GDP	 	 	 ‐0.0576***	 	
	 	 	 [0.0135]	 	
Consolidation	needs	as	share	of	GDP	 	 	 	 ‐0.0384***	
	 	 	 	 [0.0149]	
Länder	characteristicsa:	equalization	 	 	 	 	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 0.0211	 0.0143	 ‐0.0074	 0.0141	
	 [0.0202]	 [0.0197]	 [0.0117]	 [0.0161]	
Ideology	and	government	self‐interest:	 	 	 	 	
Party	affiliationb	 	 	 	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.0595	 	 	 	
[0.0534]	 	 	 	
SPD	 ‐0.0786	 	 	 	
	 [0.0558]	 	 	 	
Green	Party	 ‐0.0995*	 	 	 	
	 [0.0575]	 	 	 	
Left	Party	 0.0180	 	 	 	
[0.0651]	 	 	 	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.0223	 	 	 	
[0.0679]	 	 	 	
Alternative	individual	ideological	indicator	 	 	 	 	
Preference	for	lower	taxes	and	fees	 	 0.0028**	 0.0026**	 0.0029**	
	 	 [0.0011]	 [0.0012]	 [0.0011]	
Power	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	government	coalition	of	Land	 0.0118	 ‐0.0001	 ‐0.0029	 ‐0.0001	
	 [0.0230]	 [0.0218]	 [0.0196]	 [0.0212]	
Individual	characteristics:	 	 	 	 	
Education	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	degree	 ‐0.0348	 ‐0.0355	 ‐0.0402	 ‐0.0329	
	 [0.0252]	 [0.0255]	 [0.0256]	 [0.0251]	
Economics/Business	degree	 0.0223	 0.0236	 0.0219	 0.0199	
	 [0.0288]	 [0.0291]	 [0.0293]	 [0.0292]	
Information	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee	 ‐0.0205	 ‐0.0207	 ‐0.0191	 ‐0.0209	
	 [0.0257]	 [0.0262]	 [0.0262]	 [0.0263]	
Member	of	legal	committee	 ‐0.0569*	 ‐0.0569*	 ‐0.0562*	 ‐0.0576*	
	 [0.0323]	 [0.0327]	 [0.0316]	 [0.0327]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 0.0020	 0.0016	 0.0022	 0.0018	
	 [0.0015]	 [0.0015]	 [0.0016]	 [0.0015]	
Other	individual	characteristics	 	 	 	 	
Female	 ‐0.0386	 ‐0.0431*	 ‐0.0388	 ‐0.0416*	
	 [0.0258]	 [0.0247]	 [0.0245]	 [0.0244]	
Age	in	years	 ‐0.0015	 ‐0.0015	 ‐0.0016	 ‐0.0016	
	 [0.0011]	 [0.0011]	 [0.0011]	 [0.0011]	
Regression	diagnostics:	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 637	 636	 636	 636	
Pseudo	R2	 0.0217	 0.0205	 0.0239	 0.0214	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	individual	characteristics	 0.0980	 0.0889	 0.0998	 0.117	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party	dummies	 0.1130	 n.a.	 n.a.	 n.a.	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	Länder	controls	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	
Notes:	 This	 table	 displays	 marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 maximum	 category	 (=	 +4),	 */**/***	 denote	 significance	 at	 the	
10%/5%/1%	level;	standard	errors	in	brackets	are	clustered	at	the	Land‐party	level;	a	Länder	characteristics	are	2010	
data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012;	
b	base	category	for	the	individual	party‐dummies	is	the	free	democratic	party.	
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Table	4.3:	Ordered	Probit	Results	for	Fiscal	Equalization	Question		
(‐4=	too	low;	+4=	too	far	reaching)	
	 Ideological	variations	 Legacy	variation	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Länder	self‐interest:	 	 	 	 	
Länder	characteristicsa:	income	and	size	 	 	 	 	
GDP	per	capita	 0.0087***	 0.0073**	 0.0100***	 0.0018	
[0.0031]	 [0.0031]	 [0.0031]	 [0.0024]	
Absolute	deviation	of	Land	GDP	per	capita	 ‐0.0078	 ‐0.0056	 ‐0.0161**	 ‐0.0040	
										from	federal	GDP	per	capita	 [0.0054]	 [0.0055]	 [0.0064]	 [0.0059]	
Population	 0.0001	 0.0007	 ‐0.0090*	 ‐0.0002	
[0.0046]	 [0.0044]	 [0.0048]	 [0.0051]	
Länder	characteristicsa:	legacies	 	 	 	 	
Total	debt	to	GDP	 ‐0.0067***	 ‐0.0066***	 	 	
[0.0021]	 [0.0019]	 	 	
3	year	average	of	deficit	to	GDP	 	 	 ‐0.1100***	 	
	 	 [0.0239]	 	
Consolidation	needs	as	share	of	GDP	 	 	 	 ‐0.0736***	
	 	 	 [0.0248]	
Länder	characteristicsa:	equalization	 	 	 	 	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.0033	 ‐0.0077	 ‐0.0842***	 ‐0.0432	
[0.0304]	 [0.0297]	 [0.0168]	 [0.0286]	
Ideology	and	government	self‐interest:	 	 	 	 	
Party	affiliationb	 	 	 	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.0122	 	 	 	
[0.0365]	 	 	 	
SPD	 ‐0.0745**	 	 	 	
	 [0.0326]	 	 	 	
Green	Party	 ‐0.0676*	 	 	 	
	 [0.0354]	 	 	 	
Left	Party	 0.0249	 	 	 	
[0.0454]	 	 	 	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.0114	 	 	 	
[0.0522]	 	 	 	
Alternative	individual	ideological	indicator	 	 	 	 	
Preference	for	lower	taxes	and	fees	 	 0.0027**	 0.0025**	 0.0030***	
	 	 [0.0010]	 [0.0011]	 [0.0011]	
Power	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	government	coalition	of	Land	 ‐0.0383	 ‐0.0471	 ‐0.0501*	 ‐0.0431	
	 [0.0320]	 [0.0331]	 [0.0286]	 [0.0334]	
Individual	characteristics:	 	 	 	 	
Education	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.0112	 0.0118	 0.0027	 0.0172	
	 [0.0150]	 [0.0149]	 [0.0159]	 [0.0149]	
Economics/Business	degree	 ‐0.0097	 ‐0.0097	 ‐0.0124	 ‐0.0167	
	 [0.0191]	 [0.0181]	 [0.0190]	 [0.0195]	
Information	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee	 0.0116	 0.0115	 0.0165	 0.0129	
	 [0.0196]	 [0.0190]	 [0.0192]	 [0.0188]	
Member	of	legal	committee	 ‐0.0095	 ‐0.0106	 ‐0.0105	 ‐0.0116	
	 [0.0257]	 [0.0251]	 [0.0243]	 [0.0245]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.0007	 ‐0.0005	 0.0008	 0.0000	
	 [0.0013]	 [0.0013]	 [0.0014]	 [0.0013]	
Other	individual	characteristics	 	 	 	 	
Female	 ‐0.0100	 ‐0.0193	 ‐0.0120	 ‐0.0161	
	 [0.0238]	 [0.0252]	 [0.0245]	 [0.0253]	
Age	in	years	 0.0001	 0.0001	 ‐0.0001	 ‐0.0002	
	 [0.0009]	 [0.0008]	 [0.0009]	 [0.0009]	
Regression	diagnostics:	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 0.0912	 0.0890	 0.0971	 0.0834	
Pseudo	R2	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.953	 0.869	 0.783	 0.870	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	individual	characteristics	 0.0572	 n.a.	 n.a.	 n.a.	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party	dummies	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	
p‐value	joint	significance	of	Länder	controls	 0.0912	 0.0890	 0.0971	 0.0834	
Notes:	 	 This	 table	 displays	 marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 maximum	 category	 (=	 +4),	 */**/***	 denote	 significance	 at	 the	
10%/5%/1%	level;	standard	errors	in	brackets	are	clustered	at	the	Land‐party	level;	a	Länder	characteristics	are	2010	
data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012;	
b	base	category	for	the	individual	party‐dummies	is	the	free	democratic	party.	
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For	both	dependent	variables	 in	Tables	4.2	and	4.3	we	employ	the	 identical	set	of	
controls:	 To	 proxy	 Länder	 interests	 we	 include	 indicators	 for	 the	 current	 economic	
position	(GDP	per	capita)	and	size	(population)	of	the	Länder.	Following	our	reasoning	
on	the	relative	merits	of	tax	autonomy	for	those	Länder	above	or	below	the	mean	(see	
H3),	 we	 also	 include	 the	 deviation	 of	 a	 Land’s	 GDP	 from	 the	mean.	 Furthermore,	 we	
experiment	with	other	important	fiscally	related	variables,	such	as	the	debt‐to‐GDP	ratio	
(columns	(1)	and	(2)),	the	three‐year‐average	of	the	deficit	ratio	(column	(3)),	and	the	
need	 for	 consolidation	 (column	 (4)).	 The	 latter	 has	 been	 calculated	 by	 the	 German	
Council	 of	 Economic	 Experts	 (Sachverständigenrat	 2011)	 and	 measures	 the	 fiscal	
adjustment	necessary	to	comply	with	the	constitutional	debt	brake,	which	requires	the	
Länder	to	run	a	zero	structural	deficit	from	the	year	2020	onwards.	Finally,	we	account	
for	 the	 current	 level	 of	 fiscal	 equalization	 transfers	 to	 capture	 the	 advantage	 or	
disadvantage	 from	 the	 equalization	 system.	 All	 Länder	 characteristics	 are	 included	 in	
the	regression	on	a	real	time	basis,	that	is,	we	use	2010	data	for	the	survey	waves	which	
took	place	in	2011	and	2011	data	for	the	2012	waves.	To	get	a	gist	of	the	differences	in	
economic	and	fiscal	situations	of	the	Länder	see	Table	A.4.6.	
As	for	Länder	characteristics,	there	is	a	highly	significant	 link	between	the	income	
level	and	the	fiscal	variables	on	the	one	hand	and	fiscal	federal	preferences	(both	on	tax	
autonomy	 and	 fiscal	 equalization)	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 However,	 the	 detailed	 findings	
only	 partially	 correspond	 to	 our	 theoretical	 expectations.	 In	 line	 with	 hypothesis	 H1,	
politicians	from	Länder	with	significant	fiscal	burdens	and	need	for	fiscal	adjustment	are	
less	ready	to	accept	tax	autonomy.	This	effect	is	robust	and	significant	no	matter	how	we	
measure	 legacies	 (debt,	 average	 past	 deficit,	 or	 consolidation	 needs).	 The	 effect	 of	
population	size	is	as	expected	(see	H2).	Ceteris	paribus,	larger	Länder	are	more	opposed	
to	 tax	 autonomy.	 The	 result,	 however,	 is	 not	 statistically	 significant	with	 exception	 of	
specification	3.	The	result	for	hypothesis	H3	on	the	impact	of	the	absolute	deviation	of	
Länder	GDP	from	the	mean	contradicts	our	expectation.	Politicians	from	Länder	which	
are	 either	 richer	 or	 poorer	 than	 the	 country’s	 average	 show	 a	 significantly	 lower	
readiness	 to	open	 the	way	 for	 tax	autonomy.	As	shown	above,	 some	economic	models	
predict	positive	effects	from	autonomous	tax	setting	for	particularly	poor	or	rich	Länder.	
Members	 of	 parliaments	 do	 not	 share	 this	 view,	 though.	 Our	 expectation	 that	 the	
beneficiaries	of	 fiscal	equalization	 (see	H4)	 like	high	 transfers	 clearly	 shows	up	 in	 the	
data—albeit	 this	 effect	 is	 being	hidden	behind	 a	multicollinearity	 phenomenon:	 Fiscal	
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equalization	 receipts	 are	 not	 robustly	 significant.	 However,	 this	 indicator	 is	 highly	
correlated	with	subnational	GDP	and	legacy	proxies.	A	re‐estimation	of	our	model,	but	
now	 excluding	 the	 GDP	 per	 capita	 or	 the	measure	 of	 consolidation	 needs,	 leaves	 the	
coefficient	of	fiscal	equalization	transfers	highly	significant	(results	obtainable	from	the	
authors).	 The	 result	 supports	 our	 hypothesis	 that	 Länder	 self‐interest	 is	 important:	
Politicians	from	Länder	with	high	fiscal	equalization	transfers	are	more	opposed	to	cut	
back	transfers	than	their	counterparts	in	Länder	that	are	in	a	net‐paying	position.	
We	also	 look	at	 the	conditional	effect	of	being	a	member	of	a	Länder	government	
and	 the	amount	of	 fiscal	 equalization	 transfers	 to	GDP	or	GDP	per	capita,	 respectively	
(see	H5).	As	the	estimation	of	interaction	effects	is	not	reliable	in	a	nonlinear	estimation	
model,	we	rely	on	an	OLS	regression	for	these	specifications.	However,	the	F‐tests	on	the	
joint	 significance	 of	 the	 interaction	 effects	miss	 statistical	 significance	 at	 conventional	
levels	 which	 means	 that	 we	 cannot	 detect	 any	 significant	 preference	 asymmetry	
between	government	party	politicians	from	rich	and	poor	Länder.39	
To	 test	 the	hypothesis	H6,	 column	 (1)	 and	 column	 (2)	 in	both	Tables	4.2	 and	4.3	
include	the	results	for	two	different	specifications	of	the	ideological	proxies.	In	column	
(1),	we	use	simple	dummies	separate	for	each	party,	where	the	Free	Democratic	Party	
(FDP)	 is	 chosen	 as	 the	 base	 category	 because	 it	 is	 the	most	market	 oriented	 party	 in	
Germany	 (Benoit	 and	 Laver	 2006).	 In	 columns	 (2)‐(4),	 we	 include	 an	 alternative	
individual	ideology	measure	originating	from	the	survey	itself.	In	the	survey,	we	asked	
how	a	politician	would	 spend	a	 surplus	of	100	Euros	 in	 the	 respective	Länder	budget	
with	the	available	options	of	cutting	taxes,	redeeming	debt	or	 increasing	expenditures.	
We	take	the	percentage	allocated	to	the	cut	of	taxes	as	our	individual	ideological	proxy	
with	a	large	(small)	amount	indicating	a	right	(left)	government	ideology.	
We	 find	 that	party	 ideology	significantly	helps	 to	understand	 the	heterogeneity	of	
federal	preferences:	politicians	of	the	Social	Democratic	or	the	Green	Parties	are	much	
less	 likely	 to	 accept	 lower	 equalization	 intensity	 than	 those	 of	 the	 liberal	 FDP.	 The	
preferences	on	fiscal	equalization	of	the	Christian	Democrats	and	the	Left	Party	do	not	
differ	 significantly	 from	 that	 of	 the	 FDP.	 For	 tax	 autonomy,	 a	 (weakly)	 significant	
difference	only	exists	between	the	Green	Party	and	the	Free	Democrats.	All	other	parties	
do	not	differ	significantly	 from	the	FDP.	Our	 individual	 ideology	proxy	 is	significant	 in	
																																																								
39	The	results	are	not	presented	but	are	available	upon	request.	
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both	cases:	Preferences	for	lower	taxes	are	linked	to	a	larger	support	for	tax	autonomy	
and	less	ambitious	equalization.	
Finally,	 we	 include	 information	 on	 educational	 achievements	 (tertiary	 degree	
dummy,	 specialization	 in	 economics/business	 dummy),	 the	 amount	 of	 information	
(committee	membership	dummies	and	 length	of	parliamentary	experience),	as	well	as	
gender	and	age.	For	both	dimensions	of	federal	preferences	individual	characteristics	do	
not	 play	 an	 important	 role	 with	 one	 exception:	 Legal	 committee	 members	 are	 less	
inclined	 to	 accept	 an	 increase	 in	 tax	 autonomy.	 Preference	 formation	 may	 thus	 be	
influenced	by	the	awareness	of	the	current	legal	constraints	 in	the	Federal	Republic	of	
Germany,	which	set	high	hurdles	for	more	tax	autonomy	at	the	Länder	level	and	require	
a	change	of	the	constitution.	Interestingly,	however,	there	is	no	equivalent,	statistically	
significant	impact	of	being	a	member	of	the	budget	committee.	
Several	robustness	tests	support	our	model’s	general	validity	(Table	4.4).	In	a	first	
step,	we	re‐estimate	the	model	(starting	from	the	column	(4)	specification	in	Tables	4.2	
and	 4.3)	 applying	 a	weighted	 regression	with	 the	 inverse	 of	 responses	 per	 party	 and	
Land	to	the	party	and	Land	basic	population	as	population	weights.	The	main	results	are	
robust.	There	 is	a	strong	positive	effect	of	 individual	 ideology	 toward	 lower	 taxes	and	
fees.	Länder	characteristics	matter	as	well.	This	especially	holds	for	consolidation	needs	
for	the	period	2011–2020.	In	a	second	step,	we	exclude	all	Länder	variables	and	instead	
include	 Länder	 fixed	 effects	 in	 the	 regressions.	 The	 main	 result	 for	 the	 personal	
characteristics	 is	 not	 affected	 by	 this	 change.	 Referring	 to	 the	 fiscal	 equalization	
preferences,	however,	the	alternative	model	shows	an	additional	statistically	significant	
impact	of	government	membership.	Members	of	Länder	government	parties	are	more	in	
favor	 of	 increased	 fiscal	 equalizations	 compared	 to	 members	 of	 opposition	 parties,	
which	is	in	line	with	our	theoretical	reasoning.	
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Table	4.4:	Ordered	Probit	Results	for	Robustness	Tests	with	Alternative	
Specifications	
	 Tax	autonomy	preferences	 Fiscal	equalization	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Länder	self‐interest:	 	 	 	 	
Länder	characteristicsa:	income	and	size	 	 	 	 	
GDP	per	capita	 0.0110***	 	 0.0001	 	
[0.002]	 	 [0.002]	 	
Absolute	deviation	of	Land	GDP	per	capita	 ‐0.0161***	 	 ‐0.0031	 	
										from	federal	GDP	per	capita	 [0.005]	 	 [0.005]	 	
Population	 ‐0.0099**	 	 0.0012	 	
[0.005]	 	 [0.004]	 	
Länder	characteristicsa:	legacies	 	 	 	 	
Consolidation	needs	as	share	of	GDP	 ‐0.0555***	 	 ‐0.0650***	 	
[0.018]	 	 [0.020]	 	
Länder	characteristicsa:	equalization	 	 	 	 	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 0.0459**	 	 ‐0.0345	 	
[0.023]	 	 [0.024]	 	
Ideology	and	government	self‐interest:	 	 	 	 	
Alternative	individual	ideological	indicator	 	 	 	 	
Preference	for	lower	taxes	and	fees	 0.0022*	 0.0026**	 0.0028**	 0.0026**	
	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	
Power	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	government	coalition	of	Land	 ‐0.0169	 ‐0.0042	 ‐0.0499*	 ‐0.0556***	
	 [0.023]	 [0.017]	 [0.027]	 [0.021]	
Individual	characteristics:	 	 	 	 	
Education	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	degree	 ‐0.0384	 ‐0.0402	 0.0203	 ‐0.0036	
	 [0.028]	 [0.025]	 [0.018]	 [0.016]	
Economics/Business	degree	 0.0179	 0.0177	 0.0102	 ‐0.0042	
	 [0.027]	 [0.029]	 [0.022]	 [0.018]	
Information	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee	 ‐0.0441	 ‐0.0156	 0.0089	 0.0129	
	 [0.029]	 [0.027]	 [0.018]	 [0.018]	
Member	of	legal	committee	 ‐0.0464	 ‐0.0567*	 0.0093	 ‐0.0108	
	 [0.035]	 [0.032]	 [0.024]	 [0.025]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 0.0024	 0.0027*	 0.0003	 0.0003	
	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
Other	individual	characteristics	 	 	 	 	
Female	 ‐0.0641**	 ‐0.0394	 ‐0.0061	 ‐0.0195	
	 [0.031]	 [0.024]	 [0.025]	 [0.023]	
Age	in	years	 ‐0.0020	 ‐0.0016	 0.0002	 0.0000	
	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	
Regression	diagnostics:	 	 	 	 	
Weighted	regressionb	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	
Länder	fixed	effects	instead	of	Länder	characteristics	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Observations	 636	 636	 630	 630	
Pseudo	R2	 0.026	 0.028	 0.086	 0.110	
Notes:	 This	 table	 displays	 marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 maximum	 category	 (=	 +4),	 */**/***	 denote	 significance	 at	 the	
10%/5%/1%	level;	standard	errors	in	brackets	are	clustered	at	the	Land‐party	level;	a	Länder	characteristics	are	2010	
data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012.	
b	We	use	the	inverse	of	responses	per	party	and	Land	to	the	party	and	Land	basic	population	as	regression	weights.	
	
4.6 Länder‐Specific	 Median	 Preferences	 and	 Simulated	 Reform	
Majorities	
We	now	make	use	of	our	estimated	models	to	 identify	the	constraints	that	 federal	
reforms	 are	 facing	 in	 individual	 Länder	 parliaments	 and	 the	 Bundesrat.	 For	 that	
purpose,	 we	 use	 the	 respective	 estimates	 of	 columns	 (1)	 in	 Tables	 4.2	 and	 4.3	 to	
simulate	 the	 (voting)	 preferences	 of	 all	 Länder	 politicians	 regardless	 of	whether	 they	
participated	 in	our	 survey	or	not.	With	 the	exception	of	 the	 individual	 ideology	proxy	
(i.e.,	preference	for	lower	taxes	and	fees,	which	originates	from	the	survey	itself	and	thus	
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cannot	be	used	for	the	simulation),	all	control	variables	are	available	for	politicians	who	
did	not	participate	in	our	survey.	
The	 first	 step	 identifies	 the	 preferences	 of	 each	 subnational	 parliament’s	median	
position,	 which	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 middle	 position	 when	 ordering	 the	 predicted	
preferences	across	the	–4/+4	answer	scale.	The	results	in	Figure	4.3	(upper	part)	show	
that	 median	 positions	 in	 the	 Eastern	 German	 Länder,	 Lower	 Saxony,	 and	 Rhineland‐
Palatinate	are	(mildly)	opposed	to	tax	autonomy.	With	respect	to	fiscal	equalization,	the	
Eastern	German	Länder	(excluding	Saxony)	as	well	as	Bremen	are	in	favor	of,	while	the	
others	 are	 opposed	 to	more	 fiscal	 equalization	 with	 the	 resistance	 being	 particularly	
strong	in	the	net‐contributor	Länder	Bavaria,	Baden‐Wuerttemberg,	and	Hesse.	
The	 second	 step	 makes	 use	 of	 these	 predictions	 to	 simulate	 majorities	 within	
Länder	parliaments	and	the	Bundesrat.	We	estimate	the	approval	rate	per	Land	for	both	
reform	dimensions.	The	algorithm	assigns	an	approving	position	 to	each	politician	 for	
whom	 the	 predicted	 survey	 answer	 is	 above	 zero	 on	 the	 –4/+4	 answer	 scale.	 The	
approval	 to	both	 reform	dimensions	per	Land	 is	presented	 in	Figure	4.3	 (lower	part).	
There	is	a	slight	majority	of	nine	to	seven	German	Länder	which	would	vote	in	favor	of	
increasing	tax	rate	autonomy	and	a	larger	majority	of	ten	to	six	in	favor	of	less	intense	
equalization.	 The	 Eastern	 German	 Länder	 would	 reject	 both	 tax	 autonomy	 (with	 the	
exception	 of	 Berlin)	 and	 a	 reduction	 of	 equalization	 payments	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	
Saxony).	Western	German	Länder	would	collectively	(with	the	dissenter	Bremen)	vote	in	
favor	of	a	 less	ambitious	equalization	system	but	 they	agree	 less	when	 it	comes	 to	tax	
autonomy.	According	to	our	model’s	simulations,	 the	within‐Länder	agreement	against	
the	current	equalization	intensity	is	large;	approval	rates	for	less	equalization	frequently	
reach	 100	 percent,	 i.e.,	 all	 politicians	 in	 the	 respective	 Länder	 parliament	 (at	 least	
slightly)	 think	 that	 the	 current	 system	 of	 fiscal	 equalization	 is	 too	 far	 reaching	 and	
would	thus	vote	for	a	reduction.	The	marked	exceptions	are	Länder	in	Eastern	Germany	
and	 the	 poorer	 city‐states	 of	 Berlin	 and	 Bremen	 (with	 a	 0	 percent	 reform	 support	 in	
these	two	city‐states).	
As	 the	Länder	 cast	 their	 votes	 in	 the	Bundesrat	 as	bloc	 votes	 (voting	weights	 are	
summarized	 in	Table	A.4.7	 in	 the	appendix	to	 this	chapter),	 the	key	number	 is	not	 the	
number	of	Länder	but	rather	the	number	of	votes	in	the	Bundesrat.	Decisions	in	normal	
legislation	 pass	 with	 absolute	 majority	 (i.e.,	 thirty‐five	 out	 of	 sixty‐nine	 total	 votes),	
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while	a	change	of	 the	constitution	requires	the	consent	of	 two‐thirds	of	 the	Bundesrat	
votes	(i.e.,	forty‐six	votes).	
We	further	aggregate	pro‐reform	Länder	votes	according	to	the	bloc	vote	rule	in	the	
Bundesrat.	 All	 Länder	 votes	 are	 counted	 according	 to	 the	 majority	 position	 of	 the	
Länder.	The	resulting	majorities	are	forty	to	twenty‐nine	in	favor	of	tax	autonomy	and	
forty‐seven	 to	 twenty‐two	 in	 favor	 of	 less	 intense	 equalization.	 Thus,	 the	 Länder	
opposing	 tax	 autonomy	 have	 the	 power	 to	 successfully	 veto	 a	 constitutional	 change	
which	would	 be	 required	 to	 open	 the	way	 toward	 individual	 Länder	 tax	 rate	 setting.	
However,	 the	 veto	 power	 is	 fragile.	 The	 switch	 of	 Lower	 Saxony	 alone	 into	 the	 tax	
autonomy	camp	would	be	sufficient	to	gain	a	pro‐reform	constitution	changing	majority.	
A	 reform	 toward	 less	 intense	 equalization	 is	 more	 likely	 than	 one	 toward	 more	 tax	
autonomy	 because	 our	 simulations	 imply	 a	 larger	 majority	 and	 an	 absolute	 majority	
rather	 than	 a	 qualified	 majority	 would	 be	 sufficient	 to	 change	 the	 fiscal	 equalization	
scheme.40	
Of	 course,	 our	 calculations	 must	 be	 regarded	 with	 caution.	 In	 a	 real	 decision	 on	
reforms	of	Germany’s	fiscal	 federal	system,	the	individual	politician’s	preference	is	not	
the	 only	 determinant.	 Actual	 votes	 will	 also	 be	 influenced	 by	 Länder‐wide	 or	 even	
country‐wide	 party	 strategies	 and	 party	 discipline.	 A	 further	 complication	 is	 that	 the	
composition	 of	 Länder	 parliaments	 will	 change	 in	 the	 future	 and	 voters	 might	
strategically	 select	 candidates	 to	 influence	 the	 upcoming	 fiscal	 federalism	 reform	
decisions.	Accordingly,	our	simulations	cannot	be	seen	as	an	exact	 forecast	of	a	 future	
vote.	 However,	 they	 are	 indicative	 for	 the	 underlying	 voting	 tendencies	 and	 provide	
insights	into	the	room	for	possible	political	compromises.	
	
	 	
																																																								
40	The	 principle	 of	 fiscal	 equalization	 is	 enshrined	 in	 the	 German	 constitution.	 The	 formulas	 and	 the	
intensity	of	equalization	are	defined	in	simple	laws.	
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Figure	4.3:	Median	Parliament	Member	Preferences	and	Simulated	Voting	
Behavior	by	Land	
The	upper	panel	of	this	figure	 illustrates	the	simulated	preferences	of	the	median	parliament	member	with	
respect	 to	 both	 tax	 autonomy	 and	 fiscal	 equalization.	 The	 lower	 panel	 illustrates	 the	 simulated	 voting	
behavior	of	the	members	of	state	parliaments.	
Preference	of	the	median	parliament	member	
Tax	autonomy	
(‐4=not	in	favor;	+4=in	favor)	
Fiscal	equalization	
(‐4=too	low;	+4=too	far	reaching)	
	
Description:	Median	of	preferences	per	Land	is	∈ of	the	interval:	
(‐2,‐1)	
	
(‐1,0)	 (0,1) (1,2) (2,3)	
		
	
Voting	behavior	of	Länder	on	reform	options	(approval	rates	in	percent)	
Tax	autonomy	
(approval	to	implementation	of	tax	surcharges)	
Fiscal	equalization	
(approval	to	reduction	of	fiscal	equalization)	
	
	 Länder	identifier
	
	
1 Baden‐Wuerttemberg	 5	Hesse	 9 Bremen	 13 Berlin	
2 Bavaria	 6	Thuringia	 10 Lower	Saxony	 14 Hamburg	
3 Saarland	 7	Saxony	 11 Saxony‐Anhalt	 15 Schleswig‐Holstein	
4 Rhineland‐Palatinate	 8	North	Rhine‐Westphalia 12 Brandenburg	 16Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	
* Länder	of	the	former	German	Democratic	Republic	(GDR)	(Note:	Berlin	was	divided	in	a	West	and	East	German	part).	
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4.7 Conclusion	
This	 study	 helps	 to	 understand	 federal	 reform	 preferences	 of	 political	 decision	
makers	 in	 the	context	of	 the	current	 federal	 reform	debates.	The	results	offer	 insights	
along	 two	dimensions:	 First,	 they	 contribute	 to	 a	better	 general	understanding	on	 the	
drivers	of	subnational	politicians’	individual	federal	reform	preferences	and	the	sources	
of	 political	 controversies	 on	 federal	 reform	 options.	 Second,	 they	 show	 that	 a	 better	
understanding	of	subnational	politicians’	preferences	can	also	be	exploited	in	a	forward‐
looking	way	to	assess	reform	chances	or	to	develop	promising	reform	strategies,	which	
might	overcome	traditional	reform	blockades.	
With	 respect	 to	 the	 more	 general	 dimension	 of	 federal	 controversies,	 one	 clear	
result	is	the	joint	importance	of	ideology	and	jurisdictional	interests.	Ideology	matters	in	
the	sense	that	more	general	views	on	the	role	of	government	also	translate	into	federal	
views:	 Those	 subnational	 politicians	 who	 prefer	 lower	 taxes	 and	 a	 lower	 size	 of	
government	are	also	more	inclined	to	accept	a	more	competitive	type	of	federalism.	The	
impact	 of	 Länder	 interests	 is	 not	 as	 subtle	 and	 differentiated	 as	 some	 theoretical	 tax	
competition	models	would	suggest.	The	clear	and	simple	pattern	 is	 that	 richer	Länder	
are	more	 open	 for	 tax	 competition	 and	 less	 intense	 equalization	 than	 poorer	 Länder.	
Politicians	 from	Länder	which	 lag	behind	 the	 country’s	 economic	development	do	not	
seem	 to	 perceive	 the	 chances	 of	 tax	 competition	 as	 some	 theoretical	 models	 would	
predict.	 This	 can	 be	 taken	 as	 an	 important	 message	 to	 the	 academic	 public	 finance	
community:	 Insofar	 as	 there	 is	 a	 theoretical	 consensus	 that	 tax	 competition	may	 also	
offer	 opportunities	 for	 poorer	 Länder	 (without	 significant	 budgetary	 legacies)	 this	
insight	 has	 not	 yet	 reached	 the	 political	 discourse.	 Interestingly,	 individual	
characteristics	 are	 of	 less	 importance	 compared	 to	 Länder	 or	 partisan	 interests,	 a	
finding	which	points	to	an	effective	selection	and/or	socialization	of	parliamentarians	in	
line	with	the	interests	of	Länder	and	parties.	
Although	 further	 research	 cross‐checking	 our	 results	 for	 the	 second	 crucial	 veto	
player	 (i.e.	 the	 Bundestag)	 is	 desirable,	 our	 findings	 indicate	 that	 the	 importance	 of	
legacies	for	the	understanding	of	reform	resistance	is	crucial:	Large	legacy	debt	(open	or	
implicit)	 lowers	 the	 support	 for	 tax	 autonomy.	This	 result	 points	 to	 the	potential	 of	 a	
political	bargain.	Given	that	the	resistance	towards	tax	autonomy	in	some	pivotal	Länder	
is	 only	 weak,	 some	 targeted	 collective	 help	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 legacy	 debt	 problem	
could	open	the	way	for	compromise	and	a	move	towards	tax	autonomy	in	the	upcoming	
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reform	 decisions	 on	 German	 federalism.	 It	 is	 a	 general	 insight	 that	 compensation	 of	
reform	 losers	 can	pave	 the	way	 for	 reforms.	Regarding	 the	German	 case,	 the	mistrust	
that	 the	necessary	compensation	will	be	 fully	 implemented	and	of	 long	duration	could	
be	one	of	the	obstacles	which	so	far	have	blocked	any	serious	movement	towards	more	
revenue	autonomy.	
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4.8 Appendix	to	Chapter	4	
	
Table	A.4.1:	Distribution	of	Tax	Income	on	Different	Types	of	Taxes	
Type	of	tax	 Revenue	(million	Euro) Percent	of	overall	tax	revenue	
Joint	taxes	 403,567 70.38
Federal	taxes	 99,134 17.29
Länder	taxes	 13,095 2.28
					Inheritance	tax	 4,246	 0.74
					Real	estate	transfer	tax 6,366	 1.11
					Lottery	tax	 1,420	 0.25
					Fire	service	tax	 365	 0.06
					Beer	tax	 702	 0.12
Municipal	taxes	 52,984 9.24
Custom	duties	 4,571 0.79
Overall	tax	revenue	 573,351
Data	for	2011.	Source:	Federal	Statistical	Office	(2012)
	
Table	A.4.2:	Redistribution	at	Different	Stages	of	the	FES	
This	table	reports	the	 fiscal	capacity	of	each	Land	at	the	different	stages	of	the	German	 fiscal	equalization	
scheme.		
	 Financial	capacity	per	inhabitant	as	a	percentage	of	the	average	financial	
capacity	per	inhabitant	
Stages	of	the	FES	 Land	and	
municipal	(64%)	
tax	income	
before	
redistributiona	
After	VAT	
redistribution
and	
population	
weightingb	
After	horizontal	
redistribution	
between	the	
Länderb	
With	general	
supplementary	
federal	grants	
(SFG)b	
Bavaria	 124.4	 115.9 105.7 105.7	
Hesse	 120.1	 113.4 105.0 105.0	
Baden‐Wuerttemberg	 115.9	 111.2 104.4 104.4	
Lower	Saxony	 88.9	 99.1 99.5 99.5	
Hamburg	 157.1	 97.7 98.8 99.3	
North	Rhine‐Westphalia	 101.0	 97.6 98.8 99.3	
Schleswig‐Holstein	 91.4	 96.5 98.3 99.2	
Rhineland‐Palatinate	 93.2	 96.4 98.2 99.2	
Saarland	 78.8	 92.8 96.9 98.9	
Brandenburg	 65.4	 89.8 96.0 98.7	
Saxony	 56.8	 88.3 95.6 98.6	
Thuringia	 55.1	 88.1 95.6 98.6	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 55.5	 88.2 95.6 98.6	
Mecklenburg‐West	
Pomerania	
54.8	 86.6 95.2 98.5	
Bremen	 94.7	 71.6 91.3 97.7	
Berlin	 93.7	 69.1 90.7 97.5	
aData	for	2013,	own	calculations.	
bThe	figures	in	these	columns	include	population	weighting,	i.e.,	the	number	of	inhabitants	in	the	three	city	states	
Berlin,	Bremen,	and	Hamburg	is	fictitiously	increased	by	35	percent.	
Source:	Federal	Ministry	of	Finance	(2013).	
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Table	A.4.3:	Survey	Participation	by	Land	and	Party	
	 Number of	
MSPs	
Number of	
Responses	
Response	rate	
Survey	participation	by	Land	
Baden‐Wuerttemberg	 138 77 55.80	%	
Bavaria	 187 75 40.11	%	
Berlin	 149 30 20.13	%	
Brandenburg	 88	 19 21.59	%	
Bremen	 83	 18 21.69	%	
Hamburg	 124 39 31.45	%	
Hesse	 114 50 43.86	%	
Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	 71	 17 23.94	%	
Lower	Saxony	 152 54 35.53	%	
North	Rhine‐Westphalia	 181 51 28.18	%	
Rhineland‐Palatinate	 101 50 49.50	%	
Saarland	 51	 20 39.22	%	
Saxony	 133 45 33.83	%	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 106 47 44.79	%	
Schleswig‐Holstein	 95	 29 30.53	%	
Thuringia	 88	 36 40.91	%	
Survey	participation	by	party	 	
Christian	Democrats	 681 284 41.70%	
Free	Democrats	 123 41 33.33%	
Green	Party	 239 75 31.38%	
Left	Party	 200 47 23.50%	
Social	Democrats	 559 173 30.95%	
Other	 59	 19 32.20%	
Total	 1861 639 34.34%	
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Table	A.4.4:	List	of	Variables	and	Definitions	
	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Länder	self‐interest:	 	 	
Länder	characteristics:	income	and	size	 	 	
GDP	per	capita	 Continuous	 Gross	domestic	product	per	capita,	in	thousand	
Euros,	
source:	German	Statistical	Office	
Absolute	deviation	of	Land	GDP	per	capita		
				from	federal	GDP	per	capita	
Continuous	 Absolute	deviation	of	Land	GDP	per	capita	from	
federal	GDP	per	capita			
source:	German	Statistical	Office	
Population	 Continuous	 Population	in	millions	
source:	German	Statistical	Office	
	 	 	
Länder	characteristics:	legacies	 	 	
Total	debt	to	GDP	 Continuous	 Total	debt	divided	by	gross	domestic	product,	in		
percent,	source:	German	Statistical	Office	
3	year	average	of	deficit	to	GDP	 Continuous	 3	year	average	of	deficit	to	GDP	
source:	German	Statistical	Office	
Consolidation	needs	as	share	of	GDP	 Continuous	 Consolidation	needs	for	the	period	2011	–	2020	as	
a	share	of	calculatory	nominal	GDP		
	 	 source:	Sachverständigenrat	(2011)	
	 	 	
Länder	characteristics:	equalization	 	 	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	 Continuous	 Total	net	fiscal	equalization	transfer	payments	
between	Länder	divided	by	GDP,	in		percent,		
sources:	Federal	Ministry	of	Finance,	German	
Statistical	Office	
	 	 	
Ideology	and	government	self‐interest:	 	 	 	 	 	
Party	affiliation	 	 	 	 	 	
Free	Democrats	(FDP)	 Dummy	 Member	of	Free	Democratic	Party	(base	category	in	
regressions)	
Christian	Democrats	(CDU/CSU)	 Dummy	 Member	of	Christian	Democratic	or	Christian	Social	
Party		
Social	Democrats	(SPD)	 Dummy	 Member	of	Social	Democratic	Party	
Green	Party	 Dummy	 Member	of	Green	Party	
Left	Party	 Dummy	 Member	of	Left	Party	
	 	 	
Other	parties	 Dummy	 Member	of	other	party	
	 	 	
Alternative	individual	ideological	indicator	 	 	
Preference	for	lower	taxes	and	fees	 Continuous	 Calculated	as	the	percentage	of	a	hypothesized	
additional	Land	budget	that	is	allocated	to	lowering	
taxes	and	fees	(between	0	and	100	percent)	
Power	 	 	
Member	of	government	coalition	of	Land	 Dummy	 Member	of	one	of	the	ruling	parties	
	 	 	
Individual	characteristics:	 	 	
Education	 	 	 	 	 	
College	entrance	qualification	 Dummy	 Degree	from	academic	high	school	(Baccalaureate)	
Tertiary	degree	 Dummy	 Degree	from	university	or	polytechnic	
Economics/Business	degree	 Dummy	 Tertiary	education	in	business	or	economics	
Law	degree	 Dummy	 Tertiary	education	in	law	
	 	 	
Information	 	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee	 Dummy	 Deals	with	government	budget	of	Land	
Member	of	legal	committee	 Dummy	 Deals	with	legal	issues	of	Land	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 Discrete	 Calculated	as	2011/2012	minus	year	of	parliament	
entry	(interruptions	taken	into	account)	
Other	individual	characteristics	 	 	 	 	 	
Female	 Dummy	 Member	of	parliament	is	female	
Age	in	years	 Discrete	 Calculated	as	2011/2012	minus	year	of	birth	
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Table	A.4.5:	Summary	Statistics	for	Variables	
	
	 	
	 Observations	 Mean	 Standard	
deviation	
Min	 Max	
Dependent	variables	(answer	to	survey	question)	 	 	 	 	 	
Tax	autonomy	question	 636 0.113 3.041 ‐4	 4
Fiscal	equalization	question	 631 0.765 2.135 ‐4	 4
	 	
Länder	self‐interest:	 	
Länder	characteristics:	income	and	size	 	
GDP	per	capita	 636 30.988 7.135 21.402	 49.434
Absolute	deviation	of	Land	GDP	per	capita	from	federal	
GDP	per	capita	
636 5.680 4.279 0.104	 18.901
Population	 636 6.769 5.003 0.661	 17.845
	 	
Länder	characteristics:	legacies	 	
Total	debt	to	GDP	 636 27.496 15.405 6.920	 73.628
3	year	average	of	deficit	to	GDP	 636 0.898 0.863 ‐0.397	 3.604
Consolidation	needs	as	share	of	GDP	 636 1.240 1.135 ‐0.600	 3.500
	 	
Länder	characteristics:	equalization	 	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	received	to	GDP	 636 0.237 0.908 ‐0.794	 3.001
	 	
Ideology	and	government	self‐interest:	 	
Party	affiliation	 	
Free	Democrats	 636 0.064 0.246 0	 1
Christian	Democrats	 636 0.443 0.497 0	 1
Social	Democrats	 636 0.270 0.445 0	 1
Green	Party	 636 0.118 0.323 0	 1
Left	Party	 636	 0.074	 0.262	 0	 1	
Other	parties	 636	 0.030	 0.170	 0	 1	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Alternative	individual	ideological	indicator	 	 	 	 	 	
Preference	for	lower	taxes	and	fees	 636	 3.044	 9.882	 0	 100	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Power	 	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	government	coalition	of	Land		 636	 0.538	 0.499	 0	 1	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Individual	characteristics:	 	 	 	 	 	
Education	 	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	degree	 636	 0.744	 0.437	 0	 1	
Economics/Business	degree	 636	 0.176	 0.381	 0	 1	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Information	 	 	 	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee	 636	 0.206	 0.404	 0	 1	
Member	of	legal	committee	 636	 0.142	 0.349	 0	 1	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 636	 8.308	 6.939	 0	 38	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Other	individual	characteristics	 	 	 	 	 	
Female	 636	 0.242	 0.429	 0	 1	
Age	in	years	 636	 51.481	 10.281	 23	 73	
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Table	A.4.6:	Key	Data	on	the	Sixteen	German	Länder	
Land	 Population	
(thousands)	
Nominal	
GDP	
(million	€)	
Nominal	
GDP	per	
capita	(€)	
Total	debt	
of	Land	
(%	GDP)	
Budget	
deficit	
(%	GDP)	
Former	
Eastern	
Germany	
Baden‐Wuerttemberg	 10,786	 376,285	 34,886	 17.16	 0.21	 	
Bavaria	 12,596	 446,438	 35,443	 6.79	 ‐0.23	 	
Berlin	 3,502	 101,386	 28,952	 61.64	 0.96	 in	parts	
Brandenburg	 2,496	 55,093	 22,076	 35.77	 ‐0.36	 yes	
Bremen	 661	 28,033	 42,391	 73.63	 3.06	 	
Hamburg	 1,799	 94,428	 52,494	 26.86	 0.34	 	
Hesse	 6,092	 228,513	 37,510	 17.28	 0.64	 	
Lower	Saxony	 7,914	 224,354	 28,351	 25.42	 1.00	 	
Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	 1,635	 34,987	 21,402	 29.11	 ‐0.49	 yes	
North	Rhine‐Westphalia	 17,842	 568,861	 31,883	 33.22	 0.60	 	
Rhineland‐Palatinate	 3,999	 113,224	 28,312	 32.49	 1.77	 	
Saarland	 1,013	 30,501	 30,099	 41.83	 2.50	 	
Saxony	 4,137	 95,066	 22,979	 9.99	 ‐1.85	 yes	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 2,313	 51,882	 22,428	 39.84	 0.26	 yes	
Schleswig‐Holstein	 2,838	 73,627	 25,947	 38.57	 0.91	 	
Thuringia	 2,221	 48,121	 21,664	 35.04	 0.64	 yes	
Notes:	Data	for	2011.	Berlin	was	divided	in	a	West	and	East	German	part.
Source:	Federal	Ministry	of	Finance	(2013).	
	
	
Table	A.4.7:	Distribution	of	Votes	in	the	Federal	Council	of	Germany	
Land	 Number	of	
Votes	
Land	 Number	of	
Votes	
Baden‐Wuerttemberg	 6	 Saxony	 4	
Bavaria	 6	 Thuringia	 4	
North	Rhine‐Westphalia	 6	 Saxony‐Anhalt	 4	
Lower	Saxony	 6	 Berlin	 4	
Hesse	 5	 Bremen	 3	
Schleswig‐Holstein	 4	 Hamburg	 3	
Rhineland‐Palatinate	 4	 Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	 3	
Brandenburg	 4	 Saarland	 3	
Source:	German	Constitution	(Grundgesetz),	Article	51;	www.bundesrat.de.
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Figure	A.4.1:	Net‐Payer	and	Net‐Receiver	Länder	of	the	Horizontal	FES	in	
2013	
Positive	amounts	are	received	amounts	and	negative	amounts	are	paid	amounts.		
	
Source:	Federal	Ministry	of	Finance	(2013),	own	calculations,	millions	of	Euro.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Notes:		
The	 authors	 gratefully	 acknowledge	 support	 from	 the	 Collaborative	 Research	 Center	
(SFB)	884	“Political	Economy	of	Reforms”,	funded	by	the	German	Research	Foundation	
(DFG).	 	
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5. SERIAL	SOVEREIGN	DEBT	RESTRUCTURINGS41		
5.1 Motivation	
Even	though	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2004,	p.	53)	acknowledge	that	“‘serial	default’	is	
the	rule,	not	the	exception”,	there	is	still	no	systematic	analysis	examining	the	drivers	of	
this	 phenomenon.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 Adam	 and	 Grill	 (2013)	 show	 theoretically	 that	
gradual	 adjustment	 strategies	 through	 serial	 restructurings	 are	 not	 optimal	 if	 each	
restructuring	is	costly	(even	in	the	presence	of	only	very	small	costs).	Furthermore,	they	
show	 that	 any	 costly	 restructuring	 is	 only	 optimal	 if	 the	 country	 experienced	 a	 large,	
disaster‐like	shock	to	its	output.			
To	complement	the	literature	on	sovereign	debt	restructurings,	this	paper	provides	
an	analysis	of	potential	determinants	of	 serial	 restructurings.	Most	 importantly,	 I	 look	
for	these	determinants	in	sovereign	restructurings	themselves,	asking	whether	there	are	
certain	features	to	debt	renegotiations	that	are	correlated	with	the	probability	of	(near‐
term)	follow‐up	restructurings.	The	results	could	then	also	be	used	for	defining	possible	
measures	to	reduce	the	probability	of	a	country’s	debt	burden	becoming	unsustainable	
again	 (shortly)	 after	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 debt	 restructuring.	 The	 paper’s	 findings	
also	 contribute	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 a	 sovereign	 debt	 restructuring	 mechanism	 for	
emerging	markets	(Krueger,	2000)	or	for	European	countries	(Gianviti,	Krueger,	Pisani‐
Ferry,	 Sapir,	 and	 von	 Hagen,	 2010;	 European	 Economic	 Advisory	 Group,	 2011;	
Committee	 on	 International	 Economic	 Policy	 Reform,	 2013;	 Fuest,	 Heinemann,	 and	
Schröder,	2015).	
The	empirical	literature	on	the	phenomenon	of	serial	sovereign	debt	restructurings	
is	quite	scarce.	There	are	merely	a	few	studies	relying	on	basic	descriptive	observations	
and	 case	 studies.	One	 study	by	Moody’s	 (2012)	 suggests	 that	 an	 initial	 debt	 exchange	
was	followed	by	further	exchanges	when	the	initial	debt	exchange	was	not	large	enough	
in	relation	to	a	country’s	total	debt	(even	when	the	haircut	of	 the	 initial	exchange	was	
large).	Das	et	al.	(2012,	p.	33)	speculate	on	a	similar	reason.	They	argue	that	debt	relief	
																																																								
41	An	earlier	version	of	this	chapter	has	been	published	as	“Haircut	Size,	Haircut	Type	and	the	Probability	
of	 Serial	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Restructurings”,	 ZEW	 Discussion	 Paper	 No.	 14‐126,	 Mannheim.	 See	 Schröder	
(2014).	
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in	restructurings	with	official	creditors	(i.e.	within	the	so‐called	Paris	Club42)	has	been	
too	 low	 before	 the	 1990s,	 thus	 triggering	 serial	 defaults	 more	 often	 during	 the	
1970s/1980s.	The	IMF	(2013)	highlights	that	debt	restructurings	have	often	taken	place	
too	late	and	have	been	too	small	in	magnitude,	which	thwarted	the	re‐establishment	of	
long	term	debt	sustainability	and	durable	market	access.	It	further	makes	a	case	for	the	
avoidance	 of	 outright	 default43	and	 promotes	 pre‐emptive	 debt	 restructurings	 in	 the	
view	 of	 serious	 liquidity	 or	 solvency	 problems	 because	 pre‐emptive	 restructurings	
entail	 predictable	 cash	 flows	 (as	 opposed	 to	 outright	 defaults),	 which	 make	 the	
consequences	 for	 the	 economy	more	 predictable,	 too.	 The	 IMF	 (2013)	 further	 argues	
that	materialized	defaults	may	undermine	a	country’s	capacity	to	re‐access	international	
private	capital	markets	in	the	medium	term.		
I	 test	 these	 partly	 intuitive	 statements	 descriptively	 and	 econometrically	 by	
estimating	so‐called	survival	models	following	Cox	(1972).	Specifically,	I	check	whether	
the	 relative	 size	 of	 a	 haircut	 (in	 net	 present	 value	 terms)	 is	 correlated	 with	 the	
probability	 of	 necessary	 follow‐up	 restructurings.	 Additionally,	 I	 explore	 whether	
outright	 cuts	 in	 face	 value	 have	 the	 same	 impeding	 effect	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 serial	
restructurings	as	equally	sized	cuts	in	net	present	value	due	to	maturity	lengthening	and	
the	lowering	of	interest	payments.	Economic	intuition	suggests	that	any	reduction	in	net	
present	 value,	 no	 matter	 whether	 it	 is	 effectuated	 by	 cuts	 in	 face	 value,	 maturity	
extension	 or	 a	 lower	 interest	 rate,	 should	 have	 the	 same	 impact	 on	 a	 country’s	 debt	
sustainability.	 I	 also	 investigate	 which	 characteristics	 of	 the	 affected	 debt	 and	 the	
outcomes	 of	 the	 negotiations	 are	 correlated	 with	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 follow‐up	
restructuring.		
The	 main	 findings	 suggest	 that	 higher	 overall	 haircuts	 in	 net	 present	 value	 are	
indeed	associated	with	a	lower	probability	of	serial	restructurings.	Interestingly,	cuts	in	
face	 value	 have	 a	 stronger	 negative	 impact	 on	 this	 probability	 than	 reductions	 in	 net	
present	value	by	the	means	of	maturity	extensions	and/or	interest	rate	reductions.	This	
puzzling	 finding	challenges	the	 intuitive	expectations	 that	 it	 is	 the	overall	 reduction	 in	
net	present	value	which	may	impact	a	country’s	debt	sustainability,	no	matter	how	this	
																																																								
42	“The	 Paris	 Club	 is	 an	 informal	 group	 of	 official	 creditors	 whose	 role	 is	 to	 find	 coordinated	 and	
sustainable	 solutions	 to	 the	 payment	 difficulties	 experienced	 by	 debtor	 countries.”	 See	
http://www.clubdeparis.org/	
43	I	 distinguish	 between	 the	 terms	 “sovereign	 debt	 restructuring”	 and	 “sovereign	 default”	 because	 a	
default	occurs	when	a	country	misses	out	on	any	interest	or	principal	payment	on	the	due	date	or	beyond	
a	 pre‐specified	 grace	 period	 while	 a	 restructuring	 can	 take	 place	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 outright	
default,	i.e.	pre‐emptively,	in	order	to	prevent	a	probable	default.	
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reduction	comes	about.	It	could	be	explained,	however,	by	the	notion	that	the	timing	of	
relief	may	play	a	role.	While	cuts	in	face	value	provide	direct	relief	in	terms	of	solvency,	
maturity	 extensions	 and/or	 interest	 rate	 reductions	 may	 unburden	 the	 country	 only	
temporarily	in	terms	of	liquidity.	The	probability	that	a	truly	insolvent	and,	for	the	time	
being,	 illiquid	country	becomes	 illiquid	again	shortly	after	maturity	extensions	and/or	
interest	 rate	 cuts	 have	 taken	 place	 is	 thus	 higher	 than	 after	 an	 outright	 cut	 in	 the	
countries	debt	stock.	
Reinhart	 and	 Trebesch	 (2015)	 present	 a	 similar	 finding:	 A	 country’s	 economic	
growth	 and	 credit	 rating	 only	 improve	 significantly	 after	 a	 debt	 restructuring,	 if	 the	
agreement	included	a	cut	in	face	value.	For	deals	consisting	only	of	maturity	extensions	
and/or	interest	rate	reductions	they	do	not	find	significant	 improvements	of	economic	
fundamentals.	
		
The	 sovereign	 debt	 literature	 has	 traditionally	 been	 concerned	 with	 the	 costs	 of	
defaults	 and/or	 restructurings	 because	 these	 costs	 are	 often	 viewed	 to	 be	 the	 main	
reason	why	sovereigns	repay	their	debt.	The	idea	is	that,	in	the	factual	absence	of	legal	
enforcement	mechanisms,	 creditors	of	 sovereigns	generally	 cannot	 count	ex	ante	on	a	
debtor	country	to	repay	its	debt,	if	default	or	restructuring	were	non‐costly	alternatives	
(seminal	paper	by	Eaton	and	Gersovitz,	1981).	The	literature44	specifically	discusses	(i)	
direct	credit	market	costs	like	capital	market	exclusion	or	higher	borrowing	costs45,	(ii)	
costs	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 trade	 decline	 or	 trade	 sanctions46,	 (iii)	 a	 decline	 in	 economic	
output47,	 (iv)	 adverse	 effects	 on	 the	 financial	 and	 banking	 sector48,	 (v)	 negative	 spill‐
overs	 on	 the	 private	 credit	 sector49,	 (vi)	 adverse	 effects	 on	 FDI	 inflows50,	 and	 (vii)	
administrative	and	negotiation	costs51.	
																																																								
44	For	 a	 thorough	 review	 of	 the	 literature	 and	 an	 overview	 of	 stylized	 facts	 about	 sovereign	 debt	
restructurings	 in	 general,	 please	 see	 Das,	 Papaioannou	 and	 Trebesch	 (2012)	 as	 well	 as	 Panizza	 et	 al.	
(2009),	Sturzenegger	and	Zettelmeyer	(2006),	as	well	as	Tomz	and	Wright	(2013).	
45	Eaton	and	Gersovitz	(1981),	Gelos,	Sandleris,	and	Sahay	(2011),	Aguiar	and	Gopinath	(2006),	Mendoza	
and	 Yue	 (2008),	 Borensztein	 and	 Panizza	 (2009),	 Richmond	 and	 Diaz	 (2009),	 Asonuma	 (2010),	 Yue	
(2010),	Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013).	
46	Rose	(2005),	Martinez	and	Sandleris	(2011).	
47	Tomz	and	Wright	(2007),	Arellano,	(2008),	Mendoza	and	Yue	(2008),	De	Paoli,	Hoggarth,	and	Saporta	
(2009),	Levy‐Yeyati	and	Panizza	(2011).	
48	Borensztein	and	Panizza	(2009),	Levy‐Yeyati,	Martinez	Peria,	and	Schmukler	(2010),	Gennaioli,	Martin,	
and	Rossi	(2014).	
49	Arteta	and	Hale	(2008),	Das,	Papaioannou,	and	Trebesch	(2012).	
50	Fuentes	and	Saravia	(2010).	
51	Das,	Papaioannou,	and	Trebesch	(2012).	
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Even	 though	many	 studies	 provide	 evidence	 for	 the	 general	 existence	 of	 negative	
consequences	of	 sovereign	defaults	and	debt	 restructurings,	 the	empirical	 literature	 is	
not	completely	at	one	when	it	comes	to	the	magnitude,	the	timing,	and	the	duration	of	
the	different	costs	considered.	For	example,	some	studies	find	that	credit	markets	have	a	
rather	 short‐term	 memory	 with	 respect	 to	 direct	 credit	 market	 costs	 like	 higher	
borrowing	costs	and	capital	market	exclusion	 (see	e.g.	Borensztein	and	Panizza,	2009,	
Gelos	et	al.,	2004).	Nevertheless,	at	least	for	“final	restructurings”52	Cruces	and	Trebesch	
(2013)	find	that,	when	controlling	for	the	sizes	of	haircuts,	capital	market	exclusion	can	
take	 a	 long	 time	 and	 borrowing	 costs	 can	 be	 significantly	 higher	 following	 a	
restructuring.	Also	Richmond	and	Diaz	(2009)	estimate	the	average	duration	of	capital	
market	exclusion	to	be	non‐negligible,	taking	approximately	six	to	eight	years.	However,	
these	 authors	do	not	 control	 for	 the	 restructuring	history:	They	do	not	 explicitly	 take	
into	 account	 whether	 a	 country	 had	 been	 a	 serial	 defaulter	 or	 not,	 which	 potentially	
influences	 their	 reputation	as	good	debtors	and	 the	 resulting	capital	market	 sanctions	
significantly.			
In	 spite	 of	 all	 potential	 costs	 mentioned	 above,	 debt	 restructuring	 can	 be	 a	 well	
justified	measure	for	a	country	facing	an	unmanageable	debt	burden	in	order	to	regain	
long‐term	 debt	 sustainability.	 However,	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 reliable	 sovereign	 debt	
restructuring	mechanism	 creates	 uncertainty	 for	 both	 debtors	 and	 creditors	 and	may	
hamper	 the	 enforcement	 of	 necessary	 debt	 exchanges	 that	 could	 in	 fact	 restore	 debt	
sustainability.	The	IMF	(2013)	argues	that	debt	unsustainability	often	aggravates	before	
it	 is	 resolved	 and,	 when	 restructurings	 do	 take	 place,	 they	 do	 not	 always	manage	 to	
restore	debt	sustainability	and	market	access	in	the	long	term.	Repeated	restructurings	
would	 then	 be	 a	 likely	 consequence.	 Generally,	 nothing	 is	 gained	 if	 a	 country	
restructures	its	debt	too	late	and	to	an	extent	that	is	insufficient	for	regaining	long(er)	
term	debt	sustainability.	Too	little	and	too	late	(IMF,	2013)	restructurings	are	likely	to	
have	 negative	 consequences	 for	 debtors,	 creditors	 and,	 depending	 on	 the	 relative	
importance	of	the	country	in	question,	for	the	international	financial	system.	Persistent	
unsustainable	debt	levels	impede	investment	and	growth	in	the	debtor	country,	thereby	
reducing	the	value	of	creditors’	claims	even	further.			
	
																																																								
52	Cruces	and	Trebesch	 (2013)	define	 final	 restructurings	as	 restructurings	 that	were	not	 succeeded	by	
another	restructuring	with	commercial	creditors	within	four	years.	
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One	 important	 assumption	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 that	 serial	 and	 apparently	 insufficient	
restructurings	are	in	sum	more	costly	than	a	single	deemed‐to‐satisfy	restructuring.	In	
the	spirit	of	Eaton	and	Gersovitz	(1981)	as	well	as	Eaton,	Gersovitz	and	Stiglitz	(1986),	
every	restructuring	destroys	a	country’s	reputation	because	creditors	 infer	a	country’s	
future	 behavior	 from	 its	 past	 behavior.	 Repeated	 restructurings	 could	 thus	 lead	 to	 a	
permanently	 low	borrower	 reputation,	making	private	debt	prohibitively	 costly	 in	 the	
future.	Even	if	direct	sanctions	after	debt	restructurings	were	more	important	than	the	
loss	of	reputation	as	an	incentive	to	repay	(Bulow	and	Rogoff	1989),	serial	restructurers	
would	have	to	expect	enduring	periods	of	sanctions.	Hence,	serial	restructurings	could	
be	more	costly	than	a	single	(larger)	restructuring.	Additionally,	the	administrative	costs	
as	well	as	 the	economic	costs	due	 to	 the	uncertain	outcome	of	debt	renegotiations	 (in	
terms	of	debt	sustainability)	have	to	be	incurred	over	and	over	again.		
Fuentes	and	Saravia	(2010)	do	indeed	find	that	the	decrease	of	FDI	inflows	is	even	
stronger	for	serial	defaulters	than	for	single	defaulters.	Adam	and	Grill	(2013)	develop	a	
theoretical	 model	 to	 show	 that	 frequent	 debt	 restructurings	 are	 only	 optimal	 if	 the	
deadweight	 costs	 of	 a	 single	 default	 are	 zero	 from	 the	point	 of	 view	of	 the	 sovereign.	
Already	for	small	but	positive	costs	the	authors	find	that	restructuring	is	only	optimal	if	
they	 face	disaster‐like	shocks.	Also	 the	 IMF	(2013)	states	 that	 in	most	 instances	serial	
sovereign	debt	restructurings	cannot	be	desirable	because	any	restructuring	process	is	
disruptive	 and	 costly,	 thereby	 undermining	 the	 debtor’s	 perceived	 creditworthiness.	
Hence,	throughout	this	paper,	I	neglect	the	possibility	that	a	country	might	restructure	
its	 debt	 serially	 for	 completely	 strategic	 reasons.	 Even	 if	 single	 restructurings	 were	
strategic	in	nature,	an	entire	series	over	many	years	is	likely	not	to	be.	Such	a	strategy	is	
highly	 precarious,	 bears	 high	 risks	 and	 uncertainty,	 and	may	 therefore	 be	 seen	 as	 an	
exception	to	the	rule.		
The	 remainder	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 5.2	 describes	 the	
dataset	 used	 and	 provides	 some	 stylized	 facts.	 Section	 5.3	 descriptively	 analyzes	
correlations	 between	 restructuring	 characteristics	 and	 the	 probability	 of	 (near‐term)	
follow‐up	 restructurings.	 Section	 5.4	 presents	 the	 estimation	 results	 of	 Cox	 (1972)	
proportional	hazard	models	and	section	5.5	concludes.	
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5.2 Data	
5.2.1 Data	Source	for	Restructurings	with	Commercial	Creditors	
The	main	 dataset	 I	 use	 covers	 all	 180	 sovereign	 debt	 restructurings	with	 foreign	
commercial	 creditors	 in	 68	 countries	 since	 1970	 and	 has	 kindly	 been	 provided	 by	
Cruces	 and	Trebesch	 (2013)53.	 They	 report	 sovereign	debt	 restructurings	 of	 public	 or	
publicly	guaranteed	debt	with	foreign	private	creditors.	The	authors	focus	on	distressed	
debt	 exchanges,	 which	 they	 define	 as	 restructurings	 of	 bonds	 or	 bank	 loans	 at	 less	
favorable	 conditions	 than	 the	 original	 bond	 or	 bank	 loan.	 They	 restrict	 the	 sample	 to	
medium	 and	 long‐term	 debt	 restructurings.	 Short‐term	 agreements	 like	 90‐day	 debt	
rollovers	or	the	upkeep	of	short‐term	credit	lines	(e.g.	trade	credit)	are	disregarded	and	
agreements	with	maturity	 extension	 of	 less	 than	 one	 year	 are	 excluded.	 Cases	where	
short‐term	debt	is	exchanged	for	debt	with	a	maturity	of	more	than	one	year	are,	in	turn,	
included.	 Finally,	 the	 dataset	 covers	 only	 restructurings	 that	 have	 actually	 been	
implemented.	
The	 value	 of	 the	 dataset	 does	 not	 only	 lie	 in	 the	 mere	 listing	 of	 all	 these	
restructurings	but	especially	in	the	provision	of	information	on	the	characteristics	of	the	
restructurings.	Most	importantly,	Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	estimate	the	wealth	loss	
of	the	average	creditor	participating	in	the	exchange,	i.e.	they	estimate	what	is	generally	
called	a	haircut	in	net	present	value.	The	authors	use	two	different	haircut	measures:	the	
“market	 haircut”	 and	 the,	 in	 their	 view	 better	 suited,	 “SZ	 haircut”	 according	 to	 the	
methodology	of	Sturzenegger	and	Zettelmeyer	(2006,	2008)54.		The	dataset	also	includes	
the	magnitude	of	the	cut	in	the	nominal	value	of	the	debt,	which	is	zero	in	123	of	the	180	
cases.	
Furthermore,	 Cruces	 and	 Trebesch	 (2013)	 provide	 information	 on	 the	 absolute	
amount	of	debt	(in	current	US	dollars)	that	had	been	affected	as	well	as	other	important	
features	of	debt	contracts,	 the	debt	affected	and	negotiation	outcomes.	The	 features	of	
the	debt	contracts	and	the	debt	affected	include	information	on	whether	the	debt	was	in	
the	form	of	bonds	or	bank	loans,	whether	all	of	the	debt	affected	had	already	fallen	due	
																																																								
53	The	dataset	is	freely	accessible	online:	https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/data 
54	The	traditional	“market	haircut”	compares	the	present	value	of	new	debt	contracts	to	the	face	value	of	
the	 old	 debt	 contracts,	 whereas	 the	 “SZ	 haircut”	 is	 computed	 according	 to	 the	 methodology	 by	
Sturzenegger	 and	 Zettelmeyer	 (2008)	 who	 evaluate	 old	 debt	 contracts	 in	 present	 value	 terms	 and	
discount	both	new	and	old	debt	instruments	at	the	same	interest	rate.	See	Sturzenegger	and	Zettelmeyer	
(2008)	as	well	as	Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	for	a	discussion	of	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	the	
two	haircut	concepts.	
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at	 the	 time	 of	 debt	 renegotiations,	 whether	 the	 debt	 affected	 included	 previously	
restructured	debt,	 and	whether	 short‐term	debt	with	a	maturity	of	 less	 than	one	year	
had	also	been	restructured	such	that	the	new	maturity	exceeded	one	year.	The	features	
of	 negotiation	 outcomes	 include	 information	 on	whether	 the	 restructuring	deal	was	 a	
buy‐back	 deal	 (i.e.	 a	 country	 buys	 back	 its	 debt	 at	 large	 discount),	 whether	 the	
restructuring	 deal	 was	 a	 so‐called	 Brady	 deal55	(i.e.	 loosely	 speaking	 an	 exchange	 of	
bank	 loans	 for	 partly	 collateralized	 tradable	 bonds),	 whether	 the	 deal	 was	 “donor‐
funded	or	supported	by	bilateral	or	multilateral	money,	e.g.	via	 funds	by	 International	
Development	Association	Debt	Reduction	Facility”,	and	whether	the	deal	“include[d]	the	
provision	 of	 new	 money	 or	 concerted	 lending”	 (Cruces	 and	 Trebesch,	 2013,	 online	
Appendix	A5,	p.	39).	
5.2.2 Data	Source	for	Paris	Club	Debt	Restructurings	
Although	I	focus	on	debt	restructurings	with	commercial	creditors	in	the	descriptive	
and	econometric	sections	5.3	and	5.4,	I	include	the	restructurings	with	official	creditors	
(Paris	 Club)	 in	 section	5.2.3	 on	 the	 stylized	 facts.	 This	 helps	 the	 reader	 to	 get	 a	more	
complete	picture	of	the	problem.		
I	 gathered	 the	available	data	on	all	Paris	Club	 restructurings	 since	1950	 from	 the	
Paris	Club’s	website56	and	double‐checked	this	list	of	restructurings	with	that	of	Das	et	
al.	 (2012).	 Surprisingly,	 there	 are	 ten	 Paris	 Club	 Restructurings	 in	 their	 list	 which	 I	
cannot	find	on	the	official	Paris	Club’s	website.	I	work	with	those	421	restructurings	of	
86	countries	since	1970	that	I	could	find	on	the	Paris	Club’s	website.	
5.2.3 Some	Stylized	Facts	about	Serial	Restructurings	
When	simply	looking	at	the	timing	of	sovereign	debt	restructurings,	one	can	easily	
make	out	 restructuring	 clusters.	Figure	5.157	shows	a	 sharp	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	
restructurings	worldwide	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1980s	 and	 an	 overall	 peak	 in	 1983.	
Especially	the	number	of	commercial	restructurings	was	highest	during	this	decade	and	
																																																								
55	Brady	deals	featured	the	conversion	of	bank	loans	to	a	variety	of	new	tradable	bonds	for	mostly	Latin	
American	 countries.	 The	 new	 bonds	 were	 partly	 collateralized	 by	 U.S.	 Treasury	 30‐year	 zero‐coupon	
bonds.	 The	 main	 advantage	 was	 the	 possibility	 for	 commercial	 banks	 to	 exchange	 their	 claims	 on	
developing	countries	into	tradable	debt	instruments,	which	greatly	reduced	the	concentration	of	risk	on	
their	balance	sheets.	Argentina,	Brazil,	Bulgaria,	Costa	Rica,	Côte	d'Ivoire,	Dominican	Republic,	Ecuador,	
Jordan,	 Mexico,	 Morocco,	 Nigeria,	 Panama,	 Peru,	 Philippines,	 Poland,	 Uruguay,	 Venezuela	 and	 Vietnam	
deployed	the	Brady	program,	named	after	the	U.S.	Treasury	Secretary	Nicholas	Brady.	
56	http://www.clubdeparis.org/	
57	A	similar	figure	can	be	found	in	Das	et	al.	(2012).	
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also	peaked	in	1983.	While	there	were	only	four	commercial	restructurings	in	the	1970s	
(all	 of	 them	 in	 the	 late	 1970s)	 their	 number	 declined	 significantly	 starting	 in	 the	 late	
1980s	until	2010.	The	trend	looks	similar	for	Paris	Club	restructurings,	even	though	the	
volatility	of	 the	number	of	 restructurings	per	year	was	much	higher.	Das	 et	 al.	 (2012,	
p.	33)	explain	the	higher	number	and	frequency	of	Paris	Club	restructurings	(as	opposed	
to	commercial	restructurings)	by	the	“Paris	Club’s	reluctance	to	grant	debt	relief”	before	
the	1990s.	They	hypothesize	that	“[t]his	likely	triggered	a	pattern	of	serial	rescheduling	
with	some	debtors.”	
	
Figure	5.1:	Number	of	Sovereign	Debt	Restructurings	by	Year	and	Creditor	
This	graph	reports	the	total	number	of	sovereign	debt	restructurings	in	each	year	from	1970	to	2010.		
	
The	phenomenon	of	serial	restructurings	as	stated	by	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2004)	as	
well	as	Das	et	al.	(2012)	can	indeed	be	confirmed:	13	percent	(29	percent,	41	percent)	of	
all	commercial	restructurings	are	followed	by	another	commercial	restructuring	within	
one	(two,	three)	year(s).	The	share	of	follow‐up	restructurings	for	Paris	Club	debt	is	not	
as	high	in	the	first	year	(5	percent)	but	is	even	higher	for	the	second	and	third	year:	36	
percent	(55	percent)	of	all	Paris	Club	restructurings	are	succeeded	by	another	Paris	Club	
restructuring	 within	 two	 (three)	 years.	 When	 taking	 into	 consideration	 all	
restructurings,	the	numbers	are	even	more	striking.	35	percent	(60	percent,	70	percent)		
of	 all	 commercial	 restructurings	 are	 followed	 by	 another	 commercial	 or	 Paris	 Club	
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restructuring	within	one	(two,	three)	year(s)	while	24	percent	(54	percent,	69	percent)	
of	 all	 Paris	 Club	 restructurings	 are	 followed	 by	 another	 commercial	 or	 Paris	 Club	
restructuring	 within	 one	 (two,	 three)	 year(s).	 Overall,	 28	 percent	 (57	 percent,	 70	
percent)	 of	 all	 restructurings	 are	 followed	 by	 another	 restructuring	 within	 one	 (two,	
three)	 year(s).	 	 The	 picture	 looks	 just	 as	 impressive	 when	 inspecting	 the	 time	
differences	between	any	two	consecutive	restructurings	of	any	country	(see	Figures	5.2	
through	5.4).	Both	for	commercial	as	well	as	for	Paris	Club	cases,	about	67	percent	of	all	
debt	restructurings	 that	were	preceded	at	some	point	 in	 the	dataset	 take	place	within	
the	 first	 three	 years	 after	 an	 antedated	 restructuring.	 Considering	 all	 commercial	 and	
Paris	Club	cases	together,	over	80	percent	of	restructurings	that	were	preceded	at	some	
point	in	the	dataset	take	place	within	three	years.	
	
Figure	5.2:	Time	between	Two	Subsequent	Sovereign	Debt	Restructurings	
This	graph	reports	the	total	number	of	sovereign	debt	restructurings	that	took	place	1	to	30	years	after	an	
initial	restructuring.		
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Figure	5.3:	Time	between	Two	Subsequent	Restructurings	with	Commercial	
Creditors		
This	graph	reports	 the	 total	number	of	 sovereign	debt	restructurings	with	commercial	creditors	 that	 took	
place	1	to	30	years	after	an	initial	restructuring	vis‐à‐vis	commercial	creditors.		
	
	
Figure	5.4:	Time	between	Two	Subsequent	Paris	Club	Restructurings	
This	 graph	 reports	 the	 total	number	 of	 sovereign	debt	 restructurings	with	Paris	Club	 creditors	 that	 took	
place	1	to	30	years	after	an	initial	Paris	Club	restructuring.		
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5.3 Descriptive	Analysis	
5.3.1 The	Size	and	Type	of	Haircuts	
One	of	the	central	features	of	any	debt	restructuring	is	the	size	of	the	haircut,	i.e.	the	
reduction	of	the	debt	contract’s	net	present	value.	The	size	of	a	haircut	is	the	result	of	a	
combination	 of	 a	 direct	 cut	 in	 the	 nominal	 value	 of	 a	 debt	 contract,	 an	 extension	 of	
maturity,	and/or	a	lowering	of	interest	rates.		
As	 explained	 in	 section	 5.1	 above,	 I	 examine	 whether	 cuts	 in	 face	 value	 have	 a	
stronger	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 yearly	 compound	 probability	 of	 follow‐up	
restructurings	 than	 lower	 interest	 rates	 or	maturity	 extensions	 that	 lead	 to	 an	 equal	
reduction	 in	net	present	value.	Economic	 intuition	 suggests	 that	 face	value	 reductions	
should	 not	 differ	 in	 their	 impact.	 In	 fact,	 any	 modality	 leading	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	 net	
present	value	should	be	observationally	equivalent	to	any	other	such	modality	 leading	
to	 an	 equally	 high	 cut	 in	 net	 present	 value.	 However,	 the	 timing	 may	 also	 play	 an	
important	 role.	 While	 a	 cut	 in	 face	 value	 provides	 direct	 and	 instant	 relief,	 maturity	
extensions	and/or	lower	interest	rates	only	unburden	a	country	over	time.	
Before	I	 take	a	closer	 look	 into	 face	value	cuts	and	other	restructuring	modalities,	
however,	 I	 first	 analyze	 how	 the	 size	 of	 the	 total	 haircut	 is	 correlated	 with	 the	
probability	to	incur	near‐term	follow‐up	restructurings.	Table	5.1	presents	two	different	
haircut	measures	as	calculated	by	Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013).		
No	matter	which	 of	 the	 two	 haircut	measures	 are	 used,	 restructurings	 that	were	
followed	 by	 at	 least	 one	 other	 restructuring	 within	 one	 to	 three	 years	 exhibited	 on	
average	 statistically	 significantly	 lower	 haircuts	 (by	 about	 one	 half)	 than	 those	
restructurings	that	did	not	entail	follow‐up	restructurings	within	this	time	window.	This	
is	a	first	indication	that	the	size	of	the	haircut	is	highly	correlated	with	the	probability	of	
near‐term	follow‐up	restructurings.		
A	 different	 descriptive	 way	 of	 analyzing	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	 size	 of	 the	
haircut	and	 the	 time	until	 a	 follow‐up	 restructuring	 is	 to	plot	 (unconditional)	 survival	
functions	and	conduct	nonparametric	hypothesis	tests	for	the	equality	of	these	survival	
functions.	 Figure	5.5	 shows	Kaplan‐Meier	 survival	 functions58	to	differentiate	between	
																																																								
58	The	graphs	show	the	probability	of	not	incurring	another	restructuring	(following	a	restructuring)	over	
time.	 The	 compound	 probability	 for	 each	 point	 in	 time	 is	 calculated	 as	 follows:	 መܵሺݐሻ ൌ ∏ ሺ1 െ ௗ೔௡೔ሻ௧ሺ೔ሻஸ௧ ,	where	݀௜	is	 the	 number	 of	 follow‐up	 restructurings	 already	materialized	 at	ݐሺ௜ሻ	and	݊௜	is	 the	 number	 of	
subjects	that	were	at	risk	of	incurring	another	restructuring	at	time	ݐሺ௜ሻ.	Note	also	that:	 መܵሺ0ሻ ൌ 1.	
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very	high	(above	67	percent),	medium	(between	33	percent	and	67	percent),	and	very	
low	(below	33	percent)	–	panel	(a)	–	as	well	as	between	high	(above	50	percent)	and	low	
(below	50	percent)	haircuts	–	panel	(b).	The	nonparametric	Kaplan‐Meier	estimator	 is	
especially	suitable	for	the	task	at	hand	because	it	can	cope	with	censored	data:	Since	the	
dataset	used	ends	in	2010	and	some	follow‐up	restructurings	may	still	be	to	come	after	
that	date,	the	data	should	be	treated	as	right‐censored.	The	Kaplan‐Meier	curves	as	well	
as	 the	 hypothesis	 tests	 conducted	 also	 provide	 a	 first	 indication	 whether	 the	
proportional	hazards	assumption	 is	valid,	which	 is	 important	 for	 the	estimation	of	 the	
Cox	proportional	hazard	model	 in	section	5.4.	 In	order	 for	proportionality	 to	hold,	 the	
Kaplan‐Meier	 curves	 should	exhibit	 approximately	 the	same	shape	and	 the	 separation	
between	the	curves	should	approximately	remain	constant.	
 
Table	5.1:	Two‐Sample	t‐Tests	for	Equal	Means	–	Haircuts	
The	table	reports	the	mean	haircuts/	cuts	in	face	value	in	percent	of	net	present	value.	Using	two‐sample	t‐
tests	 for	equal	means,	the	table	compares	those	restructurings	with	a	near‐term	 follow‐up	restructuring	to	
those	without	a	near‐term	follow‐up	restructuring.	*,	**,	***	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%,	
1%	level,	respectively.	
Mean	Haircuts	of	restructuring	cases…
	 obs SZ	Haircut Market Haircut	 Cut	in	Face	Value
…	that	were	followed	by	another	
commercial	restructuring	within	one	year.	 24	 18.4	 18.5	 1.1	
	 	
…	that	were	not	followed	by	another	
commercial	restructuring	within	one	year.	 156	 39.9	 43.3	 19.2	
	 	
Significance	 *** *** ***	
	 	
	 	
…	that	were	followed	by	another	
commercial	restructuring	within	two	
years.	 53	 25.5	 27.2	 2.7	
	 	
…	that	were	not	followed	by	another	
commercial	restructuring	within	two	
years.	 127	 41.8	 45.4	 22.6	
	 	
Significance	 *** *** ***	
	 	
	 	
…	that	were	followed	by	another	
commercial	restructuring	within	three	
years.	 74	 24.0	 26.3	 2.2	
	 	
…	that	were	not	followed	by	another	
commercial	restructuring	within	three	
years.	 106	 46.1	 49.6	 26.9	
	 	
Significance	 *** *** ***	
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As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	5.5,	those	restructuring	cases	with	high	(above	50	percent)	
and	 very	 high	 (above	 67	 percent)	 haircuts	 have	 a	 significantly	 lower	 compound	
probability	 to	be	 followed‐up	upon	by	another	restructuring	 than	those	restructurings	
with	lower	cuts	in	net	present	value.	All	tests	reject	the	equality	of	survival	functions	at	
the	one	percent	significance	level	and	the	curves	are	approximately	parallel.	
Not	all	haircuts	include	an	outright	cut	in	face	value	(FV).	Indeed,	only	32	percent	of	
all	 180	 commercial	 debt	 restructurings	 in	 the	 sample	 featured	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	
nominal	amount	of	 the	debt.	When	conducting	the	same	exercises	as	 for	 total	haircuts	
(Table	5.1	and	Figure	5.6),	 I	 find	that	restructurings	with	at	 least	one	follow‐up	within	
one	to	three	years	have	in	the	mean	significantly	lower	cuts	in	face	value	by	as	much	as	
88‐94	percent	than	those	restructurings	without	subsequent	restructurings	in	the	near	
term.	 Importantly,	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 cut	 in	 face	 value	 is	 also	 highly	 correlated	 to	 the	
overall	size	of	the	haircut59,	which	is	not	surprising	since	the	haircut	is	indeed	a	function	
of,	 inter	 alia,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 reduction	 in	 face	 value.	 Figure	 5.6	 shows	 Kaplan‐Meier	
curves	 for	 restructurings	with	 and	without	 reductions	 in	 face	 value	 and	 confirms	 the	
findings	 from	 Table	 5.1.	 Those	 restructurings	 with	 a	 (high)	 cut	 in	 face	 value	 have	 a	
significantly	 lower	 compound	 probability	 of	 being	 followed‐up	 upon	 by	 another	
restructuring	at	each	point	in	time.	
One	problem	of	 looking	merely	at	reductions	 in	net	present	value	 is	 that	 the	 total	
amount	of	the	debt	affected	by	the	restructuring	relative	to	a	country’s	total	debt	stock	is	
not	taken	into	account.	Of	course,	the	amount	of	debt	cancelled	relative	to	total	debt	is	of	
crucial	importance	for	debt	sustainability.	The	haircut	alone	can	be	very	large	and	have	
almost	no	impact	if	the	amount	of	debt	affected	is	tiny	compared	to	a	country’s	total	debt	
burden	 (Moody’s	2012).	 In	order	 to	 control	 for	 this	 fact,	 I	 include	 the	amount	of	debt	
affected	by	the	restructuring	relative	to	a	country’s	total	debt	stock	as	a	control	variable	
in	the	estimations	in	section	5.5.	
	
	 	
																																																								
59	Correlation	coefficient	is	0.81	for	“Market	Haircuts”	and	0.84	for	“SZ	Haircuts”		
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Figure	5.5:	Kaplan‐Meier	Survival	Estimates	–	Size	of	Haircuts	
The	figure	shows	Kaplan‐Meier	curves	(see	also	 footnote	58).	Shaded	regions	around	the	curves	mark	95%	
confidence	bands.	
(a) Haircut	categories60	
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0000	
(b) High	(>50%)	vs.	low	(<50%)	haircuts
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0000	
	
	
Figure	5.6:	Kaplan‐Meier	Survival	Estimates	–	Cuts	in	Face	Value	
The	figure	shows	Kaplan‐Meier	curves	(see	also	 footnote	58).	Shaded	regions	around	the	curves	mark	95%	
confidence	bands.	
(a) Reduction	in	face	value	–	yes	or	no
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0000	
(b) High	(>50%)	vs.	low	(<50%)	cuts	in	FV
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0000	
	 	
																																																								
60	Category	1:	Haircut<33%;	category	2:	33%<Haircut<67%;	category	3:	Haircut>67%.	
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5.3.3 Other	Modalities	of	Debt	Restructurings	
Of	course,	the	size	of	a	restructuring	and	the	type	of	haircut	is	not	the	only	outcome	
of	 debt	 renegotiations	 that	 is	 potentially	 correlated	 with	 the	 probability	 of	 follow‐up	
restructurings.	 Cruces	 and	 Trebesch	 (2013)	 also	 provide	 information	 on	 whether	 a	
restructuring	 has	 been	 donor	 funded,	 whether	 it	 comprised	 a	 buy‐back	 of	 debt	
contracts,	whether	the	restructuring	was	a	Brady	deal	(i.e.	loosely	speaking	an	exchange	
of	 bank	 loans	 for	 partly	 collateralized	 tradable	 bonds)	 or	 whether	 it	 included	 the	
provision	of	new	money	or	concerted	lending.	Indeed,	all	of	these	features,	except	for	the	
provision	of	new	money,	are	negatively	and	significantly	correlated	with	the	compound	
probability	of	observing	at	least	one	follow‐up	restructuring	(see	Figure	5.7).		
Donor	 funded	 restructurings	 (panel	 a)	 generally	 seem	 not	 to	 entail	 (many)	 near‐
term	follow‐up	restructurings	but	 the	causality	 is	not	clear	at	all.	 It	might	well	be	 that	
donors	only	provide	funds	to	debtors,	 if	 they	expect	them	to	have	a	 low	probability	of	
their	debt	stock	becoming	unsustainable	and	having	to	restructure	again	 in	the	future.	
Thus,	we	cannot	know	whether	donor	funding	 just	works	well	with	respect	to	a	 lower	
probability	 of	 serial	 restructurings	 or	 whether	 these	 restructuring	 cases	 were	
characterized	by	a	lower	probability	of	serial	default,	to	begin	with.		
The	 argument	 for	 buy‐back	 deals	 (panel	 b)	 and	 restructurings	 that	 included	 the	
provision	of	new	money	(panel	c)	is	similar.	Countries	which	can	afford	to	buy	back	their	
debt	contracts	(even	if	they	do	so	at	a	large	discount)	may	anticipate	a	higher	probability	
of	being	sustainable	afterwards.	Oftentimes,	donor	 funding	and	buying	back	debt	even	
coincide,	 which	 makes	 the	 exogeniety	 assumption	 for	 these	 dummy	 variables	 with	
respect	to	the	probability	of	serial	restructurings	even	more	difficult	 to	defend.	Due	to	
these	potential	reverse	causality	problems,	the	baseline	estimations	in	the	econometric	
section	5.4.2	will	not	include	these	variables.	Furthermore,	I	will	check	for	robustness	of	
overall	 results	 by	 excluding	 these	 restructurings	 in	 section	 5.4.3.	 This	 way,	 I	 can	
circumvent	any	potential	omission	of	variables	that	should	actually	be	included	in	order	
to	control	for	particularities	of	these	restructurings.	
The	 exchange	of	 bank	 loans	 for	 tradable	Brady	bonds	 in	 the	1980s	 also	 seems	 to	
have	 worked	 quite	 well,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 preventing	 near‐term	 follow‐up	
restructurings.	However,	 some	of	 the	countries	had	 to	 restructure	again	6	 to	13	years	
later.	
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Figure	5.7:	Kaplan‐Meier	Survival	Estimates	–	Restructuring	Modalities	
The	figure	shows	Kaplan‐Meier	curves	(see	also	 footnote	58).	Shaded	regions	around	the	curves	mark	95%	
confidence	bands.	
(a) Donor‐funded	Restructurings
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0000	
(b) Buy‐back	deals	
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0000	
	
(c) New	money	included	
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0468	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0921	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0711	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0740	
	
(d) Brady	deals	
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0011	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0004	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0005	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0004	
	 	
	
	
	
 
5.3.4 The	Type	of	Debt	Affected	
It	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	 there	 are	 also	 different	 types	 of	 debt	 being	
affected	by	 the	 restructurings.	First,	 the	 contracts	 can	be	 in	 the	 form	of	bank	 loans	or	
bonds.	Second,	one	has	to	differentiate	between	cases	where	all	of	the	renegotiated	debt	
had	already	fallen	due	at	the	time	of	the	restructuring	or	not.	Third,	it	might	be	the	case	
that	 the	 very	 debt	 being	 restructured	 has	 already	 been	 restructured	 before.	 Finally,	
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some	debt	 renegotiations	 included	 the	 exchange	 of	 short‐term	debt	 contracts	with	 an	
original	 maturity	 of	 at	 most	 one	 year	 for	 new	 debt	 instruments	 with	 a	 longer‐term	
maturity	exceeding	one	year.	When	 looking	at	 the	survival	 functions	(Figure	5.8),	only	
the	facts	that	previously	restructured	debt	(PRD)	has	been	renegotiated	again	(panel	c)	
and	that	short‐term	debt	has	been	exchanged	for	longer‐term	debt	(panel	c)	seem	to	be	
correlated	 with	 the	 compound	 probability	 of	 follow‐up	 restructurings.	 Those	 cases	
where	previously	 restructured	debt	has	been	restructured	again,	exhibit	a	 statistically	
significant	lower	probability	of	being	followed	by	another	restructuring	at	each	point	in	
time.	This	may	be	the	case	because	in	these	restructurings	it	was	clear	that	the	previous	
restructuring	had	not	been	sufficient	for	the	country	to	regain	medium	to	long	term	debt	
sustainability.	 These	 restructurings	 are	 by	 definition	 follow‐up	 restructurings	
themselves.		
Those	 restructurings	where	 originally	 short‐term	debt	was	 exchanged	 for	 longer‐
term	 debt	 exhibit	 a	 higher	 compound	 probability	 of	 follow‐up	 restructurings	 at	 each	
point	in	time,	which	may	initially	be	surprising.	However,	short‐term	debt	being	affected	
is	 a	 sign	 of	 perceived	 liquidity	 problems	 (rather	 than	 real	 solvency	 problems).	
Exchanging	 short	 to	 longer	 term	 debt	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 reduce	 any	 acute	 liquidity	
pressure.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 also	 not	 surprising	 that	 only	 two	 out	 of	 a	 total	 of	 54	 cases,	
where	short‐term	debt	had	been	included,	featured	a	(low)	reduction	in	face	value.	The	
other	52	cases	only	comprised	maturity	lengthening	and	at	best	interest	rate	reductions.	
These	cases	may	well	have	developed	to	become	real	solvency	problems,	though.	Thus,	
they	are	followed	by	further	restructurings	with	higher	probability.	
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Figure	5.8:	Kaplan‐Meier	Survival	Estimates	–	Type	of	Debt	
The	figure	shows	Kaplan‐Meier	curves	(see	also	 footnote	58).	Shaded	regions	around	the	curves	mark	95%	
confidence	bands.	
(a) Bond	exchange	
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.6019	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.8524	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.7176	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.8633	
(b) All	debt	fallen	due	at	time	of	restruct.
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.7403	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.2747	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.4419	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.3208	
	
(c) Affects	previously	restructured	debt	
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0063	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0015	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0026	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0018	
	
(d) Short	term	debt	included	in	restruct.	
Tests	for	equality	of	survival	functions:	
H0:	Risk	of	follow‐up	restructurings	is	equal	across	groups	
‐ Log‐rank	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Wilcoxon	(Breslow)	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Tarone‐Ware	test:	p=0.0000	
‐ Peto‐Peto	test:	p=0.0000	
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5.4 Econometric	Investigation	
5.4.1 The	Cox	Proportional	Hazard	Model	
The	above	graphs	and	tests	merely	provide	a	first	rough	picture	of	the	way	certain	
features	 of	 debt	 restructurings	 may	 be	 correlated	 with	 the	 probability	 of	 serial	
restructurings.	To	complete	the	picture	and	check	for	the	general	validity	of	some	of	the	
above	findings	I	run	semi‐parametric	Cox	proportional	hazard	regressions	(Cox,	1972)	
in	order	to	model	the	simultaneous	impact	of	certain	debt	renegotiation	outcomes	and	
debt	characteristics	on	 the	probability	of	a	 follow‐up	restructuring	 taking	place	at	any	
point	in	time.	The	main	variables	of	interest	are	the	overall	size	of	the	haircut	as	well	as	
the	reduction	in	face	value	and	the	residual	haircut	due	to	maturity	extensions	or/and	
interest	rate	reductions.	
The	Cox	proportional	hazard	model	allows	estimating	the	hazard	rate	݄ሺݐሻ	(i.e.	the	
risk	of	a	follow‐up	restructuring	to	occur	at	a	time	ݐ)	and	can	be	written	as	follows:	
݄ሺݐሻ ൌ ݄଴ሺݐሻ ∗ exp	ሺߚଵ ଵܺ ൅ ߚଶܺଶ ൅ ⋯൅ ߚ௡ܺ௡ሻ	,	
where		 ଵܺ, … , ܺ௡	denote	the	covariates	and		ߚଵ, … , ߚ௡	are	the	corresponding	coefficients.	
The	term	݄଴ሺݐሻ	is	the	baseline	hazard	rate	at	time	ݐ	for	all	covariates	being	equal	to	zero	
(similar	to	the	constant	term	in	simple	 linear	regressions).	The	baseline	hazard	rate	 is	
then	 shifted	 up	 or	 down	 by	 an	 order	 of	 proportionality	 when	 one	 of	 the	 covariates	
changes.		
The	 main	 advantage	 of	 the	 Cox	 proportional	 hazard	 model	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
baseline	 hazard	 function	 is	 left	 unparameterized,	 meaning	 that	 one	 does	 not	 have	 to	
assume	a	specific	functional	form.	This,	of	course,	can	also	be	a	disadvantage	since	the	
proportionality	 assumption	 must	 hold	 for	 the	 reduced	 form	 model	 to	 be	 correct.	 In	
addition	to	the	Kaplan‐Meyer	plots	and	the	hypotheses	tests	for	the	equality	of	survival	
functions	 in	 section	 5.3	 above,	 I	 also	 conduct	 post‐estimation	 tests	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
Schoenfeld	 residuals	 to	 check	 for	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 crucial	 proportional	 hazard	
assumption.	
Another	big	advantage	of	the	Cox	model	is	that	it	can	cope	with	left	truncation	and	
right	 censoring,	which	 is	 the	 case	 for	 the	 data	 at	 hand.	 Countries	 enter	 the	 dataset	 at	
different	 points	 in	 time	 and	 some	 potential	 future	 follow‐up	 restructurings	 cannot	 be	
observed	because	the	dataset	ends	after	2010.		
The	Cox	proportional	hazard	model	is	estimated	using	pseudo	maximum	likelihood	
and	I	use	the	Efron	(1977)	method	to	handle	ties	(i.e.	if	two	observations	have	the	same	
	132	
	
survival	time).61	Each	regression	includes	country	dummies	to	control	for	time	invariant	
particularities.		Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	country	level.	
As	 control	 variables	 I	 use	most	 of	 the	 ten	macroeconomic	 variables	 suggested	 by	
Manasse	and	Roubini	 (2005)	plus	a	polity	 indicator	 to	control	 for	 the	political	system.	
Manasse	 and	 Roubini	 (2005)	 identified	 these	 ten	 variables	 to	 be	 suitable	 –	 and	
apparently	 sufficiently	 so	 –	 to	 predict	 debt	 crises.	 Unfortunately,	 data	 for	 the	
computation	of	the	public	external	debt	to	 fiscal	revenue	ratio,	 the	number	of	years	to	
the	 next	 presidential	 election	 as	 well	 as	 external	 financial	 requirements	 are	 not	
sufficiently	available	for	the	countries	and	time	span	at	hand.	
This	also	makes	 it	difficult	 to	clearly	and	unchallengeably	 identify	potential	causal	
relationships	 econometrically.	 The	 number	 of	 observations	 is	 arguably	 low,	 ranging	
between	144	and	157	for	the	baseline	case,	depending	on	which	covariates	are	included.	
Nevertheless,	 some	 of	 the	 found	 robust	 correlations	 contribute	 to	 a	 better	
understanding	 of	 what	 kind	 of	 restructurings	 entail	 serial	 restructurings	 with	 high	
probability.	
5.4.2 Baseline	Estimation	Results	
Table	5.2	shows	baseline	estimation	results	for	the	full	sample.	The	haircut	measure	
used	 here	 is	 computed	 according	 to	 the	 method	 by	 Sturzenegger	 and	 Zettelmeyer	
(2008)	as	explained	in	section	5.2.1	above.	Moreover,	the	estimations	contain	only	those	
restructuring	characteristics	that	have	been	shown	to	be	suitable	for	inclusion	into	the	
Cox	proportional	hazard	 regressions	 in	 section	5.3.	 Specifically,	 the	variables	 included	
have	 been	 tested	 for	 significantly	 different	 and	 approximately	 parallel	 Kaplan‐Meier	
functions.	The	dummy	variables	indicating	donor‐funding,	buy‐back	deals,	Brady	deals,	
and	 new	 money	 being	 included	 are	 disregarded	 in	 the	 estimations	 due	 to	 potential	
endogeniety	 issues.	 All	 variables	 are	 described	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 Table	 A.5.1	 in	 the	
appendix	to	this	chapter.	Table	A.5.2	provides	some	descriptive	statistics.	
Each	regression	is	estimated	twice:	first,	with	the	overall	haircut	as	a	regressor	and,	
second,	with	separate	regressors	for	the	cut	in	face	value	and	the	residual	reduction	in	
net	present	value	due	to	maturity	extensions	and/or	interest	rate	cuts.		Control	variables	
are	included	subsequently	in	Table	5.2.	Column	(1)	comprises	only	the	haircuts,	column	
(2)	 includes	 debt	 characteristics,	 countries’	 economic	 and	 political	 fundamentals	 as	
																																																								
61	When	using	the	exact	method	overall	results	do	not	change	(see	column	(2)	of	Table	5.3).	
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suggested	 by	 Manasse	 and	 Roubini	 (2005)	 are	 included	 in	 column	 (3),	 and	 the	 U.S.	
treasury	 bill	 rate	 (see	 also	 Manasse	 and	 Roubini,	 2005)	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 international	
capital	market	conditions	 is	added	in	column	(4).	The	estimation	results	are	tested	for	
robustness	in	Tables	5.3	and	5.4	in	section	5.2.3.	
The	regression	output	confirms	the	descriptive	findings	as	well	as	the	IMF’s	(2013)	
claim	 that	 higher	 haircuts	 lead	 to	 a	 lower	 compound	 probability	 of	 follow‐up	
restructurings.	A	higher	overall	haircut	in	net	present	value	of	1	percentage	point	is	on	
average	 associated	 with	 a	ሺexpሺെ0.04ሻ െ 1ሻ ∗ 100 ൌ െ3.9	percent	 lower	 compound	
probability	 of	 observing	 a	 follow‐up	 restructuring.	 The	 IMF’s	 (2013)	 call	 for	 higher	
haircuts	thus	seems	to	be	justified,	if	–	as	explained	in	the	introductory	section	5.1	–	one	
assumes	that	a	single	haircut	is	less	expensive	than	serial	restructurings	(with	the	same	
aggregate	haircut).		
When	discriminating	between	the	effects	of	a	haircut	in	face	value	and	the	residual	
haircut	 due	 to	 maturity	 prolongation	 or/and	 interest	 rate	 reductions,	 only	 the	
coefficient	 for	 the	 cut	 in	 face	 value	 is	 significantly	 different	 from	 zero.	 Still,	 the	
coefficient	on	the	residual	haircut	is	negative	as	expected.	Surprisingly,	we	can	reject	the	
null	hypothesis	that	the	two	coefficients	are	equal	on	the	1‐3	percent	significance	levels,	
depending	on	the	specification.	This	implies	that	a	reduction	in	face	value	has	a	stronger	
negative	 impact	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 serial	 restructurings	 than	 a	 reduction	 of	 net	
present	value	due	to	maturity	extension	and/or	an	interest	rate	reduction.	While	a	one	
percentage	point	increase	in	the	face	value	haircut	reduces	the	probability	of	a	follow‐up	
restructuring	by	roughly	6.7	percent,	an	equally	sized	haircut	due	to	maturity	extension	
and/or	interest	rate	reduction	reduces	the	probability	of	serial	default	by	only	about	2.0	
percent.	The	 intuitive	expectation	that	 it	should	not	matter	how	the	cut	 in	net	present	
value	 is	 achieved	 cannot	 be	 confirmed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 findings.	 One	 possible	
explanation	for	this	finding	might	be	that	a	cut	in	face	value	provides	outright	debt	relief,	
whereas	 interest	rate	cuts	and	especially	maturity	extensions	merely	buy	an	 insolvent	
and	illiquid	country	some	time	until	it	becomes	illiquid	again.	
The	amount	of	debt	affected	itself	also	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	probability	of	
serial	restructurings.	 It	 is	an	important	control	variable	 for	the	true	size	of	 the	haircut	
with	respect	to	the	overall	debt	burden.	The	higher	the	amount	of	debt	affected	relative	
to	GDP,	the	lower	the	probability	of	incurring	a	follow‐up	restructuring	because	even	a	
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low	haircut	erases	a	 large	part	of	 a	 country’s	debt	 relative	 to	GDP.	Estimations	where	
this	variable	is	omitted	nevertheless	generate	very	similar	results	(not	shown	here).	
The	 covariates	 describing	 the	 type	 of	 debt	 affected	 and	 fulfilling	 the	 statistical	
requirements	for	inclusion	into	the	Cox	proportional	hazard	model	are	the	two	dummy	
variables	indicating	whether	the	restructuring	affected	previously	restructured	debt	and	
whether	short‐term	debt	was	exchanged	for	debt	contracts	with	longer‐term	maturities.	
The	 coefficient	 to	 the	 dummy	 for	 short	 term	 debt	 being	 included	 is	 not	 significantly	
different	 from	 zero	 in	 most	 specifications.	 The	 coefficient	 to	 the	 dummy	 indicating	
whether	previously	 restructured	debt	had	been	affected	 is	 significantly	negative	 in	 all	
specifications,	 though.	 	 Those	 cases,	 where	 previously	 restructured	 debt	 was	
restructured	 again	 have,	 on	 average,	 a	 65‐75	 percent	 lower	 compound	 probability	 of	
being	 followed‐up	 by	 another	 restructuring.	 One	 possibility	 would	 be	 that	 these	
restructurings	 complement	 the	previous	 restructuring	 in	 such	a	way,	 that	 the	 country	
finally	 becomes	 or	 at	 least	 comes	 far	 closer	 towards	 medium‐	 to	 long‐term	 debt	
sustainability.	
A	 country’s	 real	 GDP	 growth	 around	 the	 time	 of	 restructuring	 does	 not	 enter	
significantly.	However,	a	country’s	debt	ratio	after	the	considered	debt	restructuring	is	
statistically	 highly	 significant.	 Economically	 speaking,	 a	 one	 percentage	 point	 higher	
debt‐to‐GDP	 ratio	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 1.8	 percent	 higher	 probability	 of	 having	 to	
restructure	again.		
Finally,	 I	 include	 the	 three	month	U.S.	 treasury	 bill	 rate	 to	 control	 for	 the	 overall	
international	credit	market	environment.	As	expected,	the	sign	is	positive,	implying	that	
the	more	tense	the	situation	on	international	capital	markets	(i.e.	the	higher	the	treasury	
bill	rate),	the	higher	the	probability	of	observing	follow‐up	restructurings.	However,	the	
coefficients	are	not	significantly	different	from	zero	in	this	specification.	
Generally,	the	coefficients	to	the	haircut	variables	are	left	almost	unchanged	by	the	
successive	inclusion	of	all	the	controls.	The	validity	of	the	proportionality	assumption	is	
tested	on	the	basis	of	Schoenfeld	(1982)	residuals	for	each	covariate	individually	as	well	
as	 for	 the	 full	 specifications	 and	 can	 be	 confirmed.	 The	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 the	
proportionality	 assumption	 holds	 cannot	 be	 rejected	 for	 any	 of	 the	 specifications.	
Furthermore,	Figures	A.5.1	to	A.5.4	in	the	appendix	to	this	chapter	seem	to	confirm	the	
time‐independence	 (i.e.	 zero	 slopes	 against	 time)	 of	 the	 Schoenfeld	 residuals	 for	 the	
three	main	variables	in	the	baseline	specification	presented	in	column	(4)	of	Table	5.2:	
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the	 overall	 SZ‐Haircut	 (left	 column)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 reduction	 in	 face	 value	 and	 the	
residual	haircut	(right	column).	
	
Table	5.2:	Semi‐Parametric	Cox	Proportional	Hazard	Model	–	Baseline	
	
Independent	Variables	
Only	Haircut	
(1)	
+	Type	of	debt	
affected	
(2)	
+	country	
characteristics	
(3)	
+	U.S.	treasury	bill	
rate	
(4)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Haircut	size	and	type:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Haircut	(%)	 ‐0.048***	 	 ‐0.038***	 	 ‐0.042***	 	 ‐0.042***	 	
	 [0.009]	 	 [0.009]	 	 [0.010]	 	 [0.011]	 	
Reduction	in	face	value	(%)	 	 ‐0.069***	 	 ‐0.054***	 	 ‐0.071***	 	 ‐0.072***	
	 	 [0.012]	 	 [0.011]	 	 [0.019]	 	 [0.019]	
Residual	haircut	(%)	 	 ‐0.028*	 	 ‐0.013	 	 ‐0.019	 	 ‐0.020	
	 	 [0.015]	 	 [0.012]	 	 [0.012]	 	 [0.012]	
Amount	of	debt	affected		 ‐3.086***	 ‐2.987***	 ‐2.529***	 ‐2.502**	 ‐2.582**	 ‐2.787**	 ‐2.521**	 ‐2.780**	
(%	of	GDP)	 [1.084]	 [1.010]	 [0.934]	 [0.997]	 [1.108]	 [1.130]	 [1.145]	 [1.113]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Type	of	debt	affected:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Affects	previously		 	 	 ‐1.065***	 ‐1.287***	 ‐1.277***	 ‐1.372***	 ‐1.249***	 ‐1.347***	
restructured	debt	(0/1)	 	 	 [0.243]	 [0.314]	 [0.347]	 [0.414]	 [0.341]	 [0.415]	
Short‐term	debt		 	 	 0.152	 ‐0.041	 ‐0.031	 ‐0.191	 ‐0.036	 ‐0.192	
included	(0/1)	 	 	 [0.482]	 [0.441]	 [0.594]	 [0.564]	 [0.616]	 [0.579]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Country	characteristics:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Central	government		 	 	 	 	 0.018**	 0.017**	 0.019**	 0.018**	
debt	(%	of	GDP)	 	 	 	 	 [0.007]	 [0.007]	 [0.009]	 [0.009]	
Short	term	debt		 	 	 	 	 0.002	 0.002	 0.002	 0.002	
(%	of	reserves)	 	 	 	 	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	
Real	GDP	growth	(%)	 	 	 	 	 ‐0.018	 ‐0.021	 ‐0.014	 ‐0.018	
	 	 	 	 	 [0.044]	 [0.043]	 [0.050]	 [0.051]	
CPI	inflation	(%)	 	 	 	 	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.001	
	 	 	 	 	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	
Exchange	rate	volatility	 	 	 	 	 0.000	 0.000**	 0.000	 0.000**	
([0,1])	 	 	 	 	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Real	effective	exchange	rate	 	 	 	 	 0.000***	 0.000	 0.000***	 0.000	
(index	where	100	=	PPP)	 	 	 	 	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Polity	index	(‐10	to	+10)	 	 	 	 	 0.042	 0.049	 0.050	 0.055	
	 	 	 	 	 [0.052]	 [0.050]	 [0.068]	 [0.064]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
International	credit	market	
environment:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
U.S.	treasury	bill	rate	(%)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.044	 0.029	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 [0.142]	 [0.134]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Fixed	effects	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Number	of	observations	 157	 157	 157	 157	 144	 144	 144	 144	
Number	of	months	at	risk	 13892	 13892	 13892	 13892	 12309	 12309	 12309	 12309	
Number	of	“failures”	 98	 98	 98	 98	 95	 95	 95	 95	
Number	of	countries	 60	 60	 60	 60	 51	 51	 51	 51	
Pseudo	R²	 0.140	 0.150	 0.155	 0.166	 0.165	 0.176	 0.165	 0.176	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P‐value	for	global	test	of	
proportional	hazards	
assumption	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	 0.999	 0.913	 0.999	 0.852	
	 (H0:	Proportional	hazards	assumption	is	correct)	
	 	
P‐value	for	Wald	test		 	 0.018	 	 0.005	 	 0.023	 	 0.026	
	 (H0:	Coefficients	of	“reduction	in	face	value”	and	“residual	haircut”	are	equal)	
Notes:	The	table	reports	coefficient	estimates.	Standard	errors	[in	brackets]	are	clustered	at	the	country	 level.	*,	**,	***	
indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%,	1%	level,	respectively.		
The residual haircut is the difference of the overall Haircut and the reduction in face value. The test of the proportional 
hazards assumption is based on Schoenfeld residuals.  
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5.4.3 Robustness	of	Results	
The	 main	 results	 presented	 in	 section	 5.4.2	 are	 very	 robust	 to	 using	 a	 different	
haircut	 measure	 in	 column	 (1)	 of	 Table	 5.3	 (the	 “market”	 haircut,	 see	 Cruces	 and	
Trebesch,	2013),	a	different	estimation	method	to	handle	tied	observations	with	equal	
survival	times	(column	(2)),	or	to	including	region62	or	no	fixed	effects	at	all	 instead	of	
country	 dummies.	 	 Table	 5.4	 documents	 estimation	 results	 for	 the	 baseline	 model	
including	all	covariates	for	important	subsamples,	to	check	whether	not	controlling	for	
other	 restructuring	 features	 affects	 the	 results	 in	 any	 significant	 way	 because	 any	
variable	 omissions	 may	 lead	 to	 biased	 coefficients.	 Table	 5.3	 confirms	 all	 findings	
presented	in	section	5.4.2.	Most	importantly,	higher	haircuts	lead	to	a	lower	probability	
of	serial	restructurings	and	the	impact	of	cuts	in	face	value	is	significantly	stronger	than	
that	of	maturity	extensions	and/or	interest	rate	reductions.	These	effects	are	a	bit	 less	
pronounced	in	the	specification	including	region	dummies	instead	of	country	dummies	
(column	(3)).		
The	estimation	results	for	different	subsamples	in	Table	5.4	further	substantiate	the	
main	results.	The	overall	haircut	as	well	as	the	cut	in	face	value	and	the	residual	haircut	
all	 enter	 negatively	 and	 (mostly)	 statistically	 significantly.	 The	 coefficients’	 sizes	 are	
extremely	similar	to	all	previous	estimations,	too.	Tests	for	the	equality	of	the	effects	of	a	
cut	 in	 face	 value	 and	 the	 residual	 haircut	 largely	 confirm	 the	 above	 finding:	 The	
coefficient	 to	 a	 cut	 in	 face	 value	 is	 significantly	 larger	 in	 absolute	 value	 than	 the	
coefficient	to	the	residual	haircut	in	the	first	two	columns.	Even	though	this	significance	
is	lost	in	columns	(3)	and	(4),	the	magnitudes	of	the	coefficients	remain	very	stable.		
When	 running	 all	 the	 regressions	 using	 the	 full	 sample	 with	 a	 dummy	 variable	
controlling	 for	 a	 Brady	 deal,	 a	 donor‐funded	 deal,	 a	 buy‐back	 deal	 and/or	 a	 debt	
exchange	 including	 the	 provision	 of	 new	 money	 (not	 shown	 here),	 results	 are	 still	
robust.	The	coefficient	to	this	dummy	variable	is	generally	significantly	negative.	
Finally,	 tests	 for	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 proportional	 hazard	 assumption	 imply	 that	
specifications	in	Tables	5.3	and	5.4	fulfill	this	critical	assumption.	
	 	
																																																								
62	UN‐subregions:	 Caribbean,	 Central	 America,	 South	 America,	 Eastern	 Africa,	 Middle	 Africa,	 Northern	
Africa,	Southern	Africa,	Western	Africa,	South‐Eastern	Asia,	Southern	Asia,	Western	Asia,	Eastern	Europe,	
Southern	Europe.	
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Table	5.3:	Semi‐Parametric	Cox	Proportional	Hazard	Model	–	Robustness	
Checks	1	
	
Independent	Variables	 “Market”	haircut	
measure	
(1)	
Exact	method	for	ties	
(2)	
Region	fixed	effects	
(3)	
No	fixed	effects	
(4)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Haircut	size	and	type:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Haircut	(%)	 ‐0.052***	 	 ‐0.057***	 	 ‐0.029***	 	 ‐0.030***	 	
	 [0.012]	 	 [0.014]	 	 [0.006]	 	 [0.005]	 	
Reduction	in	face	value	(%)	 	 ‐0.074***	 	 ‐0.078***	 	 ‐0.039***	 	 ‐0.038***	
	 	 [0.017]	 	 [0.021]	 	 [0.010]	 	 [0.008]	
Residual	haircut	(%)	 	 ‐0.034**	 	 ‐0.040**	 	 ‐0.016**	 	 ‐0.018***	
	 	 [0.016]	 	 [0.016]	 	 [0.008]	 	 [0.007]	
Amount	of	debt	affected		 ‐1.825	 ‐2.231*	 ‐3.311**	 ‐3.430**	 ‐0.381	 ‐0.388	 ‐0.631	 ‐0.587	
(%	of	GDP)	 [1.159]	 [1.152]	 [1.578]	 [1.554]	 [0.655]	 [0.704]	 [0.544]	 [0.579]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Type	of	debt	affected:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Affects	previously		 ‐0.793**	 ‐1.018**	 ‐1.601***	 ‐1.713***	 ‐0.500***	 ‐0.542**	 ‐0.485***	 ‐0.521**	
restructured	debt	(0/1)	 [0.336]	 [0.426]	 [0.497]	 [0.490]	 [0.187]	 [0.213]	 [0.185]	 [0.206]	
Short‐term	debt		 ‐0.023	 ‐0.145	 ‐0.730	 ‐0.862	 0.343	 0.321	 0.276	 0.309	
included	(0/1)	 [0.608]	 [0.596]	 [0.625]	 [0.611]	 [0.355]	 [0.356]	 [0.259]	 [0.246]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Country	characteristics:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Central	government		 0.022**	 0.020**	 0.027***	 0.025**	 0.003***	 0.004***	 0.003***	 0.004***	
debt	(%	of	GDP)	 [0.010]	 [0.009]	 [0.010]	 [0.010]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	
Short	term	debt		 0.002	 0.002	 0.003*	 0.003*	 ‐0.000	 ‐0.000	 0.000	 ‐0.000	
(%	of	reserves)	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Real	GDP	growth	(%)	 ‐0.014	 ‐0.014	 ‐0.029	 ‐0.032	 0.006	 ‐0.003	 0.011	 0.005	
	 [0.049]	 [0.049]	 [0.042]	 [0.041]	 [0.024]	 [0.024]	 [0.022]	 [0.022]	
CPI	inflation	(%)	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.000	 ‐0.000	 ‐0.000	 ‐0.000	
	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Exchange	rate	volatility	 0.000*	 0.000**	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.000***	
([0,1])	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Real	effective	exchange	rate	 0.000***	 0.000*	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.003	 0.000***	 0.000	 0.000***	 0.000**	
(index	where	100	=	PPP)	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.003]	 [0.003]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Polity	index	(‐10	to	+10)	 0.046	 0.053	 0.147***	 0.153***	 ‐0.009	 ‐0.015	 0.004	 0.006	
	 [0.067]	 [0.066]	 [0.056]	 [0.055]	 [0.031]	 [0.029]	 [0.019]	 [0.018]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
International	credit	market	
environment:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
U.S.	treasury	bill	rate	(%)	 0.046	 0.033	 0.095	 0.062	 0.096*	 0.080	 0.086**	 0.075*	
	 [0.139]	 [0.137]	 [0.108]	 [0.107]	 [0.052]	 [0.052]	 [0.041]	 [0.042]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Fixed	effects	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Region	 Region	 none	 none	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Number	of	observations	 144	 144	 144	 144	 144	 144	 144	 144	
Number	of	months	at	risk	 12309	 12309	 12309	 12309	 12309	 12309	 12309	 12309	
Number	of	“failures”	 95	 95	 95	 95	 95	 95	 95	 95	
Number	of	countries	 51	 51	 51	 51	 51	 51	 51	 51	
Pseudo	R²	 0.174	 0.181	 0.180	 0.192	 0.095	 0.102	 0.083	 0.089	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P‐value	for	global	test	of	
proportional	hazards	
assumption	 1.000	 0.923	 n.a.	 n.a.	 0.845	 0.914	 0.869	 0.889	
	 (H0:	Proportional	hazards	assumption	is	correct)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P‐value	for	Wald	test		 	 0.069	 	 0.009	 	 0.032	 	 0.034	
	 (H0:	Coefficients	of	“reduction	in	face	value”	and	“residual	haircut”	are	equal)	
Notes:	The	table	reports	coefficient	estimates.	Standard	errors	[in	brackets]	are	clustered	at	the	country	level	(except	for	
column	(2)).	*,	**,	***	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%,	1%	level,	respectively.		
The	residual	haircut	is	the	difference	of	the	overall	Haircut	and	the	reduction	in	face	value.	Region	dummies	are	based	on	
the	United	Nations’	definition	of	13	geographical	sub‐regions.	The	test	of	the	proportional	hazards	assumption	is	based	
on	Schoenfeld	residuals.	
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Table	5.4:	Semi‐Parametric	Cox	Proportional	Hazard	Model	–	Robustness	
Checks	2	
	
Independent	Variables	
All	18	bond	
exchanges	excluded	
(1)	
All	17	Brady	deals	
excluded	
(2)	
All	28	donor	funded	
and/or	buy‐back	
deals	excluded63	
(3)	
All	25	restructurings	
with	provision	of	new	
money	excluded	
(4)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Haircut	size	and	type:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Haircut	(%)	 ‐0.044***	 	 ‐0.041***	 	 ‐0.030***	 	 ‐0.054***	 	
	 [0.014]	 	 [0.013]	 	 [0.010]	 	 [0.013]	 	
Reduction	in	face	value	(%)	 	 ‐0.086**	 	 ‐0.086***	 	 ‐0.059***	 	 ‐0.087***	
	 	 [0.041]	 	 [0.025]	 	 [0.022]	 	 [0.031]	
Residual	haircut	(%)	 	 ‐0.021*	 	 ‐0.017	 	 ‐0.017	 	 ‐0.033*	
	 	 [0.013]	 	 [0.015]	 	 [0.012]	 	 [0.019]	
Amount	of	debt	affected		 ‐2.396	 ‐2.463	 ‐3.143*	 ‐3.927**	 ‐3.067**	 ‐3.203***	 ‐1.425	 ‐1.177	
(%	of	GDP)	 [1.625]	 [2.054]	 [1.634]	 [1.618]	 [1.238]	 [1.195]	 [3.874]	 [3.859]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Type	of	debt	affected:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Affects	previously		 ‐1.508***	 ‐1.739***	 ‐1.177***	 ‐1.269***	 ‐1.516***	 ‐1.488***	 ‐1.649***	 ‐1.738***	
restructured	debt	(0/1)	 [0.373]	 [0.471]	 [0.417]	 [0.455]	 [0.375]	 [0.411]	 [0.495]	 [0.557]	
Short‐term	debt		 ‐0.019	 ‐0.337	 0.102	 ‐0.017	 ‐0.052	 ‐0.200	 0.792	 0.472	
included	(0/1)	 [0.734]	 [0.730]	 [0.690]	 [0.652]	 [0.523]	 [0.543]	 [1.256]	 [1.245]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Country	characteristics:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Central	government		 0.022**	 0.020*	 0.021	 0.019*	 0.018**	 0.017**	 0.029***	 0.028***	
debt	(%	of	GDP)	 [0.011]	 [0.011]	 [0.013]	 [0.010]	 [0.008]	 [0.008]	 [0.011]	 [0.010]	
Short	term	debt		 0.004**	 0.004*	 0.001	 0.001	 0.002	 0.002	 0.002	 0.002	
(%	of	reserves)	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	
Real	GDP	growth	(%)	 0.028	 0.015	 ‐0.024	 ‐0.025	 ‐0.025	 ‐0.032	 ‐0.012	 ‐0.005	
	 [0.053]	 [0.056]	 [0.063]	 [0.062]	 [0.050]	 [0.052]	 [0.059]	 [0.064]	
CPI	inflation	(%)	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.001*	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.000	 ‐0.000	
	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	
Exchange	rate	volatility	 0.044***	 0.046***	 0.000	 0.001**	 0.000	 0.000**	 0.000	 0.000	
([0,1])	 [0.017]	 [0.016]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Real	effective	exchange	rate	 0.000***	 0.000	 0.000***	 0.000	 0.000	 ‐0.000	 0.000**	 0.000	
(index	where	100	=	PPP)	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Polity	index	(‐10	to	+10)	 0.052	 0.068	 0.055	 0.073	 0.048	 0.049	 ‐0.003	 0.040	
	 [0.082]	 [0.078]	 [0.071]	 [0.068]	 [0.066]	 [0.064]	 [0.145]	 [0.154]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
International	credit	market	
environment:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
U.S.	treasury	bill	rate	(%)	 0.065	 0.016	 0.031	 0.036	 ‐0.022	 ‐0.024	 0.173	 0.132	
	 [0.148]	 [0.141]	 [0.156]	 [0.160]	 [0.144]	 [0.137]	 [0.196]	 [0.209]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Fixed	effects	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	 Country	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Number	of	observations	 131	 131	 127	 127	 121	 121	 121	 121	
Number	of	months	at	risk	 11590	 11590	 9204	 9204	 9061	 9061	 10541	 10541	
Number	of	“failures”	 88	 88	 90	 90	 92	 92	 76	 76	
Number	of	countries	 51	 51	 48	 48	 38	 38	 51	 51	
Pseudo	R²	 0.204	 0.214	 0.158	 0.172	 0.137	 0.142	 0.204	 0.213	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P‐value	for	global	test	of	
proportional	hazards	
assumption	 1.000	 0.192	 0.958	 0.925	 0.997	 0.709	 1.000	 0.770	
	 (H0:	Proportional	hazards	assumption	is	correct)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P‐value	for	Wald	test		 	 0.143	 	 0.014	 	 0.129	 	 0.198	
	 (H0:	Coefficients	of	“reduction	in	face	value”	and	“residual	haircut”	are	equal)	
Notes:	The	table	reports	coefficient	estimates.	Standard	errors	[in	brackets]	are	clustered	at	the	country	 level.	*,	**,	***	
indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%,	1%	level,	respectively.		
The	residual	haircut	is	the	difference	of	the	overall	Haircut	and	the	reduction	in	face	value.	Region	dummies	are	based	on	
the	United	Nations’	definition	of	13	geographical	sub‐regions.	The	test	of	the	proportional	hazards	assumption	is	based	
on	Schoenfeld	residuals.	
	 	
																																																								
63	Many	buy	back	deals	are	also	donor	funded,	which	is	why	these	two	categories	largely	overlap.	Results	
are	almost	identical,	if	only	one	of	the	categories	is	excluded.	
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5.5 Conclusion	
This	 paper	 complements	 the	 existing	 empirical	 literature	 on	 sovereign	 debt	
restructurings	by	analyzing	whether	the	often	stated	claims	that	higher	haircuts	reduce	
the	 probability	 of	 (near‐term)	 follow‐up	 restructurings	 are	 valid.	 I	 further	 distinguish	
between	reductions	in	net	present	value	of	the	debt	in	the	form	of	cuts	in	face	value	as	
opposed	 to	 reductions	 in	 net	 present	 value	 due	 to	 maturity	 extensions	 or/and	
reductions	 in	 interest	 rates.	Finally,	 I	 investigate	whether	other	 restructuring	 features	
are	correlated	with	the	probability	of	serial	restructurings.		
The	 most	 important	 finding	 is	 that	 higher	 total	 debt	 remissions	 are	 significantly	
negatively	related	to	the	probability	of	serial	restructurings	–	most	likely	because	higher	
debt	remissions	move	a	country	closer	to	a	sustainable	debt	 level	than	low	alleviation.	
This	 finding	 is	 rather	 straight‐forward	 and	 some	 studies	 already	 anticipated	 it	
anecdotally	(IMF,	2013;	Das	et	al.,	2012;	Moody’s,	2012).	An	immediate	implication	for	
future	 restructurings	would	 be	 that	 debtors	 and	 creditors	 should,	whenever	 possible,	
dare	 to	 accept	 higher	 debt	 remissions	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 the	 debtor	 country	 from	
having	to	restructure	over	and	over	again.	If	serial	restructurings	are	indeed	more	costly	
than	single	deemed‐to‐satisfy	restructurings,	this	strategy	could	prevent	many	enduring	
sovereign	liquidity	and	solvency	crises.	If	uncertainty	and	administration	costs	are	high,	
the	 strategy	 of	 accepting	 one	 single	 large	 restructuring	 rather	 than	 several	 small	
restructurings	may	even	be	desirable	for	the	creditor.	
The	estimation	results	also	suggest	that	haircuts	in	face	value	reduce	the	probability	
of	serial	restructurings	by	about	 twice	as	much	as	haircuts	due	to	maturity	extensions	
or/and	 reductions	 in	 interest	 rates.	This	 result	 refutes	 the	 intuitive	 logic	 that	 it	 is	 the	
overall	reduction	in	net	present	value	which	may	impact	a	country’s	debt	sustainability,	
no	matter	 how	 this	 reduction	 comes	 about.	 One	 potential	 explanation	 for	 this	 finding	
may	be	that	a	cut	in	face	value	provides	immediate	and	outright	debt	relief	(in	terms	of	
debt	 sustainability),	 whereas	 interest	 rate	 cuts	 and	 especially	 maturity	 extensions	
merely	buy	an	insolvent	and	illiquid	country	some	time	until	it	becomes	illiquid	again.		
Reinhart	and	Trebesch	(2015)	seem	to	confirm	this	 finding:	A	country’s	economic	
growth	 and	 credit	 rating	 only	 improves	 significantly	 after	 a	 debt	 restructuring,	 if	 the	
agreement	included	an	outright	cut	 in	face	value.	For	deals	consisting	only	of	maturity	
extensions	and/or	interest	rate	reductions	they	do	not	find	significant	improvements	of	
economic	fundamentals.		
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Finally,	the	effects	of	donor	funded	restructurings,	buy‐back	deals,	Brady	deals	and	
restructurings	 including	 the	 provision	 of	 new	money	 cannot	 be	 conclusively	 resolved	
because	the	expectations	with	respect	to	a	country’s	future	debt	sustainability	may	drive	
decisions	 to	provide	 funding	along	with	 granting	debt	 relief.	Nevertheless,	 descriptive	
statistics	suggest	that	these	restructuring	features	are	highly	and	significantly	correlated	
with	a	lower	probability	of	serial	restructurings.	
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5.6 Appendix	to	Chapter	5	
Table	A.5.1:	List	of	Variables	and	Definitions	
Variable	 Unit	 Explanations	and	Source	
	 	 	
Haircut	size	and	type:	
Haircut	(“SZ”	or	“Market”)	 percent	of	net	present	value	of	debt	 Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
Reduction	in	face	value	 percent	of	net	present	value	of	debt	 Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
Residual	haircut	 percent	of	net	present	value	of	debt	 Own	computation:	“Haircut”	minus	
“reduction	in	face	value”	
Amount	of	debt	affected		 percent	of	GDP	 Absolute	amounts	in	US	Dollars	from	
Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
Own	computation	of	ratios	to	GDP	
(GDP	from	World	Bank	World	
Development	Indicators)	
	 	 	
Other	Modalities	of	debt	restructurings:	
Donor‐funded	restructurings	 Dummy=1	if	restructuring	was	donor	funded	 Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
Buy‐back	deals	 Dummy=1	if	country	bought	back	its	debt	 Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
New	money	included	 Dummy=1	if	new	money	or	concerted	lending	
was	provided	
Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
Brady	deals	 Dummy=1	if	restructuring	was	a	so‐called	
Brady	deal	
Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
	 	 	
Type	of	debt	affected:	
Affects	previously	restructured	
debt	
Dummy=1	if	previously	restructured	debt	
was	affected	by	restructuring	
Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
Short	term	debt	included	 Dummy=1	if	short	term	debt	(with	a	maturity	
of	less	than	one	year)	was	exchanged	for	
longer‐term	debt	(with	a	maturity	of	more	
than	one	year)		
Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
Bond	exchange	
	
Dummy=1	if	the	debt	affect	was	in	the	form	of	
tradable	bonds	
Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
All	debt	fallen	due	at	time	of	
restructuring	
Dummy=1	if	all	of	the	debt	being	affected	had	
already	fallen	due	at	the	time	of	restructuring	
Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013)	
	 	 	
Country	characteristics:	
Central	government	debt	 percent	of	GDP	 Abbas	et	al.	(2010)	
Short‐term	debt	to	reserves	 percent	of	total	reserves	 World	Bank	World	Development	
Indicators	
Real	GDP	growth	 percent	 World	Bank	World	Development	
Indicators	
CPI	inflation	 percent	 World	Bank	World	Development	
Indicators	
Exchange	rate	volatility	 Between	0	and	1	 World	Bank	World	Development	
Indicators,	Own	computation	of	
Coefficient	of	Variation	
Real	Effective	Exchange	rate	 Index,	100	means	that	PPP	holds	 World	Bank	World	Development	
Indicators	and	Darvas	(2012),	where	not	
available	
Polity	index	 ‐10	to	+10,	where	
"autocracies"	(‐10	to	‐6),	"anocracies"	(‐5	to	
+5)	and	"democracies"	(+6	to	+10)	
Marshall	et	al.	(2011)	
	 	 	
International	credit	market	environment:	
U.S.	treasury	bill	rate	 percent	 World	Bank	World	Development	
Indicators	
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Table	A.5.2:	Summary	Statistics	for	Variables	
Variable	 Number	of	
observations	
Mean	 Standard	
deviation	
Min	 Max	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Haircut	size	and	type:	
Haircut	(SZ)	 180	 37.04	 27.28	 ‐9.80	 97.00	
Haircut	(Market)	 180	 40.01	 27.02	 ‐9.80	 97.00	
Reduction	in	face	value	 180	 16.77	 30.55	 0.00	 97.00	
Residual	haircut	 180	 20.27	 16.62	 ‐14.00	 73.20	
Amount	of	debt	affected		 157	 0.15	 0.17	 0.00	 0.78	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Other	Modalities	of	debt	restructurings:	
Donor‐funded	restructurings	 180	 0.12	 0.33	 0	 1	
Buy‐back	deals	 180	 0.14	 0.35	 0	 1	
New	money	included	 180	 0.14	 0.35	 0	 1	
Brady	deals	 180	 0.09	 0.29	 0	 1	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Type	of	debt	affected:	
Affects	previously	restructured	debt	 180	 0.34	 0.47	 0	 1	
Short	term	debt	included	 180	 0.30	 0.46	 0	 1	
Bond	exchange	 180	 0.10	 0.30	 0	 1	
All	debt	fallen	due	at	time	of	restructuring	 180	 0.51	 0.50	 0	 1	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Country	characteristics:	
Central	government	debt	 159	 85.61	 67.94	 15.67	 711.94	
Short‐term	debt	to	reserves	 158	 266.95	 948.05	 5.21	 11235.10	
Real	GDP	growth	 175	 2.95	 5.53	 ‐17.15	 34.39	
CPI	inflation	 170	 56.15	 187.73	 ‐8.48	 2075.89	
Exchange	rate	volatility	 171	 39.38	 454.77	 0	 5948.22	
Real	Effective	Exchange	rate	 171	 2043.99	 13412.44	 10.41	 136987.50	
Polity	index	 168	 0.77	 6.86	 ‐9	 10	
	 	 	 	 	 	
International	credit	market	environment:	
U.S.	treasury	bill	rate	 180	 6.44	 2.71	 0.13	 14.08	
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Figure	A.5.1:	Schoenfeld	Residual	Plot	for	Overall	SZ‐haircut	Measure	
A	Schoenfeld	residual	plot	exhibiting	a	non‐random	pattern	in	time	(i.e.	a	non‐zero	slope)	is	evidence	of	a	violation	of	the	
proportional	hazards	assumption.	
	
	
Figure	A.5.2:	Schoenfeld	Residual	Plot	for	Reduction	in	Face	Value	
A	Schoenfeld	residual	plot	exhibiting	a	non‐random	pattern	in	time	(i.e.	a	non‐zero	slope)	is	evidence	of	a	violation	of	the	
proportional	hazards	assumption.	
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Figure	A.5.3:	Schoenfeld	Residual	Plot	for	Residual	Haircut	
A	Schoenfeld	residual	plot	exhibiting	a	non‐random	pattern	in	time	(i.e.	a	non‐zero	slope)	is	evidence	of	a	violation	of	the	
proportional	hazards	assumption.	
	
	
Figure	A.5.4:	Schoenfeld	Residual	Plot	for	the	Dummy	Variable	Indicating	
whether	Previously	Restructured	Debt	has	been	Affected	in	a	Restructuring	
A	Schoenfeld	residual	plot	exhibiting	a	non‐random	pattern	in	time	(i.e.	a	non‐zero	slope)	is	evidence	of	a	violation	of	the	
proportional	hazards	assumption.	
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6. VIABLE	INSOLVENCY	PROCEDURE	FOR	EURO	AREA	SOVEREIGNS64	
6.1 Introduction	
The	euro	area	debt	crisis	has	revealed	serious	flaws	in	the	institutional	setup	of	the	
European	Monetary	Union	 (EMU)	as	 it	 had	been	designed	 in	 the	 late	1990s	 (Buti	 and	
Carnot,	2012;	De	Grauwe	and	Ji,	2012;	Hodson,	2013).	In	2010,	the	crisis	started	a	wave	
of	 reforms	 to	 adjust	 this	 deficient	 setting.	 The	 temporary	 EFSF	 (European	 Financial	
Stability	 Facility)	 and	 the	 permanent	 ESM	 (European	 Stability	 Mechanism)	 are	
multilateral	 loan	 facilities	 created	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 stabilizing	 the	 government	
bonds	market	(European	Central	Bank,	2011;	Olivares‐Caminal,	2012).	A	key	element	of	
this	 reform	 program	 consists	 in	 developing	 the	 banking	 union.	 It	 includes	 a	 single	
supervisory	 mechanism	 (Howarth	 and	 Quaglia,	 2014)	 and	 bank	 resolution	 systems	
(European	 Commission,	 2014).	 In	 addition,	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 partially	
assumed	the	responsibility	of	a	lender	of	last	resort	in	case	of	government	bond	market	
panics	and	established	the	OMT	(Outright	Monetary	Transactions)	program	(European	
Central	Bank,	2012b).	Finally,	the	feeble	and	ineffective	SGP	(Stability	and	Growth	Pact)	
was	 reformed,	 specified	 and	 complemented	with	 national	 debt	 brakes,	which	 all	 euro	
area	 member	 states	 accepted	 by	 signing	 the	 European	 Fiscal	 Compact	 (Burret	 and	
Schnellenbach,	2014;	European	Central	Bank,	2012a).	
While	 this	 reform	 program	 is	 comprehensive,	 another	 serious	 incompleteness	
strikes:	to	this	point,	there	 is	no	well‐defined	and	feasible	 insolvency	procedure	which	
could	be	applied	to	restructure	the	sovereign	debt	of	a	euro	area	member	state.	This	lack	
of	a	specified	 insolvency	procedure	remains	a	much	neglected	subject	 in	 the	emerging	
new	institutional	structure	of	the	euro	area	in	at	least	two	respects.	
First,	 the	conditionality	claim	of	EFSF,	ESM	and	OMT	 loans	can	only	be	credible	 if	
creditors	 have	 a	 real	 alternative	 to	 keeping	 a	 crisis	 country	 liquid	 under	 any	
circumstances.	As	 long	as	 the	prospect	of	restructuring	remains	an	unacceptable	high‐
risk	 scenario,	 any	 threat	 to	 stop	 liquidity	 provision	 in	 case	 of	 non‐compliance	 lacks	
credibility.	 Only	 a	 credible	 restructuring	 prospect	 can	 prevent	 a	 system	 which	 is	
intended	to	merely	provide	conditional	liquidity	assistance	in	the	short	run	from	turning	
																																																								
64	This	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	 joint	 work	 with	 Clemens	 Fuest	 and	 Friedrich	 Heinemann,	 which	 has	 been	
published	as	“A	Viable	Insolvency	Procedure	for	Sovereigns	in	the	Euro	Area”,	Journal	of	Common	Market	
Studies,	doi:	10.1111/jcms.12287.	See	Fuest,	Heinemann,	and	Schröder	(2015).	
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into	 a	 system	 of	 potentially	 unconditional	 permanent	 transfers	 (Committee	 on	
International	Economic	Policy	and	Reform,	2013).	
Second,	 and	 closely	 related,	 the	 prospect	 of	 sovereign	 insolvency	 is	 crucial	 to	
safeguard	 market	 discipline	 as	 a	 complement	 to	 rule‐based	 fiscal	 discipline.	 If	
restructuring	 individual	euro	area	member	states’	debt	 is	no	realistic	option,	creditors	
hardly	face	any	default	risk	when	lending	money	to	these	borrowers.	Only	the	realistic	
possibility	of	some	kind	of	sovereign	default	can	induce	borrowers	to	carefully	examine	
the	creditworthiness	of	euro	area	countries	before	buying	their	bonds.	
While	there	is	a	strong	case	for	an	insolvency	procedure	for	sovereigns	in	a	newly	
designed	 EMU	 setup,	 its	 introduction	 is	 challenging.	 The	 financial	 and	 economic	
situation	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 will	 remain	 fragile	 for	 a	 considerable	 period	 of	 time	 as	 a	
consequence	of	 the	 crisis.	 In	 this	 situation,	 the	 introduction	of	 a	detailed	and	credible	
insolvency	 procedure	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 signal	 for	 an	 imminent	 restructuring,	 which	
might	trigger	a	new	flight	from	peripheral	government	bond	markets.	Thus,	there	is	an	
underlying	 dilemma	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 any	 sovereign	 insolvency	
procedure	(Mody,	2013):	calm	and	stable	years	would	offer	ideal	conditions	to	establish	
transparent	restructuring	rules;	but	it	is	only	during	acute	debt	crises	that	the	need	for	
such	rules	is	recognized.	
Our	 proposal	 of	 a	 ‘Viable	 Insolvency	 Procedure	 for	 Sovereigns’	 (VIPS)	 takes	 this	
dilemma	seriously.	It	builds	on	the	existing	models	(surveyed	below)	for	the	euro	area	
but	develops	them	further	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	transition	problem.	It	designs	a	
realistic	 reform	 path	 based	 on	 lagged	 implementation	 which	 could	 overcome	 the	
dilemma	 described,	 thereby	 complementing	 the	 literature	 on	 proposals	 of	 statutory	
sovereign	 debt	 restructuring	 mechanisms	 for	 the	 Eurozone,	 which	 has	 traditionally	
treated	the	short‐term	challenges	of	the	transition	toward	a	new	long‐term	system	as	an	
orphan.	
On	the	one	hand,	VIPS	avoids	any	sudden	measures	which	could	further	destabilize	
the	 present	 fragile	 situation.	 Full	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 procedure	 is	 delayed	 until	
important	 objectives	 for	 the	 new	 institutional	 setup	 have	 been	 achieved	 and	 a	 more	
solid	market	environment	(including	a	stabilized	banking	system,	a	functioning	banking	
union	and	progress	in	cutting	back	public	indebtedness)	has	been	created.	On	the	other	
hand,	VIPS	comprises	immediate	decisions	and	the	beginning	of	phasing‐in	institutional	
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adjustments	which	are	to	make	the	(later)	full	introduction	of	the	insolvency	procedure	
irreversible.	
In	 section	 6.2	we	will	 discuss	why,	 under	 the	 specific	 conditions	 of	 EMU,	 a	well‐
defined	 insolvency	 procedure	 is	 preferable	 to	 flexible	 ad	 hoc	 solutions.	 Subsequently	
(section	 6.3),	 we	 review	 existing	 models	 for	 sovereign	 insolvency	 procedures	 with	 a	
focus	 on	 those	 developed	 for	 the	 euro	 area.	 Section	 6.4	 describes	 VIPS’	 long‐run	
elements	and	section	6.5	its	transition	path,	followed	by	a	conclusion	in	section	6.6.	
6.2 Ad	Hoc	Solutions	versus	Pre‐Defined	Procedures	
The	 history	 of	 public	 debt	 (Reinhart	 and	 Rogoff,	 2008)	 and	 the	 more	 recent	
experience	with	the	European	debt	crisis	clearly	showed	that	sovereign	countries	may	
end	 up	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 insolvency.65	There	 are	 two	 essentially	 different	ways	 to	 deal	
with	 fundamentally	 insolvent	members	of	 the	 euro	 area:	Either	 a	 bailout	 is	 organized	
through	 (open	 or	 hidden)	 transfers	 from	 other	 euro	 area	members	 or	 debt	 has	 to	 be	
restructured.	 So	 far	EU	 law	has	 explicitly	excluded	bailouts	but,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	has	
shown	 no	 explicit	 interest	 in	 other	 options.	 Negating	 a	 solution	 based	 on	 transfers	
without	 offering	 a	 perspective	 on	 debt	 restructuring	 is	 a	 major	 inconsistency	 in	 the	
institutional	framework	of	the	euro	area.	
Opponents	of	statutory	 insolvency	procedures	argue	that	an	 insolvency	procedure	
would	unduly	limit	market	participants	(Gianviti	et	al.,	2010).	According	to	this	view,	the	
recommendation	of	non‐binding	‘Codes	of	Good	Conduct’	for	creditors	and	borrowers	or	
an	agreement	on	CAC	(collective	action	clauses)	in	bond	contracts	should	be	sufficient.	
However,	 solely	 relying	 on	 ad	 hoc	 solutions	 brings	 about	 challenges,	 which	 the	
proponents	of	euro	area	insolvency	procedures	stress	(see	for	similar	reasoning	Gianviti	
et	 al.,	 2010;	 Committee	 on	 International	 Economic	 Policy	 and	 Reform,	 2013;	 Mody,	
2013).	
Nowadays,	public	debt	is	predominantly	financed	through	bonds,	which	are	held	by	
a	 large	 number	 of	 dispersed	 investors.	 This	 makes	 ad	 hoc	 negotiations	 between	 the	
borrower	 and	 the	 numerous	 creditors	 difficult	 and	 time‐consuming.	 Collective	 action	
problems	 are	 notorious	 in	 this	 context.	 A	 first	 problem	 of	 that	 kind	 is	 related	 to	 the	
																																																								
65	If	one	accepts	the	notion	that	multiple	equilibria	can	drive	solvent	countries	into	illiquidity	this	insight	
does	 not	 negate	 the	 possibility	 of	 fundamental	 insolvency.	 However,	 the	 empirical	 distinction	 between	
illiquidity	in	a	‘bad’	equilibrium	and	fundamental	insolvency	is	difficult	in	reality.	An	insolvency	procedure	
has	to	deal	with	this	difficulty.	VIPS	takes	account	of	this	challenge	through	its	‘shelter	period’:	see	section	
6.4.	
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downward	 dynamics	 in	 an	 acute	 debt	 crisis:	 without	 an	 insolvency	 procedure	 which	
equates	losses	for	all	creditors	(and	hence	equates	ex	ante	risks	for	investors),	there	is	a	
detrimental	 first	mover	 advantage	 (Roubini	 and	 Setser,	 2004).	 By	 contrast,	 a	 defined	
procedure	 offers	 the	 prospect	 that,	 in	 case	 of	 illiquidity,	 rules	 will	 ensure	 equal	
treatment	of	creditors.	This	prospect	can	be	a	stabilizing	factor	in	itself.	
Pre‐defined	procedures	can	also	address	a	second	collective	action	problem:	In	ad	
hoc	negotiations,	single	creditors	have	an	incentive	to	refuse	a	debt	settlement	(holdout	
problem).	The	underlying	coordination	problem	creates	costly	uncertainties	and	delays	
(IMF,	2013;	Krueger,	2002).	
CACs,	 which	 state	 that	 a	 qualified	 majority	 of	 bondholders’	 capital	 can	 take	
decisions	 binding	 for	 all	 bondholders,	 may	 alleviate	 but	 not	 necessarily	 solve	 these	
collective	action	problems	entirely.	Even	with	 limited	capital,	holdout	strategists	could	
buy	 majorities	 (or	 blocking	 minorities)	 of	 single	 bond	 issues	 and	 litigate	 for	 full	
repayment.	Assuming	that	this	problem	could	be	tackled	through	aggregation	clauses	in	
CACs,66	these	clauses	still	do	not	offer	any	hint	as	to	the	trigger	of	restructuring,	the	time	
perspective	of	negotiations,	the	expected	loss	in	case	these	clauses	were	to	be	used,	or	
ways	 of	 interim	 financing	 during	 negotiations.	 In	 sum,	 improved	 CACs	 may	 be	 a	
reasonable	complement	to	a	full	insolvency	procedure	but	they	are	no	substitute.	
While	 the	 aforementioned	 aspects	 apply	 to	 any	 regional	 context,	 the	 specific	
circumstances	and	recent	experiences	of	the	euro	area	strengthen	the	case	for	a	defined	
procedure	 even	 more.	 The	 Greek	 insolvency	 became	 obvious	 in	 2010.	 At	 that	 time,	
bondholders	had	no	information	about	applicable	procedures,	 the	realistic	final	 loss	 in	
case	of	a	Greek	default,	or	the	time	perspective	for	a	settlement.	This	uncertainty	created	
a	massive	rush	to	the	exit,	with	immediate	contagion	to	other	country	segments	in	the	
euro	area	government	bond	markets.	
The	fact	that	PSI	(private	sector	involvement)	was	eventually	achieved	for	Greece	in	
2012	hardly	points	toward	the	merits	of	ad	hoc	negotiations	(Zettelmeyer	et	al.,	2013).	
The	 long	delay	between	 the	point	 in	 time	at	which	Greece	 lost	 its	bond	market	access	
and	 the	 implementation	 of	 PSI	 was	 effectively	 financed	 by	 taxpayers	 in	 other	 euro	
																																																								
66	With	current	euro	area	CACs,	which	became	mandatory	as	of	1	January	2013	in	all	newly	issued	euro	
area	 government	 bonds	with	 a	maturity	of	 over	one	 year,	 not	 only	 a	majority	 of	 75	per	 cent	of	 capital	
invested	 in	 the	 aggregate	but	 also	 an	additional	majority	of	 at	 least	 two	 thirds	 in	 each	 individual	bond	
have	 to	be	achieved	(see	Zettelmeyer	et	al.,	2013).	With	 this	weak	 feature	of	a	double	majority,	vulture	
funds	 could	 still	 easily	 accumulate	 bond	 volumes	 amounting	 to	 a	 blocking	 minority	 for	 a	 single	 issue	
which	leaves	the	collective	action	problem	as	described	rather	unsolved.	
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countries.	Maturing	Greek	bonds	and	the	continuing	primary	deficit	were	covered	by	the	
new	European	 loan	 facilities.	 The	 long‐lasting	uncertainties	 about	 a	 sustainable	Greek	
debt	settlement	added	to	the	dramatic	and	persistent	decline	of	the	real	economy.	
Apart	 from	 the	Greek	 experience,	 general	 features	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 underline	 the	
need	 for	 well‐defined	 procedures	 (Gianviti	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 European	 conditions	 are	
characterized	by	high	real	and	financial	integration,	very	high	public	debt	levels	(relative	
to	world	 GDP)	 and	 a	 particular	 investor	 structure	 (with	 a	 heavy	 involvement	 of	 euro	
area	 financial	 institutions).	 All	 of	 these	 features	 increase	 both	 the	 risks	 and	 the	
complexities	 of	 any	 attempts	 at	 ad	 hoc	 restructurings.	 Therefore,	 relatively	 favorable	
experiences	with	ad	hoc	negotiations	 in	 the	cases	of	 insolvent	developing	or	emerging	
economies	(Das	et	al.,	2012)	are	unlikely	to	apply	in	the	euro	area.	
A	key	political	argument	put	forward	against	a	global	insolvency	procedure	like	the	
SDRM	 (Sovereign	 Debt	 Restructuring	 Mechanism,	 see	 below)	 is	 the	 decisive	 role	 of	
multilateral	 institutions	 like	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	 implied	 reduction	 of	 national	 autonomy.	
Such	 arguments	 are	 significantly	 less	 relevant	 in	 the	 institutional	 context	 of	 the	
European	 Union	 and	 the	 euro	 area	 (Gianviti	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 In	 the	 ongoing	 process	 of	
integration,	member	 countries	have	already	 transferred	 substantial	 sovereignty	 to	 the	
European	level.	At	this	advanced	stage	of	integration	it	would	be	a	natural	further	step	
that	a	European	institution	plays	a	prominent	role	in	an	insolvency	procedure.	
6.3 Survey	of	Proposals	for	Sovereign	Insolvency	Procedures	
The	 design	 of	 insolvency	 procedures	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 proposals	 for	 statutory	
restructuring	procedures	for	developing	countries,	which	have	been	put	 forward	since	
the	 1980s	 (for	 surveys	 see	 e.g.	 Rogoff	 and	 Zettelmeyer,	 2002;	 Das	 et al.,	 2012;	 IMF,	
2013).	
	
SDRM	(Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring	Mechanism)	
A	 milestone	 in	 the	 debate,	 and	 the	 most	 prominent	 model	 so	 far,	 is	 the	 SDRM	
(Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring	Mechanism)	developed	by	Anne	O.	Krueger	(2002).	The	
SDRM	 was	 supposed	 to	 be	 established	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 IMF.	 However,	 the	
amendment	to	the	IMF’s	Articles	of	Agreement,	which	had	already	been	accepted	by	its	
board	of	governors,	was	never	implemented	(see	Gianviti	et	al.,	2010,	for	a	summary	of	
the	debate	over	this	proposal).	The	IMF	(2013)	argues	that	the	necessary	majority	for	an	
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amendment	could	not	be	achieved	because	many	 IMF	members	 (including	 the	US	and	
important	 emerging	 market	 economies)	 were	 not	 willing	 to	 give	 up	 the	 degree	 of	
sovereignty	needed	to	establish	such	a	framework.	
Krueger	 (2002)	 proposes	 four	 main	 elements	 of	 an	 SDRM	 to	 warrant	 equal	
treatment	of	all	creditors	and	preserve	asset	values.	First	of	all,	and	most	 importantly,	
she	 stresses	 the	 necessity	 of	 majority	 decisions	 (including	 aggregation	 across	 debt	
instruments)	to	overcome	the	collective	action	problem.	Second,	Krueger	calls	for	a	stay	
on	creditor	enforcement	as	well	as	payment	moratoria	while	negotiations	are	underway,	
in	order	to	ensure	that	these	negotiations	cannot	be	undermined	by	legal	actions	on	the	
part	of	 single	 creditors.	Third,	 creditor	 interests	must	be	protected	by	prohibiting	 the	
servicing	 of	 any	 junior	 claims.	 Fourth,	 any	 potential	 provision	 of	 new	 money	 during	
negotiations	 should	 be	 facilitated	 and	 incentivized	 by	 ensuring	 that	 these	 new	 credit	
lines	would	be	senior	to	all	pre‐existing	debt.	Through	the	implementation	of	the	SDRM,	
the	 IMF	 was	 to	 become	 the	 main	 institution	 for	 supervising	 and	 financing	 debt	
restructurings.	The	transition	process	toward	full	implementation	did	not	receive	much	
attention	in	the	SDRM	proposal.	When	designing	the	SDRM,	the	focus	was	on	developing	
and	emerging	countries,	where	the	perspective	of	debt	restructuring	is	less	sensitive	for	
global	systemic	stability	than	in	the	case	of	euro	area	countries.	
By	its	nature,	the	SDRM	does	not	take	into	account	the	specific	European	conditions.	
Nevertheless,	many	proposals	for	the	European	context,	including	VIPS,	refer	to	original	
ideas	of	the	SDRM.	Naturally,	the	earlier	proposals	could	have	been	more	creative	with	
respect	to	institution‐building	while	the	more	recent	ones	then	took	newly	established	
institutions	 such	 as	 the	 ESM	 as	 given	 and	 as	 a	 building	 block	 for	 an	 insolvency	
procedure.	
 
EMF	(European	Monetary	Fund)	
Gros	and	Mayer	(2010)	propose	the	establishment	of	an	EMF	(European	Monetary	
Fund),	 which	 is	 supposed	 to	 provide	 conditional	 guarantees	 or	 loans	 to	 countries	 in	
need	 and	 manage	 a	 potential	 restructuring	 of	 the	 sovereign	 debt	 in	 question.	 Euro	
countries	 would	 capitalize	 the	 fund	 through	 weighted	 contributions	 which	 would	
increase	 with	 the	 debt	 and	 deficit‐to‐GDP	 levels	 once	 they	 violated	 the	 Maastricht	
criteria.	 Countries	 facing	 illiquidity,	 in	 a	 first	 step,	 could	 obtain	 EMF	 funds	 up	 to	 the	
amount	 they	 had	 contributed	 if	 their	 fiscal	 adjustment	 program	 had	 previously	 been	
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approved	by	the	Eurogroup.	In	a	second	step,	the	country	could	call	on	more	funds	if	it	
agreed	 to	 a	 customized	 adjustment	program	 supervised	by	 the	European	Commission	
and	the	Eurogroup.	
In	 the	 case	 that	 none	 of	 the	 liquidity	 aid	 measures	 were	 effective,	 the	 proposal	
would	allow	for	the	restructuring	of	sovereign	debt.	The	haircut	should	reduce	the	debt	
level	 to	 the	 Maastricht	 level	 of	 60	 percent	 of	 GDP.	 The	 remaining	 debt	 would	 be	
guaranteed	by	exchanging	national	debt	against	claims	on	the	EMF,	which	would	follow	
the	construction	of	Brady	bonds	and	which	would	credibly	limit	the	losses	of	investors.	
The	proposal	does	not	suggest	specific	precautions	against	the	holdout	problem	and	
litigation.	It	does	not	refer	to	the	transition	problem,	either.	However,	restructuring	with	
the	 help	 of	 the	 EMF	 could	 only	 take	 place	 in	 the	 future,	 i.e.	 once	 the	 members’	
contributions	have	capitalized	the	funds	of	the	EMF	to	a	sufficient	degree.	
	
ECRM	(European	Crisis	Resolution	Mechanism)	
The	ECRM	(European	Crisis	Resolution	Mechanism)	proposed	 in	2010	(Gianviti	et	
al.,	2010)	has	much	in	common	with	the	SDRM	but	adapts	it	to	European	requirements.	
It	 consists	of	 four	main	elements.	 First,	 euro	area	members	would	have	 to	 agree	on	a	
procedure	to	initiate	negotiations	between	creditors	and	the	debtor	country.	Second,	the	
decisions	made	by	a	qualified	majority	of	the	capital	(aggregated	across	all	debt	issues	in	
question)	would	be	binding	for	all	creditors.	Third,	negotiations	should	be	supervised	or	
moderated	by	a	politically	independent	judicial	body.	The	authors	propose	establishing	
a	new	chamber	at	the	European	Court	of	 Justice	for	this	 ‘first	body’.	The	 ‘second	body’	
would	provide	analytical	and	financial	assistance.	These	responsibilities	could	be	taken	
up	by	the	European	Commission	for	the	analytical	part	and	by	a	permanent	version	of	
the	EFSF	for	the	financial	assistance	aspect	(which	would	now	be	the	ESM).	The	ECRM	
proposal	 does	 not	 contain	 any	 detailed	 discussion	 about	 the	 extent	 of	 restructurings.	
Furthermore,	 the	 ECRM	 does	 not	 pay	 any	 attention	 to	 the	 challenges	 of	 transition	
toward	the	new	regime	either.	
	
EEAG	Proposal	for	a	New	Crisis	Mechanism	for	the	Euro	Area	
In	 2011,	 the	 EEAG	 (European	 Economic	 Advisory	 Group,	 2011)	 suggested	 a	 new	
crisis	mechanism	for	 the	euro	area.	As	the	establishment	of	 the	ESM	was	underway	at	
the	time,	 the	EEAG	saw	the	ESM	as	the	central	 institution	to	provide	rescue	 funds	and	
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supervise	 fiscal	 adjustment	 programs.	 Their	 proposal	 of	 a	 three‐stage	 procedure	 for	
Eurozone	members	in	financial	distress	refers	to	different	degrees	of	crises.	
In	case	of	(short‐term)	‘illiquidity’	–	i.e.	in	the	expectation	that	a	country	will	be	able	
to	 refinance	 itself	 at	 acceptable	 conditions	 in	 the	 near	 future	 –	 a	 euro	 area	 member	
country	should	be	supported	by	means	of	short‐term	loans	with	a	maximum	maturity	of	
two	years	provided	by	the	ESM.	The	maximum	volume	should	only	cover	a	deficit	that	is	
in	line	with	the	Maastricht	criteria	and	the	country	would	have	to	undergo	fiscal	reforms	
in	order	to	balance	its	budget.	After	having	received	two	years	of	fiscal	aid,	the	country	
would	 not	 be	 eligible	 for	 assistance	 throughout	 the	 following	 five	 years.	 Should	 it	
nevertheless	need	new	funds,	it	would	have	to	declare	‘pending	insolvency’	and	thereby	
would	reach	the	next	step.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 ‘pending	 insolvency’	 the	 authors	 first	 rely	 on	 a	 market	 solution.	
However,	 in	 order	 to	 make	 this	 solution	 viable,	 all	 bonds	 should	 contain	 CACs	 with	
aggregation	rules	in	order	to	overcome	the	collective	action	problem.	The	country	would	
have	 to	 negotiate	 a	 debt	 restructuring	 program	with	 its	 private	 creditors.	 In	 the	 case	
that	 no	 agreement	 could	 be	 reached,	 the	 ESM,	 ECB	 (European	Central	 Bank)	 and	 IMF	
would	be	called	into	the	negotiation	process.	In	this	situation,	however,	there	would	be	
an	automatic	haircut	in	the	nominal	value	of	the	bond.	Only	the	size	of	the	haircut	would	
be	subject	to	negotiation;	in	any	case	it	should	amount	to	at	least	20	percent	and	at	most	
50	percent	 of	 the	 debt	 affected.	 Just	 like	Gros	 and	Mayer	 (2010),	 the	EEAG	 advocates	
Brady	bond	type	guarantees	by	the	ESM	of	up	to	80	percent	of	the	new	nominal	value.	
The	 maximum	 exposure	 of	 the	 ESM	 should,	 however,	 amount	 to	 only	 half	 of	 the	
Maastricht	debt	ratio,	i.e.	to	30	percent	of	GDP.	
In	the	face	of	‘actual	insolvency’,	i.e.	if	the	country	was	still	not	able	to	refinance	its	
debt	 on	 the	 market	 at	 acceptable	 conditions	 after	 a	 three‐year	 adjustment	 period,	 it	
would	have	 to	declare	an	outright	debt	moratorium	for	all	of	 its	outstanding	debt	and	
renegotiate	all	outstanding	private	debt.	At	this	stage,	the	ESM	would	no	longer	provide	
financial	assistance.	
Details	 of	 a	 transition	 period	 are	 not	 specified	 in	 the	 proposal.	 However,	 the	
proposal	acknowledges	the	fact	that	the	banking	sector	may	still	not	be	able	to	absorb	
large	debt	reductions	for	the	time	being.	
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ESDRR	(European	Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring	Regime)	
The	 ESDRR	 (European	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Restructuring	 Regime)	 suggested	 by	 the	
Committee	on	International	Economic	Policy	and	Reform	(2013)	takes	advantage	of	the	
newly	 implemented	 institutional	 framework	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
permanent	 ESM.	 Unlike	 earlier	 designs	 it	 contains	 well‐elaborated	 legal	 details	 and	
precautions	against	holdout	investors.	The	authors	suggest	defining	the	new	procedure	
through	an	(already	pre‐formulated)	ESM	Treaty	change	and	assigning	a	central	role	to	
the	restructuring	procedure	including	liquidity	aid	by	the	ESM.	
Countries	with	a	debt‐to‐GDP	ratio	of	up	 to	60	percent	 (i.e.	 those	 in	 line	with	 the	
Maastricht	criteria)	which	were	to	face	illiquidity	would	receive	unconditional	liquidity	
aid	 from	 the	 ESM.	 Those	 countries	 with	 a	 debt‐to‐GDP	 ratio	 of	 60–90	 percent	 would	
receive	 conditional	 funding	 and	 would	 quasi‐automatically	 have	 to	 restructure	 their	
debt	 if	 the	debt	 sustainability	 analysis	 suggested	outright	 insolvency.	 Countries	 facing	
illiquidity/insolvency	and	having	a	debt‐to‐GDP	ratio	of	over	90	percent	would	receive	
funding	only	after	a	prior	(automatic)	restructuring	had	taken	place.	Any	restructuring	
should	result	in	a	debt‐to‐GDP	ratio	below	90	percent.	
The	ESM	Treaty	change	would	offer	reliable	protection	against	holdouts	by	granting	
the	 assets	 and	 revenue	 streams	 of	 ESM	 program	 countries	 immunity	 from	 judicial	
processes,	 recommended	 previously	 (Buchheit	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Krueger,	 2002).	
Furthermore	the	treaty	change	would	comprise	a	supermajority	rule	according	to	which	
75	 percent	 consent	 of	 bondholders’	 capital	 aggregated	 across	 all	 issues	 would	 be	 a	
condition	for	an	ESM‐endorsed	restructuring.	
Compared	 to	 preceding	 proposals,	 the	 ESDRR	 has	 been	 developed	 with	 full	
awareness	 of	 the	 transition	 problem.	 The	 authors	 expect	 that,	 in	 the	 short	 run,	 their	
mechanism	would	 trigger	 immediate	 instability,	and	therefore	explicitly	consider	 their	
model	to	be	only	a	long‐term	solution.	
The	ESDRR,	with	its	detailed	legal	provisions	and	the	mentioned	awareness	of	the	
transition	problem,	advances	the	literature.	However,	it	does	not	yet	offer	a	strategy	on	
how	to	cope	with	time‐inconsistency	problems,	which	arise	due	to	the	postponement	of	
the	reform	up	to	an	uncertain	date.	
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Contingent	Convertible	Bonds	
The	procedures	described	 above	 rely	 on	 ex	post	negotiations	which	 are	 to	define	
the	conditions	of	a	restructuring	after	insolvency	occurs.	A	different	strand	of	proposals	
targets	ex	ante	rules	embedded	 in	government	bond	contracts.	Contingent	convertible	
bonds	 (‘cocos’)	 would	 automatize	 restructurings	 conditional	 on	 certain	 quantified	
criteria	(mainly	public	debt‐to‐GDP	thresholds).	They	have	been	suggested	by	Barkbu	et	
al.	(2012)	in	a	global	and	by	Mody	(2013)	in	a	European	context.	Cocos	have	the	obvious	
merit	 that	 they	 offer	 a	 swift	 and	 clearly	 predictable	 outcome	 once	 the	 contractual	
threshold	is	reached.	However,	an	ex	ante‐defined	formula	can	hardly	be	fully	sufficient	
for	all	types	of	solvency	shocks	which	a	country	may	face.	Hence,	cocos	can	be	regarded	
as	 a	 natural	 complement	 rather	 than	 a	 full	 substitute	 for	 a	 comprehensive	 insolvency	
procedure.	
6.4 VIPS:	Liquidity	Provision	and	Insolvency	Procedure	
VIPS	 shares	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 proposals	 described	 above	 that,	 under	 the	
conditions	 of	 EMU,	 a	 defined	 insolvency	 procedure	 is	 superior	 to	 reliance	 on	 ad	 hoc	
negotiations.	 It	 furthermore	 recommends	 a	 particular	 European	 approach	 for	 such	 a	
procedure.	An	international,	IMF‐centered	setup	could	serve	a	similar	function	and	may,	
compared	 to	a	European	solution,	have	advantages.	 It	might	be	 less	 susceptible	 to	 the	
special	 interests	 of,	 e.g.,	 European	 banks.	 However,	 the	 failure	 to	 establish	 SDRM	
indicates	 that	 such	 an	 international	 system	 is	 not	 available	 for	 the	 foreseeable	 future,	
whereas	recent	European	innovations	such	as	the	ESM	offer	a	promising	starting	point	
for	the	establishment	of	a	comprehensive	insolvency	procedure.	Finally,	VIPS	follows	the	
assessment	 in	 the	 ESDRR	 proposal	 (also	 put	 forward	 by	 Mody,	 2013)	 that	 the	
establishment	of	any	insolvency	procedure	is	a	risky	phase.	
VIPS	 tackles	 this	 difficulty	 through	 lagged	 implementation:	 the	 details	 of	 an	
insolvency	procedure	are	defined	today,	but	the	procedure	will	only	become	effective	‘in	
the	long	run’.	To	this	end,	VIPS	comprises	two	components:	first,	a	design	of	a	sovereign	
insolvency	 procedure	 which	 is	 to	 be	 established	 in	 the	 future;	 second,	 an	 explicit	
transition	 path,	 the	 ‘VIPS	 bridge’,	 into	 the	 ‘long‐run’	 stage.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	 first	
present	the	description	of	the	ultimate	regime	and	then	we	provide	details	on	the	bridge	
in	the	next	section.	
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When	designing	an	insolvency	procedure	for	sovereigns	the	following	fundamental	
decisions	have	 to	be	 taken:	The	procedure	must	 comprise	 a	 trigger	which	defines	 the	
conditions	 under	 which	 the	 procedure	 is	 activated.	 It	 must	 define	 rules	 and	 set	 up	
institutions	for	the	subsequent	negotiations	comprising	the	provision	of	liquidity	in	the	
negotiation	phase.	Specifically,	the	procedure	should	define	how	a	decision	on	a	haircut	
is	to	be	taken	and	whether	quantitative	criteria	can	be	defined	to	determine	the	extent	
of	a	debt	restructuring.	Furthermore,	the	insolvency	procedure	must	minimize	the	risk	
of	 lengthy	and	 costly	 litigation.	The	VIPS	 insolvency	procedure	 tackles	 these	 issues	 as	
shown	in	Figure	6.1.	
 
Figure	6.1:	VIPS	–	The	Long‐Run	Insolvency	Procedure	
This	figure	illustrates	the	timing	of	events	once	the	long‐run	insolvency	procedure	of	the	VIPS‐framework	
would	be	in	place	and	a	country	would	seek	liquidity	assistance.		
 
	
Trigger	
Any	euro	area	member	state	could	continue	to	rely	on	ESM	assistance	according	to	
the	 rules	 as	 they	 exist	 today,	 i.e.	 loans	 conditional	 on	 consolidation	 and	 reform	
measures.	Unlike	today,	the	ESM	would	be	the	only	source	of	emergency	liquidity.	The	
ECB	would	be	relieved	from	backing	the	system	up	with	its	controversial	OMT	program,	
which	 comes	 close	 to	 the	 monetary	 financing	 of	 governments	 prohibited	 by	 the	
Maastricht	constitution.	A	further	major	difference	compared	to	the	current	situation	is	
that,	under	the	VIPS	rules,	ESM	assistance	would	be	strictly	limited	to	a	period	of	three	
years,	the	‘shelter	period’.	A	time	limit	of	that	sort	was	suggested	by	Fuest	(2011)	and	is	
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also	roughly	in	line	with	the	EEAG	proposal	(which	suggests	two	years).	It	proved	to	be	
reasonable	 in	 the	course	of	 the	euro	area	debt	crisis.	Three	years	were	sufficient	 for	a	
country	 such	 as	 Ireland	 to	 launch	 substantial	 reforms,	 to	 leave	ESM	assistance	 and	 to	
return	to	the	bond	markets	for	new	loans.	Subsequent	to	the	shelter	period,	the	debtor	
country	 has	 to	 choose	 between	 returning	 to	 the	market	 and	 initiating	 the	 insolvency	
procedure.	If	the	country	does	not	consider	market	conditions	for	new	bond	issues	to	be	
acceptable,	the	only	remaining	option	is	to	trigger	the	opening	of	the	procedure	with	the	
objective	of	restructuring	 its	debt.	The	scheme	would	hardly	encourage	a	reckless	and	
‘too	early’	use	of	the	insolvency	procedure	as	an	easy	escape	from	high	debt	levels.	The	
conditionality	 of	 the	 ESM’s	 liquidity	 assistance	 will	 indeed	 prevent	 any	 precipitous	
application	 for	 funds	 because	 it	 always	 comes	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 a	 substantial	 loss	 of	
autonomy.	While	a	 country	 is	allowed	 to	 leave	 the	ESM	shelter	earlier	 than	 the	 three‐
year	period	to	return	to	the	market,	it	may	only	seek	restructuring	after	full	compliance	
with	all	conditions	of	ESM	aid	over	the	full	three‐year	duration.	This	precaution	excludes	
the	 risk	of	debtor	moral	hazard	and	a	 too	quick	and	convenient	way	out	of	high	debt.	
Equally,	the	defined	rules	for	the	strict	upper	limit	of	three	years	for	the	shelter	period	
would	address	the	converse	problem	that	insolvency	procedures	are	often	triggered	‘too	
late’	(IMF,	2013).	
The	 shelter	 period	 has	 several	 further	 merits.	 It	 prevents	 short‐run	 market	
turbulences	from	forcing	an	immediate	debt	restructuring;	thus,	 it	 limits	the	damaging	
potential	of	a	temporary	bad	equilibrium	driven	by	market	panics.	Moreover,	the	shelter	
period	can	lead	to	higher	availability	of	information	on	the	fundamental	situation	of	the	
debtor	 country,	 which	 will	 make	 multiple	 equilibria	 less	 likely	 and,	 hence,	 reduce	
uncertainty	(Morris	and	Shin,	2001).	
The	 time	 limit	 prevents	 a	 system	designed	primarily	 for	 liquidity	 assistance	 from	
degenerating	 into	a	permanent	 transfer	mechanism.	Moreover,	 the	 shelter	period	also	
helps	 to	 clarify	 the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 an	 acute	 liquidity	 problem.	 In	 reality,	 it	 is	
difficult	 to	 theoretically	distinguish	between	a	 situation	of	panic‐driven	 illiquidity	 and	
fundamental	 insolvency.	 If	 this	decision	was	based	on	a	 simple	debt‐to‐GDP	 threshold	
like	 in	 other	 proposals,	 it	 would	 be	 arbitrary	 and	 might	 provoke	 premature	
restructurings.	 The	 temporary	 protection	 over	 three	 years	 provided	 in	 the	 VIPS	
procedure	 would	 be	 highly	 informative.	 If	 a	 government,	 in	 spite	 of	 three	 years	 of	
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assistance,	was	unable	to	return	to	the	market,	this	could	be	seen	as	a	strong	indication	
of	fundamental	insolvency.	
Finally,	 the	shelter	period	would	reduce	the	risk	of	contagion	(Fuest,	2011).	 If	 the	
activation	of	the	insolvency	procedure	for	one	country	is	seen	as	a	precedent	for	other	
euro	 countries	 some	 time	 thereafter,	 these	other	 countries	 could	benefit	 from	 the	 full	
shelter	 period	 themselves.	 Hence,	 the	 occurrence	 of	 multiple	 simultaneous	
restructurings	and	the	resulting	massive	stress	for	financial	stability	could	be	avoided.	
	
Negotiations	
In	 the	 VIPS	 design,	 the	 ESM	 is	 the	 institution	 responsible	 for	 moderating	
negotiations.	For	that	purpose,	the	ESM	establishes	and	heads	a	committee	composed	of	
representatives	from	the	debtor	country	and	the	group	of	creditors.	The	ESM	must	have	
veto	power	in	all	restructuring	decisions	since	its	own	loans	from	the	shelter	period	are	
also	at	stake.	Through	the	ESM	the	interests	of	all	guarantors	(all	euro	member	states)	
are	represented.	The	ESM	may	rely,	for	all	negotiations	and	underlying	analyses,	on	the	
support	of	 the	 ‘Troika’	 (European	Central	Bank,	European	Commission	and	 IMF),	 as	 it	
does	today.	Continuing	involvement	of	the	International	Monetary	Fund	is	not	required	
for	 the	 procedure	 but	 may	 be	 desirable	 due	 to	 the	 Fund’s	 expertise.	 Here,	 the	 VIPS	
design	 is	 open	 for	 a	 differentiated	 institutional	 structure	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 ECRM	
proposal,	 which	 envisages	 different	 bodies.	 While	 the	 ESM	 is	 the	 body	 providing	
financial	 assistance,	 and	 also	 the	natural	 candidate	 to	moderate	 negotiations,	 the	ECB	
and	the	European	Commission	would	be	the	natural	candidates	to	take	up	the	analytical	
responsibility.	
The	start	of	the	procedure	has	the	following	consequences,	which	correspond	to	the	
main	elements	of	insolvency	procedures	such	as	the	SDRM	proposal,	with	the	difference	
that	the	ESM	steps	in	for	the	IMF	in	the	SDRM	blueprint:	
‐ When	 starting	 negotiations,	 an	 immediate	moratorium	on	 the	 debtor	 country’s	
debt	 service	 takes	 effect	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 collective	 of	
creditors.	Such	a	standstill	on	private	and	public	investors	could	be	made	legally	
binding	for	all	debt	contracts	issued	in	euro	area	jurisdictions.67	
																																																								
67	Buchheit	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 formulate	 a	 potential	 amendment	 to	 the	 Treaty	 Establishing	 the	 European	
Stability	Mechanism,	which	has	also	been	 taken	up	by	 the	Committee	on	 International	Economic	Policy	
and	Reform	(2013).	
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‐ The	ESM	(possibly	assisted	by	 the	Troika)	 is	 responsible	 for	 supervision	of	 the	
debtor	country	in	order	to	prevent	it	from	impairing	the	value	of	its	assets.	
‐ During	the	negotiation	phase,	the	ESM	provides	the	liquidity	which	is	necessary	
to	 guarantee	 basic	 governmental	 functions.	 The	 extent	 of	 this	 intermediate	
financing	 is	 defined	 in	 a	 bilateral	 agreement	 between	 the	 ESM	 and	 the	 debtor	
country.	The	maximum	duration	of	this	liquidity	assistance	is	12	months,	which,	
consequently,	is	also	the	maximum	time	span	that	restructuring	negotiations	may	
last.	
	
Extent	of	Restructuring	
A	pre‐defined	mechanical	formula	for	the	extent	of	a	haircut	is	neither	realistic	nor	
conceptually	convincing.	Restructuring	negotiations	are	subject	to	a	complicated	trade‐
off:	too	modest	debt	relief	may	prevent	the	debtor	country	from	returning	to	the	bond	
market	 and	 a	 too	 generous	 haircut	 would	 unduly	 impair	 the	 interests	 of	 creditors.	
During	 the	negotiations,	 it	 is	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	ESM	 (with	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	
Troika)	to	strike	the	right	balance	between	these	two	extremes	and	take	account	of	the	
economic	conditions	of	each	single	case.	
However,	an	insolvency	procedure	can	offer	a	more	effective	expectation	anchor	if	it	
includes	a	rule	which	indicates	the	possible	maximum	loss.	Similar	to	the	EMF	proposal,	
the	following	rule	should	be	enshrined	in	the	VIPS	procedure:	under	no	circumstances	
should	 the	debt	settlement	push	the	debt‐to‐GDP	ratio	below	the	Maastricht	reference	
value	 of	 60	 percent.	 Haircuts	 which	 leave	 subsequent	 debt	 levels	 above	 60	 percent	
should	remain	possible	if	the	debtor	country	is	deemed	to	be	solvent	with	higher	debt	
levels,	for	example	due	to	a	favorable	growth	perspective	or	high	assets.	Linking	VIPS	to	
the	Maastricht	debt‐to‐GDP	reference	value	would	not	only	stabilize	expectations	of	the	
maximum	loss	in	case	of	sovereign	insolvency;	it	would	also	increase	sensitivity	to	risk	
premia	and	increasing	debt	levels,	in	particular	for	levels	exceeding	the	60	percent	limit.	
Market	 discipline	 and	 the	 reformed	 SGP	 would	 then	 both	 consistently	 sanction	 debt	
levels	above	that	limit.		
ESM	 loans	 from	 the	 shelter	 period	 have	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 debt	 restructuring,	
which	is	a	fundamental	difference	compared	to	earlier	proposals	like	the	ESDRR	or	the	
EEAG	 proposal.	 We	 regard	 this	 taxpayer	 risk	 exposure	 as	 unavoidable.	 A	 preferred	
creditor	 status	 for	 ESM	 loans	 provided	 over	 the	 shelter	 period	 would	 damage	 the	
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stabilization	 chances	 of	 that	 construction.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 seniority	 of	 ESM	 claims,	 the	
quality	 of	 private	 loans	 to	 a	 crisis	 country	 would	 continuously	 deteriorate	 with	 the	
increasing	share	of	ESM	loans.	A	similar	problem	occurred	with	the	implicit	seniority	of	
Greek	bonds	purchased	by	the	ECB	since	2010	(which	actually	did	not	take	part	in	the	
PSI	in	2012;	see	Mody,	2013).	The	potential	losses	for	the	ESM	(and,	hence,	taxpayers)	
should,	 however,	 be	 limited	 by	 appropriate	 rules	 on	 the	 maturity	 structure	 of	
government	bonds,	which	would	limit	the	liquidity	needs	within	the	shelter	period	and	
also	 contain	 creditor	moral	 hazard.	 The	 latter	 issue	 arises	 since	 ESM	 financing	 offers	
insurance	 to	 investors	who	 then	 could	 expect	 to	 pass	 on	 their	 losses	 to	 the	 taxpayer	
during	the	ESM	shelter	period.	Obligatory	long	maturities	limit	this	problem.	Equally,	a	
requirement	of	a	minimum	share	of	‘cocos’	(see	section	6.3	above)	would	further	reduce	
the	 costs	and	disincentives	of	ESM	protection.	 Such	new	rules	would	hardly	 constrain	
the	politicians	currently	in	power	because	debt	contracts	would	only	be	penetrated	by	
these	features	over	time,	i.e.	they	can	only	be	phased	in	over	the	course	of	several	years.	
This	makes	severe	political	resistance	less	likely.	
The	waiver	 for	preferential	 treatment	 of	ESM	 loans	must	 only	be	 ensured	 for	 the	
loans	 from	 the	 shelter	 period,	 but	 not	 for	 the	 intermediate	 liquidity	 provided	
subsequently	 during	 the	 restructuring	 negotiations.	 These	 new	 loans	 should,	 in	 fact,	
have	 a	 preferred	 creditor	 status	 as	 they	 are	 provided	 only	 after	 the	 insolvency	
procedure	has	already	been	triggered	and	it	therefore	has	become	obvious	that	the	crisis	
country	does	not	suffer	from	a	mere	liquidity	crisis.	
	
Precautions	Against	Holdout	Investors	and	Litigation	
VIPS	minimizes	 the	 risks	 and	uncertainties	 from	 lengthy	 legal	 fights	with	holdout	
creditors	by	 installing	 two	precautions:	 first,	 the	obligatory	use	of	 refined	aggregation	
rules	 as	 an	 element	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 CACs;	 second,	 an	 adjustment	 of	 the	 ESM	 Treaty	
granting	immunity	of	program	countries’	assets	from	any	creditor	attachment,	thereby	
following	the	exact	route	of	the	ESDRR	strategy.	
Since	 1	 January	 2013,	 the	 ESM	 Treaty	 has	 mandated	 CACs	 for	 all	 newly	 issued	
government	 bonds	 of	 euro	 countries	 with	 a	 maturity	 above	 one	 year	 (Benzler	 et	 al.,	
2012;	 Buchheit,	 Gulati	 und	 Tirado,	 2013).	 These	 clauses	 state	 that	 majorities	 of	
bondholders	 are	 able	 to	 take	binding	 restructuring	decisions	 for	 all	 bondholders	with	
the	 intention	 to	 preclude	 holdout	 strategies.	 Standard	 CACs	 only	 define	majorities	 for	
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the	individual	bond	issue	and,	therefore,	are	hardly	effective	in	this	regard.	This	merely	
brings	the	holdout	problem	to	a	different	level	instead	of	solving	it	once	and	for	all.	Even	
with	 limited	 capital,	 holdout	 investors	 could	 still	 buy	 blocking	 minorities	 of	 single	
smaller	 bond	 issues	 and	 successfully	 proceed	with	 their	 strategy.	Aggregation	 clauses	
can	thwart	potential	holdouts	since	they	define	majorities	across	all	bond	issues	whose	
decisions	are	binding	for	each	single	issue.	With	the	current	euro	area	CACs,	not	only	a	
quorum	of	75	percent	of	capital	invested	in	the	aggregate	but	also	an	additional	majority	
of	 at	 least	 two	 thirds	 in	 each	 individual	 bond	 must	 be	 achieved	 (Zettelmeyer	 et	 al.,	
2013).	 With	 these	 weak	 features,	 vulture	 funds	 could	 still	 easily	 accumulate	 bond	
volumes	amounting	to	a	blocking	minority	for	a	single	issue.	
For	that	reason,	CACs	as	prescribed	in	the	ESM	Treaty	must	be	revised	to	a	stronger	
aggregation	 principle.	 Bond‐by‐bond	 quorums	 must	 be	 deleted	 completely	 with	 the	
aggregate	 quorum	 being	 the	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 binding	 creditor	
decisions,	 and	 the	 aggregate	 quorum	 should	 be	 reduced	 to	 two	 thirds	 of	 the	 capital	
invested.	Even	if	such	single	majority	aggregation	CACs	were	to	be	included	right	away,	
it	would	take	some	time	until	these	rules	penetrate	a	significant	amount	of	public	debt	
contracts.	Hence,	current	politicians	would	hardly	constrain	themselves.	
The	 risk	 that	 lawsuits	 against	 restructurings	 can	 be	 successful	 at	 courts	 in	 third	
countries	 (such	 as	 the	 US)	 or	would	 at	 least	 imply	 lengthy	 legal	 uncertainties	 can	 be	
addressed	 through	 a	 further	 adjustment	 of	 the	 ESM	 Treaty	 (Buchheit	 et	 al.,	 2013;	
Committee	 on	 International	 Economic	 Policy	 and	 Reform,	 2013).	 A	 new	 provision	
should	grant	 immunity	 from	creditor	attachments	 to	 the	assets	of	euro	area	countries	
which	 participate	 in	 an	 ESM	 supported	 adjustment	 program.68	Such	 an	 amendment	
would	be	sufficient	to	comprehensively	exclude	legal	risks.	
6.5 VIPS:	The	Bridge	
VIPS	would	expose	private	creditors	of	euro	countries	to	significant	potential	losses	
if	 these	 countries	 were	 to	 end	 up	 in	 insolvency.	 Hence,	 VIPS’	 prompt	 and	 full	
implementation	 would	 possibly	 cause	 concerns	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 euro	 area	
government	 bonds	 in	 general.	 This	 regime	 change	 could	 induce	 new	 turbulences	 and	
market	 panics,	 which	 might	 lead	 to	 a	 new	 acute	 debt	 crisis.	 Therefore,	 VIPS’	 full	
																																																								
68	See	Buchheit,	Gulati	and	Tirado	(2013,	p.	8)	for	a	precise	suggestion	for	the	wording	of	a	respective	new	
article	taken	up	by	the	Committee	on	International	Economic	Policy	and	Reform	(2013,	p.	40).	
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effectiveness	 requires	 an	 environment	 which	 is	 resilient	 and	 characterized	 in	 the	
following	way:	
‐ The	European	banking	union	needs	to	be	established	and	fully	operational.	
‐ Bank	 claims	 against	 sovereign	 debtors	 no	 longer	 benefit	 from	 regulatory	
privileges.	Claims	vis‐à‐vis	sovereigns	have	to	be	backed‐up	with	equity	just	like	
claims	vis‐à‐vis	private	debtors	(of	comparable	creditworthiness)	and	are	subject	
to	 the	 same	 rules	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 risk	 concentration	 (like	 upper	 limits	 on	
large	value	credits).	
‐ Fiscal	 recovery	 has	 made	 considerable	 progress.	 Debt‐to‐GDP	 ratios	 are	 down	
substantially	 compared	 to	 crisis	 levels	 and	 reach	maximum	values	 in	 the	 range	
between	60	percent	and	100	percent	for	the	most	compromised	countries.	
‐ The	remaining	public	debt	 is	 financed	with	 long	average	maturities.	As	a	result,	
the	 annual	 refinancing	 need	 of	 euro	 countries	 is	moderate.	 This	 long‐run	 debt	
structure	 limits	 the	 maximum	 credit	 volumes	 required,	 if	 ESM	 financing	 is	
needed	for	the	three‐year	shelter	period.	
‐ A	significant	part	of	(but	not	necessarily	the	total)	volume	of	debt	would	need	to	
be	penetrated	by	the	abovementioned	refined	CACs.	
‐ Monetary	 policy	 is	 disburdened	 from	 its	 controversial	 role	 in	 the	 provision	 of	
emergency	liquidity.	The	ECB’s	OMT	program	is	scrapped.	
	
In	such	an	environment,	 the	conditionality	of	ESM	 liquidity	 funding	as	well	as	 the	
maximum	 duration	 of	 the	 shelter	 period	would	 indeed	 be	 credible,	 because	 systemic	
risks	of	a	sovereign	debt	restructuring	at	the	end	of	the	shelter	period	would	be	reduced	
significantly	 and	 a	 perspective	 of	 monetary	 financing	 which	 could	 replace	 ESM	 loans	
would	no	longer	exist.	
Obviously,	 the	 current	 situation	 is	 still	 far	 from	 being	 shaped	 by	 such	 resilience.	
However,	 delaying	 any	 reform	 and	waiting	 for	 better	 times	 is	 no	 option,	 as	 lacking	 a	
procedure	 for	dealing	with	an	 insolvent	euro	member	country	 is	a	risk	 factor	 in	 itself.	
VIPS’	 solution	 for	 that	 dilemma	 is	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 lagged	 implementation	
through	the	construction	of	a	transition	path,	the	‘VIPS	bridge’.	Other	concepts	lack	this	
bridge.	Even	the	ESDRR,	which	pays	attention	to	the	transition	problem,	simply	delays	
any	 reform	 until	 the	 legacy	 debt	 problem	 has	 been	 dealt	 with	 (Committee	 on	
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International	Economic	Policy	and	Reform,	2013)	–	a	solution	which	would	obviously	be	
confronted	with	time‐inconsistency	problems	and	lack	of	credibility.	
By	contrast,	VIPS	pays	close	attention	to	the	time‐inconsistency	problem.	The	VIPS	
bridge	fosters	immediate	irreversibility	by	setting	the	course	for	the	new	regime	today.	
Such	a	model	of	lagged	implementation	creates	precedents	for	the	future	and	makes	use	
of	 the	 current	 crisis‐related	 opportunity	 to	 implement	 reforms	 (Buchanan,	 1994)	
without	destabilizing	the	currently	still	fragile	financial	situation.	
A	critical	condition	for	the	success	of	lagged	implementation	is	the	irreversibility	of	
the	 reform	 decision.	 With	 the	 approaching	 deadline	 for	 full	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 pre‐
announced	new	regime,	resistance	could	grow	and	finally	 impede	 full	 implementation.	
Against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 this	 strategic	 difficulty,	 VIPS	 offers	 the	 guarantees	 shown	 in	
Figure	6.2	as	a	bridge	into	the	long‐run	solution.	
 
Figure	6.2:	VIPS	–	The	Bridge	
This	 figure	 illustrates	 the	 transitory	phase	until	 the	 long‐run	 insolvency	procedure	of	 the	VIPS	 framework	
would	take	effect.	
 
 
The	insolvency	procedure,	as	described	in	the	preceding	section,	would	be	codified	
in	all	details	 through	an	amendment	of	 the	ESM	Treaty	 today.	 In	 this	amendment,	one	
article	would	stipulate	that	this	defined	insolvency	procedure	only	takes	effect	on	a	pre‐
specified	 date.	 Hence	 the	 phasing	 in	 of	 the	 new	 regime	 would	 be	 determined	 by	
international	 law	 and	 the	 unanimity	 requirement	 for	 any	 treaty	 changes	 offers	
protection	against	later	reversals.	
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The	 date	 for	 full	 implementation	 is	 to	 be	 defined	 in	 the	 following	way:	 The	 VIPS	
insolvency	regime	becomes	 fully	effective	no	 later	 than	a	 fixed	date	 (e.g.	 starting	with	
the	 year	 2030)	 or	 earlier,	 if	 the	 average	 euro	 area	 government	 debt‐to‐GDP	 ratio	 has	
fallen	 below	 a	 critical	 value	 (e.g.	 80	 percent	 from	 currently	 96	 percent)	 and	 the	
European	Resolution	Fund	for	banks	has	reached	a	certain	capitalization	level.	Further	
quantifiable	criteria	relating,	e.g.,	to	bank	capitalization	could	be	added.	It	is	crucial	that	
such	conditions	are	quantifiable	without	any	significant	margin	of	interpretation.	
The	 fixed	 date	 defines	 the	 latest	 possible	 date	 for	 the	 regime	 change.	 It	 has	 the	
function	of	a	fallback	condition	in	case	politicians	were	to	try	to	strategically	delay	the	
fulfilment	 of	 the	 quantifiable	 criteria.	 Criteria‐guided	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 insolvency	
procedure	 clearly	 is	 the	 preferable	 scenario.	 It	 would	 imply	 that	 the	 full	 VIPS	
implementation	 occurs	 in	 a	 friendly	 financial	 and	 fiscal	 environment.	 Times	 in	which	
public	debt	levels	fall	tend	to	be	times	in	which	government	bond	markets	are	stable.	
The	 transitory	 phase	 of	 the	 ESM	 Treaty	 change	 and	 the	 move	 toward	 final	 full	
effectiveness	of	VIPS	in	the	future	must	not	be	misunderstood	as	a	phase	during	which	
restructurings	of	sovereign	debt	are	precluded.	Certainly,	ad	hoc	restructurings	as	in	the	
case	 of	 Greece	 remain	 an	 available	 option	 throughout	 the	 transition	 path,	 which	 is	
defined	by	the	VIPS	bridge.	The	ESM	Treaty	change	must	avoid	any	contents	which	could	
be	mistaken	for	a	signal	 indicating	guarantees	against	restructurings	 in	 that	 transitory	
phase.69	Ad	hoc	restructurings	in	the	transitory	phase	may	also	be	used	to	apply	certain	
elements	of	the	long‐run	regime	such	as	giving	the	ESM	a	key	role	in	negotiations.	This	
would	allow	 for	 institutional	 learning	and	also	 contribute	 to	backing	 the	 credibility	of	
the	 future	regime	change.	However,	 the	ultimate	 frameworks	of	VIPS	can	only	be	 fully	
available	at	the	end	of	the	transitory	phase.	
Immediately	 changing	 the	 ESM	 Treaty	 would	 be	 an	 important,	 but	 not	 the	 only,	
precaution	 against	 the	 time‐inconsistency	 problem.	 Several	 accompanying	 measures	
would	 emphasize	 the	 irreversibility	 of	 the	 transition	 path	 starting	 from	 today.	 With	
immediate	effect,	 the	ESM	Treaty	 change	would	define	a	more	 convincing	aggregation	
clause	as	an	obligatory	element	of	the	euro	area	CACs	for	all	government	bonds	issued	in	
the	 future.	 The	 ESM	 Treaty	 change	 should	 also	 include	 precise	 prescriptions	 for	 the	
maturity	 structure	 of	 new	 government	 debt	 issues.	 The	 transitory	 phase	 toward	 full	
																																																								
69	In	this	regard,	no	grandfathering	clauses	for	bonds	issued	before	the	full	effectiveness	of	the	insolvency	
procedure	must	be	granted.	Once	the	 final	VIPS	provisions	were	 fully	effective,	all	 future	restructurings	
would	relate	to	all	outstanding	bonds.	
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VIPS	effectiveness	should	go	hand	in	hand	with	the	phasing‐out	of	regulatory	privileges	
for	sovereign	debtors	with	respect	to	bank	and	insurance	capital	requirements.	
Thus,	the	credibility	of	the	VIPS	bridge	is	firmly	grounded	on	two	pillars:	 first,	 the	
precise	 determination	 of	 full	 VIPS	 effectiveness	 through	 a	 change	 in	 the	 ESM	 Treaty	
which	 employs	 the	 commitment	 devices	 of	 international	 law;	 second,	 immediate	
reforms	which	already	launch	the	(quasi‐)	irreversible	regime	change.	
An	underlying	assumption	of	the	VIPS	bridge	is	that	the	state	of	public	finances	can	
be	improved	in	the	transitory	period	to	such	a	degree	that	euro	area	government	bond	
markets	will	finally	cope	with	the	regime	change.	VIPS	is	no	substitute	for	any	strategy	
which	 addresses	 excessive	 debt	 today.	 Possible	 strategies	 in	 this	 respect	 comprise	
perseverant	consolidation,	growth	policies,	financial	repression,	or	surprise	inflation.	In	
addition,	one‐off	measures	have	been	suggested	in	a	complementary	strand	of	literature	
which	 discusses	 the	 potential,	 e.g.,	 of	 a	 partial	 and	 transitory	 collectivization	 of	 debt	
through	a	European	Debt	Redemption	Fund	 (Sachverständigenrat,	2011,	pp.	109‐118)	
or	an	involvement	of	the	ECB	as	suggested	through	the	PADRE	plan	(Pâris	and	Wyplosz,	
2014).	A	successful	VIPS	bridge	requires	that,	in	the	meantime,	some	of	these	strategies	
or	a	combination	will	be	successful	to	bring	debt	levels	down	significantly.	
6.6 Conclusion	
VIPS	would	contribute	to	fostering	the	credibility	of	the	no‐bailout	clause	and	would	
countervail	the	deficit	bias	of	budgetary	decision‐making,	which	has	contributed	to	the	
pile‐up	of	unsustainable	government	debt	in	euro	area	countries.	It	would	build	a	bridge	
toward	a	more	consistent	institutional	architecture	for	the	euro	area.	
In	particular,	it	offers	a	model	to	deal	with	insolvent	member	countries	in	the	future	
while	paying	attention	to	the	current	fragility.	It	avoids	any	abrupt	institutional	change	
at	present,	but	does	not	simply	delay	reforms	 for	an	 indeterminate	duration.	 It	makes	
use	of	the	reform	momentum	of	the	current	crisis	to	initiate	a	cautious	but	steady	and	
irreversible	reform	transition.	And	with	respect	to	the	stuck	debate	on	an	international	
insolvency	procedure	governed	by	the	IMF,	VIPS	could	serve	as	a	blueprint	 for	a	more	
comprehensive	global	insolvency	system.	
Of	 course,	 chances	 for	 the	model’s	 political	 realization	 are	 uncertain.	 The	 current	
temporary	calming	of	the	situation	may	dampen	the	sense	of	urgency	and	therefore	the	
readiness	for	reforms.	Governments	are	always	reluctant	to	accept	reforms	which	would	
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increase	 financial	 market	 constraints	 for	 their	 borrowing.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 VIPS	
promotes	a	responsible	use	of	deficit	finance:	for	countries	with	sustainable	debt	levels,	
it	 offers	 reliable	 protection	 against	 the	 risks	 of	 liquidity	 crises.	 Furthermore,	 its	
construction	is	fully	consistent	with	the	new	euro	area	fiscal	governance	(the	reformed	
SGP	and	the	Fiscal	Compact).	All	of	 these	 innovations	stress	 the	Maastricht	60	percent	
objective	 for	 the	 debt‐to‐GDP	 level	 and,	 under	 VIPS,	 countries	 which	 respect	 that	
objective	would	 not	 be	 at	 risk	 of	 becoming	 subject	 to	 potential	 restructurings.	Hence,	
political	 resistance	 against	 VIPS	 is	 inconsistent,	 assuming	 that	 governments	 take	 the	
recent	 reforms	 of	 fiscal	 rules	 seriously.	 Apart	 from	 that,	 the	 lagged	 implementation	
inherent	in	VIPS	is	helpful	to	overcome	potential	political	resistance:	by	accepting	VIPS	
and	 the	VIPS	bridge,	 today’s	 governments	would	not	 tie	 their	own	hands	but	 those	of	
their	(distant)	successors.	
A	well‐defined	insolvency	procedure	would	also	remove	one	of	the	obstacles	on	the	
way	toward	a	consistent	fiscal	union	for	the	euro	area.	It	would	make	the	upper	limits	on	
collective	guarantees	provided	by	the	ESM	credible,	harden	national	budget	constraints	
and	 thus	 set	 stronger	 incentives	 for	 sound	national	 fiscal	policies.	At	 the	 same	 time	 it	
could	foster	acceptance	of	more	ambitious	fiscal	union	projects	such	as	euro‐wide	fiscal	
insurance	 systems	 which	 counteract	 asymmetric	 shocks	 and	 their	 dangerous	 self‐
enforcing	effects	in	a	monetary	union	(Allard	et	al.,	2013).	Without	a	credible	insolvency	
procedure,	 the	 concern	 that	 fiscal	 insurance	 turns	 into	 transfers	 undermines	 any	
acceptance	 of	 such	 ambitious	 reform	 proposals.	 Therefore,	 VIPS	 must	 not	 be	
misunderstood	 as	 part	 of	 a	 reform	 strategy	 which	 would	 preclude	 more	 European	
solidarity	 and	 macro‐economic	 stability.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 this	 blueprint	 could	 be	 a	
decisive	 step	 toward	 a	 comprehensive	 fiscal	 union	 built	 on	 the	 consistency	 between	
national	fiscal	responsibility	and	European	insurance.	
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7. CONCLUDING	REMARKS	
	
The	dissertation	at	hand	studies	several	aspects	of	recent	debates	as	well	as	actual	
changes	 and	 reforms	 in	 the	 spheres	 of	 financial	market	 and	 fiscal	 policy.	 Each	 of	 the	
aspects	 considered	 is	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another	 concerned	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 financial	
stability,	 which	 is,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 recent	 sequence	 of	 crises,	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	
regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 discussion	 in	 Europe.	 Many	 economists,	 politicians	 and	
practitioners	 tried	 and	 still	 try	 to	 design	 an	 incentive	 compatible	 regulatory	 and	
supervisory	 environment	 for	 financial	 intermediaries	 and	 sovereign	 states,	 which	
ideally	 should	 be	 able	 to	 foreclose	 moral	 hazard	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 allow	 for	 an	
appropriate	degree	of	 risk	 sharing	within	 the	European	 community.	 In	 the	 attempt	 to	
contribute	to	this	undertaking,	the	thesis	assembles	five	essays	on	financial	market	and	
fiscal	policy.	
	
The	 thesis	 starts	 off	 with	 the	question	whether	 and	how	 the	 global	 financial	
crisis	and	 the	policy	reactions	 (especially	bank	rescue	measures	and	regulatory	
tightening)	 have	 changed	 the	 quality	 and	 quantity	 of	 (German)	 banks’	
international	activities.		
Using	a	new	and	comprehensive	data	set	on	the	foreign	activities	of	German	banks,	
Chapter	 2	 shows	 that	 these	 banks	 have	 reduced	 their	 international	 assets	 during	 the	
crisis,	both	along	the	extensive	(number	of	affiliates	abroad)	and	the	intensive	(volume	
of	foreign	activity)	margin.	This	partial	withdrawal	from	foreign	markets	is	found	to	be	
the	 result	 of	 changing	market	 conditions	 due	 to	 re‐regulation	 as	well	 as	 direct	 policy	
interventions	during	the	crisis.	If	the	ongoing	re‐regulation	permanently	changes	banks’	
funding	 possibilities,	 part	 of	 the	 downward	 adjustment	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 of	 permanent	
nature.	Similarly,	to	the	extent	that	decreased	international	activities	can	be	traced	back	
to	closures	of	foreign	affiliates,	they	are	also	likely	to	be	persistent.		
The	sensitivity	of	German	banks	towards	international	financial	frictions	generally	
remained	 fairly	 stable	 over	 time.	 However,	 trade‐related	 finance	 has	 become	 more	
important	–	at	least	during	the	crisis.	Whether	this	type	of	international	banking	activity	
will	continue	to	play	an	important	role	has	to	be	shown	by	future	research,	when	more	
and	even	better	data	are	available.	
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The	 policy	 reactions	 to	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 Great	 Recession,	 which	
featured	 bank	 rescue	measures	 and	 fiscal	 stimulus	 programs,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 effect	 of	
automatic	stabilizers	with	falling	revenues	and	rising	expenditures	during	the	crisis	led	
to	 a	 worsening	 of	 public	 finances	 in	many	 European	 countries.	 For	 the	 sake	 of	 fiscal	
sustainability,	most	of	them	introduced	new	or	revised	and	strengthened	existing	fiscal	
rules	 to	 limit	 public	 deficits	more	 effectively.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 thesis	 addresses	 the	
question	 of	 whether	 the	 German	 constitutional	 ‘debt	 brake’	 is	 credible	 at	 the	
subnational	 Länder	 level.	 It	 investigates	 what	 influences	 policy	 makers’	
expectations	 regarding	 compliance	 with	 the	 debt	 brake	 in	 terms	 of	 Länder	
characteristics,	party	 ideology	and	 individual	 characteristics	of	 the	members	of	
parliament.		
Chapter	 3,	 therefore,	 first	 presents	 a	 dynamic	 theoretical	model	 characterized	 by	
lagged	implementation	of	the	new	rule,	which	raises	credibility	issues.	The	hypotheses	
from	 this	model	 are	 then	 tested	with	 the	 help	 of	 empirical	 probit	 estimations	 using	 a	
unique	self‐conducted	survey	among	members	of	all	16	German	state	parliaments.	The	
heterogeneity	 of	 compliance	 expectations	 corresponds	 to	 the	 theoretical	 hypotheses:	
Compliance	 is	more	 likely,	 (i)	 the	 lower	 is	 the	 initial	 deficit	 (ii)	 the	 lower	 are	 bailout	
expectations	of	Länder	politicians	(vis‐à‐vis	the	federal	government),	(iii)	the	tighter	is	
the	future	fiscal	rule,	and	(iv)	the	higher	is	the	current	deficit	reduction.	Additionally,	the	
paper	finds	a	robust	asymmetry	 in	compliance	expectations	between	insiders	(in‐state	
politicians	 or	 members	 of	 incumbent	 governments)	 and	 outsiders	 (out‐of‐state	 or	
opposition	 politicians),	 which	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 overconfidence	 rather	 than	 noisy	
information	on	the	basis	of	the	empirical	findings.	
	
Due	 to	 the	 limited	 revenue	 autonomy	 of	 German	 Länder,	 adherence	 to	 the	 debt	
brake	has	to	be	achieved	to	a	large	extent	via	the	expenditure	side,	which	restricts	policy	
leeway	at	the	Länder	level.	Thus,	the	third	question	addressed	in	this	thesis	revolves	
around	the	preferences	of	Länder	politicians	with	respect	to	subnational	revenue	
autonomy	 and	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 current	 German	 fiscal	 equalization	
scheme.		
Again,	using	a	self‐conducted	survey	of	Länder	politicians	of	all	16	German	states,	
the	 results	 of	 ordered	 probit	 estimations	 in	 Chapter	 4	 hint	 at	 the	 joint	 importance	 of	
ideology	and	jurisdictional	vested	interests.	Estimation	results	are	also	used	to	simulate	
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which	type	of	reform	would	garner	the	necessary	support	in	Germany’s	Upper	Chamber,	
the	Bundesrat.	Länder	 legacies	 (like	high	debt	 levels)	seem	to	be	especially	crucial	 for	
the	 understanding	 of	 reform	 resistance.	 Hence,	 there	 would	 be	 potential	 for	 political	
bargain	in	this	field.	
 
The	 European	 sovereign	 debt	 crisis	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 statutory	 fiscal	 rules	
may	 potentially	 prevent	 but	 cannot	 solve	 acute	 liquidity	 and	 debt	 sustainability	
problems	of	 sovereign	 countries.	 In	 such	a	 situation,	 the	 illiquid	 country	 either	has	 to	
rely	 on	 financial	 aid	 from	 international	 institutions	 and	 third	 countries	 or	 it	 has	 to	
renegotiate	the	debt	contracts	with	its	private	and	public	creditors.	History	has	shown	
that,	 for	 the	 case	 of	 sovereign	 debt	 renegotiations,	many	 countries	 had	 to	 restructure	
several	 times	 in	 a	 row.	 Hence,	 the	 dissertation	 tries	 to	 answer	 the	 question	which	
restructuring	 features	potentially	affect	 the	probability	of	 serial	 sovereign	debt	
restructurings.		
Using	 Cox	 (1972)	 proportional	 hazard	 models	 and	 a	 comprehensive	 dataset	 on	
sovereign	debt	renegotiations	provided	by	Cruces	and	Trebesch	(2013),	Chapter	5	finds	
that	 greater	 debt	 remissions	 decrease	 the	 probability	 of	 serial	 restructurings.	
Furthermore,	reductions	in	net	present	value	due	to	outright	face	value	haircuts	reduce	
the	probability	 of	 serial	 restructurings	more	 strongly	 than	 equally	 sized	 reductions	 in	
net	present	value	due	to	maturity	extensions	and/or	interest	rate	reductions.			
 
Finally,	the	thesis	acknowledges	the	fact	that	the	European	sovereign	debt	crisis	has	
not	 yet	 been	 overcome	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 European	 institutional	 framework	 is	 still	
missing	a	credible	mechanism	that	leads	to	the	internalization	of	credit	risk	on	the	part	
of	 private	 creditors	 of	 sovereign	 countries.	 Thus,	 Chapter	 6	 of	 this	 thesis	 presents	 a	
proposal	 of	 a	 statutory	 restructuring	 framework	 for	 sovereign	 countries	 in	 the	
euro	area	that	would	be	suited	to	(re‐)establish	the	lacking	market	discipline.	The	
chapter	 specifically	 analyzes	 political	 and	 economic	 hurdles	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	
such	a	restructuring	framework.	
The	 Viable	 Insolvency	 Procedure	 for	 Sovereigns	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 combines	 and	
refines	 existing	 proposals	 (e.g.	 Krueger,	 2002;	 Gros	 and	 Mayer,	 2010;	 Gianviti	 et	 al.,	
2010;	European	Economic	Advisory	Group,	2011;	Committee	on	International	Economic	
Policy	and	Reform,	2013).	However,	 concerning	 the	 timing	of	 the	 implementation	and	
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the	becoming	effective	of	 the	 specific	procedure	 that	 is	 supposed	 to	protect	 sovereign	
countries	and	their	creditors	in	the	long	run,	the	proposal	avoids	any	sudden	measures	
that	 could	 destabilize	 the	 still	 delicate	 situation	 in	 the	 euro	 area.	 Instead,	 it	 carefully	
designs	 an	 irreversible	 and	 credible	 transition	 path	 towards	 the	 new	 regime	
characterized	by	lagged	implementation	(Buchanan,	1994).		
	
All	in	all,	the	dissertation	has	shown	that	fiscal	and	financial	market	policies	are	not	
being	 implemented	 in	 a	 politically	 empty	 space.	 Even	 though	 certain	 policies	may	 be	
completely	 rational	 and	 reasonable	 in	 pure	 economic	 terms,	 they	 may	 not	 be	
implemented	 or,	 if	 they	 are,	 they	 may	 not	 have	 the	 intended	 effects,	 if	 the	 politico‐
economic	circumstances	are	not	taken	into	account	properly.	The	reactions	of	banks,	the	
expectations,	preferences,	and	the	striving	for	power	of	political	decision	makers,	or	the	
perceptions	and	sensitivities	of	private	and	public	creditors	of	sovereign	countries	must	
always	be	considered	when	designing	specific	policies	and	reforms.	Thorough	(politico‐)	
economic	research	with	respect	to	relevant	and	specific	policy	options	is	essential	to	be	
able	 to	 evaluate	 their	 desired	 and	 actual	 impact	 before,	 during	 and	 after	 the	
implementation	of	these	policies.			
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